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Summary  
 
This dissertation assesses the regulation of takeovers and mergers and the institutions 
created to enforce the law, from a comparative perspective. It uses South Africa as its 
point of departure and takes the laws of Delaware in the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Australia into account. The dissertation indicates that numerous 
takeover provisions in South Africa are poorly formulated, making them difficult to 
interpret and apply. Accordingly, the dissertation recommends amendment and 
improvement of certain Takeover Provisions.  
 
Special emphasis is placed on the mandatory offer requirement. The dissertation 
critically and comparatively analyses this requirement and especially its impacts on 
the market for corporate control, efficient usage of capital, corporate governance and 
(in South Africa) Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment.  
 
It appears from the literature explored that the mandatory offer requirement originated 
from the Perlman case in the United States as an expression of the equal opportunity 
rule. According to the equal opportunity rule, the controlling stake of a company is 
enriched with a premium of control, which must be shared with other shareholders 
when there is a change of the controlling shareholder. Shareholders must be given an 
equal opportunity to share in this control premium. Hence, a mandatory offer must be 
made to the remaining shareholders of the company by the new controlling 
shareholder at a price at which control was bought. Perlman case was decided in the 
United States of America during 1955.  
 
It is contended in the dissertation, that the mandatory offer requirement in section 123 
of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Act”), can ultimately be traced back to this case. 
Researchers have criticised the mandatory offer requirement in a number of respects. 
It has been pointed out that the rationale for the decision in the Perlman case was not 
clear and applied in limited circumstances. Other scholars point out that the case was 
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not a final decider on the sharing of the control premium due to later judicial 
pronouncements that differed with that case. Despite these commentaries, it appears 
that the case became a basis for imposing and enforcing this most debated rule in 
takeover and merger law.  
 
The dissertation concludes that the sharing of a premium of control, as envisaged by 
the mandatory offer requirement, is not enforced in the state of Delaware. It further 
concludes that in the UK, the mandatory offer rule forms the cornerstone of 
enforcement of the equal opportunity rule, but that widely dispersed shareholding 
ameliorates it negative consequences in that jurisdiction. The dissertation favours the 
Australian approach. That jurisdiction does not require a mandatory offer similar to that 
in section 123 of the Act, but, Australian Takeover Provisions, unlike their South 
African equivalent, have been tailor-made for Australian market conditions. The 
dissertation accordingly concludes that the mandatory offer requirement in section 123 
of the Act in its current form is not appropriate for South Africa.   
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Kakaretšo  
 
Sengwalwa se sa nyakišišo se sekaseka melao le taolo ya gotšewa le gohlakantšhwa 
gadikhampani, gotee le metheo e hlomilwego gore melao e phethagatšwe, ka go 
bapetšwa. Sengwalwa nyakisišo se, se šomiša Afrika Borwa bjalo ka seikokotlelo sa 
sengwalo ebile se sekegela tsebe melao ya Mmušong waDelaware gola United States 
of America, United Kingdom le Australia. Sengwalwa se sa nyakišišo se laetša gore 
melao ye mmalwa yeo e begilwego golaolo gotšewa le gohlakantšha gadikhampani, e 
hlamilwe ka go fokola, gomme, se se dira gore go be boima goka e kwešiša le go e 
diriša kamo goswanetšego. Ka ka lebaka leo ge sengwalwa se, se fa ditšhišinyo tša 
go fetoša le go kagonafatša tše dingwe tša melawana le dinyakwa tša gotšewa le 
gohlakantšhwa gadikhampani. 
 
Šedi ye tseneletšeng e beilwe go dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo tša gore ge mongdišere wa 
khamphani a reka goba a hweditše dišere tša go lekana goba  go feta dipersente tše 
masometharo tlhano, a gapeletšwe go reka dišere tšotlhe tše šetšeng tša bengšere 
ba khamphani, kamo sengwalong se. Sengwalwa se sa nyakišišo se sekaseka le go 
bapatša dinyakwa tše, tša kgapeletšo, kudukudu ditlamorago tša tšona mo go 
lekgotlataolo la dikhamphani, le mo tšhomišong ye maleba ya ditshelelete,  taolong ye 
maleba ya dikhampani le gona Matlafatšong ya Bathobaso Ikonoming kamo Afrika 
Borwa.   
 
Go tšwa dingwalong tša dirutegi, tšeo di fetlekilwego, go laetša gore dinyakwa le melao 
ye ya  kgapeletšo ya bengdišere e thomile go tšwa molatong le sepethong sa Perlman 
gola United States bjalo ka taetšo ya motheo wa gore, bengdišere baswanetše go 
swarwa ka golekalekana. Go ya ka motheo wo wa menyetla ya go lekalekana, 
mongdišere yo a nago le kabelo ye kgolo ya khamphani o filwe maatla le tokelo ya 
pušotaolo ya khamphani. Pušotaolo ye e humile, gomme, moalodi yo moswa o 
swanetše go ngwathelana lehumo le, le bengdišere ba bangwe nakong ya  diphetogo 
ge molaodi yo moswa a thoma go laola khamphani yeo. Bengdišere ba swanetše go 
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fiwa monyetla wa go lekalekana gore le bona ba be le kabelo lehumong la khamphani. 
Ke ka lebaka leo moladi yo moswa a gapeletšwa gore ge goba le diphetogo, molaodi 
o moswa a tšea taolo ya khampani, a fe bengdišere bao ba šetšego monyetla wa go 
rekiša dišere tša bona go yena ka tšhelete ye lekanang le ye a e ntšhitšeng go reka 
taolo ya khampani. Sephetho sa molato wa Perlman se tšerwe kua United States of 
America mo gare ga ngwaga wa 1955.  
 
Sengwalwa se sa nyakišišo se bontšha gore dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo ya bengdišere 
ka gare ga karolo ya 123 ya Molao wa Dikhampani 71 wa 2008, ge di lotwa mohlala 
gore dithomile kae, go ka šupwa molato le sepheto sa Perlman. Badiradinyakišišo 
dibukeng, ba sotše gore moreki wa taolo ya khampani a gapeletšwe go fa bengdišere 
monyetla wa gore dišere tša bona direkiwe ge a reka taolo ya khampani, go tšwa 
mahlakoreng a go fapafapana. Go bontšhitšwe gore lebakakgolo ke tšhušumetšo ya 
sephetho le molato wa Perlman. Le ge go le bjalo, go bontšhitšwe gore molato wo le 
sephetho se, se be se šomišiwa ka baka a maleba feela, mola le mola. Ba bangwe ba 
dirutegi ba laetša gore sephetho se, ga se sa mafelelo ka gobane diphetho tše tlileng 
ka morago, di fapane le sepheto se. Le ge go le bjalo, go nale tšhupo ya gore molato 
yo, e bile seikokotlelo sa go diragatša le go phethagatša motheo wa dinyakwa tša 
kgapeletšo ya balaodi ba baswa badišere, motheo yoo gobolelwang kudu ka wona mo 
mererong ya gotšewa le gohlakantšhwa ga dikhampani.    
 
Sengwalwa nyakišišo se ruma ka la gore molao wa dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo ya 
bengdišere, ga o phethagatšwe Mmušong wa Delaware, gona United States of 
America. Sengwalwa nyakišišo se, se ruma gape ka la gore kua United Kingdom, 
molao wo wa dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo go bengdišere ba baswa ke boikokotlelo bja 
phethagatšo ya menyetla ya go lekalekana gobengdišere ge taolo ya khaphani e 
fetoga. Eupša taolo le ya dišere gona kua United Kingdom e nabile ka bophara gare 
ga bengšere ka moo, e kaonafatša ditlamorago tše mpe tša motheo wa taolo ya 
dikhampani tša naga yeo. Sengwalwa se se gata ka mošito wo tee le mokgwa wo o 
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šomišitšwego ke Australia. Naga ya Australia ga e ena dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo tša 
bengšere go swana le tšeo di lego karolong ya 123 Molao wa Dikhampani 71 wa 2008. 
Melao le taolo ya gotšewa le gohlakantšhwa ga dikhampani ya Australia, e fapana le 
ya Afrika Borwa. Melao e hlametšwe feela maemo le mebaraka ya Australia. Ke ka 
lebaka leo sengwalwa se sa nyakišišo, se ruma ka gore dinyakwa tša kgapeletšo tša 
karolo ya 123 ya Molao wa Dikhampani 71 wa 2008, ka sebopego sa tšona sa bjale, 
ga di maleba ka mo Afrika Borwa.        
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
“[T] he good intentions of the legislature have provided for a form of protection 
that is costly, unwieldy and unnecessary …”1 
 
1 1 Introduction 
 
Globally, takeovers and mergers of companies is big business. Specialist 
lawyers and accountants practise exclusively in this area of law. Takeovers and 
mergers are often seen as a method of corporate expansion and diversification. 
In addition, takeovers and mergers are often used as mechanisms to remove 
managers who perform poorly. Legal experts and scholars such as Manne2 
have indicated that there is a premise that the market for corporate control is 
influenced by the performance of managers. If managers perform poorly, the 
shares of the company would lose value, whereas a sterling performance by 
managers would increase shareholder value. Hence there is scholarly support 
for the takeover theory and it has been asserted that a premium is paid in a 
tender offer because the target’s assets will be worth more under management 
of the bidder than the current management of the target company.3 The 
business is not achieving its full potential due to inefficient management.4  
 
Researchers refer to takeovers and mergers as a “market for corporate 
control”.5 These transactions often attract a lot of publicity, both positive and 
negative. Amongst the reasons for attracting negative publicity, is that bidders 
are often regarded as “corporate raiders”.6 It is suggested that bidding 
companies do not create value for shareholders. Other researchers argue that 
                                            
1JR Wiblin “Mandatory takeover offer-too high a price for the economy to pay?” (2004) 29:3 
Journal for Juridical Science 184. 
2HG Manne “Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control” (1965) 73:2 Journal of Political 
Economy 111-112. 
3GR Andre “Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform” 
(1987) 2 Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 872. 
4872. 
5See MC Jensen “Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance” (1991) 4:2 Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance 13-33. 
613. 
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takeovers and mergers damage morale of target company employees.7 This in 
turn, has a negative impact on the productivity of companies and could, 
consequently, negatively affect a country’s economy. It has been indicated that 
the media often does not notice the activities of such bidders in reducing 
corporate inefficiencies.8 Takeovers and mergers remain the most controversial 
corporate governance mechanism.9 However, they also play an important role 
in rendering managers accountable to shareholders.10 Hostile takeovers are 
seen as useful instruments for ensuring that management properly administers 
companies.11 It is suggested that if there is a threat that a company may be a 
subject of a takeover if managers do not improve the company’s share price 
performance, managers are encouraged to perform better.12 Although the 
debate on the effect of takeovers and mergers on companies’ manager 
performance continues, it is generally asserted that the possibility of acquiring 
control of a company is necessary for the efficient workings of companies.  
 
Regulation of takeovers and mergers also seeks to uphold some of the 
objectives and principles outlined by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, namely: to protect shareholders, to ensure that markets are fair 
and transparent, and to reduce systemic risk.13 
 
This dissertation deals with regulation of takeovers and mergers with a specific 
emphasis on section 123 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, (the mandatory 
                                            
7MC Jensen “The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence” (1986) 4:2 Midland Corporate 
Finance Journal 1. 
8Jensen (1991) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13-33. 
9L Enriques, R Gilson & Pacces A “The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an 
Application to the European Union)” (2013) The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series 
Discussion Paper No. 744, 05/2013, Available on 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center. (Accessed 15 -12- 2015). 
10JA Armour & DA Skeel Jr “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The 
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727. 
11B Rosenzweig “Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of British and 
American Takeover Controls” (2007) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 213.  
12Armour & Skeel Jr (2007) Georgetown Law Journal 1727. 
13See International Organisation of Securities Commissions “Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation” (2010) Available at: www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOD32. 
Accessed on (20 -3- 2016.)     
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offer). The mandatory offer is one of the methods of achieving a change of 
control, and a takeover. 
 
The mandatory offer requirements are set out in section 123 of the Companies 
Act of 2008.14 A mandatory offer to other shareholders is required where two 
types of transactions are concerned: (a) a regulated company reacquires its 
voting securities in terms of section 48 or in terms of a scheme of arrangement 
in section 114(1); or (b), a person acting alone has, or two or more related or 
inter-related persons, or two or more persons acting in concert, have acquired 
a beneficial interest in voting rights attached to any securities, issued by a 
regulated company. Furthermore, the mandatory offer will apply to such 
transactions only where: (a) before that acquisition a person was, or persons 
acting in concert together, were able to exercise less than the prescribed 
percentage (currently, 35 percent) of all the voting rights attached to the 
securities of that company; and (b), as a result of that acquisition, together with 
any other securities of the company already held by a person or persons who 
act in concert , and are able to exercise at least the prescribed percentage of 
all the voting rights attached to the securities of that company. 
 
The mandatory offer as a tool to force a shareholder who acquires control of a 
company to buy the shares of the remaining shareholders of the company has 
been a subject of many debates. According to the literature reviewed, it appears 
that the mandatory offer originates from the ‘equal opportunity rule.’15 As 
indicated by the court, in the Perlman case: 
 
[T]he rule of equal opportunity would require an offer to buy from minority 
shareholders.”16 
 
                                            
14The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act of 2008. 
15Perlman v Feldmann 219 F 2d 173, 50 ALR 2d 1134, cert. den. 349 US 952 (1955), (Perlman 
case). The case and the equal opportunity rule are discussed in detail in chapter 2 below. 
16219 F 2d 173, 50 ALR 2d 1134, cert. den. 349 US 952 (1955). 
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It has been indicated that “The origins of the mandatory offer can be traced to 
the US Perlman case.17 The mandatory offer rule is only applicable to certain 
companies that fall under the authority of the Takeover Regulation Panel.18 The 
Companies Act of 2008 refers to these companies as “regulated companies” 
are defined in paragraph 1 8 below. The dissertation undertakes a comparative 
and critical analysis of the law.  
 
This chapter sets out: the motivation and aim of the research, the research 
statement, research questions and hypotheses, as well as the research 
methodology. It also sets the limitation of the research and terminology used. 
Finally, the chapter provides an outline of the various chapters. 
 
1 2 Motivation and aim of the study 
 
The Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (the DTI 2004 Policy document),19 
published by the South African Government set out the objectives of 
government in its company law reform process. The objectives are then set out 
under section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008. These objectives include: (1) 
promoting the development of the South African economy, (2) reducing the 
costs of compliance for companies, (3) encouraging entrepreneurship, (4) 
encouraging active participation in economic organisations, (5) creating 
optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes, (6) 
encouraging the efficient and responsible management of companies, and (7) 
providing a predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of 
companies. 
 
It appears that many of the objectives of the reform process have not been 
achieved or have only been achieved partially.20 The dissertation considers 
regulation of takeovers and mergers by critically exploring section 123 of the 
                                            
17Katz (1997) Journal for Juridical Science 37. 
18 the Takeover Regulation Panel (TRP). 
19Department of Trade and Industry South African Company Law for the 21st Century: 
Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform (2004) published in GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-
2004. 
20PJ Sutherland “The State of Company Law in South Africa (A Review of Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive South African Economy by T Mongalo)” (2012) Stell LR 160. 
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Companies Act of 2008 relating to mandatory offers. It aims to contribute to the 
practice of company law on takeovers and mergers by analysing the origins of 
the mandatory offer, problems relating to its implementation, and its impact on 
the transfer of share ownership. Specific issues about the mandatory offer 
include: could the mandatory offer rule create entrenched control by managers, 
and therefore, retard good corporate governance? Does the mandatory offer 
rule lead to an inefficient use of capital? Could the mandatory offer rule hamper 
transfer of share ownership, and therefore impede Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (“BBBEE”) transactions? Does the mandatory offer 
raise costs of undertaking takeovers, and therefore costs for companies? Could 
the increased costs discourage parties entering into beneficial takeovers? If the 
answer to these questions is “yes”, then it is possible that the mandatory offer 
rule is working against the objectives set in the DTI 2004 Policy document, as 
briefly set out above.   
 
Thus, the research deals with reasons why the mandatory offer rule may be 
inappropriate for South Africa. Other methods of achieving a takeover or a 
merger will also be discussed with a view to showing how they protect minority 
shareholders other than the mandatory offer rule. Improvements in takeover 
and merger provisions brought about by the Companies Act of 2008 will be 
identified and those provisions that are problematic will be described. The 
institutions established to regulate takeovers and mergers are reviewed. 
Finally, conclusions and recommendations will be made as to how to correct 
any negative impact that the mandatory offer requirements may have. 
 
There is generally a dearth of research on South African takeovers and mergers 
provisions, particularly as to how they impact on the efforts of the government 
to promote broad-based ownership of shares, costs of doing business and good 
corporate governance standards. This dissertation adds to the limited existing 
body of knowledge in this area of corporate law. 
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1 3 Research statement  
 
It is an established principle of South African company law that minority 
shareholders should be protected during a takeover or a merger. The 
Companies Act of 2008 in part B and C of Chapter 5 and the Companies 
Regulations 2011, sets out the rules for regulating takeovers and mergers.21 
However, it is argued in this dissertation that while the rationale for regulating 
other types of takeovers and mergers, such as, the disposal of assets in terms 
of section 112, the amalgamations or mergers in terms of section 113, the 
scheme of arrangement in terms of section 114, and the general tender offer in 
terms of the Companies Act of 2008, are clear and justifiable on various 
grounds, it is not so easy to establish the rationale for enforcing the mandatory 
offer rule. Scholars appear to be divided on the policies behind the mandatory 
offer rule.22 In this dissertation, it is argued that the bases for the enforcement 
of the mandatory offer requirement in section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008 
are inappropriate for South African financial markets and economy. The 
mandatory offer rule is one of the most debated aspects in the mergers and 
takeovers arena.23 For instance, it has been asked why it is necessary that 
parties who acquire a specified percentage of a company’s shares should grant 
the same opportunity, and offer the same consideration, to the minority 
shareholders of the company. The requirement applies even though the price 
that the acquiring party is required to pay in a mandatory offer has no relation 
to the market value or underlying value of the shares of the company. The price 
paid may, for example, be based on a willing-buyer-and-willing-seller basis. 
  
1 4  Research questions  
 
The following research questions will be used to investigate the above 
statement in respect of mandatory offer requirements.  
 
                                            
21The provisions will be jointly referred to as the Takeover Provisions in this dissertation. 
22See among others, MM Katz “Developments in corporate law” Journal for Juridical Science 
(1997) 22(2).39, Wiblin (2004) Journal for Juridical Science 184, and L Gullifer & J Payne 
Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy (2011) 606-616. 
23Wiblin (2004) Journal for Juridical Science 3. 
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1 4 1  What is the rationale for regulating takeovers and mergers in terms of 
the Companies Act of 2008? 
 
1 4 2 How does Takeover Provisions in South Africa compare to similar rules 
in other countries?  
 
1 4 3 Are the Takeover Provisions achieving their intended objectives as set 
out in the Companies Act of 2008? 
 
1 4 4 Are the mandatory offer requirements in terms of section 123 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 suitable for the South African financial markets 
and economy and as envisaged by the DTI Policy 2004 document and 
the Companies Act of 2008?24  
 
1 4 5 What conclusions can be reached from the research about the 
mandatory offer requirements in section 123 of the Companies Act of 
2008, and the other methods of achieving a takeover or a merger, and 
what recommendations can be made to correct any problems identified 
by the research? 
 
                                            
24Section 7 of the Act also sets out the intention of the legislature in enacting the new Act. The 
purposes of this as it relates to profit companies are to: 
(a) promote compliance with the Bill of Rights, as provided for in the Constitution, in the 
application of company law;  
(b) promote the development of the South African economy by—(i) encouraging 
entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency; 
(ii) creating flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies, and 
(iii) encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance as appropriate, 
given the significant role of enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation; 
(c) promote innovation and investment in the South African markets;  
(d) reaffirm the concept of the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits; 
(e) continue to provide for the creation and use of companies, in a manner that enhances the 
economic welfare of South Africa as a partner within the global economy;  
(f) promote the development of companies within all sectors of the economy, and encourage 
active participation in economic organisation, management and productivity;  
(g) create optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes, and for 
the investment of that capital in enterprises and the spreading of economic risk;  
(i) balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies; 
(i)  encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies;  
(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner 
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders, and  
(l) provide a predictable and effective environment for the efficient regulation of companies.’’ 
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1 5 Hypotheses 
 
In order to investigate, examine and obtain answers to the above questions, 
the following hypotheses were tested throughout this study: 
 
1 5 1  From time to time financial melt-down has led regulators back to the 
drawing board as they seek more effective ways of regulating the 
financial services industry, including mergers and takeovers. In Europe, 
the integration of European economic markets has brought a sharp 
focus on policy makers who want to achieve a balance between 
ownership and control of companies. In addition, policy makers wish to 
ensure commercial stability as well as socially responsible companies.25  
 
1 5 2 The current takeovers and mergers provisions are in some instances 
unclear and increase the costs of takeovers and mergers.  
 
1 5 3 The mandatory offer requirement in terms of South African company law 
is inefficient and impede BBBEE and economic transformation of 
companies. 
 
1 5 4 The mandatory offer rule impedes attainment of the ideals set out in the 
Companies Act of 2008 of ensuring improved economic development by 
increasing administration costs and making deal structuring more 
expensive.  
  
1 5 5 It is necessary to reconsider the application of the mandatory offer rule, 
taking into consideration the unique economic and financial market 
conditions in South Africa and the need to promote BBBEE; promote 
corporate governance; encourage efficient use of capital; and promote 
the objective set in the Companies Act of 2008. 
                                            
25CM Rafferty “The “means and ends” of regulating barriers to takeover bids: How effectively 
will the European Takeovers Directive 2004 control defensive measures in hostile takeovers? 
Thesis presented for the Degree of Master of European Studies Academic Year 2005-2006. 
Course: European Company Law. College of Europe. Brugge Campus. (2006) 3. 
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1 5 6 The takeover and merger requirements in the Companies Act of 2008 
are sufficient to deal effectively and efficiently with protection of 
shareholders. However, it is necessary to improve and clarify some 
provisions.  
 
1 6 Methodology 
 
1 6 1  Literature Review 
 
In order to answer the various research questions for this study, a literature 
review on takeovers and mergers provisions of various countries with particular 
reference to the mandatory offer has been undertaken. A comparative critical 
analysis of the various takeover and merger procedures is undertaken.  
 
1 6 2 Countries covered in the research 
 
The dissertation comparatively considers regulation of takeovers and mergers, 
focusing on the mandatory offer in selected countries, including South Africa. 
The rationale for adopting the mandatory offer requirement in those countries, 
if any, are analysed and discussed in order to understand why they adopted 
this requirement. The reasons and experiences on why and how the mandatory 
offer requirement is applied will be useful for South Africa. Academics have 
pointed out that: 
 
“It is not only important to understand the company laws of other countries in 
those areas where we have borrowed from them but it is also necessary that 
we comprehend why we have sometimes followed our own course or why we 
have adopted rules from one jurisdiction rather than another.’’26  
 
                                            
26Sutherland (2012) Stell LR 159. 
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The comparative discussion will include the company laws of the United States 
of America - Delaware State, United Kingdom and Australia. These three 
jurisdictions have been chosen for the following reasons: 
 
1 6 2 1 United States of America- The State of Delaware 
 
The United States of America (US) and, specifically the State of Delaware, has 
been chosen as a comparative jurisdiction on the basis that the Companies Act 
of 2008 has introduced a number of US company law provisions, including 
those specifically intended for greater protection of shareholders during 
takeovers and mergers.27 The State of Delaware has been a preferred state for 
incorporation of major companies for a number of years and this is still the 
position today.28 It has more developed and sophisticated corporate law 
precedents due to the expertise of its judges.29 Therefore, it may be useful to 
examine how the rules relating to protection of minority shareholders operate, 
particularly in the absence of the mandatory offer bid as the State of Delaware 
does not apply the mandatory offer requirement.  
 
1 6 2 2 The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom (UK) has been selected because South African takeovers 
and mergers regulations are mainly based on the UK’s City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers.30 The UK‘s takeovers and mergers regulations are commonly 
referred to as the “City Code”.31 The UK City Code has been amended 
                                            
27N Boardman “A critical analysis of the new South African takeover laws as proposed under 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 313. See also section 164 of Companies 
Act 71 of 2008 dealing with appraisal rights and section 113 dealing with amalgamations and 
mergers. 
28WJ. Carney, GB. Shepherd, & J Shepherd Bailey “Lawyers Ignorance, and the Dominance of 
Delaware Corporate Law” (2012) Vol.2 Harvard Business Law Review 123. 
29DA Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions (2005) 31. 
30See the explanatory note to the Securities Regulation Code and the Rules of the Securities 
Regulation Panel. Government Gazette12962. January 1991. The Securities Regulation Code 
and the Rules of the Securities Regulation Panel forms the basis of the current Takeover 
Provisions. See the DTI 2004 Policy document, where it is indicated that the current rules 
administered by the Securities Regulation Panel will be maintained. 
31See B Clarke “Reinforcing the Market for Corporate Control” (2010) UCD Working Papers in 
Law, Criminology & Sociology-Legal Studies Research Paper No 39/2010. 9. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.comabstract=1661620. (Accessed 20-05- 2016). 
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significantly in order to meet the requirements of the European Union Takeover 
Directive (EU Directive)32 and the discussions will incorporate some comments 
about the EU Directive to broaden the understanding of the mandatory offer 
requirements. It was considered useful to examine how UK takeover and 
merger regulators apply and enforce the mandatory offer requirement. As Yeats 
points out, any research that does not include jurisdictions from which concepts 
have been sourced would be incomplete and lacking academic depth.33  
 
1 6 2 3 Australia 
 
Finally, Australia has been selected as a comparative jurisdiction on the basis 
that, like South Africa, the origin of its company law is the UK. However, its 
takeovers and mergers provisions are somewhat different, even though they 
share some elements with those of the UK. There are distinct differences in 
takeover and merger regulation between the UK and Australia. An exploration 
of the different regulations will be useful for SA in assessing its regulations.   
 
1 7 Limitations of the scope of the research 
 
Takeovers and mergers involve many aspects of company law and may 
include other areas of the law such as, labour law or public interest law or 
competition law. This research does not deal with those issues, but it is solely 
concerned with the laws, authorities and regulations aimed at protecting 
shareholder interests during a takeover or a merger.  
 
The dissertation covers the current law under the Companies Act of 2008. It 
does not discuss the possible amendments under the Draft Companies 
                                            
32Directive 2004/25 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council European of 21 April 
2004 on takeover bids, Official Journal of the European Union, 30.4.2004.  
33J Yeats The Effective and Proper Exercise of Appraisal Rights Under the South African 
Companies Act, 2008: Developing a strategic approach through a study of comparable foreign 
law, A thesis presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Commercial Law Department, 
University of Cape Town. (2015) 40. 
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Amendment Bill.34 These amendments were published during the final stages 
of completing this thesis and they accordingly could not be accommodated. 
 
1 8 Terminology 
 
Over the years, takeovers and mergers practitioners have developed their own 
jargon. In this section, a number of terms are defined that are used throughout 
the dissertation.  
 
1 8 1 An “affected transaction’’ 35 is the umbrella term used to describe all 
the different types of takeovers and mergers. Blackman et al indicate 
that the meaning of the term ‘affected transaction’ is very broad.36  
   
1 8 2 “takeover” is often used instead of “acquisition.37 The term “takeover” 
is not a “term of art”.38 A takeover refers to a transaction whereby a 
person indirectly acquires control over the assets of a company by 
acquiring control of the management of a company, usually by acquiring 
a significant shareholding in that company. The existence of a company 
                                            
34The dti has published a Draft Companies Amendment Bill in Government Gazette 41913, for 
public comments. Members of the public have been invited to submit comments by 23 
November 2018. Available at: https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/740/.Accessed 5 -11-2018. 
35Section 117(1) (c) of the Companies Act of 2008 defines affected transactions as:  
“(i) a transaction or series of transactions amounting to the disposal of all or the greater part of 
the assets or undertaking of a regulated company, as contemplated in section 112, subject to 
section 118(3); 
(ii) an amalgamation or merger, as contemplated in section 113, if it involves at least one 
regulated company, subject to section 118(3);35 
(iii) a scheme of arrangement between a regulated company and its shareholders, as 
contemplated in section 114, subject to section 118(3); 
(iv) the acquisition of, or announced intention to acquire, a beneficial interest in any voting 
securities of a regulated company to the extent and in the circumstances contemplated in 
section 122(1); 
(v) the announced intention to acquire a beneficial interest in the remaining voting securities of 
a regulated company not already held by a person or persons acting in concert; 
(vi) a mandatory offer contemplated in section 123; or 
(vii) compulsory acquisition contemplated in section 124.” 
36MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act Volume 1 
(2002) 18. 
37See JT Pretorius, PA Delport, M Havenga & M Vermaas Hahlo’s South African Company Law 
through cases: A source book (1999), 569, in which the word is generally used to denote 
affected transactions as defined in Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP 
Code. 
38Blackman et al Commentary on the Companies Act Volume 3. 18-9. 
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is not affected and it rather implies merely a change in the main 
shareholders or the introduction of a new substantial shareholder.39 The 
acquisition of control of a company may also be achieved by controlling 
the majority votes of the directors of the target.40 Another method of 
achieving a takeover is for the bidder to purchase the assets or business 
of the target.41 
 
1 8 3 The Companies Act of 2008 does not specifically define what “control’’ 
for the purposes of affected transactions is. The control referred to in 
section 2 of the Companies Act of 2008 relates to what is often referred 
to as de facto control or statutory control, being a holding of over 50 
percent of the shares.42 However, for the purposes of affected 
                                            
39HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis & PA Delport Corporate Law 2 ed (1992) 
457. 
40L Bebchuk & O Hart. “Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in contests for corporate control.” 
Discussion Paper No. 336. 10/2001. Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138. The Center 
for Law, Economics, and Business. Available at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/> (Accessed 20-1-2011). See also the 
definition of control referred to in chapter 1, paragraph 1 8 above. 
41Section 112 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
42Section 2 of the Companies Act of 2008 indicates control as:  
(1) For all purposes of this Act— 
(a) an individual is related to another individual if they— 
(i) are married, or live together in a relationship similar to a marriage; or 
(ii) are separated by no more than two degrees of natural or adopted consanguinity or 
affinity; 
(b) an individual is related to a juristic person if the individual directly or indirectly controls the 
juristic person, as determined in accordance with subsection (2); and 
(c) a juristic person is related to another juristic person if— 
(i) either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the other, as 
determined in accordance with subsection (2); 
(ii) either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
(iii) a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of them, 
as determined in accordance with subsection (2). 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a person controls a juristic person, or its business, if— 
(a) in the case of a juristic person that is a company— 
(i) that juristic person is a subsidiary of that first person, as determined in accordance 
with section 3(1) (a); or 
(ii) that first person together with any related or inter-related person, is— 
(aa) directly or indirectly able to exercise or control the exercise of a majority of the 
voting rights associated with securities of that company, whether pursuant to a 
shareholder agreement or otherwise; or 
(bb) has the right to appoint or elect, or control the appointment or election of, 
directors of that company who control a majority of the votes at a meeting of 
the board; 
(b) in the case of a juristic person that is a close corporation, that first person owns the 
majority of the members’ interest, or controls directly, or has the right to control, the 
majority of members’ votes in the close corporation; 
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transactions, control is defined with reference to the specified 
percentage as indicated for a mandatory offer in terms of section 123 of 
the Companies Act of 2008. It is the holding of 35 percent or more of the 
voting securities of a company.  
 
Regulation 81(e) of the Takeover Regulations defines ‘control’ as: 
 
“[T] he holding of a beneficial interest in a regulated company 
equal to or exceeding the specified percentage of voting rights in 
that regulated company.” 
 
The various definitions of control are not consistent. It has been  
suggested that the definitions should be amended for clarity.43  
 
1 8 4   “Regulated company” is defined in section 117(1) (i) as: a company 
to which this Part, Part C and the Takeover Regulations apply, as 
determined in accordance with section 118(1) and (2).44 
                                            
(c) in the case of a juristic person that is a trust, that first person has the ability to control the 
majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of the trustees, or to 
appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries of the trust; or 
(d) that first person has the ability to materially influence the policy of the juristic person in a 
manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, would be able to 
exercise an element of control referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c). 
43S Luiz “Some comments on the scheme of arrangement as an "Affected Transaction" as 
defined in the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2012) PER 15 (5) Available on 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v15i5.4, (Accessed 20-7-2013). 
44Section 118(1) provides that: subject to subsection (2) to (4), this Part, Part C and the 
Takeover Regulations apply with respect to an affected transaction or offer involving a profit 
company or its securities if the company is: 
“(a) a public company; 
(b) a state-owned company, except to the extent that any such company has been exempted 
in terms of section 9; or 
(c) a private company, but only if— 
(i) 10 percent or more of the issued securities of that company that have been 
transferred, other than by transfer between or among related or 
interrelated persons, within the period of 24 months immediately before 
the date of a particular affected transaction or offer exceeds the 
percentage prescribed in terms of subsection (2); or 
(ii) the Memorandum of Incorporation of that company expressly provides 
that the company and its securities are subject to this Part, Part C and the 
Takeover Regulations, irrespective of whether the company falls within 
the criteria set out in subparagraph (i).” Section 118(2) provides:“The Minister, after consulting 
the Panel, may prescribe a minimum percentage, being not less than 10%, of the issued 
securities of a private company which, if transferred within a 24-month period as contemplated 
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1 8 5 In this dissertation, the following terms are used interchangeably: 
“takeovers and mergers” and “affected transactions”;45 “offeree” and 
“target”;46 “offeror” and “bidder”;47 and; “offeree shareholders” and 
“target shareholders.”   
 
1 9 Content and arrangement of chapters 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the background for the research, sets out the motivation 
and aims of the research, provides the research statement, research questions 
and hypotheses, discusses the methodology adopted in the research, indicates 
countries selected for the research and gives brief reasons why they were 
chosen, and sets out the scope of the research. Finally, it provides an outline 
of the discussions in the various chapters.  
 
 
 
                                            
in subsection (1) (c) (i), would bring that company and its securities within the application of this 
Part, Part C, and the Takeover Regulations in terms of that subsection.”  
Section 118(3) indicates that:  
“Despite the definition of „affected transaction‟ set out in section 117(1) (c), this Part, Part C 
and the Takeover Regulations do not apply to— 
(a) a proposal to dispose, or disposal, of all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking of 
a regulated company; 
(b) a proposed amalgamation or merger involving at least one regulated company; or 
(c) a scheme of arrangement proposed by a regulated company, to the extent that any such 
affected transaction is pursuant to or contemplated in an approved business rescue plan in 
terms of Chapter 6.” 
Section 118(4) provides: 
“(4) If there is a conflict between any provision of this Part, Part C, or the Takeover Regulations, 
and any provision of another public regulation— 
(a) the conflicting provisions apply concurrently to the extent that it is possible to apply and 
comply with one of the inconsistent provisions without contravening the second; and 
(b) to the extent that it is impossible to apply or comply with one of the inconsistent provisions 
without contravening the second, the provisions of the other public regulation prevail.” 
45The phrases are used for convenience depending on the context. 
46For purposes of takeovers and mergers, the UK City Code and the SA Takeover Regulations 
use “offeree” while the Australian Corporations 2001 Act uses “target”. 
47For purposes of takeovers and mergers, the UK City Code and the SA Takeover Regulations 
use “offeror”, while the Australian Corporations 2001 Act uses “bidder”.  
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Chapter 2 An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in the 
United States of America – the State of Delaware  
 
In this chapter, regulation of takeovers and mergers in the US State of Delaware 
is discussed as the US does not have a single takeover law. The State of 
Delaware was chosen because large companies prefer it as their state of 
incorporation. The origin of the equal opportunity rule is discussed with a view 
to understanding how it developed into the mandatory offer requirement. The 
chapter further provides an overview of the various standards of reviewing 
conduct of directors including the Business Judgment Rule (BJR), and how the 
courts apply the standards to the conduct of directors during takeovers and 
mergers. The appraisal right in section 164 of the South African Companies Act 
of 2008 originates in the US and, therefore, it is appropriate that the appraisal 
right be discussed to understand how it is applied in the State of Delaware.  
 
Chapter 3 An overview of the application of mandatory offer requirement in 
the United Kingdom 
 
The development of English company law on regulation of takeovers and 
mergers is discussed, with particular reference to the mandatory offer rule. The 
reasons for the development of the rule are explored. Observations are made 
as to how the mandatory offer rule is applied in the UK compared to South 
Africa. The regulatory body enforcing the mandatory offer rule and their 
processes are discussed. The discussions also cover the criticism and the 
debates relating to the mandatory offer rule. 
 
Chapter 4 An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in 
Australia 
 
This chapter deals with Australian company law relating to takeovers and 
mergers. Even though Australian company law originates from English 
company law, takeover and merger regulations are different. The dissertation 
discusses some of the reasons why Australian takeover and merger rules 
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deviates from the UK mandatory offer. The chapter considers the different 
regulatory bodies and their procedures. 
 
Chapter 5 An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in South 
Africa with specific emphasis on the mandatory offer  
 
In this chapter, South African takeover law is discussed with specific emphasis 
on the application of the mandatory offer rule. The reasons for the development 
of the mandatory offer rule is discussed and critiqued. In addition, other 
methods of achieving a takeover or a merger are discussed. These methods 
include proposals to dispose of all or the greater part of the assets or 
undertaking of a company in terms of section 112 of the Companies Act of 
2008, amalgamations and mergers in terms of section 113 of the Companies 
Act of 2008, the scheme of arrangement in terms of section 114 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 and the general tender offer, followed by the 
compulsory acquisition in terms of section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
In addition, any shortcomings of South Africa’s mandatory offer requirement 
under section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008 are identified.  
 
The relevant case law is examined and integrated throughout the discussion. 
The few cases dealing with the protection of minority shareholders during 
takeovers and mergers are analysed and critiqued.  
 
Chapter 6 Evaluating takeover and merger provisions of selected countries 
 
This chapter evaluates the different regulatory regimes in respect of takeovers 
and mergers applied by different countries. In particular, a comparison is made 
in respect of: development of takeover and merger regulations and the reasons 
for such regulations; the types of takeovers and mergers regulated and reasons 
for such divergence; the authorities and statutes for regulating takeovers and 
mergers and the reasons for difference; dispute resolution methods for 
takeovers and mergers; enforcement measures for takeovers and mergers and 
an evaluation of arguments for and against the mandatory offer requirement. 
The origin of the mandatory offer is questioned and the application of the rule 
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is also critiqued. Furthermore, the problems relating to the application of the 
mandatory offer in the context of South Africa are identified. The differences 
and similarities between the legislation of the comparative countries are 
highlighted.  
 
Chapter 7 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
This final chapter discusses the findings of the research. Based on these 
findings, the chapter also provides a number of recommendations for 
improvement of takeover and merger provisions in South Africa. These 
recommendations are aimed at creating regulatory solutions that suit local 
economic conditions. It is suggested that some of the takeover provisions be 
amended to promote efficiency and certainty in the regulation of takeovers and 
mergers. In addition, recommendations are made that some takeovers and 
mergers provisions that have been found wanting, be amended. Of particular 
importance is a practical suggestion for the amendment of section 123 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 with a view to promoting good governance, facilitating 
BBBEE transactions, and promote efficient usage of capital as envisaged in the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
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Chapter 2: An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in 
the United States of America-The State of Delaware 
 
“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is an 
enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the 
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”1 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of regulation of takeovers 
and mergers in the US with specific reference to the State of Delaware. A 
number of provisions of the SA Companies Act of 2008 are based on the 
company laws of other countries, and it is therefore reasonable to make 
comparisons as to how these laws operate in their country of origin. A number 
of sections of the Companies Act of 2008 have been adopted primarily from the 
US and Canada.2 These include: section 66(1) relating to the allocation of 
powers to manage the company to the directors; section 76(4) - the business 
judgment rule;3 section 113 in respect of amalgamations or mergers;4 and 
section 164 in respect of appraisal rights. It is difficult to undertake a 
comparative analysis of the law of different countries in general.5 This is 
particularly relevant when comparing the US and South African law due to a 
                                            
1Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Corp 493 A.2d 948, 954 (Del 1985). 
2J Latsky “The fundamental transactions under the Companies Act: A report back from practice 
after the first few years” (2014) Stell LR 2 372. 
3FHI Cassim “The Duties and the Liability of Directors” in Cassim (Man Ed) Contemporary 
Company Law (2012) 563. Cassim indicates that the rule applied in the USA for over 160 years 
and is regarded as cornerstone of corporate law. 
4See FHI Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act: General Overview of the Act” in 
Cassim (Man Ed) Contemporary Company Law (2012) 16, where it is indicated that section 
113 is modelled on Delaware General Corporations Law.  
5CM Bruner “Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation” (2010) 50:3 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 589. In this article, Bruner refers to The Anatomy of Corporate Law 
- a book reflecting “collaboration among nine authors from six countries, and points out that “It 
has been aptly said, “no model is better than its assumptions.” The validity and utility of 
conclusions drawn from such comparative studies, then, will depend critically on accurate 
identification of a true common problem, and this determination is where functionalism 
encounters a substantial challenge.” 
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number of factors, including that the US has a federal system of government. 
In the US, state laws and federal laws often operate side by side, while in South 
Africa there is only one company law regime. There are also considerable 
differences on how states regulate corporations.6 It is indicated that in some 
instances the line between state laws and federal law is blurred.7 Corporate law 
is primarily the domain of the states, resulting in 50 different state laws.8 There 
is no single corporate national law in the US and takeover law is positioned on 
the interface of company law and securities regulation.9 This is contrary to the 
other comparative countries where securities laws and company laws are 
clearly separated. There is also no unitary takeover law in the US and there are 
no mandatory offer rules, although no state is precluded from enacting such a 
law.10 A view is taken here that a comparative analysis of the US corporate law 
is too broad. Accordingly, the analysis will be mainly restricted to the regulation 
of takeovers and mergers in the State of Delaware.  
 
2 2 An overview: The equal opportunity rule in takeovers and mergers 
 
The equal opportunity rule appears to form a basis for the mandatory offer 
requirement in South Africa, which requirement was originally in the SRP 
Code.11 The mandatory offer requirement is now in section 123 of the 
Companies Act of 2008. The equal opportunity rule seeks to give all 
shareholders of the company an opportunity to sell their shares at the same 
price and on the same terms when a change of control of a company occurs. 
The price and terms must be based on those of the controlling shareholder 
when it sold its shares to the new controlling shareholder.12 The new controller 
                                            
6K Van der Linde Aspects of the regulation of share capital and distributions to shareholder LLD 
thesis UNISA (2008) 59. 
7EP Schuster “Efficiency in Private Sales -The Case for Mandatory Offer Bids” (2010) LSE  
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 08/2010 London School of Economics and 
Political Science 9. 
89. 
99.  
109. 
11See MM Katz “Developments in corporate law” (1997) 22:2 Journal for Juridical Science 39. 
See also Schuster (2010) LSE Law 3. 
12WD Andrews “The Stockholder’s right to equal opportunity in the sale of shares” (1965) 78: 3 
Harvard Law Review 515-516. 
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has an obligation to the remaining shareholders and must then fulfill it before it 
assumes control of the company.13  
 
Private sale of corporate control is regarded as controversial. Some of the 
debates are focused on whether it is legitimate for a controlling shareholder to 
exclusively appropriate the control premium paid by a buyer.14 The question 
asked is whether controlling shareholders must share in the ‘premium of 
control’. There are three main theories about the premium of control, namely: 
 
“(a) That it is a corporate asset – a theory devised by Professors Berle and 
Means;  
(b) That it should be equally shared among shareholders – the so-called ‘equal 
sharing rule,’ proposed by Professor Andrews; and 
(c) That the law regarding these premiums should be deregulated (supported 
by law and economics scholars).”15 
 
Change of corporate control transactions can raise complex matters,16 and the 
debates on the payment of a premium for control during the sale of corporate 
control have also produced numerous academic articles.17 In the US, early 
opinions on payment of a control premium have given way to modern rules: the 
majority shareholder does not owe minority shareholders any duty when selling 
control.18 Early commentary indicates that there were a number of concerns 
about the development of the rule for sharing of a premium of control. It was 
felt that this would negatively restrict the ability of controlling shareholders to 
sell their shares. Researchers and academics have also pointed out that case 
law relating to the payment of a premium for control to the controller did not aid 
                                            
13Andrews (1965) 78: 3 Harvard Law Review 515-516. 
14SM Sepe “Private Sale of Corporate Control: Why the European Mandatory Offer Bid Rule  
is Inefficient” (2010) Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper 10-29, 15.  
Available at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1086321. 
1515. 
16RW Jennings “Trading in Corporate Control” (1956) 1 California Law Review 1. 
17A Berle “The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control” (1965) 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 629. 
18FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel “Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) 91 The Yale Law 
Journal 698. 
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the interpretation of the law.19 It has been asserted that the theories relating to 
payment of a control premium are inconsistent and resulted in confusing 
precedent.20 Against this background, Perlman v Feldmann,21 a decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emerged. The debates 
on corporate control were brought into greater focus by the Perlman case.22 
The decision of the court is often viewed as controversial.23 It is asserted that 
Perlman case is one of the most widely-discussed cases, and yet few lawyers 
understand its meaning.24 Perlman raised the issue whether a controlling 
shareholder who sells a controlling block of shares to outsiders at a price, which 
is not available to all shareholders, is compelled to pay over to the company, or 
to other shareholders any premium that exceeds the investment value of the 
shares.25  
 
The facts of the Perlman case are briefly as follows: During the Korean War, 
there was a shortage of steel, which increased the price of steel. Newport Steel 
Corporation (Newport), and some US companies could maintain stable steel 
prices and allocated steel to various companies. This created a shortage which 
meant that steel users found it difficult to obtain steel.26 Feldmann was the 
controller of Newport and realised an opportunity to sell his controlling stake to 
Wilport Company (Wilport) at a profit. Wilport represented a group of steel 
users. It desired to obtain control over the selection of Newport clients.27 to 
ensure and protect steel supplies to the group.28 Feldmann, resigned his seat 
on the board of Newport, together with his fellow directors, thereby handing 
over control to Wilport. The controlling stake was sold at a substantial premium 
over the market price. Perlman, one of the minority shareholders, sued and 
                                            
19Duke L.J. “The Sale of Corporate Control at a Premium: An Analysis and Suggested 
Approach” (1961) Duke Law Journal 554. 
20Duke L.J. (1961) Duke Law Journal 554. 
21219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir 1955). 
22Jennings (1956) California Law Review 1. 
23Duke (1961) Duke Law Journal 554, 557. 
24JG Deutsch “Perlman v Feldmann: A Case Study in Contemporary Corporate Legal History” 
(1974) 8 Journal of Law Reform 7. 
25Jennings (1956) California Law Review 1. 
26Easterbrook & Fischel (1982) The Yale Law Journal 717. 
27WN Snell “Reflections on The Practical Aspects Of "The Sale of Corporate Control" (1972) 
Duke Law Journal 1200. 
281200. 
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claimed that the sale was not a sale of shares but involved an unlawful sale of 
corporate control. It was argued that Feldmann, as director and controller, had 
a fiduciary duty to the company and other shareholders. Based on this 
argument, Feldmann should not appropriate the premium paid for control. 
Feldmann argued that it was merely a sale of a controlling stake, which stake 
has attached to it rights, powers and advantages.29 The district court ruled in 
favour of Feldmann, but on appeal, the appeal court gave judgment in favour 
of Perlman, and referred the matter back to the district court to determine the 
final purchase price to be allocated to the control premium. According to the 
court ruling, once the premium was established, it had to be shared pro rata 
between the plaintiffs to the extent of their shareholdings.30 
 
The Perlman case did not settle “this confused area of the law”31 and later 
judicial pronouncements did not favour the sharing of the control premium.32 
Although it is acknowledged that transfer of corporate control can be abused, 
scholars assert that it must be approached analytically on a case-by-case 
basis.33 There are adequate corporate rules to prevent possible abuse.34 The 
sale of control at a premium could be an advantage for remaining shareholders, 
as the new controller has an incentive to operate the company for the benefit 
of all. It is argued that the prohibition of sale at a premium has the effect of 
restricting free transfer of the sale of corporate control - contrary to sound 
economic policy.35 Majority shareholders are able to sell the stock at a premium 
“precisely because it carried control power with it.”36 
 
In certain circumstances, it may be difficult to determine the circumstances 
under which minority shareholders must be afforded an equal opportunity to 
share in the premium of corporate control. These include when corporate 
                                            
29Jennings (1956) California Law Review 2-4. 
304-5. 
31Duke (1961) Duke Law Journal 560. 
32558-560. 
33560-566.  
34566. 
35See Duke (1961) Duke Law Journal 565-566. 
36Berle (1965) Cornell Law Quarterly 628.  
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control is transferred by means of a sale of a minority shareholding that has the 
ability to influence the board. A minor shareholding has the ability to vote the 
majority of the board. This occurs where there is wide spread shareholding, 
inactive shareholders or shareholders have come to rely on management.37 
Sharing of a premium may restrain transactions at huge cost to parties who 
would otherwise want to conclude such transactions. Corporate law is aimed at 
maximising profits and, unlike in the political arena, equality of treatment is “not 
justified for its own sake.”38 Other scholars have commented that “Perlman v. 
Feldmann was an aberration arising out of a failure of the pricing system to 
allocate resources.”39 Bainbridge40 comments that the Perlman case is more 
than just controversial. He further states:   
 
“It is an outlier. The overwhelming weight of authority confirms that a controlling 
shareholder is free to sell at any price he or she gets, without having to share 
the premium with the minority or providing an alternative exit for the minority, 
absent usurpation of a corporate opportunity or sale to a looter.”41 
 
Letts states that: 
 
“A blanket rule prohibiting the retention by the seller of any premium paid for 
control, or requiring equal opportunity for other shareholders, makes sense only 
upon the assumption either that all shareholders should always be equal with 
respect to sales of their shares, or that some evil is prevented which cannot 
properly be prevented in some other way.”42  
 
                                            
37See 633-634. In these paragraphs, Berle list the difficulties of sale of control. He points to 
incidences where the sale price for the shares incorporate the influence the seller has on old 
directors as well as the actual shares. In this scenario, the sale of the shares also includes the 
relationship the seller had with the directors.  
38JB Javaras “The Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor 
Andrews” (1965) 32 University of Chicago Law Review 428. 
39B Manning “Shareholder’s Remedy An Essay for Frank Coker” (1962) 72 The Yale Law 
Journal 223 - 225. 
40See S Bainbridge “There is No Affirmative Action for Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 
in Corporate Law” (2008) 118 Yale LJ Pocket Part 71. 
41Bainbridge (2008) Yale LJ Pocket Part 71, 74. 
41JS Letts “Sales of Control Stock and the Rights of Minority Shareholders” (1970-1971) 26 Bus 
Law 631 637. 
41646. 
42Letts (1970-1971) 26 Bus Law 631 637. 
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The equal opportunity rule is designed to deal with issues of looting and 
corporate squeeze. The problems result from abuse of the control position. The 
abuse can occur at any time and does not require any transfer of control.43 In 
his discussion of the Perlman case, Deutsch indicates: 
 
“As a lawyer who practiced corporate law in the middle 1960’s, I can testify that 
at least some of the corporate bar viewed Perlman v. Feldmann as a “drastic 
departure from the existing law regarding stock ownership … [creating] a federal 
rule at variance with corporate laws of the several states.’’44 
 
The requirement for a premium to be paid as an “anti-dote” for looting is like 
banning an investment in shares in order to avoid bankruptcy.45 It is not correct 
to suspect that all acquirers of companies have the intention of looting and it is 
asserted that unequal distribution of gains from corporate control transactions 
eventually promote the interests of shareholders.46  
 
Easterbrook and Fischel,47 indicates that in the US,  
 
“[T] he mountain of academic commentary calling for some type of sharing 
requirement has not been influential, and the legal treatment of control sales is 
largely along the lines of wealth maximising. Sales at a premium are lawful, 
and the controlling shareholders generally have no duty to spread the bounty.” 
 
As can be seen from the commentaries above, the introduction of the equal 
opportunity rule concerned a number of scholars. However, the rule did not 
become law in the years since the Perlman case was decided.48 American 
courts appear not to be influenced much by the several academic theories 
formulated around private sales of corporate control.  
 
                                            
43646. 
44JG Deutsch “Perlman v Feldmann: A Case Study in Contemporary Corporate Legal History” 
(1974) 8 Journal of Law Reform. 44 
45See Easterbrook & Fischel (1982) The Yale Law Journal 718. 
46736. 
47716. 
48Deutsch (1974) Journal of Law Reform 45. 
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In the State of Delaware, it is settled law that controlling shareholders do not 
have to share a control premium with non-controlling shareholders. The 
rationale for the courts is that in making decisions on corporate control, the 
courts should not interfere in arm’s-length commercial transactions. The courts 
follow a hands-off approach: unless there is clear and visible harm done, there 
is no reason to require than an equal opportunity be given to other shareholders 
in private sales of control. The rule was formulated in Zetlin v Hanson Holdings 
Inc.49 The court in this matter recognised that those who invest their capital 
necessary to acquire a major shareholding and ownership of a corporation have 
the right to control the company.50 The decision in Zetlin case was very short 
(one page).51 The facts were briefly, Zetlin held 2 percent shares in Gable 
Industries, Inc. (Gable). Hanson Holdings, Inc., Sylvestri, and other family 
members held 44.4 percent of Gable's shares. Hanson and others sold their 
44,4 percent shareholding to a new controlling shareholder, Flintkote Co, at a 
premium price of $15 per share, while the shares were trading on the stock 
market at $7.38 per share. It was accepted by all parties that the sale of the 
44.4 percent to Flintkote Co effectively transferred control of Gable Industries 
Inc. to Flinkkote Co. Having lost the case on a first round, Zetlin appealed, and 
the Court of Appeals indicated that those who invest the capital necessary to 
acquire a dominant position in the ownership of a corporation have the right of 
controlling that corporation. The court also indicated that, “it has long been 
settled law that, absent looting of corporate assets, conversion of a corporate 
opportunity, fraud or other acts of bad faith, a controlling stockholder is free to 
sell, and a purchaser is free to buy, that controlling interest at a premium price.” 
The court pointed out that while, 
  
“[M]inority shareholders are entitled to protection against such abuse by 
controlling shareholders. They are not entitled, however, to inhibit the legitimate 
interests of the other stockholders. It is for this reason that control shares 
usually command a premium price. The premium is the added amount an 
investor is willing to pay for the privilege of directly influencing the corporation's 
                                            
49See 48 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York.  
50Sepe 2010 Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper18; and Schuster 2010 LSE Law 11-12. 
51See 48 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 
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affairs.”  
 
The court then rejected the contention of Zetlin that minority stockholders are 
entitled to an opportunity to share equally in any premium paid for a controlling 
interest in the corporation.52 The court indicated that the requirement would 
deeply affect the manner in which controlling shares are transferred.53 This 
would require that a controlling stake must be transferred only by means of an 
offer to all shareholders.54 The court indicated that the requirement would be 
contrary to existing law.55  
 
The market rule approach, also called the ‘private negotiation rule’,56 is one of 
the methods to acquire control of a company. It has been defined in the 
literature as a framework that:  
“(i) allows the incumbent controller to sell his shares together with the effective 
control over the company at any price he is able to achieve, without having to 
share the proceeds with his fellow shareholders (and/or the company); 
(ii) does not require the acquirer of the shares to offer to the remaining 
shareholders to buy the residual shares; and 
(iii) allows the acquirer to voluntarily make an offer for the residual shares, at 
any price he thinks fit, without any reference to the price he paid to the (former) 
block holder.”57  
 
2 3 An overview: Statutes and authorities applicable in takeovers and 
mergers 
 
2 3 1 The Delaware General Corporations Law and the Delaware courts 
 
Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL) regulates most US large public 
corporations, as indicated in chapter 1. Van der Linde states that the state of 
                                            
5248 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York.  
5348 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 
5448 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 
5548 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State of New York. 
56Schuster (2010) LSE Law 9. 
5713. 
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Delaware “has a reputation as the most permissive, and consequently also the 
most popular, state for incorporations in America.”58 The DGCL sets out a 
division of powers between the directors and shareholders. The DGCL provides 
in section 141(a) the broad principle that: “the business and affairs of every 
corporation … shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.” 59 This section is often used to support actions taken by directors 
against any challenges by shareholders. The section supports the application 
of the BJR.60 
 
Under the DGCL, majority shareholders cannot directly compel the board to 
take any particular action, and it is suggested that in the charters of 
incorporations, shareholders cannot be given the power to do so.61 In the State 
of Delaware, a director-centred approach is followed towards takeovers and 
mergers, which gives discretion to the directors to decide on the outcome of a 
takeover.62 An alternative to this is the director-and-shareholder approach 
where the directors decide to enter into a corporate control transaction and the 
shareholders participate by voting. American corporate law supports this 
bilateral approach in instances where agency problems exist and the 
consequent conflict of interests, particularly where directors are in the final 
stage of their tenure, such as in transactions involving a change of control.63 
Delaware’s state law gives generous leeway to directors in the management of 
corporations. It has the most flexible provisions on mergers and takeovers in 
the US and there is evidence that in some instances, companies relocate their 
place of incorporation to this state a few hours before a major acquisition, in 
order to benefit from its flexible takeover and merger provisions.64  
 
                                            
58K Van der Linde “The regulation of share capital and shareholder contributions in the 
Companies Bill 2008” (2009) 1 TSAR 42. 
59DGCL section 141(a). 
60See detailed discussions under paragraph 2 5 3 on the BJR. The BJR is seen as the corollary 
of the common law principle that directors manage the affairs of a corporation. See RJ Holland 
“Delaware Business Courts: Litigation Leadership” (2009) 34:3 Journal of Corporation Law.779.  
61Bruner (2010) Virginia Journal of International Law 594. 
62B Black & R Kraakman “Delaware ‘s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value’’ 
(2002) North Western University School of Law Vol. 96, No. 2. 558. 
63559. 
64DA Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions (2005) 31. 
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Gorris, Hamermesh and Strine,65 state:  
 
“[T]here has been a constructive symbiosis between the Model Business 
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) and Delaware’s corporation law, including its 
statutory component (the Delaware General Corporation Law, or DGCL) and 
its case law.”  
 
In most instances, the courts in the State of Delaware regulate takeovers.66 The 
Delaware courts act quickly and efficiently. It has been indicated that  
 
“[T] ime is of the essence with all corporate matters considered by our Court of 
Chancery. Businesses need quick answers so they can move to the next step 
in their transactions.”67 
 
The Delaware Court of Chancery is the oldest business court in the US. The 
five members of the Court of Chancery sit without a jury and provide a decision 
at the conclusion of each judicial proceeding. Appeals from this court go directly 
to the Delaware Supreme Court and not to the Delaware Superior Court.68 The 
decisions of the Chancery Court are well reasoned and the majority of the 
decisions are respected, and not generally appealed.69 The BJR is regarded as 
one of the best examples of the Delaware judiciary’s well-established corporate 
jurisprudence.70 According to the internal affairs doctrine relating to states, the 
decisions of the Delaware courts are final and authoritative in matters of 
corporate law, if the corporation is registered in the State of Delaware.71 
                                            
65JM Gorris, LA Hamermesh & LE Strine “Delaware Corporate Law and Model Business 
Corporations Act: A Study in Symbiosis” (2011) 74 Law and Contemporary Problems 107.  
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1612&context=lcp> (Accessed 
20-12-2014). 
66JA Armour & DA Skeel, Jr. “Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? - the peculiar 
divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation (2007) 95 The Georgetown Law Journal 1727, 
ECGI-Law Working Paper No.73/29006. 1729, Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=928928. (Accessed 5-2-2017). 
67See Interview with Editor in Metropolitan Corporate Counsel 2004 “The Hon. Myron T Steele: 
Delaware Courts, Corporate Governance and Corporate Counsel” Metropolitan Corporate 
Counsel (Delaware) 43. 
68See Holland (2009) The Journal of Corporation Law 773. 
69773. 
70773.  
71781. 
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However, the role of the courts in adjudicating disputes in mergers and 
takeovers has been criticized as it only allows for ex post facto dispute 
resolution.72  
 
2 3 2 The Williams Act of 1968, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the 
Securities Exchange Commission 
 
The Williams Act of 1968 (Williams Act)73 a federal government statute, 
provides for procedural and disclosure framework during tender offers in the 
US. The Williams Act effected a number of amendments and introduced other 
provisions into the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to address cash 
tender offers and mandates disclosure of information when such offers are 
made for stock purchases.74 It is named after Senator Harrison Williams, who 
championed it. For the purposes of the dissertation, the discussions are limited 
to an overview of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and the Williams Act. The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the US Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1934.75   According to Tyson, the Williams Act aimed at 
introducing a policy of neutrality: it is meant to be neutral between bidders and 
targets.76 The Williams Act contains several provisions which attempt to create 
a level playing field between bidders, targets and shareholders by requiring 
disclosures on share dealings at an early stage77 The Williams Act established 
the basic ground rules for tender offers.78 Shareholders are empowered with 
                                            
72Armour & Skeel, Jr (2007) The George Town Law Journal. 1729.  
73Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). Enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America.  
74The Williams Act introduced sections 13(d)–(e) and 14(d)-(f) into the Securities Exchange Act 
34. See also GA Ferrarini & GP Miller “A Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United 
States and Europe” (2009) 42 Cornell International Law Journal 304. 
75Section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
76W C Tyson “The Proper Relationship Between Federal and State Law in the Regulation of 
Tender offers” (2014) Notre Dame Law Review 252, discussing the historical regulation of 
tender offers prior to the enactment Williams Act. See also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell 
International Law Journal. 304 
77Section 14(d) and Schedule14d-1 requires filings of disclosures with the Securities Exchange 
Commission as soon as 5 percent or more shares are acquired. See also Ferrarini & Miller 
(2009) Cornell International Law Journal 304. 
78See Section 14(d)-(e) of the Securities Exchange Act and Schedule 14d-1, which specify the 
disclosures required.  
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full and complete information to make a decision about a tender offer79 The 
Williams Act created an obligation to register any cash tender offer with the 
SEC; created obligations for disclosure of the value of the offer, the source of 
the funding, why the offer is being made, what plans the purchasers have for 
the newly-acquired company and any contracts or understandings that have 
been formed in regard to the target corporation.80 The Williams Act also 
introduced  a similar disclosures and filing for tender offers for more than 5 
percent of a class of registered equity security, as those requested by the SEC 
under Schedule 14d-1.81 The information is then made available to 
shareholders and other investors82 By means of the disclosures, the Williams 
Act promotes transparency when share purchases are undertaken.83 The 
Williams Act also prohibits any use of false, incomplete or misleading 
statements when making a cash tender offer.84 This is in the interests of the 
investing parties. According to Ferrarini and Miller, under the Williams Act there 
is no direct right to sue for non-compliance but the courts have recognised the 
right for bidders, targets and shareholders. Such parties may apply to court to 
enforce the Act and the relevant regulations. .85  
 
It is suggested that the Williams Act was enacted in response to the concern 
about the possibility that an acquiring shareholder may expropriate the wealth 
of the company.86 These concerns also led to similar legislation in other 
countries. In enacting the Williams Act, the legislature wanted to avoid the 
pressure tactics being applied by bidders by launching unfair and coercive 
                                            
79See Schedule 14d-1 and also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 304-
305.  
80See Schedule14d-1 under the Securities Exchange Act and also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) 
Cornell International Law Journal. 304. 
81Schedule 13d and also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 305.. 
82See rules 14d-1 to Schedule 14D-9F under the Securities Exchange Act and also Ferrarini & 
Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 305. 
83Rules 14d-1 to Schedule14D-9F under the Securities Exchange Act. . 
84Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act and section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange 
Act are antifraud provisions. See also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 
305. 
85Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 304. 
86RB Thompson “Takeover Regulation After the ‘Convergence’ of Corporate Law” (2002) 
Vanderbilt University Law School Law & Economics Working Paper Number 02- 26 6. 
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takeover offers.87 Prior to these reforms, bidders used ‘short-lived public offers’, 
known as ‘Saturday night specials’88 or ‘Blitzkrieg tender offers’.89 By means of 
sudden, undisclosed offers, bidders would buy limited amounts of a target stock 
on a first-come, first-served basis and at a substantial premium. Such ‘Saturday 
night specials’ did not indicate the intention of the acquirer or the future plans 
of the acquirer with the acquired company. They were often launched suddenly 
and with an element of surprise, which pressured shareholders to accept the 
offer.90  
 
Tender offers were often “strategically abusive”,91 leading to unfavourable 
treatment of target company shareholders. Bidders often offered shareholders 
a high price for their shares on a “first-come first-served” basis for a very limited 
time period.92 This increased shareholder uncertainty and fear that if they did 
not act quickly, they would be left holding shares which are difficult to sell or 
may be subject to a ‘squeeze out’ merger at a lower price.93 This is because 
following the tender offer and subject to meeting the requisite thresholds, a 
bidder may acquire the shares of the shareholders who did not accept the 
tender offer which is also known as ‘minority buy-out’, “going private 
transactions”, “cash out” “squeeze-outs” or “freeze-outs.”94 The shareholder 
must control at least 90 percent of the target shares to implement the freeze 
out.95 Squeeze-outs are aimed at eliminating minority shareholders following a 
                                            
87Thompson (2002) Vanderbilt University Law School Law & Economics Working Paper 
Number 02-26 6. 
88“Saturday night specials” have been defined as a tender offer that is open for only a short 
period of time, typically just a few days, thereby forcing shareholders to decide quickly whether 
or not to accept an offer. The fear of losing out and the uncertainty forced shareholders to 
accept unfair offers. See G Subramanian “Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defences” 
(2003) Harvard John M Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper No 
9/2003. 9 <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center> (Accessed 20-2-2016). 
89S Hannes & O Yadlin “The SEC Regulation of Takeovers: Some Doubts from a Game Theory 
Perspective and a Proposal for Reform” (2008) 25 Yale Journal on Regulation 42. 
90Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 162. 
91JA Armour, JB Jacobs & CJ Milhaupt “The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in 
Developed and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework” (2011) 52 Harvard International 
Law Journal Number 1 Winter. 241. 
92Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 241. 
93See Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 241. 
94See F Restrepo & G Subramanian “The Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structures 
& Outcomes: Evidence on the Unified Approach” (2015) 5 Harvard Business Law Review 208. 
95McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law Vol.30 438. 
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tender offer or a statutory merger.96 The transactions are typically implemented 
as a merger, but can be a tender offer directly to shareholders.  
 
Freeze-outs have an element of self-dealing because the controlling 
shareholder is the buyer and may have majority representatives on the target 
board.97 Hence, the transactions have become subject to the entire fairness 
judicial review standard in Delaware courts.98 The entire fairness standard is 
discussed below in paragraph 2 5 1 below. The aim of the “first come first 
served” tactics was to put pressure on and stampede target company 
shareholders into accepting the offer, even if the offer was low.99 The short time 
period allowed to accept the offer also prevented target company directors from 
being able to take any evasive or defensive action against an unfair offer.100 
  
A number of provisions in the Williams Act have been criticised. It is indicated 
that these provisions prevent some tender offers that would lead to the 
replacement of inefficient and poor performing managers.101 If there are no 
threats of tender offers, it is likely that managers may avoid their duties and 
responsibilities knowing that there is no tool to discipline them.102 Requiring 
various disclosures, the Williams Act may discourage tender offers due to the 
fact that bidders may feel that they will have to show their strategic plans to the 
target, and possibly to other competitors.103 Further, bidders may be unwilling 
to make the first move to propose a takeover due to costs involved. The so-
called ‘free rider’ effect results from this situation where competing bidders jump 
on the bandwagon, figuratively speaking, and simply interfere with the first 
bidder’s tender offer once they have seen the disclosures.104  
 
                                            
96Restrepo & Subramanian 2015 Harvard Business Law Review 208. 
97209. 
98209. 
99Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 241. 
100241-242. 
101See Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 169. 
102169. 
103169. 
104169. 
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Further criticism against the Williams Act is that the time periods introduced 
allows managers to undertake defensive measures or even place a competing 
bid.105 A number of rules introduced by the SEC under the Williams Act are also 
criticised. These include the rule that there should not be any price 
discrimination in takeovers. It is argued that this rule increases the price of 
acquiring control.106 Efficient takeover bids could be facilitated at low cost by 
repealing some of the provisions of the Williams Act. This in turn, would 
encourage managers to perform, as they fear the possibility of “Saturday night 
specials”.107 The SEC administers other statutes intended to protect investors 
and consumers.108 The SEC has wide powers to regulate disclosure about 
tender offers and proxies, as part of protecting investors and ensuring that firms 
provides reliable information and set clear rules and regulations.109 The role of 
the SEC among others, is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and also facilitate raising of capital in US financial markets.110  
 
With broad powers over a number of industries, the duties of the SEC are 
extensive and among others, include to: interpret and enforce federal securities 
laws; issue new rules and amend existing rules; oversee the inspection of 
securities firms, brokers, investment advisers, and ratings agencies; oversee 
                                            
105169. 
106169. 
107169. 
108See section 2 of Securities Exchange Act providing the reasons for the passing the Securities 
Exchange Act. The section describes a number of areas in which the Act apply. Section 3(a) 
(47) of the Securities Exchange Act also indicates a number of laws administered by the SEC. 
These includes: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200219, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
109The SEC under section 4 of the Securities Exchange Act may prescribe rules and 
regulations, including those dealing with regulation of tender offers and proxies.  
These appear under, Title 17, Securities and Commodities, Chapter II, Securities Exchange 
Commission, Part 240. General rules and regulations, under Securities Exchange Act 34, 
Published on the Electronic Code of Federal Regulations: Available at: 
https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi/bin/textidx?SID=0aa0a0af5bbc34f913fff4940d387537&mc=true&tpl=/
ecfrbrowse/Title17/17cfr240_main_02.tpl, Accessed 2 .2. 2019. 
110See the preamble to Securities Exchange Act., Section 3 (f) of the Securities Exchange Act 
which provides: “CONSIDERATION OF PROMOTION OF EFFICIENCY, COMPETITION, AND 
CAPITAL FORMATION.—Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in 
rulemaking, or in the review of a rule of a self-regulatory organization, and is required to 
consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action 
will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”  
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private regulatory organisations in the securities, accounting, and auditing 
fields; and coordinate US securities regulation with federal, state, and foreign 
authorities. It was created to regulate a wide spectrum of the securities 
industry.111 The SEC has wide powers to enforce the Williams Act. These 
include: issuing cease and desist orders,112 administration actions,113 civil 
actions for disgorgement,114 or criminal actions through the Department of 
Justice.115  
 
The Division of Corporation Finance reviews documents that publicly-held 
companies are required to file with the SEC. The documents include: 
registration statements for newly-offered securities; annual and quarterly filings; 
proxy documents sent to shareholders before an annual meeting; documents 
concerning tender offers; and filings related to mergers and acquisitions.116 It is 
suggested that, through the Corporate Finance Division's review process and 
monitoring of compliance with disclosure requirements, the SEC seeks to 
improve the quality of the disclosure. The SEC also requires a number of 
disclosures about tender offers and proxies. These include: the offer price, a 
statement on whether the offer price is below the market price, any changes to 
offer price, the ability of bidder to finance the offer, identity of the bidder, plans 
or proposals of the offeror, and conditions and terms on the offer.117  
 
 
                                            
111See section 2 of Securities Exchange Act providing the reasons for the passing the Securities 
Exchange Act. The section describes a number of areas in which the Act apply. Section 3(a) 
(47) of the Securities Exchange Act also indicates a number of laws administered by the SEC. 
These includes: the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200219, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970. 
112Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act, also RJ Colombo “Effectuating Disclosure 
Under the Williams Act” (2011) 60 Catholic University Law Review 321-328. 
113Section 15 (c) (4) and 21 C of the Securities Exchange Act 
114Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act, See also Colombo (2011) Catholic University 
Law Review 321-328. 
115Section 21(d)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act. See also Colombo (2011) 60 Catholic 
University Law Review 321-328. 
116See Regulation14A that deals with solicitation of proxies and the information to be included. 
117Regulation 14D and Regulation 14E dealing with tender offers and the information to be 
included including the scope of both regulations, and also Oesterle, The Law of Mergers and 
Acquisitions 166. 
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2 4 An overview: Types of takeovers and mergers  
 
2 4 1 An overview of the statutory merger, a ‘‘long form merger,’’118 or a “one 
step freeze-out’’119 merger  
 
The fundamental aim of US securities laws is to protect US investors. 
Therefore, transactions conducted there or employing US jurisdictional means 
may be subject to US securities laws.120 The structuring of a transaction is 
therefore important.121 Practitioners generally rely on Delaware case law to 
structure takeovers and mergers.122 Some of the important considerations are: 
whether any of the parties are subject to US securities laws or whether the 
securities holders of any of the parties are located or residents in the US.123 
Tender offers and sale of corporate control are regarded as key mechanisms 
for replacing inefficient and nonperforming managers. Corporate assets can be 
allocated for higher and better use following a successful takeover.124 The 
takeover or merger processes will also depend on the size and number of 
shareholders, among other considerations. The bidder will generally undertake 
research and due diligence on the target company before deciding on the best 
method to undertake a takeover or merger.125  
 
There are number of transactions that allow controlling shareholders to 
appropriate equity interests of minority shareholders using a freeze-out namely: 
statutory mergers, two-step tender offers, and asset acquisitions or reverse 
stock splits.126 However, reverse stock split and asset sales are rarely used to 
                                            
118See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice.74.  
Available at: http://www.wlrk.com/ (Accessed 10-5-2018).  
119See Ventoruzzo (2010) Virginia Journal of International Law 852. 
120JM Basnage & WJ Curtin, III “Cross-border tender offers and other business combination 
transactions and the U.S federal securities laws: an overview” (2016) 71:2 The Business 
Lawyer 462. 
121520. 
122See MJ McGuiness & T Rehbock “Going Private Transactions: A Practitioner’s Guide” (2005) 
30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 437. 
123462. 
124Sepe (2010) Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper 10-29 14.  
125 6-7. 
126See Restrepo & Subramanian (2015) Harvard Business Law Review 208 and also  
M Ventoruzzo “Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals” (2010) 50:4 
Virginia Journal of International Law 851.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
37 
 
cash out minority shareholders.127 According to McGuiness & Rehbock,128 
there are two distinct methods of implementing a takeover or a merger and then 
delisting a company from an exchange that merit close consideration by 
practitioners in this area of law.129 The methods can be classified as the 
“traditional approach”, which is carried out following negotiations between the 
acquirer and the target company, followed by a merger agreement130 and, the 
“unilateral approach”, which is carried out by the acquirer who sets the price 
terms and conditions of the tender offer and, makes the offer directly to the 
shareholders. 131 
 
The board of directors are gatekeepers in respect of statutory mergers. Board 
approval creates an insurmountable barrier for a statutory merger if the board 
is unwilling to co-operate.132 Therefore, there would be no merger without the 
board say so.133 It is not possible to propose a hostile statutory merger.134 
Developments over the years have caused the terms and conditions used in 
one-step transactions and those used in two- step transactions to converge: 
they are essentially becoming one exercise.135 Both tender offers and statutory 
mergers may raise fiduciary duties of directors. Directors must always observe 
their fiduciary duties during the negotiations.136 This point will be discussed 
below under paragraph 2 5, dealing with the standards used by the courts to 
review the conduct of directors during takeovers and mergers.      
 
A statutory merger is a long-form single-step transaction and a creature of 
statute.137 In essence, the statutory merger is the purchase of all the assets and 
                                            
127Ventoruzzo (2010) Virginia Journal of International Law 851. 
128McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal 437. 
129437. 
130438. 
131437-438 
132S Bainbridge “The Geography of Revlonland” (2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 3280. 
1333286. 
1343286. 
135See RE Climan, GR Bason, Jr, FS Green and JI Greenberg “Negotiating Acquisitions of 
Public Companies in Transactions Structured As Friendly Tender Offers” (2012) 116:3 Penn 
State Law Review 671. 
136See Bainbridge (2013) Fordham Law Journal 3277-3338. 
137Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice74. 
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an assumption of all liabilities of one entity by another.138 The separate legal 
existence of one of the merging entities ceases on implementation of the 
merger by operation of law.139 The Delaware statutory merger provisions are 
generally referred to as the business combination acts by the business 
community.140 The DGCL in section 251 provides for the long-form merger 
procedure. The provision sets the framework and requirements to complete all 
mergers and consolidations.141 One of the effects of mergers is its impact on 
the legal status, rights, liabilities and powers of the merged or consolidated 
entities. A merger may negatively affect existing rights and status of parties 
after the merger, unless properly regulated.  
 
The DGCL has a number of sections dealing with legal status, rights, liabilities, 
powers and other similar rights or obligations of the merged, surviving or 
liquidated entities following a merger or consolidation.142 The DGCL provisions 
are also tailored to the different characteristics of corporations that may merge 
or consolidate their operations. The DGCL includes provisions aimed at foreign 
companies that merge or consolidate with US companies.143 In addition, the 
SEC has adopted regulation aimed at addressing conflicts between US and 
foreign regulations.144 The regulations introduced relief for certain cross-border 
tender offers and business combinations. Prior to the regulations it was 
common for bidders to exclude US investors in cross–border tender offers and 
business combinations. 145 The regulations introduce certain limited 
exemptions under Tier I and Tier II exemptions. Each Tier indicates the level 
and type of exemption limitations granted.146  
 
                                            
13874. 
13974. 
140DA Oesterle “Delaware’s Takeover Statute: Of Chills, Pills, Standstills, and Who Gets Iced” 
(1988) 13 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 879.  
141See section 251 of DGCL. 
142See sections 259, 260 and 261 of the DGCL. 
143See sections 256 and 258 of the DGCL dealing with mergers or consolidations of domestic 
and foreign companies.  
144McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 469. 
145469 
146469-470. 
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Briefly, the ‘long-form’ procedure entails a number of steps. The acquirer 
announces the intention to acquire the shares held by minority shareholders of 
the listed company.147 The target company must then form an independent 
special committee to negotiate the terms and conditions of the merger. The 
special committee is an integral part of the traditional approach method.148 The 
special committee must have independent and disinterested directors.149 It 
appears that the target company may have to appoint additional directors 
where it does not have a sufficient number of independent directors.150 Legal 
and financial advisers, who must only report to it, so as to maintain 
independence, may assist the special committee.151  
 
The special committee is obliged to negotiate on an arm-length basis with the 
acquirer to fulfil its mandate and must not let the controlling shareholders dictate 
the terms and conditions of the merger agreement. The responsibility of the 
special committee is to promote the interests of minority shareholders.152 Once 
negotiations have been successful, the special committee will recommend a 
merger agreement setting out the terms and conditions of the merger, to the 
board. The board of the acquirer and the target company will sign the merger 
agreement setting out all the terms and conditions including the obligations of 
each party and the timelines. The target company and the acquirer will then 
complete the merger based on the agreement.153 The target company must 
then prepare an information or proxy statement and seek shareholder approval 
for the merger.154 A statutory merger requires approval of shareholders of the 
target company and must therefore comply with the proxy rules issued by the 
SEC.155 The target company is obliged to prepare and file a proxy statement 
                                            
147437. 
148445. 
149The courts may review the process followed by directors during a takeover. See also 
discussions dealing with standards of reviewing directors’ conduct under paragraph 2 5 below.      
150McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 445. 
151445. 
152445. 
153445. 
154445. 
155Proxy Rules are made in terms of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules 
promulgated by the SEC in terms of the Securities Exchange Act. See Regulation 14A, 
solicitation of proxies and also Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and 
Practice 64.   
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with the SEC.156 The proxy statement provides information to the target 
shareholders about the proposed meeting of shareholders to consider and 
approve the statutory merger. The SEC may review the proxy statement prior 
to it being posted to the target shareholders.157 Some of the important 
disclosures in the proxy statement include: background to the transaction; a 
summary of material terms of the merger; historical transactions and 
interactions between the parties; brief reasons why the board of directors of the 
target company has agreed to and is recommending the proposed merger; 
background to the transaction; financial information from the acquirer where 
financing is not guaranteed; and a brief indication of any reports, opinions or 
appraisals provided to the directors of the target in respect of the proposed 
merger.158  
 
As part of the disclosures, the SEC requires explanation of the procedures 
followed when investment bankers prepare a fairness opinion, including 
banker’s opinions and any limitations to such opinions.159 Statutory mergers are 
also subject to additional disclosure information about appraisal rights.160 
Statutory mergers have certain advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Advantages for the bidder include: 
- support by the independent and disinterested special committee board 
members. This may encourage unwilling shareholders to submit their form of 
acceptance for the offer;161 
                                            
156Regulation14A deals with solicitation of proxies and the information to be included. See also 
SM Davidoff Solomon “The SEC and the Failure of Federal Takeover Regulation” (2007) 34:2 
Florida University State Law Review 235. 227 and Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz (2018) 
Takeover Law and Practice 75. 
157Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 74. 
158See section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and the rules promulgated by the SEC in 
terms of the Securities Exchange Act and also Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover 
Law and Practice 64.   
159Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 64. 
160Section 262 of DGCL on appraisal rights.  
161McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law Vol.30 458. 
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- where a well- functioning special committee on advice of legal advisers and 
financial advisers has properly conducted the process, it has a strong likelihood 
of withstanding a court challenge;162 
- the approach allows the controlling shareholders to complete the transaction 
even if it does not acquire more than 90 percent of the issued shares of the 
target because some shareholders do not tender their shares.163  
 
The disadvantages for the bidder include: 
- it increases the risk of the transaction taking longer or failing, due to prolonged 
negotiations;164 
- it may increase costs as the acquirer may be forced to increase the offer price 
so that the special committee, and then the board recommend the merger165; 
- the transaction is subject to a higher standard of review- the entire fairness 
standard, and therefore may attract more shareholder litigation than a 
transaction subject to a lower standard of review.166   
 
The decision as to which method to use depends on the circumstances of each 
transaction.167 It appears that practitioners prefer to use a statutory merger 
where it is expected that there will be delay and complications due to the 
number of regulatory requirements involved.168 The issue of own securities as 
a method of payment for a merger or takeover may result in such a delay. This 
is because the issue of own shares may require registration of a statement or 
prospectus in terms of the Securities Act of 1933, unless exempted.169 Payment 
of cash does not require any additional registration and therefore there are no 
delays to the merger. It is also indicated that under certain circumstances the 
statutory merger may have a tax advantage, particularly where the acquirer is 
                                            
162458. 
163458. 
164459. 
165459. 
166449. 
167Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 75. 
16875. 
169See Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The Business Lawyer 468.  
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paying by issuing its own shares as shareholders benefit from a rollover tax 
relief.170  
 
2 4 2 An overview of tender offers and the “two step freeze outs”171  
 
Where a company has widely dispersed shareholders, control of a company 
may be achieved by making a tender offer to the shareholders.172 The SEC has 
“erected a scaffold” 173 of rules which are generally applicable to tender offers, 
going private transactions and takeover transactions. The SEC’s approach to 
regulation of tender offers is to allow shareholders to make an informed 
decision about their investment, based on disclosures about the tender offer.  
 
The concept ‘tender offer’ is not defined in the Williams Act.174 The SEC has 
been reluctant to provide a guideline as to what ‘tenders offers’ are. The 
reluctance by the SEC to provide such guidance is due to the concern that 
precise definition would encourage bidders to attempt to avoid the 
provisions.175 Rule 14d-2 is the only SEC rule that gives an indication of what 
tender offers entail. However, the rule merely defines when a tender offer 
commences.176 A purchaser may acquire shares of a company without 
triggering the tender offer rules.177 Certain factors may support a conclusion 
that one is undertaking a tender offer. These include: widespread invitation to 
buy shares of a company; acquisitions of shares of a company at a premium 
over the market price; offers to acquire shares of a company open for a limited 
period; offer to acquire a substantial shareholding; firm offers to acquire shares 
                                            
170Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The Business Lawyer 516 and also Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 93. 
171Ventoruzzo (2010) Virginia Journal of International Law 852. The tender offer involves an 
initial acquisition of 90 percent of target shares and then followed by acquisition of the remaining 
shares hence the term two step freeze-out. See also Climan et al (2012) Penn State Law 
Review 618. 
172See Sepe (2010) Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper 10-29 6-7. 
173Davidoff Solomon (2007) Florida University State Law Review 235. 
174Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 173.  
175173. 
176173. 
177Basnage & Curtin, III (2016) The Business Lawyer 466. 
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which are not negotiable; or public announcements to acquire shares 
accompanied by rapid accumulation of shares.178  
 
Under the Unilateral Approach tender offer, the bidder determines the price, 
terms and conditions of the tender offer without initial discussions with the board 
of the target. The tender offer is then made directly to shareholders.179 The 
tender offer may be subject to a condition that the bidder holds 90 percent of 
the target shares at the end of the transaction. This will enable the bidder to 
effect a short- form merger or the ‘freeze-out’ merger after the tender offer.180 
In friendly tender offers, the bidder and the target company may include a 
provision in the agreement that following the completion of the tender offer, a 
merger will be concluded without shareholder approval in accordance with 
section 251(h) of the DGCL.181 Where parties will implement the merger in 
terms of section 251(h) of the DGCL, the tender offer is commonly conditional 
on acceptance by the majority of the shareholders.182 If the tender offer meets 
this condition, then the transaction may be implemented in accordance with the 
requirements of section 251(h) of the DGCL.183 Section 251(h) facilitates 
completion of a second-step merger by removing the requirement for a 
shareholder approval to complete the second-step merger.184 Prior to this 
section, shareholder vote was required to effect a second-step merger even if 
the acquirer had received acceptances of the tender offer exceeding the 
majority of the issued shares.185  
 
The implementation of the merger in terms section 251(h) is subject to a 
number of conditions. These include: that all shares to be acquired must be 
acquired for the same amount and kind of consideration as in the tender offer 
and; the offer is extended to all outstanding shares of the target.186 The section 
                                            
178466-467. 
179See McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 437-438. 
180See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law Practice 74. 
18174. 
18274. 
18374 
18476. 
18577. 
18677. 
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allows the bidder and the target company to consummate the transaction 
quickly and with certainty.187 In a Unilateral Approach tender offer, if the bidder 
holds more than 90 percent of the issued shares of the target when the tender 
offer ends, it can then proceed to the second step ‘short form merger'.188 Where 
the bidder and the target have agreed to implement the transaction in terms of 
section 251(h), then if the transaction meets those conditions, the bidder will be 
entitled to implement a ‘second step merger’. This explains the reference to 
‘two-step mergers’ or ‘two-step freeze-outs’.189  
 
The takeover process may also be accompanied by market purchases prior to 
the tender offer being made and in terms of the Williams Act these should 
comply with certain disclosure requirements.190 The Williams Act provides a 
framework for disclosures in respect of the acquisitions referred to above, while 
the rules of the SEC set-out certain rules about those acquisitions.191 The 
disclosures in terms of the SEC regulations and rules depend on the type of 
transactions.192 The requirements include that: the tender offer statement, the 
response statement from the target, the tender offer must remain open for 
acceptance for at least 20 business days from the date of opening;193 where 
the tender offer price is changed, the tender offer must be kept open for a 
minimum of 10 additional business days after the price has changed;194 and, 
shareholders must have a right to withdraw from the tender offer.195 
                                            
18777. 
188McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 438.  
189See CW Furlow “Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine” (2009) 11:3 U. of Pennsylvania Journal 
of Business Law at 546 discussing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Co 493 A.2d 946 (Del.1985) case 
and the two-step merger procedure. 
190Section 14(d), Regulation 14D of the Securities Exchange Act applies to certain tender offers 
and Schedule 13D under the Securities Exchange Act is also applicable on acquisition of 5 
percent or more of securities of a company. See also Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell 
International Law Journal 304-305. 
191Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act and Regulation 14E. The regulation also 
includes a number of rules dealing with tender offers. See rules 14e-1 to 14f-1, indicating certain 
unlawful tender practices. 
192For instance, transactions that requires shareholder meetings must comply with Regulation 
14A dealing with solicitations of proxies, while Schedule TO under section 14(d)(1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act  applies to tender offers.  
193Rule 14d-1(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The Business 
Lawyer 480. 
194480-481. 
195Solomon (2007) Florida University State Law Review 218. 
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A party seeking to make a tender offer is obliged to prepare and file with the 
SEC a disclosure statement in terms of SEC rules for tender offers, where the 
offer is for registered securities.196 The majority of target companies appoint a 
special committee to consider the tender offers even though it is not mandated 
by law.197 Tender offers are mainly governed by section 14(d) and section 14(e) 
of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 14(d) and the SEC rules provide for 
detailed disclosure obligations, procedural requirements and other substantive 
provisions for tender offer.198 Exemptions and exclusions may be available for 
tender offers.199 In general, the tender offer rules do not require the SEC to pre-
review tender document to shareholders. However, where there is a conflict 
with non-US rules, it may be necessary to apply to the SEC in advance.200 The 
disclosures required by SEC in the relevant forms are incorporated by the 
acquirer in the offer document, which is then sent to the shareholders of the 
target company.201 Financial information about the target company is not 
required where the offer consists of only cash.202 Disclosures assist 
shareholders in making better-informed decisions, and deter abuse.203    
 
The SEC imposes additional disclosure requirements on acquirers who intend 
to take a company private.204 It has been observed that the promulgation of the 
rule was in reaction to what the SEC regarded as inadequate protection offered 
by Delaware State laws.205 The additional disclosures include: a statement of 
                                            
196 Schedule TO, under the Securities Exchange Actand the target issues a response on 
Schedule 14D-9. See discussion by Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The Business Lawyer 467. 
197See McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 445. 
198See among others, Section 14(d) and Regulation 14D, applicable to tender offers involving 
a class of equity securities (as defined in the Securities Exchange Act) and section 14(e) of the 
Exchange Act and regulation 14E, which are aimed at preventing fraud and manipulation. See 
also Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The Business Lawyer 467. 
199Section 3(a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act and Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The 
Business Lawyer 467. 
200See Clifford Chance LLP “General overview of US Tender Offer rules Applicable to an Offer 
for Shares Registered under the Securities Act of 1934” (2014) Global M&A series.  
201See Schedule TO under the Securities Exchange Act.  
202Clifford Chance (2014) Global M&A Series.1. 
203HTC Hu “Too complex to Depict? Innovation, Pure Information and the SEC Disclosure 
Paradigm” (2012) 90:7 Texas Law Review. 1615. 
204Rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act. 
205See M Roe “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588. 
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whether the transaction is fair to the independent shareholders, a detailed 
description of the transaction, the reasons for the transaction, an opinion from 
an independent financial adviser dealing with the fairness of the transaction 
and, a brief report on all the opinions received by the target company, including 
any financial reports from its own financial advisers.206  
 
The SEC rules restricts purchases of the target company’s shares, other than 
pursuant to the tender offer, from the first public announcement by the acquirer 
of its intention to make the tender offer until the tender offer has been 
completed.207 A bidder must not acquire shares on the open market while the 
bid is still open.208 A bidder may obtain irrevocable commitments from 
shareholders to accept a tender offer.209 The SEC also enforces the ‘all price 
rule’, which requires that the price offered for the tendered shares must be the 
same for all shareholders.210 The purpose of the rule is to prevent coercive and 
unfair treatment tender offers similar to an ‘early bird special’, where 
shareholders who tendered their shares early received a higher offer.211 All 
tender offers are subject to the general anti-fraud provisions. Untrue 
statements, omission of material information or misleading statements are 
prohibited. In addition, deceptive, manipulative practices and pressure tactics 
due to short time periods are not allowed.212 Other restrictions on tender offers 
relate to antitrust legislation when the acquisition of shares of a particular value 
is made or assets.213 The discussions of the impact of takeover and mergers 
on different industries, and how they may be affected by antitrust authorities’ 
rules are beyond the scope of the dissertation.  
                                            
206Rule 13e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act and also See Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The 
Business Lawyer 489-490. 
207Rule 14e -5 of the Securities Exchange Act,  Act, and Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The 
Business Lawyer 484. 
208Rule 14e-5 of the Securities Exchange Act and also Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The 
Business Lawyer 484. 
209See Rule 14d-10 of the Securities Exchange  Act and also Basnage & Curtin III (2016) The 
Business Lawyer 487-488. 
210Rule d-10(a) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act requires the tender offer to be open to all the 
shareholders of the target, irrespective of their location. See also Basnage & Curtin III (2016) 
The Business Lawyer 497. 
211Climan et al (2012) Penn State Law Review 628. 
212Basnage & Curtin III 2016 The Business Lawyer 484. 
213See Ferrarini & Miller (2009) Cornell International Law Journal 305. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
47 
 
 
A freeze-out following a tender offer that has been structured properly under 
the Unilateral Approach will be subject to a judicial review standard under the 
deferential BJR.214 This is in contrast to a freeze-out following a traditional 
approach transaction, which is subject to the heightened entire fairness 
standard of review.215 Other scholars indicate that conflicted controlling 
stockholder transactions are generally subject to the entire fairness standard of 
review. Exceptions may include: making conflicted controlling stockholder 
transactions subject to the approval of, an effective special committee, or 
minority shareholders which may shift the burden of proving entire fairness 
standards to the plaintiff. Furthermore, subjecting such transactions from the 
beginning to the approval of both an effective special committee and minority 
shareholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote may lower the standard of 
review to business judgment.216 The standards of reviewing actions of directors 
are discussed below in paragraph 2 5. 
 
In deciding which method to adopt in effecting a takeover or merger, 
practitioners consider the method with least disadvantages.217 The Unilateral 
Approach method has both advantages and disadvantages. Advantages for the 
bidder include: 
 
- it is not subject to the heighted entire fairness standard of judicial review218; 
- it avoids time consuming and intricate negotiations with the target special 
committee. The bidder may continue even after the committee rejects the 
offer.219 Speed and timing appears to be the major advantage of the tender 
offer (it can be consummated quickly);220 and; 
                                            
214See McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law Vol.30 438. 
215438. 
216Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 43. 
217McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 458. 
218459. 
219459. 
220See Climan et al (2012) Penn State Law Review 621-622 and, at 626. 
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- further, the bidder is able to change and modify the terms of the offer 
unilaterally.221 
 
The Unilateral Approach also has disadvantages, which include: 
 
- that an offer in terms of this approach may be negatively perceived by the 
market that the offer from the bidder does not have support of the target 
company directors;222 
- that it may be difficult for a bidder to raise funding to acquire all outstanding 
shares of the target;223 
- if the bidder does not succeed in achieving the 90 percent threshold to 
implement a squeeze out after the offer, it may be forced to take another step 
such as the statutory merger, to complete the takeover. This may result in 
additional costs for the bidder as it is forced to make another offer to enable it 
to implement the squeeze out.224    
 
2 4 3 An overview of hostile and unsolicited tender offers 
 
As discussed in the previous paragraph 2 4 2, a bidder may make a tender offer 
directly to the shareholders without negotiating with directors of the target 
company. The directors of the target company, whose shareholders have 
received an offer directly from the bidder without their co-operation, may take a 
number of steps to prevent the offer from succeeding. This can lead to hostilities 
between the bidder and directors of the target company. A hostile takeover 
primarily refers to a change in corporate control against the wishes of the 
incumbent management and the board of directors. Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny225 refer to a hostile takeover as an acquisition where: 
 
                                            
221McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 459. 
222459. 
223459. 
224460.  
225RK Morck, A Shleifer & RW Vishny “Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly 
Takeovers” in AJ Auerbach, (ed) Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences (1988) 
101–136. <http://www.nber.org/books/auer88-1. (Accessed 2-8-2014.) 
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“[T]he initial bid for the target was neither negotiated with its board prior to being 
made nor accepted by the board as made. Thus, initial rejection by the target's 
board is taken as evidence of the bidder's hostility, as is active management 
resistance to the bid, escape to a "white knight,"226 or a management buyout in 
response to unsolicited pressure”227 
 
Thompson228 quotes Shleifer & Vishny who say, “Takeovers are widely 
interpreted as the critical corporate governance mechanism in the US, without 
which managerial discretion cannot be controlled.” Takeovers are regarded as 
a method of monitoring and disciplining management. It is difficult to acquire 
control of companies whose majority shares are held by a single shareholder 
or groupings without the co-operation of that shareholder. This may lead to a 
hostile takeover.229 A proxy contest may also be used to achieve a takeover.230 
Prior to the 1960s, the primary method to force a change of corporate control 
in the US was to launch a proxy contest and then remove the incumbent 
board.231 As the name suggests, proxy contests are a form of hostile takeover 
although a tender to acquire the shares may or may not be involved. 
Shareholders are entitled to nominate directors whom they believe may better 
serve the company and all its shareholders.232 The attempt to replace the 
incumbent directors may result in an election contest between the newly- 
nominated directors and existing directors.233 Unsuccessful hostile tender 
offers led to bidders formulating new strategies to overcome the defensive 
poison pills.234 A new phenomenon has developed over a number of years 
where both a hostile tender offer and proxy contests are used jointly as part of 
                                            
226A “white knight” refers to a friendly acquirer who has been invited by target management to 
increase the offer price or make an offer on better terms than those offered by an unwelcome 
bidder. See A Shleifer & RW Vishny “Greenmail, white knights, and shareholder’s interests” 
(1986) 17: 3 Rand Journal of Economics 294. 
227Morck et al in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 101 -136. 
228Thompson (2002) Vanderbilt University Law School Law & Economics Working Paper 
Number 02-26. 3. 
229Schuster (2010) LSE Law 2. 
230239. 
231239. 
232M Lipton & SA Rosenblaum “Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose 
Time has Not Come” (2003) The Business Lawyer.69. 
23369. 
234Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 247. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
50 
 
a well-coordinated takeover strategy.235 This is one of the effective strategies 
because the bidder will be able to remove the existing target directors and 
replace them with its nominated directors. The bidder’s nominees would then 
be able to remove the poison pill defence and ensure the success of the hostile 
takeover.236    
 
The federal law applicable here is section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, together with the SEC’s proxy rules. Proxy contests must comply with 
SEC rules.237 It is asserted that the SEC’s proxy rules are the most important 
regulations in proxy contests and the courts are also significant as this is where 
parties can seek relief against any inequitable conduct on the part of the board. 
The SEC’s proxy rules require a proxy statement with all solicitations for 
voting.238 The rules also provide how proxies should be obtained. Hostile tender 
offers have gradually replaced proxy contests as a means to achieve corporate 
control.239 One of the reasons for this is that the tender offer may be 
implemented quickly and also allows the bidder to recover a portion of his costs 
should the bid not be successful. The shares acquired can possibly be sold at 
a profit in the stock market.240   
 
2 5 An overview: The standards of reviewing the decisions of board of 
directors during takeovers and mergers.  
 
The State of Delaware has a more developed and sophisticated body of 
precedent-setting cases on corporate law issues than other states in the US.241 
There are a number of reasons for this, including the expertise of the judges in 
a limited jurisdiction trial court, the presence of the Delaware Chancery Court 
(a court with limited jurisdiction that is able to hear only matters of corporate 
                                            
235239.  
236247. 
237Regulation14A of the Securities Exchange Act, deals with proxies and see also the 
discussions under paragraph 2 4 2. 
238Regulation 14A of the Securities Exchange Act and Schedule 14A. See also Oesterle The 
Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 158. 
239Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 240. 
240240. 
241Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 31.  
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law), and the fact that most publicly-held companies have their place of 
registration as Delaware, even if they have only limited business dealings within 
the state. Cases on mergers and acquisitions have contributed significantly to 
the protection of shareholders, as they are able to rely on those cases in pursuit 
of their rights to the courts.242 As the DGCL is an enabling statute, the 
enforcement of the director’s fiduciary duties is one of the most important 
checks the Delaware judiciary imposes to guard against managerial abuse.243 
When shareholders believe that directors have breached their fiduciary duties, 
they can file a suit with the Delaware Court of Chancery.244 The courts have 
also developed standards of reviewing directors’ decision-making process in a 
number of transactions. It has been indicated that the terminology is not 
accurate and is:  
 
“[S]omewhat misleading, because in corporate law the standard of review is 
not the familiar civil procedure standard that governs how a higher court or 
other tribunal should review the decision of a lower tribunal. Rather, in 
corporation law, the term refers to the substantive standard that courts apply in 
deciding whether challenged board action constitutes an actionable breach of 
fiduciary duty.”245  
 
There are three standards of reviewing actions of directors namely: the entire 
fairness standard discussed under paragraph 2 5 1 below, the intermediate 
standards of review discussed in paragraph 2 5 2 below and the BJR discussed 
below under paragraph 2 5 3.246 Initially, there were only two standards of 
review- the entire fairness standard and the BJR. These two standards are 
regarded as the bedrock of standards of review in corporation law in 
Delaware.247  
 
                                            
242Oesterle The Law of Mergers and Acquisitions 31. 
243LE Strine “The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of The New 
Challenges We (And Europe) Face” (2005) 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 681 
244681. 
245JB Jacobs “Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective” 
(2015)5 Harvard Business Law Review 154. 
246154-155. 
247155.  
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2 5 1 The entire fairness standard of review 
 
The entire fairness standard of review is the strictest level of judicial review of 
the decisions of the board.248 One of the landmark cases249 in respect of the 
entire fairness standard is the case of Weinberger v UOP.250 This case is 
regarded as a seminal case in respect of the entire fairness standards where 
freeze-out mergers are involved.251 The Weinberger case clarified the type of 
protection that minority shareholders should enjoy in freeze-out mergers. The 
case involved a freeze-out merger transaction with a majority shareholder. 
Briefly, the facts are that, Weinberger, a former shareholder of UOP Inc., 
brought a suit against the directors of UOP Inc. challenging a merger between 
the company and its majority shareholder - The Signal Companies Inc.  
 
As a result of the merger, minority shareholders were bought out for cash. In its 
final ruling, the Chancery Court held that the terms of the merger were fair to 
Weinberger and other minority shareholders, and ruled in favour of the 
defendants. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, while it agreed 
with part of the Chancery Court ruling that the majority shareholder must prove 
that the transaction was fair, the plaintiff must first demonstrate some action as 
a basis for invoking the fairness obligation.252 The court also determined that 
since no measures were taken to provide for arm’s length negotiations, the 
appropriate standard of review was the entire fairness standard. The court 
further pointed out that in a parent-subsidiary context, where it is shown that 
the negotiations were done on an arms-length basis, each party exerting and 
having bargaining power against the other, this would serve as strong evidence 
that the transaction meets the test of fairness. The court further added that 
                                            
248SV Scott & S Brody “The Evolving Role of Special Committees in M&A Transactions: 
Seeking Business Judgment Rule Protection in the Context of Controlling Shareholder 
Transactions and Other Corporate Transactions Involving Conflicts of interest” (2014) 69 The 
Business Lawyer 1121. 
249McGuiness & Rehbock (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 441. 
250Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
251Subramanian “Fixing Freeze-outs” (2004) Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, 
Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 501, 4. 
http://isr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/501> (Accessed 20-2-2016). 
252Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 703 (Del. 1983). 
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where a transaction has been voted on by an informed vote of a majority of the 
minority shareholders then, the burden of proving that the transaction is unfair  
to minorities entirely shifts to the plaintiff.253 Parties who rely on the fact that 
minority shareholders have voted in favour of a transaction must show that they 
have completely disclosed all material facts relevant to the transaction.254 The 
entire fairness standard requires both “fair dealing” and a “fair price”. The court 
pointed out that: 
 
“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The 
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the 
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter 
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the 
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, 
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent 
value of a company's stock.”255 
 
The court then pointed out that in this matter, the record does not support a 
finding that the minority shareholders’ vote was an informed one. This is due 
to the fact that material information necessary for the minority shareholders to 
bargain with UOP Inc. and the majority shareholders was withheld. This 
amounted to breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties. Therefore, the court 
concluded that the merger did not meet the test of fairness.256 The matter was 
then referred to the Delaware Chancery to decide on the fair value of the 
shares.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
253Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 703 (Del. 1983).  
254703. 
255711. 
256703. 
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2 5 2 The intermediate standard of review 
 
The Williams Act does not regulate the conduct of the directors of the target 
company as the ‘‘board neutrality rule’’257 does in the UK’s takeover regime.258 
The regulation of the conduct of directors during takeovers and mergers is 
therefore undertaken through various state laws.259 In particular, the State of 
Delaware came to be seen as the chief architect of such rules. The courts 
regulated such conduct on a case-by-case basis.260 The intermediate 
standards rules did not develop systematically until after 1985.261 In the period 
between 1985 and 1988, the Delaware courts developed three intermediate 
standards of reviewing directors’ decisions based, on common law judicial 
decision-making.262 These standards add a higher level of judicial scrutiny, also 
referred to as “enhanced business judgment”263 standard of judicial review. The 
intermediate standards of judicial review dealt with instances where the board, 
subject to a hostile takeover bid, adopted defensive actions and opposed the 
takeover bid. The question as to who should decide a hostile offer between the 
board and the shareholders is not clear-cut.264 Some of the questions to be 
answered are: 
 
“[W] ho should decide whether an unsolicited takeover bid can go forward – the 
stockholders or the target company board, and which governmental branch – 
the executive, legislative, or judicial – should decide the first question?” 265  
 
                                            
257The Board Neutrality rule provides that when a tender offer is launched, the directors of the 
target cannot initiate or continue any action that might frustrate the success of an offer without 
the approval of shareholders in a meeting. M Ventoruzzo “Takeover Regulation as a Wolf in 
Sheep’s Clothing: Taking U.K Rules to Continental Europe” (2008) 11:1 U. Pennsylvania 
Journal of Business Law 135 141. 
258Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 259. 
259259. 
260262. 
261243. 
262245. 
263See S Bainbridge “Unocal At 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers” 2005 31 
Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 31. 
264Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 243. 
265243. 
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The State of Delaware has not made any pronouncements on either issue, but 
historically the courts have always ruled on the conduct of directors during 
takeovers, and this is settled at least in the State of Delaware.266 Where the 
takeover bid takes the form of a proposal for a merger, the DGCL provides that 
the board had powers to decide whether or not shareholders may vote on the 
merger. This is in line with the basic principles set out in DGCL in section 
141(a), relating to directors’ powers to manage the affairs and business of 
corporations.267 Where a transaction involves a tender offer, the DGCL does 
not vest any statutory power in the board.268 
 
The issue of defensive tactics during a takeover was a focal point in the matter 
of Unocal Corp. v Mesa Petroleum Co.269 The Delaware Supreme Court 
decided the case on the basis of fiduciary duties of directors. The court held 
that the directors have fiduciary duties to interpose themselves between the 
bidder and the shareholders and, if necessary, to take defensive action which 
is not disproportionate to the threat posed by the takeover. The decision in the 
Unocal case270 created a new standard to measure directors’ duties during a 
hostile takeover. One of the concerns the court had was that hostile offers 
create potential for conflict of interest. As the court puts it, because of the 
“omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests 
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders”,271 it is imperative that 
such a tender offer be subject to additional judicial scrutiny. Briefly, the facts in 
the Unocal case are as follows: The appellant, defendant in the court of first 
instance, Unocal Corp. (Unocal), appealed the decision of the Court of 
Chancery where the court had ruled in favour of the plaintiff, Mesa Petroleum 
Co (Mesa). Mesa held approximately 13 percent of the issued shares of Unocal. 
Mesa attempted to launch a buy-out of Unocal in a two-stepped transaction. 
The board of Unocal rejected the offer on the basis that it was unfair and not 
                                            
266242. 
267Section 141(a) of the DGCL provides that “the business and affairs of every corporation … 
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”. This prevents possible 
meddling and interference on directors’ actions by shareholders in the day-to-day operation of 
the corporations without due course.  
268Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 243. 
269493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
270493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
271493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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for the benefit of shareholders. It did so after taking a number of steps to 
consider the offer, including taking advice from financial advisers. The advice 
received was that the offer was grossly inadequate. Based on this advice, the 
board adopted a defensive strategy against the hostile bid. As part of a 
defensive tactic against the hostile offer, the board introduced a self-tender of 
its own shares (share repurchase). The share repurchase would exclude the 
shares held by Mesa. In addition, the share repurchase would require Unocal 
to incur debt, as it would raise money to be used for the share repurchase. The 
directors considered the matter and concluded that the action is reasonable 
and the company can afford the debt. Mesa then launched an application 
seeking an injunction against the actions of the board in respect of the share 
repurchase. Mesa claimed that the share repurchase that excluded it was not 
legally permissible. The Court of Chancery agreed. On appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court disagreed and ruled that a blanket prohibition of this kind of 
practice could not be maintained. The court ruled that: 
 
“The factual findings of the Vice Chancellor, fully supported by the record, 
establish that Unocal’s board, consisting of a majority of independent directors, 
acted in good faith, and after reasonable investigation found that Mesa’s tender 
offer was both inadequate and coercive. Under the circumstances the board 
had both the power and duty to oppose a bid perceived to be harmful to the 
corporate enterprise. On this record we are satisfied that the device Unocal 
adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and that the board acted 
in the proper exercise of sound business judgment.”272 
 
In summing up the reasons for its decision and reversing the decision of the 
Chancery Court, the Supreme Court highlighted a number of important factors. 
The Supreme Court indicated that it would not substitute the decision of the 
board for its own, if that decision can be “attributed to any rational business 
purpose.” 273 This was because the board of Unocal had a broad authority upon 
which to make decisions. Its duties and responsibilities are based on the 
inherent powers conferred by section 141(a) of the DGCL. In terms of this 
                                            
272493 A.2d 946, (Del. 1985). 
273493 A.2d 946, (Del. 1985). 
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section, the affairs and business of a corporation are under the management of 
the board. A Delaware corporation may validly deal selectively with its 
shareholders, on condition that the directors have not acted out of sole or 
primary purpose to entrench themselves in office to the exclusion of 
shareholders.274 The board has a fundamental duty to protect the corporation 
from harm, irrespective of where it may come from. The board has an obligation 
to respond to the offer in a manner that is in the best interests of the company 
and its shareholders.275 In its ruling, the Delaware Supreme Court referred to 
the BJR,276 and indicated that unless shown on preponderance of evidence that 
the directors’ decisions were aimed at perpetuating themselves in office, or 
some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good 
faith or being uninformed, the court cannot substitute its decision. Here the 
court applied the BJR and the directors had the benefit of the BJR based on 
the presumption that when they made their decisions they acted: (1) on an 
informed basis, (2) in good faith, and (3) in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interest of the company.277 Directors were able to avoid 
the enhanced scrutiny by complying with these requirements.278 With this 
ruling, the court created the enhanced BJR to guard against the potential 
conflicts faced by the directors. However, the standard has been diluted over 
time.279 
 
In another matter dealing with defensive tactics during a takeover is Revlon Inc. 
v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.280 The court had to decide whether the 
standard of reviewing directors’ conduct in defending a hostile takeover created 
in the Unocal case, namely, “the enhanced scrutiny”, was applicable.281 Briefly, 
the facts in Revlon are: Revlon’s board was faced with the threat of a hostile 
                                            
274493 A.2d 946, (Del. 1985)  
275493 A2d 946, (Del. 1985) 
276493 A.2d 946, (Del. 1985) 
277493 A.2d 946, (Del. 1985) 
278I Anabtawi “The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence” (January 
2019, Forthcoming) 43, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 10; UCLA School of Law, Law & 
Economics Research Paper Series Research Paper No 18-11 Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3248474.Accessed (20 -11-2018.) 
279Anabtawi (January 2019 Forthcoming) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 10. 
280Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986). 
281Bainbridge (2013) Fordham L. Rev 3297. 
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takeover by Pantry Pride, a subsidiary of MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc. 
(the bidder). The board implemented several defensive measures, including a 
poison pill282 and, a share repurchases in exchange for promissory notes and 
preference shares (the initial defensive measures). In addition, the board 
searched for another bidder as a “white knight”283 (the second defensive 
measures). Forstmann Little & Co became the white knight and agreed to 
acquire Revlon. The agreement had numerous provisions to protect the 
transaction from another bidder. The terms of the merger agreement included 
a no-shop clause,284 a termination fee,285 and a lock-up option. 286 The lock-up 
option gave Forstmann Little & Co the right to buy two divisions of Revlon for 
significantly less than market value should another bidder buy 40 percent or 
more of Revlon’s shares. The bidder then approached the Chancery Court for 
an injunction against the transaction which was granted. On appeal the 
Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the board of Revlon and upheld the initial 
defensive measures taken by the board. The Supreme Court indicated that 
directors defending a takeover may be protected by the BJR, provided they can 
                                            
282A poison pill refers to various defensive measures adopted by boards of directors in response 
to a takeover attempt or in advance of a possible takeover attempt which may cause severe 
economic repercussions in the acquirer or the potential controlling person. See SS Dawson, 
RJ Pence & DJ Stone “Poison Pill Defensive Measures” (1987) 42: 2 The Business Lawyer 423-
439 423. There is no doubt that the sale of the two divisions at 40 percent discount will devalue 
the target company and thereby cause potential financial harm to the competing bidder. 
283See definition of “white knight” at note 262 above. A Shleifer & RW Vishny “Greenmail, white 
knights, and shareholder’s interests” (1986) 17: 3 Rand Journal of Economics 294. 
284“No-shop clause” also called “no talk” is an agreement to negotiate only with one party. A 
typical exclusivity provision requires the grantor not to `initiate contact with, solicit, encourage 
or participate in any way in discussions or negotiations with, or provide information to a 
competing bidder. Under this type of clause, the directors of the target are forbidden from taking 
any action, such as seeking or considering an alternative offer, even higher bid, which would 
render the consummation of the transaction under lock up less likely. See J Mayanja “No-shop, 
No Talk and Break-up Fees Agreements in merger and takeover Transactions: The case for a 
fresh regulatory approach” (2002) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 6-7. 
285A termination fee refers to a fee that is usually payable by the target company whose 
directors have agreed to support a negotiated acquisition transaction by the bidder to a bidder 
if the transaction is not implemented in accordance with the agreed terms as a result of certain 
clearly defined events. See JQ Jeon & JA Ligon “How much is reasonable? The size of 
termination fees in mergers and acquisitions” (2011)17Journal of Corporate Finance 959-
981.959, termination fees are also called break fees or reimbursement fees. 
286“Lock up device” refers to an option granted at the discretion of target management, which 
gives a selected bidder the right to purchase a portion of a target at a discount. It allows target 
managers to simultaneously advocate an acquisition by one party and obstruct attempts by 
others. See TR Burch “Locking out rival bidders: The use of lockup options in corporate 
mergers” (2001) 60 Journal of Financial Economics 103-141 104. 
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establish that they meet the requirements for relying on it.287 The court also 
indicated that: 
 
“Where directors have decided to commit the corporation to a change of control 
transaction, their actions must be evaluated solely by reference to their duty to 
obtain the highest value reasonably available.”288 
 
The reason for the court to uphold the initial defensive tactics adopted by the 
board of Revlon was that the directors acted to protect the shareholders against 
a low, unfair price while retaining the flexibility to accept any higher offer that 
may be received. Therefore, the defensive action taken was regarded as 
reasonable considering the threat posed by the hostile bid.289 Rejecting the 
second line of defensive tactics adopted by the board, the court indicated: 
  
“[T]he Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a 
merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for 
sale. The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon 
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for 
the stockholders' benefit. This significantly altered the board's responsibilities 
under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and 
effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. 
The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The directors' role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with 
getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.’’ 290  
 
The court then considered the lock-up option defensive tactic. The defensive 
measure gave Forstmann Little & Co the right to buy two divisions of Revlon for 
significantly less than market value should another bidder buy 40 percent or 
more of Revlon’s shares. The court found that the board were no longer acting 
in the interest of shareholders to maximise shareholder value when it concluded 
                                            
287506 A.2d 173 181 (Del.1986). 
288WT Allen, JB Jacobs & LE Strine Jr “Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law” (2001) 26 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 893.  
289506 A.2d 173 181 (Del.1986).  
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this scheme. The board should have been aware that the company was for sale 
and their duties were to obtain a higher price for shareholders.291 The board 
breached their duty of care to shareholders and their actions were potentially 
detrimental to the interest of shareholders.292 The lock-up device as a defensive 
tactic had the effect of ending the auctioning of the shares of Revlon to the 
detriment of shareholders, even though the bidder had increased the offer 
price.293 The bidder could no longer proceed with the takeover offer, thereby 
denying shareholders an opportunity to get a higher price.294 The defensive 
tactics adopted by the board of Revlon was tainted by directors’ interests and 
directors had breached their fiduciary duties.295 The court concluded that this 
defensive measure is contrary to a duty of care and the directors were not 
entitled to protection under the BJR.296 This defensive measure was 
invalidated.297 The court also ruled against the ‘no-shop clause’ in the 
agreement as it prevented the board from negotiating with other bidders. The 
court concluded that target shareholders are entitled to the best price available. 
Therefore, market forces should be allowed to operate freely in order for 
directors to obtain best prices for shareholders. 298 The decision of the court 
created what is generally referred to as the ‘Revlon doctrine’, under the 
Delaware law.299 The Revlon doctrine is applicable when the board of directors 
considers the sale of a company or a change of control.300 The Revlon doctrine 
has two important implications. These are:  
 
“First, the focus of the board’s fiduciary duties shifts from the long-term well-
being of the corporation to the short-term interests of the stockholders in 
achieving a transaction that will maximize the value of their shares. These 
refocused duties are frequently referred to as Revlon duties. Second, the Court 
                                            
291506 A.2d 173 182 (Del.1986). 
292506 A.2d 173 182 (Del.1986). 
293506 A.2d 173 183 (Del.1986). 
294506 A.2d 173 179 (Del.1986) 
295506 A.2d 173 185 (Del.1986). 
296506 A.2d 173 184 (Del.1986). 
297See S Bainbridge “The Geography of Revlon-Land” (2013) 81 Fordham Law Review 3298-
3299. 
298506 A.2d 173 184 (Del.1986). 
299CW Burlow “Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine” (2009) 11:3 U. of Pennsylvania Journal of 
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will subject the board’s performance of its Revlon duties to enhanced scrutiny, 
even though, under the business judgment rule, the decision would be entitled 
to judicial deference.” 301  
 
The following situation will trigger Revlon principles: 
 
“(1) the target’s board initiates an active bidding process to sell the corporation 
or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear breakup of the company; 
(2) in response to an initial offer, the target’s board causes the corporation to 
abandon the corporation’s long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction involving the breakup of the company;  
(3) the transaction results in a sale or change of control of the corporation.”302 
 
The Revlon case created a standard of review of the conduct of directors during 
takeovers or mergers in terms of which the judicial deference created by the 
BJR, generally given to board decisions narrows from rationality to a range of 
reasonableness.303 Under the Revlon doctrine, in the sale for cash payment, 
the court closely scrutinises the price paid and the process followed by the 
board.304 This is done to ensure that no other considerations were taken into 
account by the board, other than ensuring that the shareholders obtain the 
highest price.305 Bainbridge noted that, the Revlon standard created a number 
of problems and the courts initially “waffled”306 on the matter as to what exactly 
are the Revlon standards of review. The precise geography of Revlon 
standards of judicial review is still unclear.307  
 
The obligation imposed on directors, to obtain the best price for shareholders, 
as imposed in the Revlon case was further clarified in another case, In re 
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation,308 where shareholders 
                                            
301523. 
302Bainbridge (2013) Fordham Law Review 3337-3338. 
303JT Laster “Revlon is a Standard of Review: Why it’s True and What it Means” 19 (2013-2014) 
Fordham J. Copr & Fin. L 6. 
304Harvard Law Review “Recent Cases” (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1256. 
305Harvard Law Review “Recent Cases” (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1256. 
306Bainbridge (2013) Fordham Law Review 3299. 
3073317.  
308No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).  
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would receive shares in another company as part of the consideration for selling 
their shares. In this matter, the court applied the principles set out in the Revlon 
case where a consideration for acquiring shares in a negotiated merger was 
split equally between a cash and share payment.309 Briefly, the Court of 
Chancery had to consider an application for an injunction against a merger 
transaction entered into by the board of Smurfit–Stone Container Corp, where 
the merging company had no controlling shareholder, by a shareholder who 
alleged breach of fiduciary duties by directors.310 Plaintiff contended that the 
transaction is subject to the Revlon principles as the directors had put the 
company of up for sale.311  
 
In essence, the argument was that the directors are obliged to obtain the 
highest price for the shareholders in line with the Revlon case. In this case, 
shareholders were to receive a combination of cash and shares, in equal 
proportions as a consideration.312 The court had to consider whether the 
standard for reviewing directors’ duties is the enhanced scrutiny set in terms of 
the Revlon case or the deference rule in terms of the BJR.313 The Delaware 
Chancery court considered the applicable principles established in the Revlon 
case and held that even though payment was split equally in cash and shares 
of the acquirer, and the company had no controlling shareholder, the Revlon 
doctrine applied.314 The court indicated that “the concern here is that there is 
no “tomorrow” for approximately 50% of each stockholder’s investment in 
Smurfit-Stone”.315 According to the court, for a Smurfit shareholder, that is the 
end of the game for a substantial investment in a Delaware corporation.316 The 
transaction will result in the end of the corporation.317 The decision is criticised 
as having a potential to discourage the target board from agreeing to 
                                            
309No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011), See also Harvard Law Review 
“Recent Cases” (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1256. 
310No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) 23-25.  
311No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) 26. 
312No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011).26-27. 
313No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) 28, and in Harvard Law Review 
“Recent Cases” (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1256. 
314No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) 40. 
315No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011) 36. 
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transactions that could be beneficial to shareholders where payment is split 
equally in cash and shares.318  
 
It is pointed out that the original Revlon case dealt with cash payment, the court 
can easily establish whether shareholders were paid the highest price.319 In 
transactions involving shares and share mergers, the BJR applies because the 
board is in a better position to decide on the merits of such transactions.320 A 
court cannot declare that one proposal is better than the other based only on 
shares as the future value depends on the financial health of the acquirer and 
profits of the combined company.321 Similarly, in a mixed consideration 
transaction with equal shares and cash, the value of the merger is not easily 
determinable.322  
 
Applying the Revlon doctrine in the scenario requires the court to evaluate the 
strategies of the parties, to determine the value of the transaction post the 
merger. Target boards are in a better position to evaluate this fact rather than 
the courts.323 While the court found that the directors in the matter had properly 
carried out their duties, the decision is criticised, and it is submitted by scholars 
that the court should not have applied the enhanced scrutiny principle as set 
out in the Revlon case. It is argued that taking into consideration the process 
followed by the directors in this case, directors had exercised their duties 
faithfully.324 It is asserted that: 
 
“Corporate law would have been better served if the Court of Chancery had 
refrained from applying Revlon case to the Smurfit-Stone transaction and 
instead deferred to the business judgment of the disinterested directors, who 
could best determine whether the Rock-Tenn transaction was in the interest of 
Smurfit-Stone shareholders.”325 
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Another important matter relating to the application of the BJR in mergers, 
decided by the Chancery Court, is In re MFW Shareholder Litigation.326 The 
Chancery Court had to deal with a case where the majority shareholder wanted 
to buy out the remaining shares. The offer by the controlling shareholder was 
subject to two main conditions, namely: approval by an independent special 
committee of the board of directors, and approval by the majority of the minority 
shareholders.327  
 
Certain shareholders sued the directors and the controlling shareholders on the 
basis that the transaction was unfair, and attempted to interdict voting at the 
shareholders meeting. However, the litigants abandoned the initial claims and 
eventually sued for damages on the basis of breach of fiduciary duties by 
directors. The plaintiff argued that the transaction should be subject to the 
“entire fairness procedure,”328 rather than the deferential BJR. The defendants 
argued that the transaction should only be subject the BJR due to the specific 
procedures set by the controlling shareholder prior to the merger discussions. 
The Court of Chancery agreed with the defendants and dismissed the claim. 
The rationale of the court was that the two procedures, which were pre-
conditions for the merger, were correctly followed. The court further ruled that 
the BJR should,  
 
“[O]nly be invoked if:  
(i) the controller conditions the transaction on the approval of both a Special 
Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders;  
(ii) the Special Committee is independent;  
(iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and 
to say no definitively;  
(iv) the Special Committee acts with care;  
(v) the minority vote is informed; and  
(vi) there is no coercion of the minority.”329 
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328 See the discussions of the entire fairness standard in paragraphs 2 5 1.  
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The court analysed the process followed in the transaction and indicated that 
the independent committee consisted of directors who were in law independent, 
and that the majority of the minority shareholders who voted in favour of the 
transaction were unconnected to the bidder.330 The court held that it is 
appropriate to defer to the disinterested directors and shareholders whose 
money was at stake.331 The courts are not business experts.332 The members 
of the independent committee had an incentive to ensure that proper 
procedures were followed because they wished to protect their reputations. 
Therefore, they will be willing to negotiate for a buy-out price that is in the best 
interests of shareholders to ensure that shareholders will approve it.333 The 
controlling shareholder also knowing that the independent committee who has 
no interest negotiates the transaction will likely accept their views since he is 
concerned that they are unlikely to recommend a transaction they consider not 
fair.334 If the transaction is not recommended by the independent committee it 
may be rejected shareholders.335 The majority of the minority shareholders on 
the other hand, have the opportunity to reject the deal based on the full 
disclosure and without any coercion.336 For these reasons the court ruled in 
favour of the defendant. In an appeal against the ruling of the court of first 
instance, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v M & F Worldwide Corp 
(MFW),337 endorsed the decision of the Court of Chancery in in re MFW 
Shareholder Litigation. The court confirmed that the standard of review that 
governs mergers between controlling shareholders and its subsidiary where the 
transaction ab initio was subject to both the approval of an independent 
sufficiently-empowered special committee of the board that fulfils its duty of 
care; and voted on by the majority of the minority who voted freely based on 
informed basis, is the BJR.338 The court pointed out that the defendant must 
                                            
330500-503. 
331500-503. 
332525-527. 
333525-528. 
334528-530. 
335530-530. 
336528-530 
33788 A3d 635 (Del 2014). 
33888 A3d 635 (Del 2014). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
66 
 
prove that the transaction was fair to minority shareholders. The defendant may 
shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff by proving that: the transaction was 
approved by either a well-functioning independent board of directors, or the 
transaction was approved by an informed vote of a majority of the minority 
shareholders.339 The full bench of the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled that the more deferential business judgment rule standard of review, 
rather than the entire fairness standard of review applies to buy-outs by 
controlling shareholders, if the conditions for invoking the BJR stated by the 
Chancery Court in In re MFW Shareholder Litigation, as quoted above, were 
met. The court analysed the transaction process adopted by the board of MFW. 
It was noted that from the beginning of the transaction, MFW’s board required 
that the proposal to effect a buy-out be undertaken on two conditions aimed at 
protecting shareholders. Firstly, the merger proposal was to be negotiated and 
approved by a special committee of independent MFW directors. Secondly, 
MFW required that the proposal be approved by a majority of shareholders not 
connected to MFW.340 By subjecting the transaction to the above procedural 
steps ensured protection for minority investors against the potential conflict, 
because of the involvement of the controlling shareholder. Therefore, the court 
ruled that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties, and were entitled 
to the protection of the more deferential BJR.341 
 
Another matter that came before the Delaware Chancery court concerning 
defensive tactics in hostile takeovers is Blasius Industries Inc. v Atlas 
Corporation.342 A matter dealing with proxy contests, in particular, the action of 
directors that are designed to interfere with the rights of shareholders to vote. 
The reaction of the target board in a proxy contest raises numerous issues, 
including fiduciary duties. As discussed above in paragraph 2 4 3 under hostile 
takeovers, proxy contests are a form of a hostile takeover. The main issue for 
the court to decide in the Blasius case was: which standard of reviewing the 
conduct of directors should be applied when a board take steps intended to 
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interfere with the right of shareholders to vote, particularly the right to vote for 
a different board.343 Briefly, the facts in the case are that Blasius Industries Inc 
(Blasius), a substantial shareholder, approached the board of Atlas Corporation 
(Atlas), with a number of proposals. Blasius requested the board to undertake 
various steps, including, shareholder voting on amendment of bylaws of Atlas, 
increasing the board and electing new board members representing Blasius, 
restructuring and repayment of capital.344 The increase of the board would have 
resulted in directors representing Blasius being in the majority on the board of 
Atlas. This was viewed by the board of Atlas as an attempt to take control. The 
board of Atlas reacted by increasing the number of directors to ensure that 
Blasius does not have majority of directors on the board. The board of Atlas 
refused to co-operate with the other proposals and voted against them. Blasius 
sued on the basis that the directors did not act in good faith and their actions 
were motivated by selfish effort to protect their positions to collectively control 
Atlas. The defendants relied on the BJR, and asserted that they acted with due 
care and in good faith to protect the shareholders of Atlas from the threat of 
having an impractical, dangerous proposal being forced on them.345 The court 
ruled that the BJR is not applicable where directors’ actions interfere with 
shareholders votes, even if the decision of the directors was taken in good 
faith.346 In the court’s ruling, where a board took defensive actions which had 
the effect of interfering with shareholders’ freedom to vote, the actions will be 
invalidated, unless the board can show a “compelling justification”347 for taking 
such actions. The court held that there are policy justifications for adopting this 
rigorous standard. This is because directors are installed into office following a 
vote by shareholders. Directors’ legitimacy to exercise their corporate powers 
is derived from being voted in by the shareholders. Therefore, it is important 
that the right of shareholders to vote should be protected against any 
interference by the board.348 The Blasius case standards of reviewing the 
conduct of directors was designed to enforce that basic principle of company 
                                            
343Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 245. 
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law.349 According to Siegel,350 the Delaware courts have applied the Blasius 
test to five other shareholder voting cases. The standard of judicial review of 
directors’ conduct in respect of shareholder voting cases requires further 
“judicial pruning.’’351  
 
2 5 3 The business judgment rule 
 
A decision by directors whether to enter into a transaction or not, is often 
complex and challenging. As indicated above in paragraph 2 5 above, 
Delaware judges introduced standards by which conduct of directors are 
evaluated when exercising their fiduciary duties. The BJR is one of these 
standards. The BJR protects directors who have reached their decisions, 
having acted fully informed, in good faith, without personal bias or interest, and 
with an honest belief that the action undertaken was in the best interest of the 
corporation and its stakeholders.352 The BJR plays an important part in 
regulation of takeovers and mergers in the US, including in the State of 
Delaware. Therefore, it is appropriate that a section is dedicated to this rule. 
The BJR is not only applicable to takeovers and mergers but its reach is much 
broader, as it can be seen from case law discussed in this chapter. 
 
The BJR has its origins in England and the 1742 matter of Charitable Corp v 
Sutton 2 Atk,400,26 Eng.Rep.642 (Ch.1742).353 The Lord Chancellor of 
England indicated the court’s unwillingness to second guess business 
decisions of directors. The BJR has been described as expressing a policy that 
directors’ decisions may not be reviewed by judges if certain conditions exist.354 
In those cases, a judge determining adherence to BJR will consider if: 
 
“(i) a decision was made by directors (as opposed to incumbent management);  
                                            
349Armour et al (2011) Harvard International Law Journal 247.  
350M Siegel “The Problems and Promise of “Enhanced Business judgment” (2014) 17 U. 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 189. 
351184. 
352WM Lafferty, MA Schmidt, & DA Wolfe Jr, “A brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of 
Directors Under Delaware Law” (2012) 11 Penn State Law Review 839. 
353Holland (2009) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 679. 
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(ii) the directors were disinterested and independent,  
(iii) the directors acted in subjective good faith, and  
(iv) applied a reasonable decision-making process.”355 
 
The BJR is a “logical common law corollary to the fundamental statutory 
principle, codified in section 141(a) of the DGCL that the business and affairs 
of a corporation are managed by its board of directors.”356 The BJR is designed 
to effect a compromise between two competing values: the need to hold board 
of directors accountable and their authority. Boards of directors should be held 
accountable but their discretionary powers must also be preserved.357 The BJR 
is regarded as providing procedural guidance to litigants and also operate as a 
substantive rule of law. In making decisions, the board is presumed to have 
acted on an informed basis: in good faith and honestly in that the action taken 
is in the interests of the company. Where there is no breach of fiduciary duties, 
conflict of interest or bad faith, directors will be entitled to rely on the BJR.358 
Litigants who challenge the board’s decision must rebut the presumption. 
Presenting facts showing that the directors have in fact acted disloyally, in bad 
faith, or with gross negligence can do this.359 Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz360 
indicate that: 
 
“The purpose of the rule is to “encourage [ ] corporate fiduciaries to attempt to 
increase stockholder wealth by engaging in those risks that, in their business 
judgment, are in the best interest of the corporation ‘without the debilitating fear 
that they will be held personally liable if the company experience losses’’ 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v Lewis,361 described the BJR as 
follows: 
 
                                            
355870. 
356Holland (2008-2009) 34 Journal of Corporation Law 779. 
357S Bainbridge “The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine” (2004) 57.1 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 84. 
358Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d, 805, 812 (Del 1984).  
359See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 29. 
360See Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (2018) Takeover Law and Practice 29. The footnote in 
the quote has been omitted.  
361Aronson v Lewis 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
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“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse 
of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts.”362 
 
Briefly, the facts in the Aronson case are as follows: the Delaware Supreme 
Court dealt with an appeal from the Chancery Court where a shareholder, 
acting on behalf of a company, challenged certain actions by the directors on 
the basis that they failed to comply with their fiduciary duties. Having succeeded 
at the court of first instance, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the Chancery Court on appeal. In its ruling the Supreme Court emphasised 
the basic and important principle of the DGCL that directors of a corporation 
rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the corporation 
as provided in terms of section 141(a) of the DGCL, except where the certificate 
of incorporation of the company provides otherwise. The court further added 
that these powers are also subject to certain fundamental fiduciary duties to the 
corporation. The court pointed out that the BJR is an acknowledgement of 
managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors under section 141(a). There is 
a presumption that in making a business decision, directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests the company. The courts will respect the 
decision and actions taken by directors where the directors did not abuse their 
discretion. Any party challenging the decision of the directors must rebut the 
presumption that the decision was properly made.363     
 
Another important case on the BJR is that of Smith v Van Gorkom (Van Gorkom 
case).364 The brief facts of the matter are that the directors of Transunion 
Corporation (the Company), a public company, agreed to sell the company to 
another company, New T Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Mormon 
Group Inc, in a merger.365 The agreement was that the shareholders of the 
Company would receive cash for their shares. The directors approved the 
                                            
362473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984). 
363473 A 2d 805 (Del.1984). 
364Van Gorkom Case 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985). 
365See Van Gorkom case 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) at 864. 
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merger and the shareholders of the Company approved the merger based on 
the disclosure provided by the directors. Some shareholders of the Company 
instituted a class action claiming damages from directors who had agreed to 
the merger of the Company.366 The Chancery Court found that the board of 
directors had to be protected in terms of the BJR on the basis that when they 
made a decision to recommend a merger agreement to the shareholders, the 
directors were informed. However, the Delaware Supreme Court did not agree 
with this view and reversed the decision by majority rule decision.367 The 
Supreme Court ruled (1) that the directors were not fully informed when they 
made the decision to recommend the merger agreement. (2) that the Board's 
subsequent efforts to amend the Merger Agreement and take other curative 
action were ineffectual, both legally and factually; and (3) that the Board did not 
deal with complete openness with the shareholders by not disclosing all 
material facts, which they knew or should have known, before securing the 
shareholders' approval of the merger. 368 
 
The court referred to the chronology of the events leading to the approval.369 
The Supreme Court found that the board of directors approved the merger 
proposal after a meeting lasting two hours and without seeing the written 
agreement. With the exception of two directors, the board was not informed 
about the purpose of the meeting until it was in session. The decision to merge 
was based primarily on a short oral presentation by Van Gorkom, the Chief 
Executive Officer and Chairman of Trans Union. The oral presentation was 
based on a merger agreement that Van Gorkom had not reviewed and he was 
not informed of the essential provisions. Van Gorkom generated the merger 
proposal in relative secrecy and never disclosed to the board how he came up 
with the merger price. The investment bankers for the company were not invited 
to the meeting. The board did not ask questions as to how the price was arrived 
at. The board was also not aware of the intrinsic value of the company as 
                                            
366See Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 
367Van Gorkom case 488 A.2d 858, (Del 1985) 863-864.  
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compared to the merger price. None of the board members read the merger 
agreement before signing, and the final amendments did not correspond to the 
actual documents discussed with the board.370 The Delaware Supreme Court 
did not agree with the decision taken by the board, more so because there was 
a likelihood that a higher offer price could have been secured for 
shareholders.371 In order to support a contention that a business judgment 
decision by directors was an informed one, the directors should inform 
themselves before making a business decision, of all material information 
reasonably available to them. 372 
 
The court then indicated: 
 
“On the record before us, we must conclude that the Board of Directors did not 
reach an informed business judgment on September 20, 1980 in voting to ‘sell’ 
the Company for $55 per share pursuant to the Pritzker cash-out merger 
proposal. Our reasons, in summary, are as follows: ‘The directors (1) did not 
adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's role in forcing the “sale” of 
the Company and in establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were 
uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company; and (3) given these 
circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving the “sale” of 
the Company upon two hours' consideration, without prior notice, and without 
the exigency of a crisis or emergency.”373 
 
The court further indicated: 
 
“The defendants simply failed in their original duty of knowing, sharing, and 
disclosing information that was material and reasonably available for their 
discovery. They compounded that failure by their continued lack of candour in 
the Supplemental Proxy Statement.”374 
 
The court added:  
                                            
370Van Gorkom case 488 A.2d 858, (Del 1985) 864-870. 
371See L Lederman ‘Deconstructing Lyondell: Reconstructing Revlon’ (2010/2011) New York 
Law School Law Review 645. Analysing the rationale of the court. 
372Van Gorkom case 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 872. 
373Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (del 1985) 874. 
374Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 893. 
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“For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the director defendants breached 
their fiduciary duty of candour by their failure to make true and correct 
disclosures of all information they had, or should have had, material to the 
transaction submitted for stockholder approval.” 
 
In conclusion, the court stated:  
 
“To summarize: we hold that the directors of Trans Union breached their 
fiduciary duty to their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of 
all information reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to 
recommend the Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material 
information such as a reasonable stockholder would consider important in 
deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer”375 
 
Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Chancery Court, erred 
in applying the business judgment rule in favour of the directors of Trans Union 
in this case.376 The court ordered that the Court of Chancery conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine the fair value of the shares represented by the 
plaintiffs' class, based on the intrinsic value of Trans Union on September 20, 
1980. Following that, an award of damages may be entered to the extent that 
the fair value of Trans Union exceeds the price paid under the merger 
agreement.377 
 
The case is possibly the most famous case decided by the Delaware Supreme 
Court.378 The Van Gorkom case shows the important role the board must play 
during negotiations for a takeover or merger. The court in this case found 
directors grossly negligent in approving an arm’s length sale of the company as 
they failed to inform themselves about the value of the transaction.379 This was 
                                            
375See Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 893. 
376Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 893. 
377Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985) 893. 
378Sharfman (2008) 33 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 287.  
379BS Sharfman “Fine Tuning Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After VanGorkom” 
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despite the fact that shareholders overwhelmingly supported the merger after 
detailed disclosures were made.  
 
In light of this court ruling, it could be concluded that the board cannot merely 
rely on shareholders’ approval of the transaction or rely on the market or 
takeover price to discharge its duties. The board must itself, or through some 
adviser, obtain the true value or intrinsic value of the shares of the company.380 
Black and Kraakman reiterate this fact by indicating that: “[T]he board planning 
to sell its company must diligently seek the best price for shareholders.”381 This 
principle has been recognised in Revlon case and it has also been reiterated 
and refined in a number of cases.382 The board “is not a passive 
instrumentality”383 in the face of takeover and merger transactions. The board 
may not merely be persuaded by the executive directors without themselves 
being actively involved and ensuring that they are informed about the merger 
before asking for shareholder to vote on it. 
 
This decision has been criticised by academics and practitioners alike. It is 
pointed out that in certain transactions the powers of the board as gatekeepers 
have been clearly set out in statutes. This will be applicable in transactions such 
as acquisitions, mergers and assets sales. However, when it applies to tender 
offers, particularly hostile offers, the role of the board, as a final gatekeeper is 
not so clearly set out. This is due to the fact that the bidder may directly 
approach shareholders with an offer.384 Consequently, there may be a conflict 
of interest between accountability and authority of the board during tender 
offers. Directors may be more interested in preserving their positions rather 
than consider the interests of the shareholders or the company. These potential 
conflicts of interest have been acknowledged by the courts, hence the need to 
review the decisions of directors during such transactions. Other scholars 
                                            
380Lederman (2010/2011) New York Law School Law Review 649-652. 
381Black & Kraakman (2002) North Western University School of Law 526. 
382526. 
383Bainbridge (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 1. 
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indicate that the Delaware courts chose a reasonable balance between 
avoiding accountability and restricting the board’s authority.385  
 
Practitioners criticised the approach of the court in this matter, even though 
they averred that the court achieved the correct result.386 Critics hold that even 
though Van Gorkom case created a basis to hold directors accountable, the 
BJR still protects most directors from judicial review both on substantive and 
procedural grounds. It is asserted that the “probability of a director being found 
liable for a breach of the duty of care is still incredibly low.”387 This should 
presumably not discourage directors to take risks for the benefit of the 
company. Nevertheless, the decision in Van Gorkom case, introduced a new 
era for director’s fiduciary duties during a takeover. The decision of awarding 
damages against directors was novel, and disturbed the business community 
and the legal fraternity.388 The decision negatively impacted on the ability of 
boards to make decisions for fear of personal liability.389 Van Gorkom case had 
a wide-reaching effect on the conduct of directors in corporate America. 
Directors reacted in a number of ways including: requesting indemnities; 
requesting increased cover for liability insurance and being too cautious.390 
Following the decision of the court, the Delaware legislature enacted section 
102(b)(7) of the DGCL to deal with these concerns. The section provides: 
 
“102. Contents of certificate of incorporation  
(a)… 
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of 
incorporation by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation 
may contain any or all of the following matters: 
 
(7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the 
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the 
                                            
385See Bainbridge (2005) Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 198. 
386Sharfman (2008) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 301. 
387Sharfman (November 2006) The Business Lawyer 160. 
388151. 
389151. 
390Sharfman (2008) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 301-302. 
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liability of a director: (i) for any breach of the directors duty of loyalty to the 
corporation or its stockholders;(ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law;(iii) under 
s174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction form which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit. No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability 
of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date when such 
provision becomes effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall 
be deemed to refer to such person or persons, if any, who, pursuant to a 
provision of the certificate of incorporation in accordance with s 141(a) of this 
title, exercise or perform any powers or duties otherwise conferred or imposed 
upon the board of directors by this title.”  
 
The effect of the section was to eliminate the duty of care in actions against 
directors for money damages. The charters of Delaware corporations have 
since been amended to remove such liability to the extent allowed by law.391   
 
Scholars indicate that the Delaware corporate law standard of review of 
directors’ duties have rapidly developed over the years. The decisions by courts 
when reviewing directors’ duties have not been without criticism from scholars 
and practitioners alike. The development of corporate law relating to the 
standard of review of duties of directors in Delaware, has not been without 
concerns.392 Considering the difficulties of the fundamental questions being 
asked and the speed with which judges are required to make decisions on the 
new law of corporate mergers and takeovers, it is understandable that courts 
made imperfect decisions. The courts were required to develop a body of rules 
to impose legal order upon a new dynamic phenomenon where there were no 
precedents and no government authority regulating such transactions.393 The 
courts then had to employ some doctrine to evaluate the decisions of directors 
in a multitude of circumstances.  
 
                                            
391Lederman (2010/2011) New York Law School Law Review 640. 
392Allen et al (2001) Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 864. 
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It is not surprising that the standards of reviewing directors conduct developed 
are imperfect.394 The courts used the BJR to link the disparate standards.395 
The various cases dealing with new standards of review of directors’ duties in 
cases such as Blasius, Unocal, Revlon and others, were decided within a 
relatively short time of each other.396 Many companies were faced with hostile 
offers.397 The courts in those decisions sought to develop a consistent and 
coherent body of legal doctrine. There was a need for the courts to innovate to 
deal with new forms of takeovers and board responses thereto. The tools had 
to be flexible and this made it even more difficult to perfect them.398 There is a 
need to adopt mid-course corrections so as to preserve the benefits of those 
innovations and eliminate their dysfunctions.399 The decisions dealing with 
judicial review of directors’ duties during takeovers and mergers were taken 
without due regard to the policies underlying the purpose of applying those 
standards.400 There should be a closer alignment between the standards of 
judicial review used in Delaware corporate law and the underlying policies that 
that body of law seeks to achieve.401 It is also suggested that the new standards 
of review increased in number when a smaller number would have “provided a 
more coherent analytical framework”.402 It is further suggested that a rigorous 
functional examination of existing corporate law standards of review will clarify 
their application, reduce their number, and facilitate the task of corporate 
advisors and courts.403 For this purpose there should be three basic standards 
of review: 
 
“(i) a gross negligence standard of review for claims that directors are liable for 
damages caused by their inattention-a standard that would require a plaintiff to 
prove both a breach of the duty and the fact and extent of any damages caused 
by the breach;  
                                            
394863-867. 
395863-867. 
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399866-867. 
400864. 
401864-867. 
402864. 
403864 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
78 
 
(ii) a rehabilitated entire fairness standard to address duty of loyalty claims; and  
(iii) an intermediate standard of review to govern challenges to director 
decisions arguably influenced by an entrenchment motive, e.g., the adoption 
of antitakeover defensive measures or the approval of a change of control.” 404 
 
Scholars argue that these standards will lead to efficiency in formulating the 
general standards reviewing duties of directors. Standards for reviewing the 
conduct of directors serves an important policy function. They are intended, 
among others, to ensure that courts do not erroneously make decisions which 
may deter directors from risk-taking to the detriment of shareholders.405 
Creation of more standards of review may create a false sense that 
shareholders are adequately protected.406 The fact that directors comply with a 
standard does not necessarily mean that shareholders’ interests are better 
protected. A more functional approach to the standards of review for directors’ 
duties is required.407 There should be an evaluation of the existing corporate 
law standards of review so as to clarify their application and, reduce their 
number so as to facilitate their application by the courts and practitioners.408 
Delaware corporate law has been referred to as being unsettled on two basic 
issues. These are: 
 
 “[T]he precise reach but also the continuing utility of the business 
judgment rule as now formulated, and whether a narrow corporate 
purpose is and should be mandated.”409 
 
2 6 An overview: Appraisal right in the State of Delaware  
 
The concept of appraisal rights in the US has been in existence for some time. 
An earlier judicial pronouncement on appraisal rights states that the aim of the 
                                            
404865. 
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right is to protect dissenting shareholders.410 It appears that one of the first 
cases to refer to an appraisal right is Lauman v Lebanon Valley Railroad Co,411 
a case decided during 1858.412 In the Lauman case, the court held that the 
dissenter could not be forced to accept new shares in the acquirer but the 
company was forced to pay the dissenter in cash before it could proceed with 
the merger.413 The dissenter was paid cash for his shares without the benefit of 
legislation.414 The appraisal right is defined as a right that entitles a shareholder 
opposing certain transactions entered into by a company, to have his or her 
shares bought by the company in cash at an agreed price or, failing, at a price 
determined by a court order. No fault is required, and only shareholders who 
have adhered to the procedural requirements will be entitled to exercise the 
right. Most states in the US have some form of appraisal right and it is asserted 
that it has been in existence “ever since the needs of Modern Corporation 
forced abandonment of the common law requirement of unanimous stockholder 
authorization for fundamental corporate changes”.415 In the State of Delaware, 
section 262 of the DGCL provides a basis for shareholders to exercise appraisal 
rights whenever a fundamental change occurs in the corporation. Section 263 
of the DGCL provides for a statutory authority to raise appraisal rights in short-
form mergers when a controlling shareholder owns at least 90 percent of the 
shares in the target company in a cash-out or going-private transaction.416  
 
However, their rights are limited. In the matter of Krieger v Wesco Financial 
Corp.,417 the Delaware Court of Chancery held that shareholders were not 
entitled to appraisal rights in terms of section 262 of the DGCL, when those 
shareholders could choose to be paid in shares of an acquirer whose shares 
                                            
410Anderson v International Minerals & Chemical Corporation 67 NE 2d 573 (NY, 1946). 
41130 PA 42 1858. 
412 See B Manning “Shareholder’s Remedy An Essay for Frank Coker” (1962) 72 The Yale Law 
Journal 230 and discussions under notes 20 and 38 of the article. 
413See Manning (1962) The Yale Law Journal 230 at note 20. 
414See Manning (1962) The Yale Law Journal 230. 
415LS Daniel “Some Observations on the Scope of Appraisal Statutes” (1958) The Business 
Lawyer 240-253 240. 
416ZA Paiva “Ouasi-Appraisal: Appraising Breach of Duty of Disclosure Claims following “Cash-
Out” Mergers in Delaware” (2017) 23:1 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 243. 
417C.A. No. 6176-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011). 
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were publicly traded.418 Section 262(g) of the DGCL has recently been 
amended to limit appraisal right demands by including a de minimis exception. 
This amendment restricts appraisal demands where the value or number of 
shareholders’ shares is minimal. The de minimis restriction is applicable only to 
shares listed on a national exchange immediately before the transaction.419 
Delaware’s state law does not allow appraisal rights for shareholders where 
there is an asset sale by the company or an amendment of certificate of 
incorporation under section 242 of the DGCL.420  
 
There are four main questions regarding the basic application of the appraisal 
remedy. These are: what kinds of transactions support appraisal rights; what 
are the procedural requirements for enforcement of the appraisal rights; how 
do courts determine “fair value” in appraisal rights; and, is the appraisal right 
the only remedy available to dissenting shareholders.421 The appraisal right 
allows for a balance between the needs of the majority to vote on certain 
transactions and the minority whose shares may be negatively affected. 
Minorities are afforded an opportunity to disinvest on fair and reasonable terms. 
It is generally accepted that bringing an appraisal rights action can be quite 
complex.422 The fact that the exercise of appraisal rights is subject to a number 
of detailed and complex procedures does not assist the applicant in obtaining 
an appraisal remedy. It appears that failure to comply with one of these steps 
may jeopardise the ability to exercise such a right. The Delaware appraisal 
section is one of the most limited of state codes.423 Costs of raising appraisal 
rights may run into millions and the shareholder is not certain of a successful 
outcome.424 Appraisal rights are controversial and are continually being 
reviewed.425 Appraisal rights introduced in terms of section 164 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 are discussed in chapter 5 6 6 below.  
 
                                            
418C.A. No. 6176-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011). 
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2 7 Concluding remarks 
 
One of the important reasons for the courts to closely consider decisions of 
directors is that takeovers or mergers increase conflict of interest among 
directors. This concern is reasonable. Directors may be faced with job losses 
and loss of perks after the takeover or merger. Therefore, directors may be 
influenced by ulterior motives when considering a takeover or a merger. It is 
generally acknowledged that directors know more than shareholders about the 
business of the companies in which they preside. By virtue of this knowledge 
they also understand to what extent a takeover or a merger will be to the benefit 
of the bidder and the target company. In addition, statutory mergers cannot be 
completed without the co-operation of the board.426 However, these can also 
result in conflicts of interest. The bidder knows that statutory merger 
transactions can only be voted on by shareholders after approval and 
recommendation by the board of directors. This may encourage the bidder to 
compensate the directors to ensure their co-operation. This can lead to side 
payments for directors.427 Hence there is a need for vigilance and enhanced 
scrutiny of such transactions. The role of the independent board members plays 
a crucial role during this period. Acquisitions give rise to any number of 
managerial agency problems. Board independence may control these concerns 
better.428 
 
The Delaware courts try to establish a balance between authority and 
accountability when they assess the fiduciary duties of directors.429 The board 
has legitimate authority to approve, recommend approval or prevent a merger. 
The courts closely scrutinise the role of the board during a takeover or merger. 
It will examine the extent to which they were advised of the mergers, the 
relevant information they had prior to their decision to merge, and the extent to 
                                            
426See discussions under paragraph 2 4 1 above. 
427Bainbridge (2013) Fordham L. Rev 3288- 3289. 
428JN Gordon “The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices” (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1465. Columbia 
Law and Economics WP No. 323. 1503. Available at: SSRN: 
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which they were independent of any influence by incumbent management. The 
State of Delaware has established itself as the preferred state for registration 
of companies.430 Further it is generally accepted that the Delaware courts have 
created some of the important principles relating to takeovers and mergers.431  
 
The standards of reviewing the conduct of directors during takeovers and 
mergers are some the important principles created by the Delaware courts.432 
These principles are also extended beyond takeover law and are useful as a 
measure of how directors have exercised their fiduciary duties in their day-to-
day business operations. The appraisal remedy in Delaware raises a number 
of concerns and is continuously reviewed by the courts, and recently, by the 
Delaware State Legislature through an amendment.433 It is acknowledged that 
the appraisal right is complex and its effect uncertain. Its efficacy in protecting 
shareholders has been questioned. Furthermore, as indicated in the Unocal 
case,434 Delaware corporate law is not static, it grows and develops in response 
to needs and evolving corporations and their operating environment. This is 
supported by Anabtwi who argues that certain standards of reviewing conducts 
of directors such as the enhanced scrutiny created in the Unocal case and the 
review of sale of control in Revlon case have reached their twilight due to 
erosion and relaxation of their application over time.435 
 
The adoption of certain provisions from US corporate law under the South 
African Companies Act of 2008, such as the appraisal rights in section 164 and 
statutory mergers in section 113, will require that some of the principles 
established by the State of Delaware’s judiciary will in future play an important 
role in the interpretation of these sections. This promotes development of 
takeovers and merger law in South Africa, to better serve investors and 
shareholders. Practitioners and academics alike would welcome this 
development of SA company law. However, two important limitations of this 
                                            
430Introduction to this chapter 2. 
431See paragraph 2 5 above 
432See paragraph 2 5 above. 
433See Paiva (2017) Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 243. 
434493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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approach should be borne in mind. The continuous mutation of Delaware law 
requires that SA laws must also be continuously monitored and adjusted to 
ensure alignment with new developments. Moreover, caution is required when 
adopting principles from Delaware, as that judicial system and the economy 
under which its corporation laws are applied are significantly different from 
those in South Africa. 
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Chapter 3: An overview of the application of the mandatory offer rule in 
the United Kingdom 
 
“The mandatory bid rule is one of the most discussed rules that Member States 
had to implement. The mandatory bid rule aims to provide the minority 
shareholders with the opportunity to exit the firm on fair terms, but arguably fails 
to open up the market for corporate control.”1 
 
3 1 Introduction  
 
The enforcement of the mandatory offer requirement forms one of the 
cornerstones of the powers of the UK Takeover Panel. The mandatory offer has 
also been extended to a number of EU countries in terms of the Takeover 
Directive.2 This has increased the debates surrounding the desirability of such 
a rule in a number of EU countries.3 This chapter deals with regulation of 
mandatory offers in the UK. It is important to understand how the mandatory 
offer rule developed in England before attempting to discuss its application in 
South Africa. This may assist in establishing the rationale for applying the 
requirement in South Africa, despite the apparent different economic and 
financial market structures of both countries.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the rationale behind choosing the UK as a 
comparative jurisdiction is that South African company law is based mainly on 
                                            
1JA McCahery & E Vermeulen “Does the Takeover Bids Directive Need Revision?” (2010) 
Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 7.  
2Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
Takeover Bids (Takeover Directive). However, it must be noted that some, EU countries may 
choose to opt out of the mandatory offer rules. Member states may also tailor-make certain 
provisions for their own countries. 
3See P Bockli, P Davies, E Ferran, G Ferrarini J Garrido Garcia, K Hopt, A Pietrancosta, K 
Pistor, R Skog, S Soltysinski, J Winter and E Wymeersch, European Law Experts “Response 
to the European Commission’s Report on the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive” (2014) 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies. Paper No.5/2014 3. Available 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn (Accessed 20-3-2014). 
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English company law.4 In addition, the most important section dealing with 
mandatory offers in South Africa, section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008, 
and the Takeover Regulations are based on the UK City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (the City Code). The predecessor to section 123, rule 8 of the 
Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the Rules of the 
Securities Regulation Panel, were also based on the City Code. 5   
 
3 2 The development of the mandatory offer in the United Kingdom 
 
3 2 1 A brief overview of developments leading to the mandatory offer  
 
The mandatory offer requirement is one of the strongest expressions of the 
equality rule in takeovers and mergers.6 The mandatory bid rule is also known 
as the Equal Opportunity Rule.7 The equal opportunity rule as expressed in 
Perlman case has been discussed in paragraph 2 2 above. There are a number 
of interlinked principles for the enforcement of the mandatory offer in takeovers. 
Scholars assert that after a change of control, the future hopes and interests of 
the shareholders lie with the new controlling shareholder.8 Minority 
shareholders of the controlled company can be prejudiced should the new 
controlling shareholder not conduct the affairs of the company properly.9 Once 
there is a change of control of a company, shareholders must be given an 
opportunity to leave the company and sell their shares to the new controlling 
shareholder on the same terms as those who sold theirs to the new controlling 
shareholder. The opportunity to sell should not be dependent on the willingness 
                                            
4HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis & PA Delport Corporate Law 2nd ed (1992) 
16; See also S Luiz An Evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeover 
and Mergers LLD thesis Unisa (2003) 6.  
5This is indicated in the Explanatory note of the Securities Regulation Code and Mergers and 
the Rules of the SRP Code. The SRP Code indicates that it is based mainly on the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers, which has been issued by the London Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers. See also Luiz An Evaluation of the South African SRP Code (2003) 573-1022. 
6PL Davies, & S Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 10th ed (2016). 962.. 
7See RA Albuquerque & E J Schroth “Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private 
Benefits of Control” (2008) ECGI Finance Working Paper No.202/2008 and Swiss Finance 
Institute Research Paper No. 08-21. 2.Available at SSRN:  
https://ssrn.com/abstract =1099901, (Accessed 21-2-2018). 
8Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 968-969. 
9968-969. 
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of the new controlling shareholder to voluntarily make a general offer, but 
should instead be compulsory.10 The essence of the mandatory offer 
requirement is contained in two principles: Firstly, shareholders should have 
the opportunity to sell and exit the company whose control has changed,11 and 
secondly, the shareholders should have the opportunity to sell their shares on 
the same terms as those who sold theirs to the new controlling shareholder. 12 
The latter requirement is the most controversial.13  
 
It appears that the mandatory offer requirement developed alongside rules 
relating to disclosures in respect of takeovers and mergers. This makes sense 
as companies seeking funds are also subject to disclosure rules to ensure that 
investors are protected. Accordingly, when there is a disinvestment, or sale of 
shares particularly by a major shareholder, similar rules should also apply. The 
initial rules to regulate takeovers and mergers appears to have been aimed at 
preventing fraud and misleading information during takeovers. It appears that 
in earlier times there were few measures to protect investors during takeovers 
and mergers. One the statutory provision was the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act of 1958.14  An offer document is an invitation to the offeree 
shareholders to dispose of their shares, therefore, it falls within the statutory 
regulation of investment circulars imposed by this Act.15 Possibly due to an 
attempt to mainly prevent fraud and misinformation, authorities saw fit to 
regulate disclosures in respect of takeovers and mergers, as it was believed 
that more disclosures would promote protection for investors, particularly 
minority shareholders. It was assumed that more disclosures would assist 
investors in making an informed decision about their investments. Prior to the 
introduction of these regulations, changes-of-control transactions were marked 
by poor disclosures. This increased the risk that investors could be treated 
                                            
10968-969. 
11968-969. 
12968-969. 
13969. 
14See Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1958, CHAPTER 45. UK General Acts. 
Available on: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1958/45/section/26/enacted. Accessed 
20.2.2019.The Act created offences for certain conduct when dealing in securities. These 
included providing false and misleading information.     
15RR Pennington Penningtons’Company Law (1980) 805. 
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unfairly and that minority shareholders could be oppressed by the majority. The 
Bank of England had, before the formal regulation of takeovers, also been 
instrumental in introducing more protective measures for investors in respect of 
mergers and takeovers.16  
 
A review of the literature suggests that the rules relating to the regulation of 
takeovers and mergers underwent a number of developments over a long 
period of time as regulators sought an effective regulatory regime to protect 
investors Methods to acquire control of companies had to be developed by 
practitioners as the need for takeovers developed. Regulators on the other 
hand had to improve their methods of protecting shareholders. In the UK, 
schemes became operative in the 196017 These schemes of arrangement then 
developed into a procedure for the takeover of a company by which the 
squeeze out provisions could be avoided.18  
 
The UK developed quasi-self-regulatory procedures for takeovers long before 
statutory regulation was established in other European countries.19 The origin 
of takeover regulation can be traced back to a period between 1950 and 1960, 
when bidders took advantage of the lack of regulation of mergers.20 Takeovers 
were regarded as “sharp practice” at that time and some directors and 
authorities believed that they were harmful to companies and investors alike.21 
Possible abuse and unfair treatment of investors during the takeover frenzy 
spurred regulatory authorities into action. 
 
In the development of any new industry there is bound to be opportunists who 
may easily take advantage of inadequacies in existing laws. Hence, there was 
                                            
16See Armour et al ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed and Emerging 
Markets: An Analytical Framework (2011) Vol 52 Harvard International Law Journal 235 also 
FB Palmer & CM Schmitthoff Palmer’s Company Law 24 ed (1987) 1178 and Luiz An 
Evaluation of the South African SRP Code Vol. 1: 13.  
17Luiz ‘Some comments on the regulation of takeovers and mergers’ (1997) 9 SA Merc Law 
Journal 240. 
18Luiz (1997) SA Merc Law Journal 240.See Luiz An Evaluation of the South African SRP Code 
Vol. 1: 15. 
19Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920. 
20920 
21L Gullifer & J Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy (2011) 568. 
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a need to formulate new rules to cater for these developments. New complex 
methods of achieving takeovers and mergers attracted the attention of financial 
services authorities that were concerned about possible abuse. The increasing, 
and often controversial, burgeoning takeover and merger practices led to the 
development of regulation of takeovers and mergers.22 Protective measures for 
investors were required as bidders took advantage of the absence of regulatory 
oversight.23 These concerns resulted in the introduction of the Queensberry 
Rules in 1959, which were modest rules.24 These rules or guidelines, titled 
“Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses”, were brief but did establish the 
principles relating to shareholder primacy in the regulation of takeovers. The 
guidelines then formed the core principles in English law for regulation of 
takeovers.25 The guidelines emphasised that there should be no interference 
with the free market for shares, that shareholders should decide for themselves 
whether to sell or not. Further, shareholders were to be given enough time and 
sufficient information in order to make informed decisions about takeover 
offers.26 Lack of adjudication and enforcement procedures for these guidelines 
eventually led to their undoing, even though they were well received.27 Their 
perceived ineffectiveness led to hostile criticism in the financial media and there 
were calls for a more determined body to police takeovers.28 In addition, the UK 
government entered the fray with veiled threats that if the industry could not, or 
does not introduce its own effective regulatory and enforcement methods, then 
the Government would intervene.29 
 
Regulation of takeovers and mergers in the UK developed through a number of 
phases.30 Hostile takeovers and changes to share ownership also emerged 
                                            
22B Rosenzweig “Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of British And  
American Takeover Controls” (2007) 18 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 224. 
23Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920.  
24920 
25Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 568. 
26568. 
27568. 
28D Prentice “Take-over Bids – The City Code on Take-over and Mergers” (1972) 18 McGill LJ 
18:3. 386. 
29Prentice  (1972) 18 McGill LJ 18:3. 386-387. 
30See Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920-921. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
89 
 
through various stages.31 The development of the mandatory offer requirement 
in the UK appears to have been spurred by the rapid increase of merger and 
takeover transactions, which resulted in a number of “squabbles in contests for 
control of public companies.” 32 It is also evident from the literature reviewed 
that these developments were partly due to the inability of regulators to find 
regulatory procedures which could cater for the conflicting interests of 
shareholders, supervisory authorities and companies.33  The continuing 
changes in the investment environment, as companies and practitioners 
introduced additional takeover methods such as partial offers had the effect that 
the regulations which were previously adequate to prevent a negative impact 
on minority shareholders, became inadequate.34 The introduction of new 
takeover methods such as leveraged takeovers by private equity funds also 
made discussions on regulation of takeovers more relevant.35  
 
It is arguable that the introduction new takeover methods could not be properly 
regulated under the same regulations. Hence, there was a need for regulators 
to keep improving their regulations to ensure that they stayed up to date with 
new developments in financial markets.36 The then ‘Notes’ were not adequate 
to deal with developments of defensive measures in takeovers. The courts 
resolved the disputes using common-law fiduciary duties.37 The approach was 
not acceptable to investors due to the delays it caused and uncertainty in the 
transaction. The delays made reduced the likelihood that takeovers would 
succeed and litigation as a defensive measure was also potent.38  
 
 
                                            
31Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 423. 
32See Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 385 and also Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 435- 
436. 
33See Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 385-386 and 416-417.See also Johnston (2007) Cambridge 
Law Journal 422-442 
34See Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 444-445. 
35Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 460. 
36436.  
37436. 
38436. 
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3 2 2 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers  
 
Following criticism and concerns raised, the elaborate City Code was 
introduced. It forms the basis of the current City Code.39 The introduction of the 
City Code effectively stemmed litigation during takeovers.40 The City Code was 
established and promulgated as a self-regulatory body of rules in the UK in 
1968.41 A community of institutional investors and investment bankers drove 
the making of the rules forming the City Code.42 With the publication of the City 
Code, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers was also created to administer and 
enforce this regulatory document.43 Regulation of takeovers and mergers in the 
UK appears to have been driven by the need to protect shareholders, and no 
other stakeholders, as can be seen from the following statement by Hinton:44 
 
“[W]e see the lead constituent as far as the book is – the takeover panel is 
concerned as being the shareholder, they are the only people in a bid who have 
an investment decision to make and so we think they’re the people who 
deserve some protection...”  
 
Originally, the UK Panel was not based on statute.45 This fact could easily lead 
to underestimation of the powers of the UK Panel.46 In R v The Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc. and another (Datafin case), 47 it 
                                            
39See Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 387. 
40Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 441. 
41UK City Code in the Introduction 12th Ed (2016). See also H Baum “Takeover Law in the EU 
and Germany: Comparative Analysis of a Regulatory Model” (2006) 3 University of Tokyo 
Journal of Law and Politics 2. 
42JA Armour & DA Skeel Jr. “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The 
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 The Georgetown Law 
Journal, 1727. 
43Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920 
44N Hinton, Former Deputy Director General of the Panel, South African Corporate Law Reform 
Roundtable Meeting held in England 19 March 2005. 
45Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920, see also the City Code 
12th ed (2016), Introduction. 
46See Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 920. 
471987 QB 815 CA. 
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has been described as “a truly remarkable body.… performing this function 
without visible means of legal support.”48 The court further indicated as follows:  
 
“[L]acking any authority de jure it exercises immense power de facto by 
devising, promulgating, amending and interpreting “The City Code on Take-
over and Mergers”, by waiving or modifying its application of the Code in 
particular circumstances, by investigating and reporting upon alleged breaches 
of the Code and by the application of sanctions. These sanctions are no less 
effective because they applied indirectly and lack a legally enforceable base.”49 
 
The UK Panel has been closely associated with the London Stock Exchange.50 
This may explain its efficacy as co-operation between the institutions promote 
shareholder protection. The promulgation of the EU Takeover Directive51 has 
since required that the UK Panel change its status to a statutory body. The new 
statutory regime has also been designed with the clear objective of maintaining 
the earlier self-regulatory regime.52 Even though the City Code is now on a 
statutory basis, it should on balance be considered to be a self-regulatory 
instrument.53  
 
The statutory basis of the Panel is set out in terms of chapter 1 of part 28 of the 
UK Companies Act 2006.54 The role and function of the Panel and the City 
Code, however, still remain largely unchanged.55 The Panel still retains its 
status as a regulator of takeovers and composition of its members has not been 
affected by the changes brought about by the UK Companies Act 2006. 
Members of the Panel and its various committees come from various 
professions including: banking, investment banking, pension funds, chartered 
accountancy and the legal professions.56 The composition of the panel 
                                            
481987 QB 815 CA. 
491987 QB 815 CA. 
50See Palmer & Schmitthoff Palmer’s Company Law 82-02. 
51Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC).  
52Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 568. 
53Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 447. 
54See UK Companies Act 2006, sections 942-965.  
55Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 572. 
56See Introduction to the City Code. 
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indicates the various commercial interests operating in the UK.57 The UK Panel 
has also retained its rule-making and adjudication functions, where it gives 
rulings and enforces compliance with the City Code.58  
 
The UK Companies Act 2006 created new powers for the Panel. It can now 
also require parties to disclose information that it reasonably requires to 
exercise its powers and functions.59 The Panel may enforce the City Code by 
issuing rulings relating to compensation of parties,60 and rulings in respect of 
compliance.61 It also has the power to discipline parties who are subject to the 
rules of the City Code.62 The City Code has a wider remit than the Takeover 
Directive. 63  
 
The UK Panel may still sanction the parties as it did prior to the implementation 
of the Takeover Directive.64 Sanctions include a private reprimand, a public 
censure and a request that institutions represented on the Panel withdraw 
facilities from the securities market.65 This is commonly known as ‘cold-
shouldering’66 and refers to the denial of various services or funding to a party 
who is alleged to have breached rules of the City Code. It is suggested that the 
sanction of ‘cold-shouldering’ plays an important role as one of the enforcement 
measures of the Panel. This type of sanction appears to be unique to the UK 
                                            
57See Prentice (1972 McGill LJ 387. 
58Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 572. 
59UK Companies Act 2006 section 94; See also Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law 
Principles and Policy 572. 
60UK City Code in 10 (c), Enforcing the Code.  
61UK City Code in 10 (d), Enforcing the Code. 
62UK City Code in 11, Powers to discipline parties who have transgressed the City Code. 
63Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 572. 
64573. 
65572. 
66See Takeover Appeal Board “Principle Capital Investment Trust PLC- Decision of the Appeal 
Board” (2010) 14 www.the takeoverappealboard.org.uk (Accessed 20-12-2013) A ruling of The 
Appeal Board of the Takeover Panel in the matter of Principle Capital Investment Trust Plc 
(PCIT). 2010/1. In this matter, the directors of PCIT were cold-shouldered by the Hearings 
Committee of the Panel for a period of 3 years. This was due to their attempt to hide their 
dealings in shares and misleading the Executive of the Panel in the share dealings to avoid the 
mandatory offer requirements in rule 9 of the City Code. The parties appealed against the ruling 
of the Hearing Committee. The Appeal Board confirmed the ruling and indicated that the cold- 
shouldering and the period is the appropriate sanction taking into consideration the gravity of 
the transgression, both the sanction and the period of the sanction was justified. Accordingly, 
the appeal of the directors of PICT was dismissed.  
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Panel. In addition, the co-operation between the Panel and the Financial 
Services Authority also bolsters the enforcement powers of the Panel. The 
Financial Services Authority Handbook, Market Conduct, in section 4.3 
supports the sanction of ‘cold-shouldering’ by providing as follows: 
 
“A firm must not act, or continue to act, for any person in connection with a 
transaction to which the Takeover Code applies ... if the firm has reasonable 
grounds for believing that the person in question, or his principal, is not 
complying or is not likely to comply with the Takeover Code.” 67 
 
The decisions of the Panel are subject to review by the courts in appropriate 
cases.68 The courts have indicated that their role should only be to consider 
reviewing the decision of the Panel after the takeover has been completed.69 
The courts recognise that takeover proceedings must be completed as speedily 
as possible and that any intervention has the potential to disrupt the takeover. 
This approach by the courts has the effect of discouraging would-be litigants 
intending to delay a takeover. Tactical litigation is accordingly discouraged.70  
 
The review power of the courts is used in line with the judgment of the Datafin 
case.71 In that case, the court indicated that:  
 
“It is not for a court exercising a judicial review jurisdiction to substitute itself for 
the fact-finding tribunal, and error of law in the form of a finding of a fact for 
which there was no evidence or in the form of a misconstruction of the panel’s 
own rules would normally be a matter to be dealt with by a declaratory 
judgment. The only circumstances in which I would anticipate the use of 
remedies of certiorari and mandamus would be in event, which I hope 
unthinkable, of the Panel acting in breach of the rules of natural justice, in other 
words, unfairly. Nothing that I have said fetter or is intended to or should be 
construed as fettering the discretion of any court to which application is made 
                                            
67Rosenzweig (2007) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 213. 
68LS Sealy & S Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law 9 ed (2010) 714. 
69 [1987] QB 815; See also R v The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc 
[1990] 1QB 146.  
70J Mukwiri “The myth of tactical litigation in UK takeovers” (2008) 8 :2 Journal of Corporate  
Law Studies 373-388. 
711987 QB 815 CA. 
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for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the panel or which leave 
having been granted, is charged with the duty of considering such an 
application. Nevertheless, I wish to make it clear beyond a peradventure that 
in the light of the special nature of the panel, its functions, the market which is 
operating, the time scales which is inherent in that market and the need to 
safeguard the position of their parties, who may be numbered in thousands, all 
of whom are entitled to continue to trade on an assumption of the validity of the 
panel’s rules and decisions, unless and until they are quashed by the court, I 
should expect the relationship between the panel and the court to be historic 
rather contemporaneous. I should expect the court to allow contemporary 
decisions to take their course. Considering the complaint and intervening, if at 
all, later and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the panel 
not to repeat any error and would relieve individuals of the disciplinary 
consequences of any erroneous finding of breach of the rules. This could 
provide a workable and valuable partnership between the courts and the panel 
in the public interest...”72  
 
The court in the Datafin case73 indicated that this is due to the special nature of 
the function of the Panel. It is required that market integrity be maintained, the 
timelines set in the City Code rules be observed, and that parties who deal on 
the basis of decisions of the Panel continue to rely on those decisions. The 
courts will grant relief in the form of a declaratory order after the event and will 
not interfere with the panel’s regulatory process during a takeover.74 Therefore, 
based on this approach, the courts will only give guidance to the panel after the 
takeover has been completed. This is with a view to ensuring that a similar error 
should not occur.75  
 
The decision in the Datafin case has been followed in R v Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc.76 In the Guinness case, the court indicated 
                                            
72[1987] QB 815 CA. 842. 
73[1987] QB 815. 
74Sealy & Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law 715. In the commentary, 
it is suggested that the courts do not interfere with takeover process.  
75Mukwiri (2008) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 373-388. 
76[1990] 1 QB 146, CA. See also comments by Sealy & Worthington Sealy’s Cases and 
Materials in Company Law confirming that the UK courts readily accept the UK Panel as the 
appropriate forum for regulating takeovers. 
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that during a takeover process the time-lines are short and it is important that 
financial-markets participants should be able to rely on rulings of the Panel. 
Therefore, the intervention of the courts may not be possible, or may even be 
against public interest.77 In another case of R v Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers, ex parte Fayed,78 a case involving the disciplinary powers of the UK 
Panel, the court emphasised the importance of the Panel in regulating 
takeovers and mergers. In that case, the court also refused to intervene during 
the course of a takeover. The court referred to the earlier decision in Datafin 
and Guinness Plc cases. 79  
 
The City Code is divided into: the introduction, the general principles, the 
definitions and the rules. In addition, the rules have detailed explanatory notes 
for some rules and also appendices on certain rules.80 The UK Panel has a 
number of committees.81 Nominating organisations are entitled to designate 
members for different committees and may also have alternate members.82For 
the purposes of the dissertation the following are relevant. The Code 
Committee, as the name implies, is mainly responsible is to keep the City Code 
updated by ensuring that the rules are amended as when it is required. The 
Hearings Committee is responsible for reviewing rulings of the Executive and 
conducts disciplinary hearings for breach of the City Code.83 Rules of 
procedures of the Hearings Committee are set out in Appendix 9 to the City 
Code. Membership of the Panel’s committees is restricted. For instance, 
members are only allowed to be on one committee. No person who is or has 
been a member of the Code Committee may simultaneously or subsequently 
be a member (or an alternate of a member) of the Hearings Committee or the 
Takeover Appeal Board (Appeal Board).84  
 
                                            
77[1989] 1 All ER 509, 512. 
78[1992] BCLC. 938. 
79[1992] BCLC 938. 
80The UK City Code. 
81See UK Panel website. http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/committees.The other 
committees are for administrative purposes and corporate governance matters.  
82See UK City Code in 4(a) of the introduction. 
83 See 4 of the introduction to the UK City Code.  
84See 4 (a) to (d) of the introduction the UK City Code. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
96 
 
When the Panel acts in relation to any proceedings before the Hearings 
Committee or the Appeal Board, it must do so only by an officer or member of 
staff (or a person acting as such) who must not be a member of the Code 
Committee, the Hearings Committee or the Board.85 The restriction appears to 
be aimed at separation of responsibilities within Panel committees. This 
ensures independence between committees and prevents members of the 
Code Committee adjudicating and interpreting rules as members of the 
Hearings Committees. The rules of the Appeal Committee are available on its 
separate website and are also briefly referred to in the City Code.86  
 
The self-regulatory model may not be the solution for other jurisdictions as the 
success of the model is dependent on the specific parties involved in the 
regulatory system.87 One of the distinguishing features of the UK Panel is the 
ability to apply the rules in a flexible and informal manner. It is therefore doubtful 
that a formal government body could play a similar effective role. Government 
regulation has a tendency to become rigid and bureaucratic.88 Despite the UK 
Panel’s metamorphosis from self-regulatory to a statutory footing, its status and 
roles remained mainly unaffected.89 Therefore, it could be argued that the 
effectiveness of the regulatory system is closely tied to the incentives of the 
individuals and entities that provide the rules.90  
  
3 2 3 The application of the mandatory offer rule in the United Kingdom 
 
The mandatory offer rule is closely linked to the equal opportunity rule as 
already discussed above in chapter 2. The mandatory offer rule was originally 
introduced in the UK City Code as rule 35 during 1972. The initial threshold was 
acquisition of 40 percent of the issued shares.91 The rationale for setting a 
                                            
85See 8 of the introduction to the UK City Code. 
86See 8 of the introduction to the UK City Code. The Appeal Board rules are available at: 
www.thetakeoverappealboard.org.uk. (Accessed 15 -08-2017). 
87Amour & Skeel Jr. (2007) Georgetown Law Journal 1785.  
88See Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 414-415. 
89Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 573. See also Amour & Skeel 
Jr. (2007) George Town Law Journal 1788. 
90See Armour & Skeel Jr. (2007) George Town Law Journal 1785. 
91Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 392. 
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specific threshold solved the problem of having to define control for the purpose 
of the rule. It is acknowledged that defining control is not easy due to the fact 
that it involves a number of variables including, whether a company has a 
dispersed shareholding and shareholder participation in the affairs of the 
company.92 The mandatory offer rule was originally applied only where effective 
control was acquired from company officers. The UK Panel determined what 
constituted acquisition of control on a case-by-case basis.93 However, it has 
become common to set specific thresholds to determine control for the purpose 
of the mandatory offer in most countries. The mandatory offer rule is triggered 
at various shareholding levels in various countries. Countries introduce different 
thresholds taking into consideration, among others, the size of companies and 
type of shareholding in those companies.94 There are no studies that show the 
optimal ownership levels at which a mandatory offer must be made. This results 
in different mandatory offer thresholds throughout the world, ranging from an 
acquisition of 15 percent of the shares in India to an acquisition of 67 percent 
shares in Finland.95 The 30 percent voting rights threshold in the UK has been 
determined on the basis that in most cases, acquisition of voting rights 
equivalent to that percentage will constitute effective control.96 Setting a specific 
percentage has also created certainty for acquirers and avoids arbitrary 
determination of control after the fact. 
  
The mandatory offer rule in the UK is in rule 9 of the City Code.97 The rule 
includes explanatory notes under each sub-rule. In short, rule 9.1 of the City 
Code provides that any person who acquires, whether by a series of 
transactions over a period of time or not, an interest in shares which (taken 
together with shares in which persons acting in concert with him are interested) 
have voting rights of 30 percent or more of the voting rights of a company; or 
any person, together with persons acting in concert with him, is interested in 
                                            
92Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 388. 
93R Skog “Does Sweden need a Mandatory Bid Rule? A Critical Analysis” (1997) Societe 
Universitaire Euopeenne de Recherches Financieres (SUERF). 5 
94T Nenova “Takeover Laws and Financial Development” (2006) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4029. 9. 
959. 
96Skog (1997) Societe Universitaire Euopeenne de Recherches Financieres (SUERF) 5. 
97See Annexure Rule 9 of the UK City Code  
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shares which in aggregate vote between 30 percent and 50 percent of the 
voting rights of a company acquires an interest in any other shares which 
increases the percentage of shares carrying voting rights in which he is 
interested, such person or persons must make an offer to the holders of any 
class of equity share capital, whether voting or non-voting, and also to the 
holders of any other class of transferable securities carrying voting rights. The 
rule has two trigger points for the mandatory offer obligation: acquisitions of 30 
percent or more of the voting rights and acquisition of any percentage of voting 
rights in cases where the acquirer already holds more than 30 percent of the 
voting rights but not more than 50 percent of the voting rights of a company. 
This is also referred to as the creep rule. “Creeping in” happens when a bidder 
holding less than 30 percent makes a voluntary offer to acquire a small 
percentage of shares at a low price to avoid triggering the mandatory offer. 
“Creep on” occurs when a shareholder has acquired shares exceeding 30 
percent and increases its shares by buying more shares without any legal 
obligation to make a mandatory offer.98 Unless the Panel consents otherwise, 
each person or persons who acquires shares as described above, must make 
a mandatory offer.99 The Panel may relax the strict application of the rule in 
limited circumstances. The mandatory offer rule in the City Code is long and 
not easy to read. It is suggested that this is due to the fact that the rule is drafted 
to be as broad as possible to prevent circumvention.  
 
The only condition to the mandatory offer is acceptances in respect of the 
shares that will result in the acquirer holding more than 50 percent of the voting 
rights of the company.100 The payment to be offered must be in cash or be 
accompanied by a cash alternative at not less than the highest price paid by 
the offeror, or any person acting in concert with it, for any interest in shares of 
that class during the 12 months prior to the announcement of that offer. The 
Panel may also determine the highest price to be paid in appropriate 
                                            
98Böckli, et al (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies. Paper No.5/2014. 
9-10. 
99See first sentence to Rule 9 of the UK City Code. 
100Rule 9.3 of the UK City Code. 
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circumstances.101 The City Code prevents voluntary acquisitions unless the 
acquirer is able to acquire more than 50 percent of the target.102 This is intended 
to encourage bidders to make a fair offer, otherwise the bid will fail as more 
than 50 percent of the shareholders are unlikely to accept an unfair offer price. 
This prevents bidders acquiring companies ‘’on the cheap’’.103 In addition, the 
requirement is intended to put beyond doubt the identity of the de jure 
controlling shareholder.104 This creates certainty to shareholders as to the 
identity of the controlling shareholder. Shareholders may then choose to remain 
invested in the company where they know the identity of the controlling 
shareholder or may choose to exit their investment where they do not know the 
controlling shareholder.  
 
The City Code also creates obligations for directors or their related parties when 
they sell their shares or interests in shares. Such directors must ensure that as 
a condition of the sale of their shares, the buyer undertakes to fulfill his 
obligations under the mandatory offer rule. Such persons may also not resign 
from the board until the first closing date of the offer or the date when the offer 
becomes wholly unconditional; whichever is the later, unless the Panel 
agrees.105 Persons who have an obligation to make a mandatory offer may 
avoid such an obligation, with the consent of the Panel, by disposing the shares 
that triggered the obligation. Such persons may not exercise any votes 
attaching to such shares pending their disposal.106  
 
The Panel has wide discretion to dispense with the requirement for a mandatory 
offer in various circumstances.107 The mandatory offer may be waived by vote 
of independent shareholders of the offeree company when the company issues 
                                            
101Rule 9.5 of the UK City Code. 
102Rule 10 of the UK City Code. 
103See E Wymeersch “A New Look at the Debate About the Takeover Directive (2012) Ghent 
University, Financial Law Institute Working Paper No 2012-05. 7.Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988927.(Accessed 20 -5-2018). 
104See Böckli, el al (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies. Paper 
No.5/2014. 9-10. 
105Rule 9.6 of the UK City Code.  
106Rule 9.7 of the UK City Code 
107See 2(c) in the introduction to the UK City Code. 
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new securities.108 The issue of the new securities should be as consideration 
for an acquisition or a cash subscription. The requirement for a general offer 
will also be waived, provided there has been a vote of independent 
shareholders, in cases involving the underwriting of an issue of shares which 
results in the underwriter crossing the 30 percent threshold. This could be due 
to the company not having sufficient underwriters to subscribe for the issue of 
shares.109 The issue of shares to the underwriter must be approved at a 
meeting of the shareholders by a majority of independent shareholders. The 
voting must be conducted by a poll rather than a show of hands.110 The 
resolution is also referred to as the ‘’white wash’’ resolution.111 The Panel may, 
in exceptional circumstances, consider waiving the requirement for a general 
offer, on condition that independent shareholders approve the transfer of 
existing shares from one shareholder to another. 112  
 
The practical effect of the mandatory offer has been summed up as follows: it 
discourages a shareholding of interests in shares carrying more than 29,99 
percent of a company; it discourages a voluntary bidder from acquiring shares 
on the market if it wishes to make a voluntary offer subject to various types of 
conditions; and, it encourages persons who may be “acting in concert” and who 
are close to or above 30 percent to consult the UK Panel. Due to these reasons, 
mandatory offer bids are not frequent.113   
 
In its annual report for the year 1991, the UK Panel summed up the reason for 
rule 9 of the City Code in respect of the mandatory offer rule as follows: 
 
                                            
108Note 1 under Rule 9 of the UK City Code. 
109Note 1 under Rule 9 of the UK City Code. 
110C Pearson & N Adams “Mandatory and Voluntary Offers and their Terms” in M Button (ed) 
A Practitioner’s Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2006/2007) 144. 
111See Appendix 1- Whitewash Guidance Note, in the UK City Code. The importance of the 
waiver is notable from the extensive Guidance Note setting out what applicant must do to be 
entitled to the dispensation. The guidance note also provides transactions that may disqualify 
applicants.  
112Note 1 under Rule 9 of the UK City Code. 
113Pearson & Adams in Button (ed) A Practitioner’s Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers (2006/2007) 150. 
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“The philosophy underlying this Rule is that, if effective control of a company is 
obtained by the acquisition of shares, the principle of equality of treatment for 
shareholders requires that all shareholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain the price per share paid for control (it will usually be a premium price) 
and that they should have the opportunity to get out of the company if they do 
not like what has happened.”114 
 
The Hearings Committee of the UK Panel, in the matter of Principle Capital 
Investment Trust PLC (“PCIT”)115 concerned allegations that certain parties 
‘acting in concert’ acquired the shares of PCIT and that the acquisition triggered 
the mandatory offer rule. Therefore, it was argued that the parties must make 
a mandatory offer to the remaining shareholders of PCIT. The Hearings 
Committee indicated that: 
 
“The purpose of the mandatory bid requirement is two-fold: 
to provide that, where a person obtains control of a company, he must provide 
the opportunity of an exit to all other shareholders in the company, since they 
may not wish to remain in the company now that control of the company 
effectively rests in the hands of a single (or different) person or a group of 
persons acting in concert; and on the basis that the new controller may have 
paid a premium price to obtain control of the company, to ensure that all 
shareholders in the company are granted the opportunity of an exit at the same 
premium price as that which may have been paid to acquire control.”116 
 
The UK Takeover Appeal Board upheld the decision of the Hearings Committee 
above in a ruling dated 13 July 2010.117 The mandatory offer rule in the UK has 
been amended on several occasions in order to keep up with developments in 
the corporate finance industry, as practitioners become more innovative in 
                                            
114The Takeover Panel. Annual Report 1991. Available on http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk 
(Accessed 20-12-2013). 
115See Takeover Appeal Board “Principle Capital Investment Trust PLC- Decision of the Appeal 
Board” (2010) 14 Available on http://www.the takeoverappealboard.org.uk (Accessed 20-12-
2013).  
116See Takeover Appeal Board “Principle Capital Investment Trust PLC- Decision of the Appeal 
Board” (2010). 14. Available on www.the takeoverappealboard.org.uk (Accessed 20-12-2013). 
117See Takeover Appeal Board. “Principle Capital Investment Trust PLC- Decision of the Appeal 
Board” (2010) 14. 
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developing complex financial instruments and changing market conditions.118 
In particular, amendments were necessary to ensure that the mandatory offer 
rule kept up with newly developed financial products, such as, derivative 
instruments, including options.119 The current mandatory offer rule in the City 
Code120 has been amended comprehensively with the implementation of the 
Takeover Directive. The mandatory offer rule in rule 9 of the City Code is more 
stringent than in the Takeover Directive.121 What is notable about the 
mandatory offer rule in the City Code is that it has not been drafted like typical 
regulations in South Africa. It is also applied in a flexible manner rather than 
according to the letter of the law.122 A number of rules have detailed explanatory 
notes. These notes serve as guidelines on how the City Code should be 
interpreted and applied. In addition, the rules avoid the use of legalese. For 
instance, one finds expressions such as “the rule will not normally be …”123 It 
is suggested that the style used is more suitable for self-regulatory regimes, 
from which the rules originates.  
 
As the mandatory offer rule in the UK is now based on statute due to the 
requirements of the Takeover Directive,124 it is important to briefly set out the 
principle underlying the mandatory offer rule. The Takeover Directive provides 
the following:  
 
“Article 3 
General Principles 
 
1. For the purpose of implementing this Directive, Member States shall ensure 
that the following principles are complied with: 
                                            
118The UK City Code was amended numerous times since it was a loose-leaf edition starting in 
1985. See second page of 12 ed of the UK City Code (2016). 
119See Practice Statement No 26 issued by the UK Panel to deal with Shareholder Activism 
dated 9 September 2009 and also Practice Statement 29 dealing with payment of inducement 
fees updated during 2015. Available on www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/up-content. (Accessed 
20 -12 -2017).  
120UK City Code (2016) The City Code was also extensively amended to bring it in line with the 
European Union Takeover Directive of 2004.  
121Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 962. 
122See Introduction to the UK City Code and the notes thereunder. 
123See among others: rules 6.1, 6.2, and 8.3 of the UK City Code. 
124Article 3 General Principle 1 of the Takeover Directive 2004. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
103 
 
(a) all holders of the securities of an offeree company of the same class must 
be afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a 
company, the other holders of securities must be protected;”  
 
The contents of the Directive were modeled almost entirely on the provisions of 
the City Code.125 The general principle 1 in article 3 of the Takeover Directive 
is taken verbatim from City Code.126 The wording in article 3, general principle 
1 of the Takeover Directive was in the City Code even before the Takeover 
Directive became effective.127 This principle provides the main rationale for 
enforcing the mandatory offer in various EU countries. 
 
3 3 An evaluation of the reasons for and against application of the 
mandatory offer rule in the United Kingdom 
 
The reasons for and against the mandatory offer rule, as indicated in the 
research, appear to be closely related, and in some instances, are similar but 
with a different emphasis. The rationale for application of the mandatory offer 
rule is to ensure that shareholders are not unduly coerced into accepting offers 
due to distorted information, and to protect minority shareholders from 
abuse.128 It is asserted that there is a third rationale for applying the mandatory 
offer rule: to equalise the position between shareholders who are close to the 
market and those outside the market.129 It appears that an assumption is made 
that institutional shareholders are close to the market while minority 
shareholders are not.  
 
Presumably, institutional shareholders are closer to the market by virtue of 
access to research capacity while minority are outside the market due to their 
limited research capacity. The third rationale also supports a need to level the 
playing field between the well-resourced and well-informed shareholders, such 
                                            
125Johnson (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 448. 
126Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 606. See General Principle 1 
in the UK City Code. 
127Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 606. 
128606. 
129606. 
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as, institutional shareholders, and the minority shareholders, who are often 
uninformed. The requirement to make a mandatory offer to all shareholders 
meets the desire to treat shareholders equally.130 The first two reasons for 
regulation of mandatory offers are in line with the general principle 1 of the City 
Code and the Takeover Directive dealing with the protection of shareholders 
and equality of treatment of shareholders.131 
 
Gullifer and Payne,132 expand the first and second rationales for the mandatory 
offer rule, dividing the rationale into two main categories, namely the 
‘undistorted choice’ and the ‘protection of minority shareholders’.133 Choice 
distortion refers to the possibility that shareholders may be forced to accept an 
offer although it is not necessarily acceptable, simply because of the pressure 
tactics adopted by the bidder.134 For instance, this may occur where a bidder 
announces an offer that will be available for a short period and limited to a set 
number of shareholders who accept it within the stipulated time. Such an action 
may distort the choice of shareholders who may accept the offer out of fear of 
being left in the lurch by the new controlling shareholder. In such an instance, 
shareholders may not exercise their free will and may not have sufficient time 
to consider the merits or demerits of the offer. The requirement of equality of 
treatment will prevent such actions by bidders since shareholders will then have 
to be treated equally.  
 
It is asserted that by treating shareholders equally, there could be no distortion 
of shareholders’ choices. The danger of ‘divide and rule’, where only a minimum 
number of shareholders get preferential treatment or special deals to entice 
them to accept the offer, which will ensure that the bidder gets control of the 
company, is prevented.135 Therefore, it is contended that the mandatory offer 
                                            
130606 
131See Takeover Directive, Article 3 General Principle 1, and also the UK City Code General 
Principle Number l.  
132Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 606-616. 
133606-616. 
134606. 
135The UK City Code General Principle 1. 
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rule plays a crucial role in avoiding distortion of shareholders’ choices.136 The 
success of the rule is also bolstered by the requirement to provide sufficient 
information and allow enough time during the course of the mandatory offer.137 
 
The second role that the mandatory offer rule plays is to protect minority 
shareholders in two ways: firstly, the mandatory offer rule prevents the 
oppression of minority shareholders,138 and secondly, it gives minority 
shareholders the right to exit the company and sell their shares.139 The reason 
why the mandatory offer rule is required as an additional measure in a bid, is 
that there is a danger that once a controlling shareholder has acquired control, 
it may engage in oppressive conduct to the prejudice of minority 
shareholders.140 Prejudice can occur in various forms, such as, a change in the 
company’s business strategy, withholding or even changing a company’s 
dividend policy, and sale of company assets.141 For this reason, shareholders 
must have an opportunity to exit from the company if they wish to do so. Once 
the bidder has made an offer to the shareholders, they are given the opportunity 
to sell and avoid any subsequent oppressive conduct by the new controlling 
shareholder. The position of minority shareholders is dependent on the identity 
of the new controlling shareholder, regardless of whether the new controlling 
shareholder will actually oppress the minority shareholders, or not.142 The 
concern is rather the new direction that the company may take. The new 
business strategy undertaken by the new controllers may, for example, be less 
successful or not appealing to the existing minority shareholders.143  
 
Other assertions in favour of the mandatory offer are that: the mandatory offer 
rule is aimed at preventing the new controlling shareholders from buying out 
minority shareholders at a low price, while the premium is paid to the controlling 
                                            
136Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 610. 
137See the UK City Code General Principle 2. 
138Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 612. 
139615. 
140612. 
141613.  
142614. 
143614. 
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shareholder;144 and the mandatory offer rule serves to protect minority 
shareholders in that they avoid inefficient change of control in companies.145 
 
The requirements of the mandatory offer rule that the new controlling 
shareholders should pay the same price paid to the current controlling 
shareholders to all minority shareholders, is controversial.146 Objections existed 
even when the rule was introduced.147 Those who are against it contend as 
follows: The mandatory offer requirement may be difficult to enforce, 
particularly during a financial downturn.148 There is a well-accepted principle 
that the value of the majority shares has an inherent premium.149 According to 
the mandatory offer rule, the majority shareholder cannot enjoy the value 
inherent in the premium attached to the controlling shares, because the 
premium must be shared equally among all shareholders. It has been stated 
that the application of the principles of equality of treatment of shareholders 
during takeovers are in contrast with the general UK company law, which 
requires that shareholders be treated fairly and not necessarily equally.150  
 
The idea of treating shareholders equally seems to go against the well-
accepted view that controlling shares are worth more than non-controlling 
shares.151 In light thereof, it could be asked why the mandatory offer rule should 
require that all shareholders must be treated equally when a controlling stake 
is acquired.152 Valuation experts argue that if a controlling stake commands a 
premium, then a minority stake should reflect a discount, taking into account its 
inability to control.153 The payment of the premium in the UK is not particularly 
significant considering the fact that shareholding of companies in the UK is 
                                            
144Sealy & Worthington Sealy’s Cases and Materials in Company Law 717. 
145See Nenova (2006) World Bank Policy Research Paper 4029. 
146Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615. 
147See Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 393. 
148Palmer & Schmitthoff Palmer’s Company Law 1194. 
149Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 614. 
150606. 
151606.  
152606.  
153RA Booth “Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings” (2001) 
SSRN Available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=285649. (Accessed 20-5-2013).  
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widespread.154 However, in countries where shareholdings are concentrated, 
this aspect of the rule is difficult to justify.155 Discussions on valuations and how 
discounts or premia are applied during the valuation of a company that is the 
subject to a takeover or a merger is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Another argument against the mandatory offer is that the rule deters acquirers 
from attempting to acquire control of a poorly-performing company. This 
removes the advantages of a free market for the transfer of corporate control. 
Because acquirers will have to ensure that they have enough cash to buy out 
all shareholders of the offeree company.156 This requirement may actually 
prevent the bidder from paying a premium, as previously mentioned, as such a 
payment is likely to increase the cost of the takeover.157 The mandatory offer 
rule may be a disincentive to make bids due to increasing costs of bids.158 The 
mandatory offer requirement may, in fact, work against the promotion of 
takeovers since it increases the cost of undertaking such a takeover.159  
 
It is generally asserted that takeovers improve corporate governance. However, 
the mandatory offer rule seems to be working against corporate governance as 
it discourages takeovers.160 The additional cost required to buy the entire 
issued capital rather than only the controller means there will be fewer changes 
of corporate control. This undermines the credibility of the threat of a hostile 
takeover as a mechanism for forcing directors to promote shareholder value.161  
 
The primary aim of the drafters of the City Code was not to promote standards 
of corporate governance in general but to maintain investor confidence.162 The 
                                            
154Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615. 
155615. 
156Prentice (1972) McGill LJ 393.  
157Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615; see also Davies & 
Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 968-969 has similar views. 
158See Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 969.  
159McCahery & Vermeulen (2010) Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.8. See 
also Baum (2006) University of Tokyo Journal of law and Politics, referring to the UK City Code 
concurs that the mandatory offer rule makes takeovers more expensive.  
160Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615. 
161Johnston (2007) Cambridge Law Journal 451. 
162451. 
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‘right to exit’ to ensure the protection of minority shareholders under the 
mandatory offer rules, are not properly justified.163 Even without a change of 
control, the existing controlling shareholders may still develop a new strategy 
to the detriment of minority shareholders, but in such a case, shareholders will 
have no right to exit.164 Company operations may also change due to changes 
of control resulting in increased shareholder value.165 It may be argued that 
there may well be benefits and disadvantages during a change of control and 
that these outcomes should not be restricted by the mandatory offer rule.166  
  
3 4 Concluding remarks 
 
Based on the discussion above, it appears that the concerns about abusive 
conduct and potential prejudice to remaining shareholders by new controlling 
shareholders led to the introduction of the mandatory offer rule. In addition, 
concerns expressed by financial markets regulators, directors and market 
participants about fraud and a lack of disclosure, played a pivotal role in the 
introduction of the mandatory offer rule. 167 The rule has since been adapted 
over a period of time based on the general principles relating to the protection 
of investors. One of the aims of the rule is to ensure equal treatment of all 
shareholders – the requirements for equality consist of the opportunity to sell, 
and to sell at the same price as the exiting controlling shareholders. However, 
the sharing of the premium makes it impossible to sell at a premium since the 
purchaser knows that it will have to make the same offer to all other 
shareholders.168   
 
In the UK, regulation of takeovers and mergers, including mandatory offers, is 
done based on the general principles set out in the City Code. The independent 
Panel, in collaboration with the Financial Services Authority, plays a major role 
                                            
163Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615. 
164615. 
165615. 
166615. 
167Rosenzweig (2007) Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law. See also Luiz An 
Evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
168Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 969.  
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in the success of enforcing the mandatory offer rule. There is a close 
relationship between the UK Panel and the parties being regulated as the Panel 
members are made up of industry members.169 Therefore, the stakeholders 
who are regulated by the UK Panel are well represented in the decision-making 
committees of the Panel, both when the rules are made and when they are 
enforced.170 The relationship between the UK Panel and the financial 
community lends credibility to the rules of the City Code and also builds trust 
between the financial services market participants.171 Consequently, 
participants are more likely to abide and comply with the rules as they have a 
role to play in their enforcement and because they believe that these rules are 
in their interests. It is arguable that the success of this model in the UK does 
not necessarily support its replication elsewhere.  
 
It is asserted that the pillars of the UK model of regulation particularly favours 
minority shareholders in countries that have widespread ownership structures. 
Few mandatory offers are actually made in the UK.172 Due to the fact that the 
mandatory offer rule has been developed to provide for the circumstances that 
existed in the UK, it may not be appropriate for every country without 
modification.173  
 
It appears that the drafters of the Takeover Directive considered this view. The 
Takeover Directive allows countries to provide derogations from the mandatory 
offer rule and also opt out of certain provisions. It has been indicated that in the 
context of the mandatory offer rule “the exception is the rule.”174 To 
accommodate company laws and the types of companies in different countries, 
the EU has accepted breakthrough rules that may be applicable where a 
company has defences in its charter that prevents a takeover. The main effect 
                                            
169See UK City Code. 
170The UK Panel operates through various committees. See the discussions under paragraph 
3 2 2 above.  
171Rosenzweig (2007) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 224. 
172Davies & Worthington Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 963 and also in Wiblin 
“Mandatory takeover offer too high a price for the economy to pay” (2004) Journal for Juridical 
Science 3. 
173Bockli et al (2014) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies. Paper No.5/2014.7.  
1747.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
110 
 
of the breakthrough rule is to facilitate a takeover bid of companies whose 
charters limit the number of shares shareholders may acquire. Once a 
particular threshold is acquired, the break-through rules would override any 
limitations of the number of shares set by the company charter. In their words, 
control could be ‘broken through.”175 This is in recognition that different 
countries have different needs that should be accommodated. It is also in 
recognition that some company structures may likely impede takeovers and 
mergers. Under the Takeover Directive, the mandatory offer rule is applied, but 
is adapted to suit different economic conditions. 
 
The mandatory offer rule forms part of strategies implemented by UK financial 
participants in an attempt to protect investors. A question may be asked 
whether the mandatory offer rule should be applied in other countries. The 
rationales for the application of mandatory offers in the UK, and the institutions 
and the rules created to enforce rules have clearly been designed specifically 
for UK financial markets. The rules may not be appropriate or as effective in 
other countries.176 The mandatory offer rule may not be suitable for application 
in other countries for a number of reasons, including the differences between 
the UK’s financial markets and economic conditions, and those of other 
countries.  
  
                                            
175McCahery & Vermeulen (2010) Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 10. 
176See Bockli et al. 2014 University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies. Paper 
No.5/2014. The discussions in the paper indicate some of the challenges of applying the 
mandatory offer rule across the EU.  
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Chapter 4:  An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in  
Australia  
 
“The Australian experience seems to indicate an initial preparedness to adapt 
the received law in response to local circumstances.”1  
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, the dissertation deals with an overview of the regulation of 
takeovers and mergers in terms of Australian takeover law. The previous 
chapter dealt with the mandatory offer as applied in the UK. Even though 
Australian company law,2 like South African company law,3 originated from the 
UK, their takeover and merger regime is different in respect of their provisions 
and the bodies regulating takeovers and mergers. There is a notable distinction 
- particularly the absence of a mandatory offer rule as applied in the UK. It is 
important to understand the rationale for Australian authorities deviating from 
the UK takeover and mergers rules, particularly, the mandatory offer rule. 
 
4 2 The development of takeover and merger provisions in Australia  
 
4 2 1 The developments leading to takeovers and mergers provisions in 
Australia 
 
 English company law was introduced into Australia over a period of time. This 
then developed into modern companies based on Australian legislation.4 
Australian company law is often seen as a mere “copy” of English company 
law.5 However, there are distinguishing features that defy the assertion that 
                                            
1P Lipton “History of Company Law in Colonial Australia: Economic Development and Legal 
Evolution” (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review. 830. 
2805.   
3HS Cilliers, ML Benade, JJ Henning, JJ Du Plessis & PA Delport Corporate Law (1992) 16. 
4Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 807. 
5806. 
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Australian law is “a wholesale imitation of the law of England”.6 Australian 
company law had already laid foundations of company law prior to the 
promulgation of limited liability companies’ legislation based on UK company 
law.7 Some of the countries, which adopted the English company law at an 
early stage quickly, developed thriving economies.8 These thriving new 
economies encouraged inward investment, and they quickly developed 
successful, well-managed companies and other institutions. These 
developments also led to innovations and increased entrepreneurship.9 Based 
on these developments, it is suggested that there is an inter-relationship 
between economic development, and the evolution of company law in various 
countries.10 Companies and other institutions assisted in developing a healthy 
and well-managed economy.11 The new institutions also created confidence in 
the economies of the thriving states, as investors felt protected.  
 
Based on the Australian example, it could be argued that a strong and 
appropriate regulatory culture encourages rapid economic development. Lipton 
asserts that those countries that made rapid economic progress often also had 
well-developed legal systems. Well-developed and well-managed public 
institutions were catalysts for growth in the economies of those countries. It is 
suggested that the countries that had English law transplanted at an early stage 
also saw their economies developing rapidly due to increased investments.12 
However, a question was raised as to whether the adoption of the English law 
by Australian companies was suitable for local conditions.13 It appears that the 
Australian authorities acknowledged that this may not necessarily have been 
appropriate and hence designed a different takeover regime that is discussed 
in the following section. From the literature reviewed, it appears that 
development of takeover law in Australia and Australian company law in 
                                            
6Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 806. 
7822. 
8805. 
9828. 
10822. 
11822 
12812. 
13806. 
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general has been slow and tortuous. For a considerable time, regulation of 
companies was done separately by the various states. Although it was 
accepted that there was a need for unified national securities and companies’ 
regulations, this did not happen for a considerable time.14 
 
It is generally accepted that takeovers and mergers allow companies to 
diversify risk and better grow their revenue base due to their bigger size. It is 
also acknowledged that a takeover or merger allows for the replacement of non-
effective managers. However, these justifications are not universally accepted. 
Some researchers hold that takeovers are undertaken for the benefit of 
institutional investors and that managers often undertake mergers or takeovers 
in pursuit of short-term gains.15  
 
4 2 2 Reasons for the development of takeover and merger provisions in 
Australia 
 
The bust of the 1890’s followed the economic boom of the 1880’s. The frauds 
and malpractice in companies that often took place led to numerous changes 
to the Australian company law.16 This was similar to the situation in the UK, 
where frauds led to an overhaul of the then existing UK company law and 
resulted in the introduction of the City Code.17 By means of these reforms, the 
modern Australian company law was shaped. As more and more investors 
flocked into Australia, authorities saw a need to develop effective provisions for 
investor protection. This led to the introduction of numerous provisions relating 
to compulsory disclosures. Presumably, it was considered that more 
disclosures made to investors by companies would assist investors in making 
informed decisions about their investments in those companies. Regulation of 
                                            
14B Mees & I Ramsay Research Report Corporate Regulators in Australia (1961-2000): From 
Companies’ Registrars to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2008) 
Available at: http (Accessed on 20-10-2013). 
15I Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia (2010) .3. 
16Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 822. 
17See the discussions in Chapter 3 paragraph 3 2.  
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takeovers in Australia have since the 1960s “vacillated between attempts at 
rigid control and a practically laissez faire approach.”18 
 
The development of current takeover laws in Australia may be attributed to the 
successive corporate scandals of the late 1980s and the early 21st century.19 
These scandals led to the introduction of corporate regulation of takeovers by 
the federal authorities and the formation of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission to oversee the regulation of takeovers and mergers. 
Concerns about more corporate scandals led to the establishment of numerous 
committees whose mandate was to develop laws and procedures that were 
aimed at protecting investors. The various committees had varying degrees of 
success. It appears that some of the states resisted what they saw as 
‘interference’ by the federal government in undermining their power to register 
companies. It is also suggested that this resistance from the states led to slow 
reforms of company law.20  
 
The Eggleston Committee,21 named after Sir Richard Eggleston, the convener, 
was one of the many committees that contributed to important developments in 
the regulation of takeovers and mergers in Australia. The Committee led the 
discussions on the introduction of new takeover and merger provisions, and 
introduced principles that were focused on the avoidance of mistreatment of 
shareholders.22 The principles are considered to be the foundation of 
Australia’s takeover legislation. They concentrated on four requirements, 
namely (1) that the identity of the bidder be known; (2) reasonable time be 
allowed for shareholders to consider the offer; (3) the necessary information be 
                                            
18P Brown & R da Silva Rosa “Australia’s Corporate Law Reform and the Market for Corporate 
Control” (1998) 5: 2 Agenda 179-188. 
19A Dignam “Lamenting Reform? The Changing Nature of Common Law” (2007) 25 Corporate 
Governance Regulation’ Company and Securities Law Journal 283-299. 2.Available at: 
http//ssrn. com/abstract=1839447. (Accessed 20- 5- 2017). 
20Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 826. 
21J Lessing “Corporate takeovers: Law Reform and Theory- Is The minority shareholders being 
disadvantaged? (1997) 9 BLR.6. The committee sat during 1969 and its principles became to 
be known as the Eggleston Principles.  
22M Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in I 
Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia (2010) 39. 
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provided to shareholders to make an informed decision; and (4) an equal 
opportunity be granted for shareholders to participate in the offer.23 The 
Eggleston Principles are primarily concerned with distributive justice.24 It is 
suggested that the conflicts between demands for equity and motives for 
making a profit need to be given greater consideration by means of a clear 
policy.25 A number of researchers do not seem to share the view that the 
Eggleston Principles benefit shareholders. In their view, these principles are 
principal stumbling blocks to a policy overhaul that would favour market 
activity.26  
 
The same concerns that shareholders may be treated unfairly during takeovers 
and mergers no doubt also apply in Australia. A view has been expressed that 
rules to regulate takeovers and mergers are intended to benefit target 
shareholders, as during a tender offer bid, target shareholders often do not 
benefit as much as they should.27 This situation may leave many target 
shareholders with no real choice, and prevents competing bids by rival bidders 
that would have benefited all shareholders. It is suggested that this is due to 
the fact that, in takeovers or mergers, most shareholders have very little power 
and, therefore, limited choice. It is asserted that the growing dissatisfaction with 
these features of the marketplace for corporate control led to the introduction 
of similar regulatory measures in the UK. It is further indicated that some of the 
strategies which pressured target shareholders include coercing target 
shareholders into accepting the offer, holding target shareholders bound to the 
offer and ensuring that bidders retain maximum leeway with respect to the 
offer.28 Bidders are able to coerce target shareholders into acceptance by use 
                                            
23Guidance note GN 1 (guidance note 1) and also RB Thompson “Takeover Regulation After 
the “Convergence” of Corporate Law” (2002) Vanderbilt University Law School Law & 
Economics 6 Available at http://ssrn.com/abstarct id= 362880 (Accessed 15-2-2014). 
24Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 39. 
25B Sheehy “Australia’s Eggleston principles in takeover law: Social and economic sense?” 
(2004) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 6. 
26Brown & da Silva Rosa (1998) Agenda 179-188. 
27R Sappideen “Takeover Bids and Target Shareholder Protection: The Regulatory Framework 
in the United Kingdom, United States and Australia” (1986) 8 Journal of Comparative Business 
and Capital Market Law 281-317, 281. 
28Sappideen (1986) Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 281. 
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of the partial bid together with acceptances based on a first-come, first-served 
basis. 29 This means that only a limited number of the shares are bought. 
Furthermore, according to the first-come first-serve offers, the sellers’ shares 
are accepted in the order by which they are tendered into the offer. This tactic 
results in the creation of a prisoner's dilemma for target shareholders. Those 
who do not tender into the offer while other shareholders do so will not have 
the opportunity to accept the offer once the offer is closed. Shareholders may 
fear being left in a company that had substantial change of shareholding. On 
the other hand, they may not have the full details of the offer due to the time 
limit and tactic adopted by the bidder to ensure that the shareholders have little 
time to respond to the offer. Hence the prisoner’s dilemma. The bidders could 
also attempt to strengthen their position by making their offers subject to a 
number of conditions that further add uncertainties to the bid. This also 
weakens the position of target shareholders.30  
 
The main principles for regulating takeovers and mergers are now set out in 
terms of section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001. In short, this section requires 
that: 
 
“(a) changes of control in respect of certain companies including listed 
companies, or an unlisted company with more than 50 shareholders takes 
place in an efficient, competitive and informed market;  
(b) shareholders or holders of relevant interests and the directors of the 
company or body or the responsible entity for the transactions know the 
identity of any person who proposes to acquire a substantial interest in the 
company, body or scheme and have a reasonable time to consider the 
proposal; 
(c) the shareholders and such persons or bodies, or entities, in (b) above, are 
given enough information to enable them to assess the merits of the 
proposal; and 
                                            
29281. 
30Sappideen (1986) Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 282. 
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(d) that an appropriate procedure is followed as a preliminary action to a 
Compulsory acquisition of voting shares or interests or any other kind of 
securities.”31 
 
The first three requirements form the core of the Eggleston Principles. The last 
principle was introduced by section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001.These 
principles form the foundation of the Australian merger and takeover provisions 
in their modern form. Section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001 is “remarkably 
faithful to the Eggleston Principles”.32 Section 602(d) of the Corporations Act 
2001 was added by the legislature to ensure protection of minority 
shareholders, as they are able to sell their shares to the acquirer where the 
acquirer has acquired 90 percent of the relevant voting securities. In the same 
way that the acquirer is forced to buy out the minority shareholders, subject to 
safeguards put in place by the courts, this section forces a major shareholder 
to acquire the shares of minority shareholders. 33 
 
While the Eggleston Principles and section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001 
set out the basic principles for regulating takeovers and mergers, the 
fundamental approach in Australian takeover law is a general takeover 
prohibition contained in section 606 of the Corporations Act 2001. The basic 
approach is that an acquisition of 20 percent of the voting rights in a company 
is not allowed, unless certain principles have been complied with. Unless there 
is compliance with the takeover and merger provisions, no such acquisitions 
must be made.34 The Australian takeover regime is a uniquely restrictive 
hybrid.35 It has elements of the UK City Code and of the US takeover rules. 
Hence, it is pointed out that the Australian model of takeover regulations did 
                                            
31Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
32Sheehy (2004) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 2. 
33ASIC Regulatory Guide 10 Compulsory acquisitions and buyouts (2013) Available 
at:http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg10-published-21-June-
2013.pdf/$file/rg10-published-21-June-2013.pdf> (Accessed 20-2-2014). 
34 King & Wood Mallesons “A guide to takeovers in Australia” (2012) Available at: 
http://www.mallesons.com/Documents/A_guide_to_takeovers_in_Australia.pdf> (Accessed 
20-2-2014). 
35E Hutson “Australia’s takeover rules: how good are they?” (2002) Corporate Regulation, 
Jassa Issue 4 Summer 33.  
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not “borrow wholesale” from the UK City Code.36 Most important for this 
dissertation is that the mandatory offer rule that exists in the UK was not 
adopted by Australia.37  
 
The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 2003, commonly referred 
to as the CLERP, introduced a new way of regulating mergers and takeovers 
in Australia. Disclosures form an important part of the regulatory regime in 
takeovers in terms of these reforms. It is generally accepted that disclosures 
about takeovers assist shareholders to make informed decisions about the 
value of their company shares. Continuous disclosures enable investors to 
protect themselves and plan accordingly. The CLERP memorandum indicates 
that the existence and enforcement of Australia’s continuous disclosure laws 
are fundamental to the efficient operation and protection of its financial and 
securities markets.38 During the CLERP reforms, Australia considered 
introducing a mandatory offer and comments on the matter were requested.39 
However, the legislator finally decided against it. A mandatory rule did not find 
its way into the Corporations Act 2001. The idea was abandoned as it was not 
supported by the non-government parties at the time.40 One of the concerns 
was that it had possible adverse impact on a competitive market for corporate 
control as it reduced the opportunity for auctions for control.41 
 
However, the absence of a mandatory offer bid in Australia does not mean that 
minority shareholders are not protected, although it may at first sight, appear 
so. The equal treatment rules in Australia are more rigid than those of the UK 
City Code.42 While in the UK, a mandatory offer is applicable once the offeror 
moves over 30 percent threshold, “The offeror for an Australian company 
                                            
36See Dignam (2007) Company and Securities Law Journal 283-299. 
37See above 283-299. 
38Australian Government Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill (2003) Available at: 
http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/acts_bills_ems.aspx. (Accessed 20-8-2013).  
39Emma Armson ‘Evolution of Australian Takeover Legislation’ (2012) Vol 39, No 3 Monash 
University Law Review 682. 
40Armson (2012) Monash University Law Review 683 at note 252. 
41Armson (2012) Monash University Law Review 682. 
42J Mannolini ‘Convergence or Divergence: Is there a Role for the Eggleston Principles in a 
Global M&A Environment ‘(2002) Vol 24:336 Sydney Law Review 358. 
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cannot acquire control of a parcel of more than 20 per cent, except pursuant to 
a general offer.”43 Therefore, a minority shareholder in Australia tends to “be 
empowered to a far greater extent than in the United Kingdom”.44  
 
The approach of regulators over the world is that regulating takeovers and 
mergers is important from the perspective of all stakeholders, including 
shareholders. Shareholders need to be protected during the course of a 
takeover and they need to be able to make an informed decision about whether 
to sell or retain their shares during a bid. These fundamental principles of 
regulating takeovers and mergers also form the cornerstone of regulating 
takeover and mergers in Australia. 
 
4 2 3 Bodies responsible for regulating takeovers and mergers 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the 
Australian Takeovers Panel (Australian Panel) are the two regulating bodies 
responsible for takeover and merger regulation in Australia. Each of them 
performs a separate regulatory function in respect of takeovers and mergers. 
ASIC is Australia’s corporate, markets and financial services regulator and 
ensures that Australia’s financial markets are fair and transparent, and 
supported by confident and informed investors and consumers.45 It has been 
set up under, and is administered in terms of, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act No 51 of 2001 (ASIC Act)46 and carries out most 
of its work under the Corporations Act 2001.47 On the other hand, the Australian 
Panel is an adjudicator of disputes that may occur during a takeover or a 
                                            
43Mannolini (2002) Sydney Law Review 358. 
44Mannolini (2002) Sydney Law Review 358. 
45See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Available at: http//www. asic.au.gov. 
(Accessed 20-2-2014). 
46Section 8 Section 8 of the Australian Securities and Investments Act No 51 2001 provides 
that ASIC: 
(a) is a body corporate, with perpetual succession; and 
(b) has a common seal; and 
(c) may acquire, hold and dispose of real and personal property; and 
(d) may sue and be sued in its corporate name. 
47See Australian Securities and Investments Commission June 2013, Regulatory Guide 9 
<http// www.asic.au.gov.> (Accessed 20-2-2014)).  
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merger.48 The Panel was created in terms of section 171 of the ASIC Act. It is 
inevitable that in their regulatory spheres, ASIC and the Australian Panel will 
often cross paths, even though they regulate different aspects of takeovers and 
mergers. It is also important that the two bodies co-operate in order to ensure 
maximum compliance. 
 
The Australian takeover and merger provisions apply to companies listed on 
the Australian Securities Exchange, private companies that have more than 50 
shareholders, corporate bodies, even if such bodies are not companies that are 
formed in Australia, and listed managed investment schemes.49 
 
4 2 3 1 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission  
 
ASIC was established by section 7 of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act of 1989 and has continued to exist in terms of section 261 of 
the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act of 2001. ASIC has 
the functions and powers that are conferred on it by, or under, various 
Australian acts.50 Some of those functions and powers are not relevant for the 
purposes of this dissertation. It also has numerous broad functions including 
monitoring and promoting market integrity and consumer protection in relation 
to the Australian financial system, and monitoring and promoting market 
integrity and consumer protection in relation to the payments system. It is 
required to undertake a number of steps in order to achieve its mandate. The 
steps include public awareness and educating consumers.51 ASIC may also 
                                            
48See The Australian Takeover Panel <www.takeoverspanel.au.gov. (Accessed 20-2-2014).  
49Sections 602, 602A, 603 and 604 of the Australian Corporations Act No 50 of 2001.  
50The Acts include:(a) the Insurance Act 1973; (b) the Insurance (Agents and Brokers) Act  
1984; (c) the Insurance Contracts Act 1984; (d) the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) 
Act 1993; (e) the Life Insurance Act 1995;(f) the Retirement Savings Accounts Act 1997; and 
(g) the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.  
51In accordance with the above functions, ASIC is required to undertake the following:  
(a) promoting the adoption of approved industry standards and codes of practice; and 
(b) promoting the protection of consumer interests; and 
(c) promoting community awareness of payments system issues; and 
(d) promoting sound customer‑banker relationships, including through: 
(i) monitoring the operation of industry standards and codes of practice; and 
(ii) monitoring compliance with such standards and codes. 
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advise the Minister about any changes to a law or advise the Minister to make 
recommendations about any matter relating to its functions. 
 
ASIC can be termed a ‘super regulator’ due to its comprehensive regulatory 
functions and powers.52 In contrast, in South Africa, the functions performed by 
this singular body are spread across various independent regulatory bodies, 
such as, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority,53 which administers various 
financial-services statutes, the National Credit Regulator54 (which deals with 
matters relating to credit), the National Consumer Commission55 (which resolve 
consumer related matters), the Companies Commission (which administers the 
Companies Act of 2008),56 the Companies Tribunal57 (which resolves certain 
disputes in terms of the Companies Act of 2008) and the SA Takeover 
Regulation Panel (SA Panel)58 in reviewing merger and takeover documents, 
and The Takeover Special Committee.59 (which resolves disputes in respect of 
mergers and takeovers in terms of the Companies Act of 2008). 
 
Among its many functions, ASIC is responsible for reviewing takeover and 
merger documents in terms of the Corporations Act 2001. It may also 
investigate, monitor, prosecute and develop policies in respect of mergers and 
takeovers. In terms of section 655A of the Corporations Act 2001, ASIC has the 
power to exempt any person from any of the provisions in chapter 6 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. The power of ASIC to exempt is, however, subject to 
the provisions of section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001 – the main principles 
for regulating takeovers and mergers. ASIC must consider these principles 
before any exemption may be granted. Where the application for exemption will 
be against the purpose and principles set in section 602, such an exemption 
will not be granted. 
                                            
52ASIC is responsible for administering a number of legislations. See note 50 above. 
53 See section 58 of the FSR Act which set the functions of the Financial Sector Conduct 
Authority.   
54Section 12 of the National Credit Act No 34 of 2005. 
55Section 85 of the Consumer Protection Act No.68 of 2008.  
56Section 185 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
57Section 193 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
58Section 196 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
59Section 202 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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The role of ASIC in supervising takeovers and mergers incudes administration 
and monitoring how takeover bids are conducted.60 The differences between 
the Australian Panel, ASIC and the SA Panel in regulating takeovers and 
mergers will be dealt with in chapter 6. In the Regulatory Guide 9 on takeover 
bids, ASIC has indicated that the functions and powers of ASIC as an overseer 
of takeovers and mergers, among others, include: (a) reviewing and monitoring 
of documentation, disclosures and conduct in relation to bids to ensure 
compliance with the takeover provisions; (b) providing regulatory guidance and 
relief that improve commercial certainty and balance the protections of the 
takeover provisions; and (c) in applicable cases, taking enforcement action to 
protect the interests of investors and promote their confident and informed 
participation in the takeover process and financial markets, generally.61  
 
ASIC’s regulatory role in undertaking surveillance of takeovers and mergers, its 
day-to-day administration role and its enforcement role with respect to 
takeovers, are supported and complemented by the role of the Australian 
Panel, which is the main forum for resolving disputes concerning takeover or 
merger transactions. ASIC also regulates schemes of arrangement undertaken 
in terms of the Corporations Act 2001 that are aimed at achieving a change of 
control of a corporation in a similar way as may be achieved by a takeover offer. 
ASIC’s coordinated efforts in regulating mergers and takeovers is aimed at 
ensuring that, as far as practically possible, similar principles and protections 
are afforded to investors, regardless of whether control acquisition is through a 
scheme of arrangement or a takeover bid.62 In regulating takeover bids 
including schemes of arrangements, ASIC applies the general principles set 
out in section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001.63 In terms of this guideline, 
                                            
60Australian Securities and Investments Commission, issued December 2016, Regulatory 
Guide 9. Available at https//www.asic.au.gov. (Accessed 19 February 2019). 
61Regulatory Guide 9 paragraphs 9.6. 
62See Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Regulatory Guide 60 (Regulatory 
Guide 60), dealing with Schemes of arrangement Available at: https// www. asic.au.gov. 
(Accessed 20-2-2014 
63Regulatory Guide 9 and Regulatory Guide 60. 
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ASIC follows what it terms as “truth in takeover”.64 Hereby, ASIC ensures that 
the schemes of arrangement comply with the basic principles of full disclosure, 
fairness and equality of treatment, among others, when it examines the 
documents relating to schemes, the proposed scheme and the draft 
explanatory statement for the scheme.65 ASIC also reviews and makes 
inquiries during a takeover. Certain documents must be lodged with ASIC as 
part of the takeover or merger process, which may include agreements or 
irrevocable undertakings relating to the takeover or merger. The review process 
may consider the terms, conditions and structure of the takeover or merger, as 
well as the disclosures made in the various documents. According to the ASIC 
guideline, ASIC has a general power to refuse to register or receive a document 
submitted for lodgement that does not comply with relevant procedural 
requirements.66  
 
During their review process, ASIC may also make additional inquiries in relation 
to a takeover to ensure that relevant parties are complying with their obligations. 
ASIC may undertake the inquiries at their own initiative or as a result of a 
complaint lodged by any interested party. The inquiries may be broad and 
include questions about the conduct of parties during a takeover or merger, and 
announcements or comments made in the media during the takeover process. 
In undertaking their reviews or inquiries, ASIC’s point of departure is the 
principles set out in section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001. ASIC considers 
whether the conduct of the parties or announcements made during a takeover 
has any detrimental effect or undermines the principles set out in section 602 
of the Corporations Act 2001. In this way, any misleading information is 
addressed. Parties may then be required to issue corrective statements. Failure 
to reach an agreement with parties may lead to an application to the Australian 
Panel to declare particular conduct as an unacceptable circumstance in relation 
to a takeover or a merger.  
 
                                            
64Regulatory Guide 9  
65See Regulatory Guide 60  
66See Regulatory Guide 60 
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When ASIC exercises its discretionary powers in terms of section 655A of the 
Corporations Act, one of the main considerations in granting exemption from 
the requirements of section 602 of chapter 6 is that such an exemption does 
not negatively impact on the principles set out in section 602.67 ASIC also has 
the power to grant class orders, grant modifications, grant specific consent or 
approvals, and to make market integrity rules.68 In terms of section 631 of the 
Corporations Act 2001, it is an offence if a person publicly proposes to make a 
takeover bid and then does not proceed to make offers under that bid within 
two months of the proposal. This law is in place to ensure that announced 
takeovers are followed through and offers are actually made. ASIC and the 
Australian Panel have a co-operative relationship. ASIC has standing to apply 
to the Australian Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances in 
relation to the affairs of any company or listed registered managed investment 
scheme.  
 
In cases where other parties apply to the Australian Panel for a declaration, 
ASIC must be invited to make submissions on the matter and on any orders 
that the Australian Panel proposes to make in terms of section 657A(4) and 
657D(1) of the Corporations Act 2001. In deciding whether or not to make 
submissions, ASIC considers the following: 
(a) whether unacceptable circumstances exist in relation to a takeover bid; (b) 
whether interests of parties may be affected by the relevant circumstances and 
such parties are not represented in the proceedings – in particular, retail or 
minority investors; (c) whether the issues raise matters of policy or 
interpretation that may have wider implications for the conduct of takeovers in 
general; (d) whether it has had any previous involvement or engagement with 
the matter or dispute at hand; and (e) whether they are in a position to provide 
any factual information that may assist the Australian Panel.69 ASIC and the 
Australian Panel have entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to 
enhance cooperation in their respective roles in takeovers. The MOU deals with 
                                            
67The section setting out the main principles underlying regulation of takeover and mergers in 
Australia. 
68See Regulatory Guide 9  
69Regulatory Guide 9. 
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information-sharing, consultation on policy development and regular liaison 
between the parties.70 
 
4 2 3 2  The Australian Takeovers Panel 
 
Regulation of takeovers and mergers in Australia was initially entrusted to the 
National Companies and Securities Commission and finally to the current 
Australian Panel.71 Due to the concerns that it is not appropriate to vest the 
powers of an investigator and an adjudicator in the same body, there was a 
need to separate these two powers. This led to the establishment of the 
Australian Panel. The Australian Panel initially existed as the Corporations and 
Securities Panel, finally changing its name to the Australian Panel, as it is still 
known today.72  Prior to the restructuring of the Australian Panel to its current 
form, it was regarded as ineffective. Most disputes had to be settled by the 
courts.73 Ramsay,74 for example, agrees with the assertion and indicates that 
the Australian Panel was not successful prior to the introduction of the changes 
by the Corporations Act 2001 (Australian Corporation Act). Initially the 
Australian Panel struggled with limited jurisdiction, with a legal framework that 
hindered its operations. ASIC also did not want to refer disputes on takeovers 
to the Australian Panel as it was supposed to do so in terms of the regulatory 
regime. 
 
The Panel has been established in terms of section 171 of the ASIC Act and is 
given its powers under part 6.10 of the Corporations Act 2001. It carries out its 
functions and mandate in terms of chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 2001.75 
The Australian Panel is a peer review body and its members consist of various 
                                            
70Australian Securities and Investments Commission June 2013, Regulatory Guide 9. 
71Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 34. 
7234. 
73N Calleja The New Takeover Australian Panel –A Better Way? (2002) 5. 
74Ramsay “The Takeovers Australian Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Australian Panel and 
the Takeovers Regulation in Australia 34. 
75658-659. 
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industry practitioners.76 The Australian Panel comprises legal and commercial 
experts in the area of takeovers and mergers.77   
 
The Panel members are appointed by the Governor-General, on nomination by 
the Minister, in terms of section 172 of the ASIC Act. There must be a minimum 
of five members and they are nominated based on their knowledge or 
experience.78 On 28 June 2013, the Australian Panel had 48 members.79 
Australian Panel members perform their functions on a part-time basis and the 
executive of the Australian Panel undertakes the day-to-day regulatory 
guidance. The executive of the Australian Panel consists of at least four 
persons, namely, the director, counsel and two support staff members, and up 
to two secondees who usually come from law firms.80 The sitting members of 
the Australian Panel (as members who are responsible for adjudicating a 
dispute is known) are supported by the executive team and a president chairs 
the Australian Panel proceedings.81 The executive team of the Australian Panel 
is not involved in the dispute resolution process of the Australian Panel, but 
rather play an important role in ensuring that the Australian Panel informs 
parties of the various procedures involved in the resolution of a takeover 
dispute.82  
 
The executives of the Panel are the first point of contact for parties involved in 
any disputes. According to the notes to the rules, the executives act with the 
authority of the president of the Australian Panel when conducting business on 
behalf of the Australian Panel and when interacting with parties.83 In order to 
                                            
76Calleja The New Takeover Australian Panel –A Better Way? 1.  
77E Armson “Working with Judicial Review: The New Operation of the Takeovers Australian 
Panel” (2009) 33 Melbourne University Law Review. 658. 
78Australian Takeovers Panel, Panel Proceedings, Available at: http//www.takeovers.gov.au. 
content/DisplayDoc.aspx? doc=Panel_members.html, (Accessed on 15-2-2014). 
79Australian Takeovers Panel Annual Report 2012-2013, Available at: 
http//www.takeovers.gov.au. content/resources/reports/annual_ reports.2012-2013 (Accessed 
on 15-2-2014). 
80AustralianTakeoversPanelAvailableat:http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/DisplayDoc.aspx
?doc=Panel_process/the_Panel_process.htm. (Accessed 15-2-2014). 
81Australian Takeovers Panel, Panel Proceedings, and Available at: 
http//www.takeovers.gov.au. content/DisplayDoc.aspx? doc=Panel_ process/ the_ Panel. html, 
Accessed on (15-2-2014). 
82See Australian Takeovers Panel- About the Panel. 
83The Australian Takeovers Panel. Procedural Rules, Note 1 to rule 10.1.  
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preserve procedural fairness and to make it possible to preserve 
independence, the parties and the president of the Australian Panel or 
Australian Panel members do not communicate directly.84 The executives of 
the panel manage the day-to-day administrative functions of the Australian 
Panel. These include dealing with matters such as informing parties of the 
progress of their applications and advising the president of the Australian Panel 
or Australian Panel members about various applications and submissions, 
questions of law and issues of policy, when needed.85  
 
Some of the specific tasks undertaken by the executive are: assisting the 
president to identify an Australian Panel for a matter; assisting Australian Panel 
members with conflict checks; conducting research for the Australian Panel; 
preparing draft documents for the Australian Panel such as media releases, 
declarations, interim and final orders and reasons for a decision; and when 
requested, advising and assisting the president or the Australian Panel in 
performing or exercising their functions or powers. According to note 3 to the 
rules, the executive does not make decisions on the merits of an application. 
They do not sift or filter information to be submitted to the Australian Panel. It 
is the function of the Australian Panel itself to decide on such matters.86 Another 
important function of the executive is to provide market participants with the 
current approach on policy issues so as to provide guidance. The executive 
may give market participants or parties its general opinions on the Australian 
Panel's likely views on a particular matter or a hypothetical transaction. Such 
opinions, however, do not bind the Australian Panel.87  
 
The primary role of the Panel is to decide whether there are unacceptable 
circumstances in relation to a takeover or merger, applying the principles 
underlying the takeover provisions set out in chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 
                                            
84The Australian Takeovers Panel. Procedural Rules, Notes to the Procedural Rules.  
85The Australian Takeovers Panel. Procedural Rules, Note 2 to Rule 10 of the Procedural 
Rules. 
86The Australian Takeovers Panel. Procedural Rules, Note 3 to Rule 10 of the Procedural 
Rules. 
87The Australian Takeovers Panel. Procedural Rules, Note 4 to Rule 10 of the Procedural 
Rules.  
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2001. In declaring ‘circumstances unacceptable’ in relation to takeovers or 
mergers the main aim of the Australian Panel is to ensure that takeover or 
merger transactions adhere to the policy set out in section 602, containing the 
main original Eggleston Principles.88 
 
The Australian Panel has an internal review panel whose function is to review 
decisions of the hearing panel at the request of the parties or ASIC. The internal 
review panel will exclude those members of the Australian Panel who 
participated in the decision being reviewed.89 The president of the Australian 
Panel must consent to the application to review the decision of the Australian 
Panel prior to convening the review panel.90 In 2000, the Australian Panel 
gained new powers by means of the CLERP.91 These reforms brought about 
major changes in how disputes in takeovers are resolved.92 The reforms were 
aimed at promoting speedy, informal and uniform decision-making during the 
regulation of takeovers.93 The CLERP reforms were also aimed at avoiding 
tactical litigation during takeover and mergers.94 It was also hoped that by 
creating a specialist takeover regulatory body, the courts would be freed from 
being involved in takeover disputes, except in certain circumstances. 
Therefore, although the Australian Panel is the primary forum for regulating 
disputes in mergers and takeovers, the courts still have a role to play as the 
Australian Panel may refer questions of law to the court. The reform of the 
Australian Panel also ensured a more responsive body that could quickly and 
efficiently deal with disputes in takeovers and mergers. This also ensured that 
parties were not unnecessarily lumbered with high costs when resolving 
                                            
88Section 602 also incorporate additional principles relating to efficient, competitive and 
informed market as well as compulsory acquisitions. See guidance note 1 at paras 30-31.  
and see Calleja The New Takeover Australian Panel –A Better Way? 3. 
89Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 1-38. 
90E Armson “The Australian Takeovers Panel: Commercial Body or Quasi-Court? (2004) 58 
Melbourne University Law Review, 2 Available at: SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=887650 
(Accessed 14-2-2014).  
91E Armson “An Empirical Study of the First Five Years of the Takeovers Panel” (2005) 27 
Sydney Law Review 665. 
92665. 
93665. See also Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia (2010) 34. 
94Armson (2005) Sydney Law Review 665. 
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disputes during their transactions.95 The Australian Panel became the main 
forum for regulating takeovers and this also allowed it to achieve principle-
based rather than “black-letter-of-the-law regulation.96 This approach is 
encouraged, as it is believed that the regulation of mergers and takeovers 
should be about principles and not just what the law prescribes.97 The 
Australian government introduced two principal reforms, which rejuvenated the 
Australian Panel during 2000.98 These are: 
 
“1) replacement of the black letter of the law regime with a principles based 
regulatory one; and 
2) shifting the primary responsibility for dispute resolution from the courts to a 
tribunal comprising markets participants.”99  
 
It is generally known that detailed legislative requirements may create 
significant opportunities for tactical litigation to be used as a strategy to affect 
the outcome of a takeover bid or a merger. During a takeover or a merger, there 
are considerable incentives to pursue tactical litigation due to the conflicting 
interests between the bidder and the directors of the target company. The 
conflicts arise mainly due to the fact that the directors of the target company 
will lose their jobs if the takeover or merger succeeds. 100 Tactical litigation can 
also be pursued by legal practitioners who may be motivated by the prospect 
of huge success fees should they be able to defeat a takeover by another 
company.  
 
The implementation of the above changes was not without difficulties. It is 
suggested that this is due to the fact that when a statutory regime is replaced 
by principle-based regulation; there is a possibility of judicial review and 
                                            
95Calleja The New Takeover Australian Panel –A Better Way? 4. 
96Dyer & MacDonald, “Why Was the Takeover Panel Established” in Ramsay (ed) The 
Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia (2010) 80-96.88. 
97B Dyer & M MacDonald “Why Was the Takeover Panel Established” in The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 81. 
98See Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 34. 
99S McKeon “Foreword” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers Regulation 
in Australia (2010) v-vii. 
100Armson (2005) Sydney Law Review 666. 
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constitutional challenge.101 This indeed happened. The Australian Panel 
subsequently gained constitutional recognition in the case of Attorney General 
v Alinta,102 where the High Court upheld the constitutional validity of the 
Australian Panel’s powers.103 Prior to this, the provision that the Australian 
Panel as a primary forum for regulating disputes in takeovers and mergers was 
often questioned by the disputing parties and their legal representatives.104 To 
reduce the use of tactical litigation, the Corporations Act 2001 significantly 
restricts the courts’ role. The courts’ involvement is restricted because the 
Corporations Act 2001 contains a limitation clause that restricts access to the 
courts during the course of the bid.105 The Australian Panel, on its website, 
proclaims: 
 
“Under s659B of the Corporations Act, private parties to a takeover no longer 
have the right to commence civil litigation, or seek injunctive relief from the 
courts in relation to a takeover, while the takeover is current.” 106  
 
Only governmental authorities may commence court proceedings in relation to 
a takeover bid during the course of a bid.107 In line with the rule of law, the 
Australian Panel is subject to review by the courts – to guard against the 
possibility that the Australian Panel acts outside the law in exercising its powers 
to resolve disputes arising during a takeover bid.108  
 
As indicated above, it is generally accepted by most commentators on 
Australian takeovers and mergers, that the Australian Takeover Panel was not 
effective in its first years of existence.109 This was due to the structure of the 
                                            
101McKeon “Foreword” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers Regulation in Australia. v-
vii. 
1022008 233 CLR 542. See also Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 662. 
103Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 662. 
104657-682. 
105See section 659B of the Corporations Act 2001. 
106The Australian Takeovers Panel Available at: http www.takeoversAustralian Panel.au.gov. 
(Accessed 15-2-2014). 
107Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 661. 
108661. 
109See Calleja The New Takeover Panel –A Better Way? 4; Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, 
Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 39-79; and also, Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” 
in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38. 34. 
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Australian Panel and because it could only deal with matters which had been 
referred to it by ASIC for dispute resolution. During the first few years of the 
Australian Panel’s existence, ASIC referred few matters to it. Another problem 
was the fact that parties to a dispute could not directly approach the Australian 
Panel for dispute resolution, nor could complaints in respect of a takeover or a 
merger be lodged directly with the Australian Panel. The Australian Panel could 
also not resolve disputes mero motu but had to be reactive and wait for a 
referral from ASIC. It appears that the amendments introduced by CLERP 
improved the situation for the Australian Panel. The Australian Panel can now 
directly take matters for dispute resolution without any referral from ASIC. In 
terms of section 657C (2) of the Corporations Act 2001, any person may now 
request the Australian Panel to resolve any dispute in respect of a takeover or 
a merger. This includes the bidder, the target company, ASIC or any person 
whose interests may be affected by the takeover or the merger.  
 
4 2 4 The role of the Australian Takeover Panel in takeovers and mergers 
 
One of the most important powers of the Australian Panel is to make 
declarations regarding ‘unacceptable circumstances’ pertaining to a takeover 
or merger.110 The power to declare circumstances unacceptable is created in 
terms section 657A of the Corporations Act 2001. The section provides that:  
 
“(1) The Australian Panel may declare circumstances in relation to the affairs 
of a company to be unacceptable circumstances. Without limiting this, the 
Australian Panel may declare circumstances to be unacceptable 
circumstances whether or not the circumstances constitute a contravention of 
a provision of this Act. 
(2) The Australian Panel may only declare circumstances to be unacceptable 
circumstances if it appears to the Australian Panel that the circumstances: 
(a) are unacceptable having regard to the effect that the Australian Panel 
is satisfied the circumstances have had, are having, will have or are likely 
to have on: 
                                            
110Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia (2010) 1-38. 
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(i) the control, or potential control, of the company or another 
company; or 
(ii) the acquisition, or proposed acquisition, by a person of a 
substantial interest in the company or another company; or 
(b) are otherwise unacceptable (whether in relation to the effect that the 
Australian Panel is satisfied the circumstances have had, are having, 
will have or are likely to have in relation to the company or another 
company or in relation to securities of the company or another 
company) having regard to the purposes of this Chapter set out 
in section 602; or 
(c) are unacceptable because they: 
(i) constituted, constitute, will constitute or are likely to constitute 
a contravention of a provision of this Chapter or of 
Chapter 6A,6B or 6C; or 
(ii) gave or give rise to, or will or are likely to give rise to, a 
contravention of a provision of this Chapter or of Chapter 6A, 6B 
or 6C. 
The Australian Panel may only make a declaration under this 
subsection, or only decline to make a declaration under this subsection, 
if it considers that doing so is not against the public interest after taking 
into account any policy considerations that the Australian Panel 
considers relevant.”111 
 
The power to declare that circumstances are unacceptable in respect of a 
merger or takeover is so important that the Australian Panel has issued 
Guidance Note 1112 to its stakeholders, including companies and their advisers. 
The guidance note is intended to assist companies and the advisers, relating 
to conduct, practices or terms and conditions during a takeover or a merger that 
are regarded as inappropriate.   
 
The circumstances under which the Australian Panel may declare 
unacceptable circumstances are very wide. It is notable that circumstances 
may be unacceptable circumstances whether or not they contravene the 
                                            
111Corporations Act 2001, section 657A. 
112Guidance note 1 provides examples of unacceptable circumstances. 
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Corporations Act 2001.113 The guidance note issued by the Australian Panel 
describes a wide range of circumstances that can be declared unacceptable. 
The guidance note states that this is necessary to allow the Australian Panel to 
fulfill its role, as envisaged by the Corporations Act 2001, as the main forum for 
resolving disputes about a takeover bid. Applications for a declaration can only 
be made within two months after the alleged circumstances have occurred or 
such longer period that the Panel may allow.114 The powers of the Australian 
Panel to declare unacceptable circumstances are subject to the overarching 
requirement that any declaration of unacceptable circumstances made by the 
Australian Panel must not unfairly prejudice any person.115  
 
There is no definition in the Australian Corporations Act 2001 of what an 
unacceptable circumstance in respect of a merger or takeover is.116 Although, 
at first sight, this power to declare such a circumstance may seem limited, it is 
in fact very wide.117 It could be argued that the definition has been left out on 
purpose to avoid limiting the powers of the Australian Panel. An overview of the 
decisions taken by the Australian Panel suggests that most applications 
considered by the Australian Panel are to declare circumstances in respect of 
a takeover or merger unacceptable. In addition, the Australian Panel may make 
other decisions where it considers that taking into account the circumstances 
of a transaction, and its effect on the control or the acquisition of a substantial 
interest in a company may be unacceptable.118 To protect the rights of other 
persons, before making the order, the Australian Panel must give any person 
who may be affected by the order, as well as ASIC, an opportunity to make 
submissions to it about the matter.119 In terms of section 657A (3), the 
Australian Panel in exercising its powers under this section must consider a 
                                            
113See Corporations Act 2001, section 657(A)(1). 
114Corporations Act 2001, section 657C (3). 
115Guidance note 4 and also E Armson “Judicial Review of Takeovers Panel Decisions” in The 
Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia (2010) 176-210. 
116Guidance note 1 provides examples of unacceptable circumstances. See also Khan 
“Unacceptable Circumstances in Takeovers” (2010) 6 MLJ, discussing the Australian 
Takeovers Panel guidance note 1. 
117Guidance note at para 17. 
118E Armson “Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the UK” (2005) 5 Part 2 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 408. 
119See Section 657A of the Corporations Act 2001. 
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number of other factors in addition to the principles relating to regulations of 
mergers and takeovers as set out in section 602. It must also observe other 
matters specified under the regulations made in terms of the ASIC Act.120 The 
Panel rules provide detailed procedures and guidelines on how to lodge 
applications, including the format of the application, parties to whom documents 
must be provided, submission of confidential documents and withdrawal of 
applications.121  
 
The guidance note indicates, that the Panel does not seek to punish when 
deciding on a remedy, although such a remedy may adversely affect a 
person.122 The declarations are wide and could be orders in favour of any 
person whose interests are affected by the relevant circumstances. The Panel 
may also make any order, including remedial orders. These may include: an 
order to protect rights or interests of a person or group of persons in takeovers 
or mergers;123 orders freezing transfer of securities proceeds; and orders 
freezing rights attached to securities.124 Following a declaration, the Panel may 
also admonish any person including advisers, report such persons to relevant 
authorities or make media releases in respect of unacceptable 
circumstances.125 Further, it may make cost orders against any person to pay 
costs of the hearing.126 Subject to informing the affected parties, the Australian 
Panel may vary, revoke or suspend any order.127  
 
In terms of section 657EA of the Corporations Act 2001, another Australian 
Panel may internally review matters that have been dealt with by a particular 
                                            
120See section 657A(3)(iv) Corporations Act 2001. Some of the matters relate to the procedures 
to be followed when making decisions.  
121See Australian Takeover Panel, Procedural Rules (2010) paragraphs 1-10.  
122See Australian Takeover Panel, Guidance Note 4 Remedies General issue (2017) paragraph 
5. 
123See Australian Takeover Panel, Guidance Note 4: Remedies General issue (2017) 
paragraph 2.  
124See Australian Takeover Panel, Guidance Note 4: Remedies General issue (2017). 
paragraph 22. 
125See Australian Takeover Panel, Guidance Note 4: Remedies General issue (2017) 
paragraph 49. 
126See Australian Takeover Panel, Guidance Note 4: Remedies General issue (2017) 
paragraph 25. 
127See rule 8 Australian Takeover Panel, Procedural Rules (2010).  
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Australian Panel; subject to a number of requirements including avoidance of 
conflicts of interests. In terms of section 657EB of the Corporations Act 2001, 
a court hearing a matter in relation to a decision of the Australian Panel could, 
instead of making a decision, refer the matter to the Australian Panel for review. 
The review panel has the same powers as the initial Australian Panel and 
considers the matter as if it has never been considered or heard before.128  
 
Following section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001, dealing with the 
fundamental principles for regulating takeovers and mergers, and guidance 
note 1, dealing with ‘unacceptable circumstances’ may be explained under the 
following subheadings: 
 
(a) Inhibition of efficient, competitive and informed markets 
 
Section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001 requires that a takeover or merger 
must occur in an efficient, competitive and informed market. Accordingly, any 
circumstance in a takeover or merger that could have the effect of preventing 
the realisation of these principles should be declared unacceptable.129 An 
unacceptable circumstance may result due to the deficiency of the information 
relating to the merger or takeover, the creation of a false market. Lack of 
sufficient resources to pay the takeover or merger price by the bidder may 
inhibit an efficient market for the shares of the target. Other circumstances that 
may result in unacceptable circumstances may be anti-takeover defences 
adopted by target companies, such as a high amount of a break fee130 payable. 
A high amount of a break fee payable when the takeover or merger is not 
supported that is included in the takeover or merger agreement, may have the 
                                            
128Rule 3.3 of the Australian Takeover Panel Procedural Rules (2010) and notes thereunder. 
129Guidance note 1 issued by the Australian Takeovers Panel and the Notes there under; and 
see also Khan (2010) 6 MLJ “Unacceptable Circumstances in Takeovers” clvii-clxiv. 
130A break fee refers to a fee usually payable by the target company (whose directors have 
agreed to support a negotiated acquisition transaction by the bidder) to a bidder if the 
transaction is not implemented in accordance with the agreed terms as a result of certain clearly 
defined events. See JC Coates, & G Subramanian, (2000) Harvard Law School John M. Olin 
Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper Series. Paper 274. Available on 
http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/274.) (Accessed 15 -12 -2017). It is also called other names 
including an “inducement fee.” See also note 280 in chapter 2 in paragraph 2 5 2 above.  
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effect of discouraging a competing bid. Hence, an unreasonably high break fee 
may be declared unacceptable.131 In the case of a no-talk shop agreement, the 
effect may be that directors are unable to seek competing bidders for the target 
company thereby preventing a competitive price for the target shares. This may 
be detrimental to target shareholders as they are then faced with one bid only. 
 
The reuse of reports obtained for different purposes can also lead to 
misinformation in cases where it is not clear for whom, and for what purposes, 
the report was obtained. It is suggested that where the report was obtained for 
a certain purpose and then used to possibly support or to justify a merger, it 
may also be misleading. To counter this, it is a requirement that any report must 
be dated and provide certain prescribed information. This is aimed at 
preventing use of old and outdated reports or event reports which are not 
relevant to the particular takeover or merger.132  
 
There must be a balance between the ability of directors to pursue transactions 
to maximise the interests of the company and the right of the shareholders to 
be able to consider the takeover bid.133 In the matter of Glencore International 
AG v Takeovers Panel,134 the Australian Federal Court described the process 
leading to the declaration of unacceptable circumstances by the Australian 
Panel.135 The court also indicated that courts should be slow to interfere with 
the decision of the Panel as they are made in “circumstances where the market 
is significantly volatile by reason of the currency of takeover offers.”136 
According to the court, the Australian Panel may declare circumstances 
unacceptable where it appears that particular circumstances are unacceptable 
due to the effect of these circumstances. The court pointed out that the 
Australian Panel has a duty to enquire and make a determination as to the 
effect of those circumstances.137 Only the unacceptability of the effect will allow 
                                            
131Khan (2010) MLJ. clxii-clxiii. 
132Khan (2010) MLJ clix-clxiii. 
133Khan (2010) MLJ clxiii. 
1342005 FCA 1920.  
1352005 FCA 1920 paras 30-32. 
1362005 FCA 1920 para 35. 
1372005 FCA 1920 paras 38-39. 
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intervention by the Australian Panel. The Australian Panel must first make a 
finding about the existence of unacceptable circumstances. It would then 
determine its effect on a merger or a takeover. The court referred to section 
657A (2) of the Corporations Act 2001 and stated that the Review Panel in this 
matter was required to make a finding that the circumstances will have some 
effect on either the acquisition or control as referred to in section 657A (2).138 
Following the judgment, the powers of the Panel was further clarified as 
discussed under paragraph 4 3 below. 
 
(b) Details and identity of the bidder 
 
The shareholders and the directors of a company must know the identity of a 
person who proposes to acquire a substantial interest and must be given a 
reasonable time to consider the proposal. Furthermore, they must be given 
enough information to enable them to assess the merits of the proposal.139 
 
(c) Misinformation relating to the bid 
 
Misinformation and misleading information may result in unacceptable 
circumstances due to the fact that shareholders will not receive the relevant 
information to make an informed decision. Disclosure of the relevant 
information is therefore important to enable shareholders to consider the merits 
and demerits of an offer. Information contained in shareholder circulars, bidder 
statements and independent expert advisers must comply with the 
Corporations Act 2001 and its regulations.140  
 
(d) Reasonable and equal opportunities to consider the offer 
 
It is a fundamental principle in takeovers and mergers that shareholders be 
offered a reasonable and equal opportunity to be able to take part in the benefits 
                                            
1382005 FCA 1920 paras 38-39. 
139See guidance note 1 and the Notes there under; and also, in Khan (2010) MLJ clix. 
140Guidance note 1 and also Khan (2010) MLJ, clvi-clvii. 
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of an offer or a transaction which result from a change of control.141 As the 
guidance note states, reasonableness relates to the ability of shareholders to 
have enough time to consider, sell or vote if required. The guidance note further 
states that shareholders should not be subjected to pressure tactics to accept 
the offer. Shareholders should have a reasonable opportunity to participate in 
the offer.142 This requirement does not mean that the offer must be equally 
acceptable to all shareholders. It only means that the offer is made to all 
shareholders equally, while some may find the offer more attractive than others 
due to their peculiar circumstances or the price they paid for their shares.143  
 
(e)  Appropriate procedure for compulsory acquisition of voting shares 
 
Another requirement introduced by section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001 is 
that there must be a suitable avenue to allow shareholders to exit or sell their 
shares to the controllers once the controlling shareholders have reached levels 
of acceptance beyond 90 percent of the issued shares of the company. This is 
intended to prevent shareholders from being trapped in a company without any 
means of selling their shares in cases where they remain as minorities. At the 
same time, it also avoids shareholders greenmailing controlling shareholders 
by demanding unreasonable compensation for their shares.144 
 
(f) Examples of unacceptable circumstances 
 
According to the various guidance notes, examples of possible unacceptable 
circumstances include: a bidder not having funding in place to pay to the 
takeover,145 actions that may result in frustrating of a takeover bid,146 a target 
company’s associate acquiring the target’s shares as a defense to a takeover 
                                            
141See section 602 Corporations Act 2001. 
142See section 602 Corporations Act 2001. 
143See Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and the Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 8. 
144See guidance note 1 and also Australian Securities Investment Commission, Corporate 
control: a better environment for productive investment Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program Proposals for Reform: Paper No. 4 1997 Available at: http, (Accessed 14-2-2014). 
145See Guidance Note 14 Funding Arrangements.  
146See Guidance Note 12 Frustrating Action. 
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bid,147 rights issues undertaken by the target company that are not readily 
available to all shareholders148 and payments of collateral benefits to other 
shareholders.149  
 
4 2 5 The Australian Takeover Panel’s powers to enforce and prohibit 
transactions 
 
In order to bolster enforcement of the above requirements and to discourage 
noncompliance, the Corporations Act 2001 in section 606 prohibits certain 
acquisitions unless such acquisitions have been exempted or allowed by ASIC. 
This is the ‘central prohibition’ in Australian takeover provisions as discussed 
in paragraph 4 2 2 above.150 These prohibitions are aimed at achieving the 
policy objectives set out in chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 2001. In terms of 
section 606 of the Corporations Act 2001, there is a clear, outright prohibition 
on making an offer that would mean that the purchaser would hold 20 percent 
or more of the issued shares of a company or similar instruments, or any further 
percentage up to 90 percent of the issued shares of a company or similar 
instruments. The emphasis is on voting shares or relevant interest or equity in 
an Australian company or a body corporate. The various concepts, such as the 
company, body corporate, voting shares, relevant interests or equity are all 
clearly defined in the Corporations Act 2001. Any acquisition or the making of 
an offer to acquire the relevant interests which would result in a contravention 
of subsection 606 of the Corporations Act 2001, is similarly prohibited in terms 
of section 606 (4) of the Corporations Act 2001. The Australian legislature 
considered it imperative that the various concepts are clarified. It is suggested 
that this was done to avoid any uncertainty or vagueness in relation to the 
interpretation of the various concepts. It is asserted that clarity and certainty is 
important in order to ensure effective and efficient enforcement of takeovers 
and merger provisions. 
 
                                            
147Guidance Note 7 Lock-up devices. 
148Guidance Note 17 Rights Issues.  
149Guidance Note 21 Collateral Benefits. 
150The Eggleston Principles are incorporated in section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001. See 
also the discussions by Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 659. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
140 
 
To ensure that there is no avoidance of the prohibitions in section 606 of the 
Corporations Act 2001, the prohibitions are couched broadly. They cover any 
acquisitions of relevant interests in voting securities. The exemptions, and 
allowed acquisitions include: 
 
- acquisition transactions that results from acceptance of an offer under a 
takeover bid;  
- acquisitions in relation to bid class securities that result from an on-market bid;  
- acquisitions of a bid class that results directly from the exercise of rights 
attached to convertible securities during a takeover bid;  
- acquisitions that results from the exercise by a person of power, or 
appointment as a receiver, or a receiver, manager under a mortgage; 
- acquisitions approved previously by a resolution passed at a general meeting 
of the company in which the acquisition is made;  
- acquisitions resulting from the issue of securities of the company in which the 
acquisition is made if the company has started to carry on any business and 
has not borrowed any money;  
- acquisitions that result from another acquisition of the relevant interests in 
voting shares in a body corporate included in the official list of a prescribed 
financial market or a foreign body conducting a financial market that is a body 
approved in writing by ASIC; - acquisitions made through a will or through the 
operation of law,  
- acquisition made through a compromise or arrangement approved by a court;  
- acquisition that results from an arrangement entered into by a liquidator; and;  
- acquisition that results from a buyback authorised by section 257A of the 
Corporations Act 2001.  
 
The Australian Panel also has the power to make any order that it deems 
appropriate in order to protect the interests of any person affected by 
unacceptable circumstances. This ensures, where possible, that a takeover bid 
proceeds as if the unacceptable circumstance had not occurred. This may take 
the form of an interim order.151 In addition, the Australian Panel may also review 
                                            
151See Guidance Note 4- Remedies General at paragraph 10. 
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the decisions made by ASIC in respect of a takeover or a merger during a bid 
period. Another power of the Australian Panel is that it could accept 
undertakings for the purposes of settling unacceptable circumstances during a 
takeover or merger where it considers that it is in the public interest.152 The 
Australian Panel may order additional disclosures, cancellation of contracts, 
freezing of transfers of securities, freezing of transfers of rights attached to 
securities, which forces the disposal of securities and allow more time to 
provide additional information or establish rights of withdrawal.153 The 
Australian Panel in exercising its powers must balance different interests. 
Therefore, it weighs the rights or interests of all persons involved against the 
possible prejudice that may result from making or not making an order.154  
 
4 2 6 A brief overview of Australian Panel proceedings during hearings  
 
The Australian Panel operates like a court in an adversarial setting.155 However, 
the procedures followed by the Australian Panel differ markedly from that of a 
court. For example, unlike the courts, the Australian Panel is not bound by rules 
of evidence or by precedents.156 The main aim of Australian Panel procedures 
is that of efficiency and fairness. In terms of efficiency, the Australian Panel 
prefers that matters be dealt with in writing, rather than by means of oral 
presentations or arguments. This is because dealing with matters on paper is 
often found to be expeditious and quicker. This allows the Australian Panel to 
consider applications within a shorter period than would be the case if the 
parties would appear personally before the Australian Panel in a hearing.157 
Another important requirement for the proceedings of the Australian Panel is 
that of fairness. Fairness requires that parties have to be able to make 
submissions and that the proceedings must be fair. Hence, parties are allowed 
                                            
152Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and the 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 9. 
153Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 51. 
15451. 
155Armson (2004) Melbourne University Law Review 565.  
156565.  
157565. 
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to exchange submissions and are entitled to receive responses to all 
applications and all other papers submitted to the Australian Panel in support 
of the applications.158 
 
The Australian Panel rules were published in accordance with section 188 of 
the Australian Securities Investment Commission Act 2001 and contain 
procedural rules for all hearings before the Australian Panel.159 The rules make 
provision for, among others, regulations regarding applications to the Australian 
Panel, referral of matters to the Australian Panel, the time period for 
proceedings, abuse of Australian Panel proceedings, decisions made by the 
Australian Panel to conduct proceedings, requests by parties to be involved in 
proceedings, conduct of conferences, purposes of conferences, witnesses, 
misbehaviour by parties and summons for witnesses, and payment of expenses 
of parties involved in proceedings. The Australian Panel procedural rules 
specifically state that their objectives are to promote: 
 
“(a) procedural fairness; 
(b) timely and cost-effective completion of proceedings; 
(c) obtaining the best available information and  
(d) not unnecessarily delaying commercial transactions.”160 
 
Rule 10.2,161 indicates that the rules are to be interpreted according to their 
spirit, by looking beyond form to substance and in a way that best promotes the 
objectives set out in paragraph (a) to (d) above. The rules are made by the 
president of the Australian Panel in consultation with other members of the 
Australian Panel. The rules must take into consideration the purposes of 
chapter 6 as set out in section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001.162  
 
                                            
158565. 
159Australian Takeovers Panel, Panel Proceedings, Available at: http//www.takeovers.gov.au. 
content/rules_for_proceedings/ default.aspx, (Accessed on 15-2-2014). 
160Australian Takeovers Panel, Procedural Rules, Rule 10.1 Definitions and interpretations. 
161Australian Takeovers Panel, Procedural Rules, Rule 10.2 Definitions and interpretations. 
162Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 69. 
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4 3 A brief evaluation of the Australian Panel’s functions and performance 
 
It has been generally accepted by most commentators that, prior to the 
amendments brought about by the CLERP reforms, the Australian Panel was 
not successful in its role as a regulator of mergers and takeovers.163 The debate 
on the successes of the Australian Panel continues. The key criterion in 
measuring the successes of the Australian Panel is the number of transactions 
that have been regulated by the Australian Panel as compared to the earlier 
period.164 The period after the promulgation of the CLERP provisions saw 
dramatic changes on how the Australian Panel operated, and the Australian 
Panel is now highly regarded as a successful regulator. It is important to identify 
the reasons why the Australian Panel became so successful in takeover dispute 
resolution.165 Various reasons have been mentioned for its successes. The 
reasons for the successes of the Australian Panel are numerous and include 
the independence of the Australian Panel and the fact that the Australian 
government strengthened the role of the Australian Panel in takeovers 
disputes.166 Making the Australian Panel the main adjudicator of takeover 
disputes during the course of a takeover did this.  
 
The earlier takeover provisions limited the role of the Australian Panel to only 
being able to react to referrals from ASIC.167 The amendments brought about 
by the Corporations Act 2001 enabled parties to approach the Australian Panel 
directly for resolution of takeover disputes, and the decision of the Full Federal 
Court in the Alinta Ltd case168 confirmed the constitutional validity of the 
Australian Panel. The fundamental question in the Alinta case was whether the 
                                            
163Calleja The New Takeover Panel –A Better Way? 4; See also McKeon “Foreword” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia vi; See also Ramsay “The 
Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation 
in Australia 1.  
164Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38. 
165See Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38. 
166See Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38. 
167See paragraph 4 2 2 on developments of takeover and merger provisions in Australia. 
168(2008) 233 CLR 542 16. 
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Australian Panel exercised judicial powers contrary to the requirements of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, which prevented the Australian Parliament from 
“reposing any power essentially judicial in any other organ or body” other than 
the courts.169 One of the key reasons why the Federal Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of the Australian Panel was that the Australian Panel’s 
powers were underpinned by policy.170 The Australian Panel is not exercising 
judicial powers in declaring unacceptable circumstances, because those 
circumstances constitute contravention of the Corporations Act 2001.171 
 
By declaring the powers of the Australian Panel constitutionally valid, the courts 
removed any skepticism that had earlier plagued the Australian Panel’s 
proceedings.172 The breadth of the Australian Panel’s powers was also 
confirmed by the Full Federal Court in CEMEX Australia Pty Ltd v Takeovers 
Australian Panel,173 dealing with the powers of the Australian Panel to declare 
unacceptable circumstances. While there may still be challenges to the 
Australian Panel’s powers, the legislative framework is now robust and the 
courts accept the Australian Panel as the primary regulator in takeovers on the 
basis of “commercial, policy and public interest factors”.174  
 
Another feature of the Australian Panel’s’ structure which led to its success is 
the clearer delineation of the respective roles of the courts and the Australian 
Panel. Where it appears that there is uncertainty as to the role of the Australian 
Panel, this is bound to affect the credibility of the Australian Panel.175 The 
strength of the membership of the Australian Panel also contributes to its 
achievements: The fact that members of the Australian Panel are industry 
professionals allows the Australian Panel to enjoy greater respect and 
                                            
169Armson “Judicial Review of Takeovers Panel Decisions” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers 
Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia.188. 
170Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 659. 
171659. 
172Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 6. 
173(2009) 257 ALR 403. 
174Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 61-62. 
175Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 16. 
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credibility. 176 It can be argued that this is due to the fact that participants often 
have to face their peers in a different environment as regulators. The influence 
of the Australian Panel on market practice is also important for the success of 
the Australian Panel: As the Australian Panel started providing guidelines on 
takeovers and making more decisions, it developed consistent and accepted 
market behaviour.  
 
The Australian Panel also influenced acceptable market practices by issuing 
guidelines along with its decisions.177 The speed with which the Australian 
Panel makes decisions also contributed to its success: The fact that the 
Australian Panel could make timely decisions, led to market participants gaining 
confidence in the ability of the Australian Panel. The Australian Panel was able 
to make decisions much more speedily than the courts.178 The accessibility of 
the Australian Panel also contributed to its success: By keeping its doors open, 
it encouraged participants to consult them and seek guidance.179 Furthermore, 
the new provisions facilitated a shift away from tactical litigation. Prior to the 
amendments brought about by the Corporations Act 2001, the Australian Panel 
was beset by tactical litigation.180  
 
The Australian Panel’s extensive consultation processes are yet another factor 
contributing to its success. By consulting practitioners, the Australian Panel 
ensures that market participants buy into its decisions.181 It is suggested that 
participants readily cooperate and easily abide by market practices and rules 
that they had a part in forming and implementing. The Australian Panel’s 
informal and non-legalistic approach to resolving takeover disputes is also 
credited for its achievements. The informal nature of the dispute resolutions 
also encouraged people who are not lawyers to readily approach the Australian 
Panel and thereby facilitated speedy decision-making.182  
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The Australian Panel’s focus on policy is also responsible for its success:183 
Focusing on and adhering to policies underlying the regulation of takeovers and 
mergers, which is to protect investors, ensures that the Australian Panel does 
not shift from its mandate. The support the Australian Panel has received from 
the government, in the form of monetary support and assistance, enables the 
Australian Panel to properly carry out its mandate. It is doubtful whether the 
Australian Panel would have been so successful without proper government 
support.184  
 
Finally, the effective leadership of the president of the Australian Panel, and the 
expertise of the Australian Panel executive, has played a major role in the 
achievements of the Australian Panel so far. Experienced Australian Panel 
executives who advised parties about Australian Panel rules and procedures 
also played a crucial role in practitioners gaining confidence in the Australian 
Panel.185 In order to promote compliance with the takeover provisions, the 
Australian Panel has issued a number of guidance notes. Some of the most 
important guidance notes includes Guidance Note 1, which is intended to assist 
market participants to understand the Australian Panel’s approach to making a 
declaration of unacceptable circumstances as discussed in paragraph 4 2 4 
above. It provides an overview of the Australian Panel’s powers and the 
circumstances in which the Australian Panel may declare circumstances 
unacceptable.  
 
Guidance Note 7, indicates that certain terms and conditions of takeovers such 
as break fees and no talk shop agreement, that may result in unacceptable 
circumstances are not allowed, as discussed in paragraph 4 2 4 above. Some 
of these terms and conditions, may discourage competitive bids, to the 
detriment of shareholders. Whether such terms and conditions are considered 
unacceptable in relation to a takeover bid will depend on their effect on the 
general principles set out in section 602 of the Corporations Act 2001, the main 
                                            
18329. 
184Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia, 30. 
18530. 
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principles relating to protection of shareholders during takeovers or mergers. 
Should a term or condition of a takeover or merger be found to have a negative 
effect on the principles set out in section 602, it may be declared unacceptable.  
 
Guidance Note 12 deals with frustrating actions on bids. In terms of this 
guidance note, directors may not take any action that could have the effect of 
defeating or frustrating a takeover bid. Guidance Note 18 deals with the details 
and content of takeover documents. Guidance Note 21 covers payment of 
collateral benefits that may be declared unacceptable in relation to a takeover 
bid.186 
 
ASIC187 has more recently issued Regulatory Guide 9 - Takeover Bids. ASIC 
points out that the guide was issued to companies, their advisers and investors, 
and  
 
“[D]iscusses ASIC’s regulatory role in relation to takeover bids and how we 
interpret and administer the requirements of the takeover provisions in Chapter 
6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act); and explains how we 
exercise our discretionary powers in relation to takeover bids, including the 
power to exempt from, or modify, the takeover provisions. “188 
 
An empirical study by Armson indicates that the highest number of applications 
to the Australian Panel relates to the provisions of chapter 6 of the Corporations 
Act 2001.189 This is not surprising due to the fact that the fundamental principles 
of the takeover provisions are contained in section 602 of chapter 6 of the 
Corporations Act 2001. In conclusion she states that in the first five years the 
Australian Panel focused significantly on the purpose of an “efficient, 
competitive and informed market” and the substantive requirements relating to 
the takeover procedures and offers under chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 
                                            
186Australian Takeovers Panel. Guidance Note 21. See paragraph 4 2 4 above discussing how 
the Panel deal with unacceptable circumstances in takeovers.  
187ASIC. Regulatory Guide 9: Takeover bids. Available at: http://www.asic.gov.au.( Accessed 
on 14-2-2014). 
188ASIC. Regulatory Guide 9: Takeover bids.  
189Armson (2005) Sydney Law Review 665.  
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2001.190 She further indicated that it is not surprising that the majority of the 
decisions of the Australian Panel involve matters relating to disclosures in 
takeovers that had been declared unacceptable.191  
 
Miller, Campbell and Ramsay192 undertook another empirical study aimed at 
providing an understanding of how, and with what degree of effectiveness, the 
Australian Panel has operated since the amendment brought in by the 
Corporations Act 2001. The study analysed some 153 matters that were 
considered and decided upon by the Australian Panel between May 2000 and 
January 2005. The most popular remedy sought by applicants was a 
declaration of unacceptable circumstances in terms of section 657A, which 
constituted 73 percent of all the applications. Section 636 deals with the content 
of bidder’s statements and is one of the common sections to be contravened. 
The majority of the applications involved small capitalisation companies. This 
suggests that takeover transactions involving small capitalisation companies 
are the most problematic.193 
  
Despite the achievements of the Australian Panel post CLERP reforms, some 
commentators believe that additional reforms will assist the Australian Panel to 
offer better oversight role for takeovers and mergers. Levy & Pathak have made 
comprehensive proposals to enhance the regulatory oversight role of the 
Australian Panel.194 The views and proposals for reform include that disputes 
could be resolved quickly if the Panel had full-time members.195 It is also 
suggested that tactical litigation has shifted from the courts to the Australian 
Panel.  
 
                                            
190673. 
191673. 
192C Miller, R Campbell & Ramsay I The Takeovers Australian Panel: An Empirical Study 
(August 2006). University of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No. 160. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924501> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.924501 (Accessed 14-2-
2014). 
193See Miller, Campbell & Ramsay The Takeovers Australian Panel: An Empirical Study (2006) 
32. 
194R Levy & N Pathak “The Takeovers Panel of the Future” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers 
Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 211-240. 
195216. 
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The practice where interested parties review the bidder statement and then 
raise objections by applying to the Australian Panel, seeking changes or 
additional disclosures, has the same effect as delaying the transaction in court 
applications.196 The proportion of hostile offers ending up at the Australian 
Panel may be the same as those that ended up in the courts.197 Factors that 
encourage tactical litigation at the Australian Panel include absence of punitive 
costs awards, the relatively inexpensive nature of Australian Panel proceedings 
and the absence of powers to award damages.198  
 
It has further been suggested that the powers of the Australian Panel should 
be enhanced.199 The Corporations Act 2001 should be amended to reduce 
uncertainty in respect of the scope of the Australian Panel’s jurisdiction relative 
to that of the courts. While the Panel is the main forum during takeovers, it is 
not the exclusive forum.200 There is an overlap between the jurisdiction of the 
courts and that of the Panel.201 The law is not clear on whether there is a 
possibility for parties to ‘forum shop’ and whether both the Australian Panel and 
the court may have jurisdiction to hear a matter.202 It is also suggested that the 
Australian Panel should be given additional powers. These would include the 
power to make advance rulings, the power to grant exemptions and 
modifications, the power to excuse contraventions and the power to intervene 
directly in a takeover rather than wait for the parties to lodge an application.203  
 
Currently, the Australian Panel has no powers to regulate schemes of 
arrangements.204 This is a ‘significant gap.’ 205 The current schemes of 
arrangements provisions are complex, as they require assessment of a large 
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199222-231. 
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202Levy & Pathak “The Takeovers Panel of the Future” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 222. 
203231. 
204Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay 
(ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 63. 
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body of case law.206 The current schemes of arrangement should be simplified 
before the authority to regulate such methods is shifted to the Australian 
Panel.207 There should be a single regulator with specialist expertise in the two 
methods of bringing a change in control in companies208  
 
Finally, it has been proposed that resources of the Australian Panel should be 
increased by, for example, expanding the executive of the Australian Panel and 
adding a full-time president to the Australian Panel and applying a modified UK 
Panel model of using merchant bankers and lawyers who have been seconded 
by their institutions for a year. The seconded lawyers and bankers should form 
part of the sitting Australian Panel and be involved in hearing matters.209 Cash 
funding should also be increased for the Australian Panel and the methods of 
funding the Australian Panel should be reconsidered.210 Cost orders should be 
increased to discourage trivial complaints and applications. Applicants could 
also be made to defray the costs of the Panel.211 Application fees should be 
increased and some of ASIC’s funding should be made available to the 
Australian Panel.212  
 
4 4 Concluding remarks 
 
It is suggested that the rationale for Australian authorities not adopting UK 
takeover laws wholesale was that they had considered that Australia has a 
different economy, markets, companies and regulatory environment than the 
UK. Therefore, they had to create new takeover rules to suit their own context 
instead of transplanting UK takeover laws wholesale.213 This was despite the 
strong historical connection between the two countries in, notably, their culture, 
                                            
206Levy & Pathak "The Takeovers Panel of the Future” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 227. 
207228. 
208227. 
209234-235. 
210236. 
211 Levy & Pathak “The Takeovers Panel of the Future” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 237. 
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213Thompson (2002) Vanderbilt University Law School Law & Economics Working Paper 
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economies, markets and company laws.214 In introducing the various reform 
policies, such as the Eggleston Principles, as the fundamental principles for 
regulating takeovers and mergers, it is suggested that the authorities 
deliberately acknowledged that Australia needed a unique approach to 
takeover regulation. Even though the mandatory offer was considered, it was 
not adopted. 215 Australia has combined aspects of the UK’s takeover regulatory 
regime with unique Australian aspects.216 As indicated above, in paragraph 4 2 
2, the equal treatment rules in Australia are more stringent than those of the 
UK City Code even though Australia does not have a mandatory offer.217  
 
The Australian Panel faced a number of difficulties in its initial years of 
operation. The difficulties are attributed to a number of factors, which have 
since been resolved. The reformed Australian Panel has made commendable 
strides, as can be seen by a number of positive comments from various 
commentators.218 The Australian Panel now enjoys the respect and confidence 
of those who are actively involved in takeovers following a number of reforms 
undertaken.219 It is not possible to compile a common list of factors that have 
led to the success of the Australian Panel. Scholars have highlighted that the 
Australian Panel regulates according to “the spirit, rather than the letter of the 
law”.220 The Australian Panel is an independent regulatory body, with part time 
members appointed from the active members of Australia's takeovers and 
business communities. Its efficiency has also led to market participants gaining 
confidence in its dispute regulatory activities. It appears that, despite criticism 
                                            
2141-2. 
215See Armson (2012) Monash University Law Review 683 at note 252. 
216See A Dignam tThe globalisation of General Principle 7: transforming the market for 
corporate control in Australia and Europe” (2008) Legal Studies 96al St 
217J Mannolini ‘Convergence or Divergence: Is there a Role for the Eggleston Principles in a 
Global M&A Environment ‘(2002) Vol 24:336 Sydney Law Review 358. 
218I Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38; Hoyle “An Overview of the Role, Functions and Powers 
of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in 
Australia 39-79; Levy & Pathak “The Takeovers Panel of the Future” in Ramsay (ed) The 
Takeovers Panel and Takeovers Regulation in Australia 211-240. 
219 Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and 
Takeovers Regulation in Australia 1-38. 
220See also rule 10 of the Takeover Panel Procedural Rules and Dyer & MacDonald “Why Was 
the Takeovers Panel Established” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 81. 
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by some researchers, the Australian Panel continues to operate successfully 
upholding policy considerations for regulating takeovers and mergers.  
 
There are a number of similarities in the takeover rules of the UK and Australia. 
However, there is a clear distinction in the content and the manner in which the 
rules are applied. These similarities and distinctions will be discussed in chapter 
6 below, which evaluates the takeover and merger provisions of selected 
countries. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
153 
 
 
Chapter 5: An overview of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in 
South Africa with an emphasis on the mandatory offer  
 
“It is respectfully submitted that South African corporate law is in dire need of 
reform. The imperative of globalisation is that domestic regulation of any 
country cannot be allowed to be out of step with international trends, each 
country’s domestic laws must be investor friendly in order to attract foreign 
investors. The South African corporate legislation is defective in a number of 
respects and in this regard, attention must be drawn to the archaic provisions 
relating to capital maintenance.”1 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
Having reviewed takeovers and mergers provisions from comparative 
countries, this chapter discusses the South African provisions in detail. Of the 
three comparative countries analysed in the dissertation, the South African 
takeover and merger provisions are the most recent. In trying to keep up with 
the developments in other countries, South Africa had its company law entirely 
revamped. The takeover and merger provisions of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 (Companies Act of 1973) in the form of the SRP Code were 
comprehensively amended to form part of Chapter 5 of the Companies Act of 
2008 as discussed in Chapter 1 (the Takeover Provisions). The new provisions 
generally adhere to the structure of the existing South African company law, 
while adding new provisions borrowed from other jurisdictions, such as the US.2  
 
In her research, Luiz comprehensively discusses the SRP Code on takeovers 
and mergers that has now been replaced by chapter 5 of the Companies 
Regulation 2011 (Takeover Regulations), effective May 2011.3 Her research 
                                            
1MM Katz “Developments in corporate law” Journal for Juridical Science (1997) 22(2).39. 
2E Davids, T Norwitz & D Yuill “A Microscopic analysis of the new merger and amalgamation 
provision in the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 338.  
3S Luiz An evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers LLD Thesis, Unisa (2003) 573-1022.  
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traces the history of the regulation of takeovers and mergers in South Africa. 
The SRP Code was modelled on English company law.4 The UK Code was, 
until recently, a form of self-regulation.5 The approach to regulation of takeovers 
and mergers of self-regulation, in line with the UK practice, was adopted by the 
South African legislature when it introduced the SRP Code even though the 
SRP Code was based on statute.6 In the introduction and explanatory note of 
the SRP Code, it is stated that “the appointment of the Panel and its formulation 
and application of the rules in the Code, express the principle of self-regulation 
by the securities industry”. The Takeover Regulations have been based on the 
SRP Code,7 which in turn was based on the UK City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, commonly referred to as the City Code.8 The fact that SA company 
law originated from UK company law may have played a pivotal role in the 
adoption of the City Code. In addition, SA and the UK’s close economic ties 
may also have contributed to the adoption of the UK City Code.  
 
5 2 Objectives of the Companies Act of 2008 in respect of takeovers and 
mergers 
 
It is submitted that the Companies Act of 2008 has finally brought the South 
African company law in line with modern corporate law practice of other 
countries. It was generally accepted that the Companies Act of 1973 was 
outdated. The Companies Act of 2008 repealed the Companies Act of 1973, 
and introduced comprehensive changes to South African company law. 
According to the DTI 2004 Policy document, the Companies Act of 2008 seeks 
to make company law simple, flexible, transparent, predictable and efficient. 
The document indicates that the Companies Act of 2008 is aimed at ensuring: 
 
                                            
4Luiz An Evaluation of South African Securities Regulation Code 573-1022. 
5See also Johnston “Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical perspectives on the City 
Code” Cambridge Law Journal (2007) 66:2, 447. 
6Securities Regulation Code (SRP Code) and the Rules of the Securities Regulation Panel 
(SRP). Government Gazette12962. January 1991.  
7See Introduction and the explanatory notes to the SRP Code. 
8See Part B and C of Chapter 5 to the Companies Act of 2008 and the regulations thereto. 
Some of the sections of the Act read very similar to the repealed SRP Code rules. See for 
instance section 126 of the Companies Act of 2008 and compare it to rule 19 of the SRP Code. 
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“[T]hat the regulatory framework for enterprises of all types and sizes promoted 
growth, employment, innovation, stability, good governance confidence and 
international competitiveness. Regulation should be consistent, effective, 
predictable, transparent, fair and understandable. It should provide flexibility 
and promote adaptability to an environment with fast changing technologies, 
economic opportunities and social circumstances. The regulatory scheme 
should not create artificial preferences and distortions, where these are 
unnecessary. And it should attempt, where practically possible, to balance the 
competing interests of economic actors and of society at large.”9 
 
In the DTI 2004 Policy document, it was acknowledged that the existing 
takeovers and mergers regulations applied by the SRP, in the form of the SRP 
Code,10 were aligned with international practices. However, it was also 
accepted that there was a need to review the enforcement measures of the 
SRP to ensure compliance with the SRP Code.11 
 
The DTI 2004 Policy document, explained the need to rewrite the Companies 
Act of 1973, as follows: 
 
“It is not the aim of the DTI simply to write a Companies Act 2008 by 
unreasonably jettisoning the body of jurisprudence built up over more than a 
century. The objective of the review is to ensure that the new legislation is 
appropriate to the legal, economic and social context of South Africa as a 
constitutional democracy and open economy. Where current law meets these 
objectives, it should remain as part of company law.”12 
 
In its preamble, among other things, the Companies Act of 2008 indicates in 
respect of takeovers and mergers that it seeks “to provide for equitable and 
efficient amalgamations, mergers and acquisitions of companies”.13 The DTI 
                                            
9DTI 2004 Policy document 9. 
10DTI 2004 Policy document 40. 
11DTI 2004 Policy document 41. 
12DTI 2004 Policy document 7. 
13Preamble to the Companies Act of 2008 as amended. 
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2004 Policy document rests on five objectives.14 These objectives are named 
as: 
“(1) to simplify the procedure for company formation and reduce the costs of 
forming and maintaining a company; 
(2) to promote flexibility in the design and organisation of companies and to 
ensure a predictable and effective regulatory environment; 
(3) to promote the efficiency of companies and their management; 
(4) to encourage transparency and high standards of corporate governance; 
(5) to harmonise our company law with the best practice jurisdictions 
internationally.”15   
 
Section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008 also sets out the objectives of the 
legislature in enacting the new legislation. The objectives are: (a) promoting 
compliance with the Bill of Rights as provided in the Constitution when company 
law is applied; (b) promoting the development of the South African economy by 
(i) encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency, (ii) creating 
flexibility and simplicity in the formation and maintenance of companies, and 
(iii) encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance as 
appropriate, given the significant role of enterprises within the social and 
economic life of the nation; (c) promoting innovation and investment in South 
African markets; (d) reaffirming the concept of the company as a means of 
achieving economic and social benefits; (e) providing for the creation and use 
of companies in a manner that enhances the economic welfare of South Africa 
as a partner within the global economy; (f) promoting the development of 
companies within all sectors of the economy, encouraging active participation 
in economic organisation, management and productivity; (g) create optimum 
conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes and for the 
investment of that capital in enterprises and the spreading of economic risk; (h) 
balancing the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within 
companies; (i) encouraging the efficient and responsible management of 
companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
                                            
14FHI Cassim “The Companies Act 2008: An Overview of a Few of its Core Provisions” (2010) 
22 SA Merc LJ 158.  
15Cassim (2010) SA Merc LJ 158. 
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stakeholders; and (j) providing a predictable and effective environment for the 
efficient regulation of companies.16  
 
Takeovers and mergers involve risks for both shareholders and offerors. There 
are also inherent conflicts between different parties, including incumbent 
management. Therefore, it is important that their activities are properly 
regulated and the Takeover Provisions are aimed at realising this objective.17 
The Takeover Provisions should ideally strike a balance between the interests 
of all stakeholders of the company, including the economy and society at 
large.18 It is suggested that some of the provisions of the Companies Act of 
2008, such as, the mandatory offer requirement in section 123, prevent the 
realisation of some of the objectives set in the DTI 2004 Policy document and 
statute. 
 
5 3 Authorities responsible for regulating takeovers and mergers 
 
With the above objectives in mind, the Companies Act of 2008 has introduced 
a number of changes compared to the Companies Act of 1973. The Companies 
Act of 2008 in section 197 of chapter 5, creates, empowers and clarifies the 
role of the Panel,19 a new body that replaced the SRP.20 The Panel performs 
the same functions of regulating takeovers and mergers as the former SRP had 
done. The Companies Act of 2008 clarifies and enhances the functions and 
powers of the Panel. The new name clearly indicates what type of the 
transactions the Panel regulates and avoids any possible confusion that may 
have existed due to the reference to “securities” in the name of the former SRP. 
The reference to securities regulations is broader and may be confusing as the 
Financial Services Conduct Authority (previously the Financial Services Board) 
also undertakes the broader regulation of securities. The usage of Takeover 
                                            
16See Section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
17S Luiz “Protection of holders of securities in the offeree regulated company during affected 
transactions: general offers and schemes of arrangements” (2014) 26 Merc LJ. 560. 
18Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338. 
19Section 197 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
20The SRP was created by section 440B of the Companies Act of 1973. 
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Regulation Panel more accurately reflects those aspects of securities relating 
to takeovers and mergers.  
 
Section 197(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides for membership of the 
Panel. Members of the Panel consist of the Competition Commissioner (or a 
person designated by him/her) and the Companies Commissioner (or a person 
designated by him/her). Other members are appointed as follows: Three 
persons are designated by each exchange, and the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (the Minister) appoints additional members, based on “their knowledge 
and experience in the regulation of securities and takeovers.”21 SRP members 
appointed in terms of the Companies Act of 1973 continued as members of the 
Panel in accordance with the transitional provisions of the Companies Act of 
2008.22 Members appointed in terms of section 197(1) (a) and (b), being the 
Companies Commissioner and the Competition Commissioner respectively, 
serve on the Panel as long as they hold such offices. Those appointed in terms 
of section 197(1)(c) serve for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by 
the exchange. Members appointed in terms of section 197(1)(d) hold office for 
a period of five years.23 The Panel may also co-opt additional members for a 
specific purpose and for a limited period.24 The Minister may designate a 
chairperson and deputy chairpersons of the Panel from among members of the 
Panel. The Executive Director or the Deputy Executive Director and the 
employees of the Panel carry out the day-to-day operations of the Panel.25 
 
The structure of the Panel and the appointment of Panel members differ from 
which existed in terms of the Companies Act of 1973. Under the Companies 
Act of 1973, a number of institutions and organisations were entitled to 
nominate members of the SRP, who were then appointed to the SRP by the 
                                            
21Section 197(1) (d) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
22Schedule 5(12) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that the members of the old SRP will 
continue to hold office as members of the new Panel. 
23Section 197(4) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
24Section 197(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
25Section 200 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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Minister.26 In terms of the Companies Act of 2008, the Minister plays an 
important role in deciding who is appointed as a member of the Panel.27  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 also created a new body in terms of section 202(1), 
known as the Takeover Special Committee (TSC), which is a committee of the 
Panel. Members of the TSC consist of at least three persons.28 The function of 
this body is to hear and decide on referrals made to it by the Panel and to review 
compliance notices issued by the executive director or deputy executive 
director of the Panel.29 The Panel designates members of the TSC from time 
to time. The TSC is similar to the appeal committee of the SRP.30 However, the 
appeal committee of the SRP was created in the SRP Code, which was 
subordinate legislation in terms of the Companies Act of 1973, whereas the 
TSC is created in the main legislation.31  
 
The functions and the role of the TSC are similar to those of the old appeal 
committee of the SRP.32 The quorum of the old SRP appeal committee was five 
members and it may have consisted of any member of the SRP, irrespective of 
the body or organisations that nominated him or her.33 However, in the new 
TSC, only members appointed by the Minister in terms of section 197(1) (d) of 
the Companies Act of 2008 may be members of this committee.34 In addition, 
section 202(2) of the Act specifically requires the chairperson of the TSC to be 
either an attorney or an advocate, whether practising or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
26Section 440 B (3) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
27Section 197(1) (d) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
28Section 202(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
29Section 202(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
30SRP Code section 2(d). 
31Section 440C of the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code section 2(d). 
32Section 202(3) of the Companies Act of 2008 and SRP Code sections A2(c) and A2 (d). 
33SRP Code Section A 2 (d). 
34Section 202(2) (b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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5 4 Functions of the Takeover Regulation Panel 
 
Section 201 of the Companies Act of 2008 lists four functions of the Panel.35 All 
these powers existed in the Companies Act of 1973 in one form or another, 
except the power to wind up a company in section 81(1)(f) of the Companies 
Act of 2008. These powers relate to regulation of affected transactions and 
offers, the power to investigate complaints in respect of those transactions and 
the power to consult with the Minister respect of those transactions.36 The Panel 
may apply for an order to wind up a company in terms section 81(1)(f) where 
the officers have committed fraud, an illegality or have failed to comply with a 
compliance notice. The act must have been committed in the previous five 
years and the officers must have received an administrative fine or a conviction 
for the same conduct. It appears that this section is aimed at repeat offenders. 
Presumably, the offences will have to be serious for the Panel to invoke the 
section. Nevertheless, the section does not give any indications of how and 
under what circumstances the Panel will exercise this power.  
 
Section 119 sets out the rationales for regulating takeovers and mergers. It 
provides: 
 
“119. Panel regulation of affected transactions. — (1) The Panel must regulate 
any affected transaction or offer in accordance with this Part, Part C and the 
Takeover Regulations, but without regard to the commercial advantages or 
disadvantages of any transaction or proposed transaction, in order to— 
(a) ensure the integrity of the marketplace and fairness to the holders of the 
securities of regulated companies; 
(b) ensure the provision of—  
                                            
35Section 201 of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that the panel is responsible to ... (a) 
regulate affected transactions and offers to the extent provided for, and in accordance with, 
Parts B and C of Chapter 5 and the Takeover Regulations;(b) investigate complaints with 
respect to affected transactions and offers in accordance with Part D of Chapter 7; (c) apply for 
a court order to wind up a company, in the manner contemplated in section 81 (1) (f); and (d) 
consult with the Minister in respect of additions, deletions or amendments to the Takeover 
Regulations. 
36See Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973. 
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(i) necessary information to holders of securities of regulated 
companies, to the extent required to facilitate the making of fair 
and informed decisions; and 
(ii) adequate time for regulated companies and holders of their    
securities to obtain and provide advice with respect to offers; 
and  
(c) prevent actions by a regulated company designed to impede, frustrate, or 
defeat an offer, or the making of fair and informed decisions by the holders 
of that company’s securities.” 37 
 
This section encapsulates the general principles previously contained in 11 
sections in the SRP Code.38 These principles have been reduced and 
subdivided into three subsections.39 The principles originate from the City 
Code40 issued by the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. The policy 
underlying regulation of takeovers and mergers incorporated in the Takeover 
Provisions is the same as was applicable to the repealed Companies Act of 
1973, and the SRP Code.41 The General Principles that formed the purpose 
and the spirit of the SRP Code will still be applicable in regulation of affected 
transactions.42 These principles are: 
 
   “2. General principles 
 
1. All holders of the same class of securities of an offeree company shall be 
treated similarly by an offeror. 
 2. During the course of an offer, or when an offer is in contemplation, neither 
the offeror nor would be offeror, nor the offeree company, nor any of their 
respective advisers, shall furnish information to some holders of relevant 
securities which is not made available to all holders of such securities 
except with the consent of the Panel. 
                                            
37United Kingdom The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers The Takeover Code 12th ed (2016), 
commonly referred to as the UK City Code Available at http//www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/.../code.pdf>(Accessed on 16-4-2017). 
38Section C of the SRP Code, General Principles of the Code. 
39Section 119(1) (a), (b) and (c) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
40See UK City Code (2016). See also M Warham “The Takeover Panel” in M Button (ed) A 
Practitioners’ Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. City & Financial Planning 
(2006/2007) 2. 
41P A Delport & Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 1 ed (2011) 426(1). 
42426(2).  
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 3. An offeror shall only announce an offer or its intention to make one after 
the most careful and responsible consideration. Such an announcement 
shall be made only when the offeror has proper grounds for believing that 
it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. Responsibility 
in this connection also rests on the financial adviser to the offeror. 
 4. Holders of relevant securities shall be given sufficient information and 
advice to enable them to reach a properly informed decision and shall 
have sufficient time to do so. No relevant information shall be withheld 
from them. 
 5. Any document or advertisement addressed to holders of relevant 
securities containing information or advice from an offeror or the board 
of the offeree company or their respective advisers shall, as in the case 
of a prospectus, be prepared with the highest standards of care and 
accuracy. 
 6. All parties to an offer shall take all reasonable steps to prevent the 
creation of a false market in the securities of an offeror or the offeree 
company. Parties involved in offers shall take care that statements are 
not made which may mislead holders of relevant securities or the market. 
 7. After a bona fide offer has been communicated to the board of the offeree 
company, or after the board of the offeree company has reason to believe 
that a bona fide offer might be imminent, such board may not take any 
action without the approval of the holders of the relevant securities in 
general meeting, in relation to the affairs of the company, which could 
effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the holders 
of relevant securities being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits. 
 8. Rights of control shall be exercised in good faith and the oppression of a 
minority is unacceptable. 
 9. The directors of an offeror and the offeree company shall at all times, in 
advising the holders of relevant securities, act only in their capacity as 
directors and not have regard to their personal or family shareholdings 
or to their personal relationships with the companies. It is the interests of 
holders of relevant securities taken as a whole, which shall be considered 
when the directors are giving advice to such holders. 
 10. An affected transaction normally gives rise to an obligation to make a 
general offer to all other holders of the relevant securities. Where an 
acquisition is contemplated as a result of which a person may incur such 
an obligation, he shall, before making the acquisition, ensure that he is 
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and will continue to be able to implement such an offer. 
 11. The underlying principle is that persons holding an equity interest in an 
offeree company through shares or other securities in that company 
(whether or not such carry voting rights) shall be entitled to dispose of 
their said interest on terms comparable to those of any affected 
transaction in the relevant securities.”43 
 
The Panel must ensure that parties adhere to the provisions of section 119(2), 
when it regulates takeovers and mergers.44 Section 119(2) is aimed at ensuring 
that the objects of section 119(1) are promoted in regulating takeovers and 
mergers. The provisions aim to achieve the following: that parties undertaking 
takeovers and mergers do not mislead investors; that there is equality of 
treatment of shareholders; that no shareholder is preferred above others; that 
sufficient details about the takeovers or mergers are provided in good time; and 
that shareholders are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of an 
offer due to insufficient information or information that is provided at a late 
stage.45 These requirements emphasise the notion of fairness and equity during 
a takeover or merger. In order to make an informed decision about a takeover 
or a merger, shareholders need detailed information that must be provided in 
good time. By allowing sufficient time, shareholders will have enough time to 
obtain independent advice should they choose to do so. The City Code46 also 
expresses similar principles and these principles form the cornerstone of 
                                            
43Section C of the SRP Code. 
44Section 119(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides that: ‘subject to the provisions 
of subsection (6),  
 (a) that no person may enter into an affected transaction unless that person is ready, 
able and willing to implement that transaction; 
(b) that all holders of—  
(i) any particular class of voting securities of an offeree regulated company are afforded 
equivalent treatment; and  
(ii) voting securities of an offeree regulated company are afforded equitable treatment, 
having regard to the circumstances;  
(c) that no relevant information is withheld from the holders of relevant securities; and  
(d) that all holders of relevant securities—  
(i) receive the same information from an offeror, potential offeror, or offeree regulated 
company during the course of an affected transaction, or when an affected transaction 
is contemplated; and  
(ii) are provided sufficient information, and permitted sufficient time, to enable them to 
reach a properly informed decision.’ 
45 Section 119(1) and section 119(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
46 See General Principles of the UK City Code. 
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takeover laws of various jurisdictions, including EU countries and also 
Australia.47 The European Directive on Takeovers and Mergers is modeled on 
the City Code.48 Accordingly, the principles have also been adopted in the 
European Directive on Takeovers and Mergers.  
 
The Panel may also require certain disclosures, require filing of documents for 
approval, issue compliance certificates, receive complaints, and investigate 
and issue compliance notices in respect of takeovers and mergers.49 To 
empower the Panel to carry out its mandate, section 119(5) gives the Panel 
teeth to ensure compliance. The Panel is able to prohibit and require any action 
by a person or order a person to divest of an acquired asset, or account for 
profits.50 The Panel does not consider the commercial advantages or 
disadvantages of takeovers and mergers when it regulates such transactions.51 
However, in certain instances the Takeover Provisions provides that the offer 
must be on the same terms and conditions for all shareholders. In this way the 
Takeover Provisions may affect the nature and amount of consideration offered 
for the securities during an affected transaction.52 In this respect, the 
Companies Act of 2008 has retained the provisions of the Companies Act of 
1973.53 This is similar to the provisions of the City Code, where the UK Panel 
does not consider the commercial advantages or disadvantages of takeovers 
and mergers.54 It is the domain of shareholders to consider the commercial 
advantages or disadvantages of takeovers and mergers.55  
                                            
47See the EU Takeover Directive. Some of the principles are also applied in Australia. See 
section 602 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 dealing with the Eggleston principles, the 
main principle for regulating takeovers and mergers as discussed in chapter 4 above. 
48H Baum “Takeover law in the EU and Germany: Comparative analysis of a regulatory model” 
(2006) University of Tokyo’ Journal of Law and Politics 360-372. 
49Section 119(4) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
50Section 119(5)(b) of the Companies Act of 12008. 
51Sections 119(1) and 201(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. See also S Luiz “Some Comments 
on the Scheme of Arrangement as an “Affected Transaction” as defined in the Companies Act 
71 of 2008” (2012) PER/PELJ (15) 5.116/638. 
52See among others; section 123, and 125(2), which requires that parties make a comparable 
offer in certain circumstances and regulation 111(2), which set a minimum consideration to be 
offered where, parties have acquired securities for cash during a prescribed period. 
53Section 440c (2) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
54Warham “The Takeover Panel” in A Practitioners’ Guide 1. See also Securities Regulation 
Code and the Rules of the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP Code). Government Gazette 
12962. January of 1991 in the introduction to the SRP Code. 
55Warham “The Takeover Panel” in A Practitioners’ Guide 1. 
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The Takeover Regulations set out the details of the required disclosures and 
the documents to be filed with the Panel. The Regulations, among other things, 
provide for when and which document must be submitted, and how such 
documents must be filed. They also provide for how and when announcements 
and documents must be sent to shareholders. Further, the Regulations provide 
that announcements and documents must be approved by the Panel before 
they are sent to shareholders.56 The regulations also specifically require 
companies undertaking transactions to comply with a number of requirements, 
including providing certain documents to shareholders such as annual financial 
statements, documents evidencing any valuations of property, memoranda of 
incorporations or contracts relating to a current takeover or a merger, to be 
available for inspection by shareholders.57 It is submitted that practitioners 
structuring takeovers and mergers, and those drafting offer circulars, can no 
longer refer only to the regulations as was the case with the SRP Code. 
Practitioners must refer to both the Takeover Regulations and chapter 5 of the 
Companies Act of 2008, to determine their obligations and disclosures so as to 
ensure compliance with the Takeover Provisions.58 The Companies Act of 
1973, in chapter XVA, merely provided a general basis for regulation of 
takeovers and mergers. Most of the details relating to the underlying principles 
for regulating takeovers and mergers, including the disclosures, prohibitions 
and powers of the SRP were in the SRP Code.59  
 
 
 
 
                                            
56Regulation 117 of the Takeover Regulations. 
57Regulation 106 of the Takeover Regulation requires certain documents to be available for 
inspection. 
58See the SRP Code. The SRP Code established rules, which also contained the general 
principles. The rules among other things created obligations to disclose. The fact that the Act 
separate obligations and detailed disclosures makes it imperative that both Chapter 5 of the 
Act and Chapter 5 of the regulations be consulted for undertaking takeovers and mergers, 
whereas with the SRP Code practitioners could rely on for compliance the regulation in the 
SRP Code with limited reference to Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973.  
59Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code promulgated in terms of 
section 440C of the Companies Act of 1973. 
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5 5 Companies subject to the Takeover Provisions  
 
The Panel regulates affected transactions or offers that involve regulated 
companies, as defined in the Companies Act of 2008.60 Regulated companies 
are defined in paragraph 1 8 of Chapter 1 above. The Takeover Provisions 
mainly affect public companies due to their widely-held shareholding. The 
requirements to comply with the Companies Act of 2008 for public companies 
is similar to that of the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code. This also 
applies to state-owned companies.61  
 
However, there is a significant difference between the requirement of the 
Companies Act of 2008 and that of the Companies Act of 1973 in respect of the 
regulation of takeovers and mergers of private companies. The SRP Code only 
applied to private companies where it had more than 10 beneficial shareholders 
and the transaction value was more than R5 million. In addition, the provisions 
were only included in the SRP Code - a regulation - whereas in terms of the 
Companies Act of 2008, the provisions are in the Companies Act of 2008 and 
the Takeover Regulations.62 There is no provision for a general exemption from 
compliance for private companies. Once a company is defined as a regulated 
company,63 it must comply with the takeover provisions whenever it undertakes 
an affected transaction or it must specifically apply to the Panel for exemption.  
 
However, the Companies Act of 2008 provides for voluntary compliance in 
section 118(1)(c)(ii) by private companies that are not defined as regulated 
companies. This provision may protect the interests of minority shareholders 
better as it provides for enforcement of takeover provisions by the Panel during 
takeovers and mergers by private companies that have adopted voluntary 
compliance. The definition of private companies that are regulated companies, 
requires 10 percent share dealings in a period of 24 months. It has been 
criticised harshly by a number of researchers. The section unnecessarily 
                                            
60See section 117 dealing with definitions and section 118 dealing with companies that are 
subject to the Takeover Provisions under the Companies Act of 2008. 
61Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973 read with section A3 of the SRP Code. 
62Section A3 of the SRP Code. 
63See definition of regulated company in chapter 1, paragraph 1 of the dissertation.  
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burdens small private companies with compliance and associated costs. These 
companies will be forced to comply with takeover and merger provisions or 
have to apply for an exemption to the Panel. It is submitted that this is another 
addition of bureaucratic compliance and resultant costs for small businesses. 
The threshold of 10 percent required by section 118(2) of the Companies Act 
of 2008 has been criticised for being an irrelevant criterion.64 The logical and 
commercial measure to determine the type of companies that should be subject 
to the Takeover Provisions should be value and the number of shareholders.65  
 
The section goes against the objectives of the Companies Act of 2008 in section 
7, as discussed in paragraph 5 2 above.66 One of the objectives is to reduce 
costs for small companies. Criticism is also expressed by other practitioners 
who indicate that the benefits of transparency, as weighed against the costs of 
compliance, are disproportionate and, at worst, unnecessary.67 There are 
problems relating to the applicability of the Takeover Provisions to private 
companies.68 It is suggested that the 24 months trading period and 10 percent 
transfer of shares test in private companies has unintended consequences in 
that even very small companies, or companies that have not yet traded, will be 
forced to comply with the requirements of the takeover provisions. This 
requirement for regulated companies is much broader than is necessary. By 
casting the net so wide, it appears that the legislature assumed that the majority 
of private company shareholders require the protective measures in the 
takeover provisions.  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 does not even seem to consider that, in certain 
circumstances, shareholders may have developed their own protective 
measures in their constitutions, and therefore do not need special protection in 
                                            
64HE Wainer “The new Companies Act: Peculiarities and Anomalies” (2010) 126 (part 4) South 
African Law Journal 825.  
65Wainer (2010) South African Law Journal 825. 
66See also Wainer (2010) South African Law Journal 825 referring to the objectives of the 
Companies Bill, where it is indicated that the Act should reduce costs of doing business for 
small companies. 
67N Boardman “A critical analysis of the new South African takeover laws as proposed under 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 318.  
68PJ Sutherland “The state of Company Law in South Africa: A review of modern company law 
for a competitive SA Economy by T Mongalo (ed)” (2012) 1 Stell LR 157. 
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terms of the Act. It is pointed out that, although companies may be entitled to 
apply for exemptions from the Panel in terms of section 119(6) of the 
Companies Act of 2008, such applications come at a cost. Companies may 
need to seek advisers and pay filing fees in order to obtain such exemptions. It 
is also not appropriate to achieve regulation by exemption, and this may affect 
the efficiency of the regulatory measures and introduce an additional burden 
on both the regulators and the parties who are required to comply with the 
regulations. Applications for exemptions create complexity and unnecessary 
formalism.69  
 
The Panel regulates affected transactions undertaken by private companies in 
a flexible manner, as contemplated by the DTI 2004 Policy document and 
section 7.70 The Panel does not enforce a strict formalistic approach to 
compliance in respect of affected transactions by small, regulated private 
companies. The Panel has introduced guidelines to deal with regulation of 
affected transactions by small regulated private companies.71 The practice 
ensures that affected transactions do not have to comply with the full 
disclosures required by parts B and C in Chapter 5 of the Act. The guidelines 
allow private regulated companies to submit applications for exemption from 
compliance with the Takeover Provisions in accordance with section 119(6) of 
the Act. Evidence suggests that the majority of exemptions granted by the 
Panel relate to affected transactions by private regulated companies.72  
 
It is suggested that the basis for regulating takeovers and mergers by private 
companies set out in the SRP Code should have been retained, but with a 
higher threshold in number of shareholders and the value of transactions. This 
would allow oversight by regulators and simultaneously ensure that any 
possible prejudice to minority shareholders in private companies is limited. At 
                                            
69Sutherland (2012) Stell LR 174. 
70See the discussions in paragraph 5 2 dealing with the objectives of the Companies Act of 
2008.  
71See Guideline 3/2011. Available of http//trpanel.co.za. Accessed 2 .2.2019.  
72See Annexure 1 to the Takeover Regulation Panel Annual Report for the 13 months ended 
31 March 2013. 39. 
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the same time, it will avoid the unintended consequences of adding a burden 
of compliance and costs to small private companies. 
 
5 6 Types of affected transactions regulated 
 
5 6 1 Introduction 
 
Section 117(1)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008, lists seven affected 
transactions relating to regulated companies.73 These transactions, are in 
common parlance, takeovers or mergers of companies.74 While the focus of the 
dissertation is the mandatory offer, it is also important to provide an overview 
of other methods of achieving takeovers and mergers. These other affected 
transactions are discussed to provide a broad overview of the different types of 
takeover methods and show how their enforcement offers alternative protection 
to minority shareholders during such takeovers or mergers. Accordingly, the 
discussions of these affected transactions are not exhaustive. 
 
5 6 2 Section 112: Proposals to dispose of all or the greater part of assets or 
undertaking of a company 
 
Section 112 of the Companies Act of 2008 deals with the disposal of all or the 
greater parts of the assets or undertaking of a company. Like the Companies 
Act of 1973, the Companies Act of 2008 does not define what ‘dispose’ means 
in this context.75 It is submitted that some of the definitions provided will 
influence how the section is interpreted. Given the similarities between the 
Companies Act of 1973 and the Companies Act of 2008, guidance may be 
sought from previous judicial decisions as to what is meant by ‘dispose.’76 To 
dispose means ‘to part with’ or ‘to get rid of’ and contemplates permanently 
depriving the company of any rights to the ownership of the assets.77 The courts 
                                            
73See also Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 426(5).  
74See definitions in paragraph 1 8 above. 
75JL Yeats, RA de la Harpe, RD Jooste, H Stoop, R Cassim, J Seligmann, L Kent, RS 
Bradstreet, RC Williams, MF Cassim, E Swanepoel, FHI Cassim and KA Jarvis Commentary 
on the Companies Act of 2008 (2018) 5-3. 
76Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-3. 
775-3. 
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have given direction as to what may constitute a disposal. The question whether 
cessions and pledges are disposals, in particular, has been addressed. A 
cession or pledging of shares in securitatem debiti (and not an out and out 
cession), is not a disposal of the shares provided that the reversionary rights 
are preserved. This is so because during the period when the shares are ceded, 
the cessionary is not free to dispose of those shares, but has an obligation to 
cede the rights back to the cedent once the debt has been paid.78 The passing 
of a mortgage bond over a company’s assets has also been clarified. In the 
matter of Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Hunkydory Investments 188 
(Pty) Limited,79 the court ruled that the passing of a mortgage bond over 
immovable property is not a disposal of assets as contemplated in terms of 
section 228 of the Companies Act of 1973.80 The court clarified that to dispose 
in that section meant the act of transferring ownership. A transaction in terms 
of which a debtor agrees to hypothecate his property, is not a disposal to the 
creditor or anyone. Such an interpretation would extend the meaning of the 
section beyond what was intended by the legislation.81 The legislature referred 
to disposal in the ordinary and narrower sense.82 The section is aimed at those 
disposals that transfer ownership of the assets and not a transaction that 
exposes the company’s assets to the risk of a forced disposal of those assets 
because of the borrowing.83 It is inaccurate to characterise a mortgage bond as 
one of the steps to a sale in execution and therefore a disposal, because in the 
event of the execution, it is the sheriff who enforces or executes the forced sale 
of the property.84 The correct view is that a disposal has occurred when there 
is an unconditional, binding agreement to dispose the assets. Where the 
disposal is subject to a condition, it is impossible to say, before the condition is 
fulfilled, whether or not the entering into the contract disposed of the property. 
When the condition is fulfilled, the making of the contract had the effect of the 
                                            
785-3. 
79Case No 15427 /2008(WCC). 
80 Case No 15427 /2008(WCC) par 23 
81Case No 15427 /2008(WCC) 23 and Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 
5-4. 
82Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-4. 
835-4. 
84J Latsky “The fundamental transactions under the Companies Act: A report back from practice 
after the first few years” (2014) 2 Stell LR 366. 
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disposal of the property and if the condition is not fulfilled, the making of the 
contract had no legal effect at all.85 
 
A disposal of the assets or undertaking is one of the methods of taking over or 
merging a company’s operations. The method can be used to obtain control 
over the business of a company without purchasing the shares of the company, 
“and is one of the ways for a predator to takeover a business.”86 Disposals of 
all or greater parts of the assets or undertaking of a company were not regarded 
as affected transactions until the amendment of the Companies Act of 1973 by 
the Corporate Laws Amendment Act No.24 of 2006 that became effective 14 
December 2007. The effect of section 112 is substantially similar to section 228 
of the Companies Act of 1973.  
 
However, the wording of section 112 is significantly different in that the 
Companies Act of 1973 referred to the capacity of director, while the 
Companies Act of 2008 refers to the capacity of the company.87 The new 
section includes a definition of all or the greater part of the assets or undertaking 
being disposed of, as opposed to the Companies Act of 1973 that did not 
provide such a definition.88 Section 228 of the Companies Act of 1973 was 
deficient in this respect. Another useful addition to the ‘disposal of assets’ 
section is the requirement that the fair value of assets disposed must be 
disclosed. Section 112(4) states that any part of the undertaking or assets of a 
company to be disposed of, as contemplated in this section, must be fairly 
valued, as calculated in the ‘prescribed manner’, as at the date of the proposal, 
which date must be determined in the ‘prescribed manner’.  The regulations do 
not indicate what is the ‘prescribed manner’ by which the assets or undertaking 
must be valued. It is asserted that the regulations need to be amended to avoid 
uncertainty.89 Where a disposal relates to a regulated company, sections 
                                            
85366. 
86363.  
87Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 404.  
88Section 1 of the Companies Act of 2008 of the Act defines “All or the greater part of the assets 
or undertaking” as meaning more than 50 percent of the company’s gross assets at fair market 
value, irrespective of its liabilities; or more than 50 percent of the company’s value of its entire 
undertaking, at fair market value.  
89Latsky (2014) Stell LR 364. 
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114(2) and (3), read with regulation 90, will apply. Regulation 90 requires 
parties to obtain a ruling from the Panel and, if the Panel rules that an expert 
opinion is required, the parties must proceed to obtain such an opinion in terms 
of regulation 90. The regulation creates an obligation to retain an independent 
expert to advise the company in respect of a section 112 transaction instead of 
the section creating such an obligation. The regulation prescribes that the 
valuation must be done in accordance with generally- accepted valuation 
approaches and methods in use from time to time. The methods include the: 
(a) capitalisation, income or cash flow approach which relies on the ‘value–in–
use’ principle and requires determination of the present value of future cash 
flows over the useful life of the asset or the business; (b) comparative or market 
approach that relies on the principle of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ and 
requires that the amount obtainable from the sale of an asset or undertaking is 
determined as if in an arm’s length transaction; and (c) cost approach that relies 
on historical amounts spent on asset or undertaking.90  
 
It would have been preferable if the obligation was in the section itself, rather 
than in the regulation, as this is not the right place to create an obligation and 
may be ultra vires as it is created in a subordinate legislation.91 The disposal 
must be considered independently of any other disposals. Accordingly, it is not 
aimed at seeking shareholders’ approval for a number of disposals that 
collectively would qualify as a disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or 
undertaking of a company.92 Section 112(5) also provides that the authorisation 
must only be granted for specific transactions. The authorisation required must 
be by special resolution. Prior to its amendment, the Companies Act of 1973 
allowed disposals by ordinary resolution.93 Section 112 does not have a specific 
reference to ratification, unlike section 228 of the Companies Act of 1973. The 
Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011 removed reference to ratification that 
was in section 115(5) of the Act. Delport and Vorster indicate that ratification of 
                                            
90Regulation 90(4). 
91See regulation 90 that creates the obligation. This is different to the obligation created by 
section 114(2) of the Companies Ac of 2008 in respect of schemes of arrangement.  
92Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 408(1). 
93See Corporate Laws Amendment Act No.24 of 2006.  
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a contract already concluded by the company, will be sufficient.94 However, 
there is a view that, unlike section 228 of the Companies Act of 1973, the 
Companies Act of 2008 does not allow ratification of a disposal.95 It appears 
that the matter is not clear as the common law generally allows ratification 
where authorization is required. It can be argued that the deletion of ratification 
does not exclude ratification in common law. The deletion of “ratifies” by the 
legislature makes it unclear as to whether the common-law position applies.96 
A question has been asked as to whether shareholder approval relates to the 
conclusion of the agreement of disposal or to the implementation of the 
agreement. Is the agreement binding without shareholder approval? This issue 
created difficulty in the Companies Act of 1973 and it remains unclear and 
uncertain.97  
 
There is support for a view that a disposal transaction that does not comply with 
the requirements of the Companies Act of 2008 is not void, but is unenforceable 
as between the parties.98 It has been suggested that it is important to know 
when a disposal has taken place. Once a disposal has happened it may be too 
late to comply with the Act.99 It is a moot point among practitioners whether a 
disposal in terms of section 112 can be approved by means of a written 
resolution, in terms of section 60. The preferred view is that there must be a 
meeting of shareholders complying with the requirements of section 115. It 
cannot be done by means of a ‘round robin’ resolution.100 Section 115(2) (a), 
which indicates that the transaction must be approved by “a special resolution 
adopted… at a meeting called for that purpose,” seems to support the 
assertion.101 A disposal in terms of section 112 entitles shareholders of the 
company to exercise appraisal rights in terms of section 164. Should a disposal 
                                            
94Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 404. 
95Latsky (2014) Stell LR 365. 
96365. 
97CM Cassim & J Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers” in FHI Cassim 
(Man Ed) (2012) Contemporary Company Law 720. 
98Latsky (2014) Stell LR 367 and also Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 
71 of 2008 404, who state that an agreement that has not been approved as required is not 
void or invalid but cannot be enforced. 
99Latsky (2014) Stell LR 365. 
100363. 
101363. 
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be approved in terms of a round-robin resolution, exercising appraisal rights 
can prove to be unworkable due to numerous procedural steps that 
shareholders must undertake to exercise the appraisal rights. Nevertheless, the 
validity and enforceability of a disposal that does not comply with the Act has 
not yet been clearly determined by the courts. This uncertainty will exist until 
clarified by the courts.102 The novelty of the issues raised by application of 
section 112 leads to a number of unanswered questions that requires further 
research. Further, the dearth of research on this topic limits the discussions. 
The development of case law will assist in the interpretation of the section.  
 
In Moraitis Investments (Pty) v Montic Dairy,103 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
had to consider the principle of unanimous assent for the purposes of approval 
of a section 112 disposal.104 Before applying the principle, the court pointed out 
that the principle has long been recognised as part of English company law, 
that has been accepted as part of South African company law.105 The appellant 
in this matter argued that a transaction contemplated in a settlement agreement 
entered into earlier by the parties, was subject to the requirements of sections 
112 and 115 and, therefore, could only be implemented in terms of a special 
resolution. The court disagreed with the contention.106 The court pointed out 
that the purpose underpinning the requirements of sections 112 and 115 is to 
ensure that the interests and views of all shareholders are taken into account 
before a company disposes of the whole or the greater part of its assets or its 
undertaking.107 Sections 65(9) and (10) of the Companies Act of 2008, stipulate 
the majority required for the passing of a special resolution, which is 75 percent 
of the voting rights exercised on the resolution or such percentage as may be 
allowed by the company’s MOI. The court held that, where the company has a 
single shareholder, these requirements are a mere formality.108 The court 
extended the application of the principle of unanimous assent to special 
                                            
102Latsky (2014) Stell 363. 
103Case no: 799/2016 (SCA).  
104Case No 799/2016 para 37. 
105Case No 799/2016 para 37. 
106Case No 799/2016 para 40. 
107Case No 799/2016 para 37. 
108Case No 799/2016 para 37 
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resolutions.109 The burden of proving unanimous consent where multiple 
shareholders are involved may be too onerous to discharge. Therefore, it is 
prudent to ensure that all special resolutions are passed in accordance with the 
required formalities.110 This is even more so where filing at the CIPC is 
required.111  
 
5 6 3 Section 113 – Proposals for amalgamations or mergers 
 
The second type of an affected transaction is an amalgamation or a merger 
transaction.112 This is a new type of transaction, which has been introduced in 
section 113 of the Companies Act of 2008. The transaction requires a 
consensual process between the various companies involved in the 
transaction.113 According to the DTI 2004 Policy document, this new type of 
transaction is aimed at introducing efficient takeovers and mergers.114 The 
amalgamation or merger in terms of section 113 is a new fundamental and 
radical concept borrowed from the US.115 However, it is submitted that such an 
introduction is to be welcomed. It makes takeovers or mergers simple and 
efficient and contributes to the facilitation of mergers and takeovers.116  
 
                                            
109C Wood and S Singh “The doctrine of unanimous assent” (2018) Without Prejudice 8. 
1108. 
1118. 
112Section 1 of the Companies Act of 2008 defines amalgamations or mergers as meaning a 
transaction, or series of transactions, pursuant to an agreement between two or more 
companies, resulting in— 
(a) the formation of one or more new companies, which together hold all of the assets and 
liabilities that were held by any of the amalgamating or merging companies immediately before 
the implementation of the agreement, and the dissolution of each of the amalgamating or 
merging companies; or 
(b) the survival of at least one of the amalgamating or merging companies, with or without the 
formation of one or more new companies, and the vesting in the surviving company or 
companies, together with such new company or companies, of all of the assets and liabilities 
that were held by any of the amalgamating or merging companies immediately before the 
implementation of the agreement.  
113Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 408. 
114DTI 2004 Policy document 43. 
115Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers” in Contemporary 
Company Law 676. 
116677. 
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The new amalgamations and mergers provisions in section 113, read with 
section 116, of the Companies Act of 2008 are innovative.117 South Africa has 
never had a statutory merger in the true sense.118 The amalgamations or 
merger provisions have been transplanted from the US but have been adapted 
to suit local company law. Davids et al119 deal with these transactions in detail 
and convincingly indicate the merits of these types of transactions. They point 
out that the new provisions will facilitate the creation of business combinations, 
as several companies may merge their operations in terms of the section. 
Cassim, in a comprehensive analysis of this section, indicates that the 
introduction of the section is a significant liberalisation of policy by the 
legislature.120 
 
Section 113 is useful for intragroup mergers. One company may absorb the 
operations of another or others without approaching each individual party to 
contract with.121 There is no formal distinction between an amalgamation and a 
merger.122 The only distinction between the two transactions seems to be that, 
in an amalgamation, a new company is formed while, in the case of a merger, 
existing companies are involved in the transaction.123 The merger or 
amalgamation procedure in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 is a simple 
procedure which requires a number of steps to be completed: An agreement 
needs to be signed by the companies, shareholders of the companies have to 
cast a vote based on disclosures, and dissenting shareholders are afforded an 
appraisal right to have the shares bought at ‘fair value’ in terms of section 164 
of the Act. The courts only play a role in specified circumstances.124  
 
Section 116 of the Companies Act of 2008 dealing with the implementation of 
an amalgamation or merger also provides additional requirements for 
                                            
117Sutherland (2012) Stell LR 1. 
118CM Cassim “The Introduction of Statutory Mergers in South African Corporate Law: Majority 
Rule Offset by the Appraisal Right (Part 1)” (2008) SA Merc LJ 1–32, 1. 
119Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338.  
120Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 1–32, 1. 
121Latsky (2014) Stell LR 377. 
122Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338. 341. 
123Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 408. 
124Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers” in Contemporary 
Company Law 618. 
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completion of a merger or amalgamation that are intended to protect creditors. 
The provisions include: (a) filing of a notice of the merger in the prescribed 
manner by the merging companies to all known creditors;(b) protection of 
creditors in that, on receipt of notice, they may apply to court to review the 
merger on the basis they may be materially prejudiced. However, the court may 
grant leave to apply for review of the merger only if: it is satisfied that the 
applicant is acting in good faith, the merger, if implemented, would materially 
prejudice the creditor and there are no other remedies available to the 
creditor.125  
 
Further requirements for the notice of a merger include: filing with the 
Companies Commission and confirmation that the transaction has satisfied the 
requirements of section 115 relating to voting.126 The notice must also include 
confirmations that approvals or consents have been obtained from other 
regulators if so required, such as in terms of the Competition Act or the financial 
services legislation. Any other shareholder approvals that are still required, 
such as, for the amendment of the Memorandum of Incorporation of any newly-
incorporated company must be disclosed.127 On receipt of the notice of the 
merger agreement, the Companies Commissioner must complete a number of 
administrative steps. These include: issuing new registration certificates for 
new companies and deregistering any of the merged companies that did not 
survive the merger.128  
 
The effect of the merger agreement is that implementation is subject to 
conditions set in the merger agreement; any existing liabilities are not affected; 
any pending or existing civil, criminal or administrative actions or proceedings 
may continue against or in favour of any merged company. Any order, ruling, 
judgment or conviction against or in favour of any merged company is also not 
affected by such merger agreement.129 Section 116(7) deals with the impact of 
                                            
125See section 116(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
126The requirements of section 115 of the Companies Act of 2008 are discussed separately 
under paragraph 5 6 6 below.  
127See section 116(3) and section116(4) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
128See section 116(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
129Section 116(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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the merger agreement on property rights of each merged or surviving company. 
The property of each merging company becomes the property of the newly-
merged or surviving company. The newly-merged or surviving company is also 
liable for the obligations of the merging company. The above rights and 
obligations are in accordance with the terms and conditions of the merger 
agreement but are subject to the requirement that each merged company must 
meet the liquidity and solvency tests. Where a property registered in terms of 
public regulation is required to be transferred from one merging company to 
another in terms of the merger agreement, the registrar of deeds may effect 
registration of such property on production of the copy of the merger agreement 
and the filed notice of merger agreement. The provisions of the Banks Act 94 
of 1990, prevail over those of section 116(7) in case of a conflict between 
them.130 
 
The legislature is trying to balance the interests of the shareholders and 
economic growth by introducing the statutory merger to facilitate such 
transactions.131 However, there is lack of clarity in this section due to the fact 
that there is no definition of what an amalgamation or merger is.132 It is also not 
easy to determine which transactions may be undertaken using which 
mechanism.133 It is further asserted that the legal effect on the transfer of assets 
and liabilities following the completion of an amalgamation or merger in terms 
of section 113 is not clear.134 It, for instance, is not clear what their effect will 
be on existing contractual rights. A question has been raised regarding the 
impact of a merger on pre-emptive rights where the shareholder is a company. 
Can failure to offer the shares to other shareholders be regarded as a breach 
of a clause in the MOI that grants a pre-emption right to those shareholders? 
This question is controversial and uncertain in those jurisdictions where the 
section originated.135 The requirements of sections 113 are not clear or specific 
on the issue. It is generally accepted that statutory mergers should be 
                                            
130See section 116(9) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
131Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 1–32 1.  
132Sutherland 2012 Stell LR 175. 
133175. 
134175. 
135Latsky (2014) Stell LR 375. 
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welcomed. However, it is also asserted that the relevant sections need to be 
tidied to remove uncertainties.136 
 
5 6 4 Section 114 – Proposals for schemes of arrangement 
 
Schemes of arrangement in terms of section 114(1) are defined as the third 
type of affected transaction in section 117(1)(c). The scheme of arrangement 
procedure in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 is fundamentally different, 
and in significant respects, from the previous procedure for schemes of 
arrangement in terms of section 311 of the Companies Act of 1973. The 
Companies Act of 2008 specifically refers to a number of transactions that will 
constitute arrangements by the company including, divisions, consolidations, 
expropriations, exchange and repurchases of securities. It is submitted that 
providing specific instances where the scheme of arrangement may be used, 
suggests that the legislature intends to facilitate these schemes.137 Not all 
schemes of arrangements qualify as affected transactions subject to the 
Takeover Provisions because they might not involve a regulated company. 
Such a scheme would be regulated as a fundamental transaction only.138  
 
The requirements for a scheme of arrangement in terms of section 114 are 
simple and clear. Although the expression “scheme of arrangement” is not 
defined, it appears that “just about any arrangement between the company and 
holders of a class of securities would qualify as a scheme if the company has 
complied with the requirements of the Act.”139 There is no numerus clausus of 
transactions with shareholders and the company that could qualify as schemes 
of arrangement.140 The “arrangements” contemplated by this section: 
 
 “[A]re of the widest character and … the only limitations are that the scheme 
cannot authorise something contrary to the general law or wholly ultra vires the 
                                            
136See Sutherland (2012) Stell LR 175. 
137Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers” in Contemporary 
Company Law 659. 
138Luiz (2014) Merc LJ 573 at note 83. 
139Latsky (2014) Stell LR 369. 
140369.  
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company …’ and that if capital is to be reduced the formalities [as prescribed 
by ss 83 et seq in terms of the 1973 Act] ‘must also be complied with’”.141  
 
The principle applied in Ex parte Federale Nywerhede Bpk,142 that there is no 
reason to give a narrow or limited meaning to an arrangement, has been 
maintained in section 114. The section is now specific and it is clear that any 
number of arrangements may be entered into using the section. There are 
safeguards for shareholders in the scheme of arrangement in terms of section 
114. These are in the form of disclosures required by the Act, including the 
independent expert report, a requirement that there must be a quorum of 25 
percent of the shareholders entitled to vote, and the transaction must be 
approved by 75 percent of those entitled to vote in terms of section 115(2)(a). 
The special resolution must be passed by independent votes.143 Shareholders 
may unanimously waive the requirement for independent expert advice in 
section 114. This is in line with the general principle that a beneficiary of a right 
may freely waive such a right if such a waiver does not raise any public interest 
concerns.144 The requirement for the expert report is required for the benefit of 
shareholders as a whole. Where a scheme of arrangement is used to effect a 
merger those who sell may be prejudiced if the shares are sold at a low price, 
and those who remain may also be prejudiced if the shares are bought at a high 
price. A waiver of the expert report by well-informed directors and shareholders 
should not present a high risk to directors. However, there is nevertheless a 
risk and directors should not lightly agree to such a waiver.145  
                                            
141Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 410.  
1421975 (1) SA 826 W 830. In this case the court quoted from the English case Re National 
Bank Ltd.,(1966) 1 All  E.R 1006, that rejected a limitation or qualification on the generality of 
the word ‘arrangement’ in section 206 of the UK Companies Act of 1948.In that case, the court 
indicated that the legislature had not seen fit to impose a limitation and the court did not see 
any reason for implying any.   
143See section 115(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 which provides that (4) For the purposes 
of subsections (2) and (3), any voting rights controlled by an acquiring party, a person related 
to an acquiring party, or a person acting in concert with either of them, must not be included in 
calculating the percentage of voting rights— 
(a) required to be present, or actually present, in determining whether the applicable quorum 
requirements are satisfied; or 
(b) required to be voted in support of a resolution, or actually voted in support of the resolution. 
See also S Luiz “Case Comments: Use of a Schemes of arrangement to Eliminate Minority 
Shareholders” (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 449. 
144Latsky (2014) Stell LR 370. 
145371. 
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A brief excursion into the UK Companies Act 2006 on the subject of schemes 
of arrangement is appropriate in order to put the South African scheme of 
arrangement in perspective. The courts in the UK have rejected an argument 
that where a scheme is used as an alternative to a takeover offer, the threshold 
for voting should be 90 percent rather than 75 percent.146 The UK Companies 
Act 2006 does not prescribe the subject matter of schemes of arrangement. A 
scheme of arrangement could also include a compromise or arrangement 
between a company and its creditors.147  
 
Schemes of arrangement, rather than the traditional takeover offer have been 
a preferred takeover method of choice in the UK for a number of years.148 The 
scheme of arrangement requires approval of 75 percent of qualifying offeree 
company shareholders to proceed. In a scheme of arrangement, the offeror 
deals with the board of directors of the offeree company. Often a transaction 
agreement is entered into between the board of the offeree company and the 
offeror, in terms of which each party undertakes to ensure that certain steps are 
undertaken. The scheme is a corporate action of the offeree company and is 
therefore controlled by the offeree board. The directors of the offeree must 
agree and recommend proposing a scheme of arrangement to the 
shareholders. The offeree company directors must include a special resolution 
as part of the scheme document so that shareholders can vote to have their 
shares expropriated and pass control to the offeror. 
 
A friendly relationship with the offeree company board is therefore a pre-
requisite to propose a scheme of arrangement between the offeree and its 
shareholders. In contrast to a takeover offer, there can be no hostile scheme of 
arrangement.149 Protection of minority shareholders in a company where a 
scheme of arrangement is proposed consists of the requirement that the 
                                            
146J Payne “Schemes of Arrangement, Takeovers and Minority Shareholder Protection” (2011) 
II Part 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 72. 
147See Payne (2011) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 88. 
148See N Boardman “Public Takeover Offer Versus Schemes of Arrangement” Corporate 
(March 2012). Boardman is one of the drafters of the Companies Act 2008. 
149Payne (2011) JCLS 70. 
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scheme must be approved by a special resolution adopted by persons entitled 
to exercise voting rights on such matter, at a meeting called for that purpose 
and at which sufficient persons are present to exercise, in aggregate, at least 
25 percent of all the voting rights that are entitled to be exercised on that matter, 
or any higher percentage as may be required by the company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation.150 It is notable that the section specifically indicates that the 
approval may be by a higher threshold.151 It is suggested that directors may not 
lower the threshold for approvals of fundamental transactions, but may set a 
higher threshold, if the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company allows 
this.152 Arguably, the higher the threshold for approval, the more protection 
offered to shareholders during a fundamental transaction. In the UK, a scheme 
of arrangement requires court approval. Once all the formalities have been 
complied with, it is likely that the court will approve the scheme.153  
 
In SA, section 311 of the Companies Act of 1973 also required the court to 
approve the scheme. But the Companies Act of 2008 simplified this procedure. 
In terms of section 114, only shareholder approval is required and court 
involvement will only apply in certain circumstances.154 Court involvement is, 
therefore, no longer mandatory. This is in line with the DTI 2004 Policy 
document to avoid excessive formalism and the need to improve efficiency in 
regulation of takeovers and mergers.155  
 
The legislature seeks to ensure that companies can obtain shareholder 
approval in an efficient manner. The removal of automatic court involvement 
does not mean that shareholders have been left unprotected, as shareholders 
can still approach the courts in terms of section 115(3), provided that certain 
                                            
150Section115(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008. 
151Section 115(2) (a).  
152In terms of section 64(2 of the Companies Act, a company may provide in its Memorandum 
of Incorporation a lower quorum for meeting than 25 percent but this is not allowed for the 
purposes of approving a fundamental transaction 
153Boardman (2010) Act Juridica 316. 
154Section 115 of the Act provides for court intervention where certain requirements have been 
met, such as where 15 percent of holders voted against the relevant resolution and sought 
court approval, or where the company applies to court for such approval. 
155See Boardman (2010) Act Juridica 315.  
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requirements are met.156 In terms of the section, a company may not proceed 
to implement a resolution to implement a scheme without the approval of a 
court if-  
 
“(a) the resolution was opposed by at least 15 percent of the voting rights that 
were exercised on that resolution and, within five business days after the vote, 
any person who voted against the resolution requires the company to seek 
court approval; or  
(b) the court, on an application within 10 business days after the vote by any 
person who voted against the resolution, grants that person leave, in terms of 
subsection (6), to apply to a court for a review of the transaction in accordance 
with subsection (7).”157 
 
The court may grant relief to the shareholders and set aside the resolution to 
approve the scheme where: 
 
“(a) the resolution is manifestly unfair to any class of holders of the company’s 
securities; or  
(b) the vote was materially tainted by conflict of interest, inadequate disclosure, 
failure to comply with the Act, the Memorandum of Incorporation or any 
applicable rules of the company, or other significant and material procedural 
irregularity.”158 
 
The additional protection for shareholders is the appraisals right in terms of 
section 164. This right is discussed below in paragraph 5 6 6. It appears that 
the legislature has achieved a balancing of interests for the parties involved in 
schemes of arrangements by introducing simplicity, efficiency and additional 
protection for shareholders.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
156Section 115 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
157Section 115(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
158Section 115 (7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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5 6 5  Section 48(8) (b) – Share repurchases 
 
In this paragraph, share repurchases are discussed only in so far as they are 
affected transactions and, accordingly, this part has a limited scope. The 
Companies Amendment Act of 2011, introduced share repurchases in section 
48(8)(b) into the Companies Act of 2008. The Companies Act of 1973, prior to 
its amendment, did not allow for general share repurchases mainly due to 
capital maintenance rules for the protection of creditors and shareholders.159 
An amendment to the Companies Act of 1973 introduced sections 85-90, which 
dealt with acquisition of shares. The sections provided for repurchase of shares 
subject to safeguards for creditors and shareholders.160 The articles of the 
company had to make provision for share repurchases before the company 
could proceed with a share repurchase.161 In addition, the company had to pass 
a special resolution. The resolution could authorise a specific or general share 
repurchase. A general resolution was only effective until the next general 
meeting of the company.162 Further, in doing a buy-back, the directors of the 
company had to comply with liquidity and solvency requirements.163 A company 
could not repurchase all its shares to the point where it no longer had issued 
shares.164 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 also allows for repurchase of shares subject to 
certain requirements including: (a) directors’ resolutions; (b) solvency and 
liquidity requirements under section 46 and; (c) compliance with sections 114 
and 115, as detailed underneath. It also attempts to ensure that all shares in 
the company will not be repurchased to the point where it will no longer have 
shares apart from shares held by a subsidiary or shares that are convertible or 
redeemable.165 However, there are clear differences between the Companies 
Act of 1973 and the Companies Act of 2008 on how share repurchases must 
be regulated. Section 48 of the Companies Act of 2008 emphasises that the 
                                            
159R Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim (Man Ed) Contemporary Company Law 294. 
160See the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
161See section 85(1) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
162See section 85(2) of the Companies of 1973. 
163Section 85(4) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
164See section 85(9) of the Companies Act of 1973. 
165Section 48(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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responsibility for repurchasing shares rests with the board. It must authorize a 
repurchase and such a repurchase must comply with the requirements for a 
distribution in section 46, which includes that it must reasonably appear that the 
company will afterwards remain solvent and liquid, and that the board must 
acknowledge that they have applied the solvency and liquidity test and that they 
have reasonably concluded that this test will be met.166 More importantly, 
section 48(8) does not distinguish between selective and general share 
repurchases and it does not generally require shareholders to approve these 
transactions. Furthermore, it was felt that this did not provide adequate 
protection to shareholders and section 48(8) was added by the Amendment Act 
3 of 2011. Approval by special resolution is now required for repurchases from 
directors, prescribed officers or parties related to them. Moreover, and most 
significant for this thesis, share repurchase of 5 percent or more of the shares 
of a company was made subject to the requirements of sections 114 and 115 
of the Act.167 Section 48(8) raises a number of debates as discussed 
underneath. 
 
The section appears to introduce another “affected transaction” or a 
"fundamental transaction” through a ‘back door’.168 The section seems to 
impose the requirements of affected transactions and fundamental transactions 
by subjecting share repurchases in terms of section 48(8)(b) to the 
requirements of sections 114 and 115 of the Companies Act of 2008. A section 
114 scheme of arrangement is listed under part A of chapter 5 as a fundamental 
transaction and section 115 deals with procedural requirements to approve 
fundamental transactions. It has been argued by some practitioners that all 
                                            
166Section 46(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
167See section 48(8)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
168Section 48 of the Companies Act of 2008 (relating to share repurchase of shares) provides 
that: ‘(8) A decision by the board of a company contemplated in subsection (2) (a (i.e. to 
repurchase the shares)—(a) must be approved by a special resolution of the shareholders of 
the company if any shares are to be acquired by the company from a director or prescribed 
officer of the company, or a person related to a director or prescribed officer of the company; 
and  
(b) is subject to the requirements of sections 114 and 115 if, considered alone, or together with 
other transactions in an integrated series of transactions, it involves the acquisition by the 
company of more than 5 percent of the issued shares of any particular class of the company’s 
shares.’ 
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share repurchases for more than five percent of the issued shares of a company 
must be undertaken in terms of a scheme of arrangement and section 115 of 
the Companies Act of 2008. Conversely, it has been asserted that share 
repurchases in terms of this section merely require parties to comply with the 
procedural requirements of section 115. According to this approach a 
repurchase does not become a scheme of arrangement.169 The section is not 
clear in this regard.170 It is pointed out that the reference to “subject to the 
requirements of sections 114 and 115” does not imply that the repurchase is a 
scheme of arrangement. Should that have been the intention of the legislature, 
the section would not have emphasised “the requirements.”171 Furthermore, 
common law rules provide that where a mandatory procedure has been 
prescribed in the Act, that procedure cannot be substituted by a scheme of 
arrangement.172 It is also pointed out that: 
 
“Section 48(8) of the Companies Act provides merely that a reacquisition of 
securities contemplated that section “is subject to the requirements of section 
114. It does not provide that the transaction will constitute (or must be carried 
out only by means of) a scheme of arrangement as contemplated in section 
114(1), not that it is deemed to constitute a scheme of arrangement.”173  
 
It is argued that section 48(8)(b) does not require share repurchases to be 
made by means of a scheme of arrangement, but parties may choose to use a 
scheme of arrangement to effect a share repurchase. Where this is done, the 
transaction will amount to an affected transaction. The Companies Act of 2008 
however, is not specific whether or not such a repurchase “…now becomes an 
arrangement as contemplated in section 114.”174 The legislature must make it 
clear that these transactions are not affected transactions. This is important 
particularly when one considers the numerous and cumbersome obligations 
                                            
169Latsky (2014) Stell LR 381. 
170Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 208(1). 
171208 (1). 
172208(1). 
173Latsky (2014) Stell LR 380. 
174Luiz (2012) PER/PELJ 108/638. 
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relating to the concept of an affected transaction.175 Yeats at al,176 indicates 
that the effect of section 48(8)(b) is that the acquisition is treated as a scheme 
of arrangement and must accordingly comply with sections 114 and 115.  
 
It may be asked whether it is necessary to import the requirements for a scheme 
of arrangement in respect of repurchases. It is submitted that the rationale for 
regulating such transactions is that by their nature, repurchases, like schemes 
of arrangement, have an expropriation effect and are potentially prejudicial to 
shareholders, even if the re-purchase is for a small percentage, such as five 
percent. Accordingly, it may be argued that shareholders need to be protected, 
and companies must comply with requirements for schemes of arrangements.  
 
However, where parties merely repurchase shares on a consensual basis, such 
protections may be unnecessary.177 Share repurchase may lead to unequal 
treatment of shareholders particularly where specified shareholders have their 
shares repurchased. Specified shareholders then have an undue preference to 
have their shares bought out at prices agreed with directors. In the case of 
specific repurchases it is possible that the repurchase may result in the wishes 
of the majority being forced on the minority. This abuse may be present 
particularly where the shares are tightly held and the market for them is less 
liquid. In this instance, the abuse will be that those shareholders who were not 
specifically approached to sell, will not have an opportunity to sell their shares 
elsewhere.178 It will be sensible that the repurchase must be subject to 
additional protections for the minority shareholders. However, it is different 
where a company generally offers to repurchase shares from all its 
shareholders. In this scenario, only shareholders who wish to participate in the 
repurchase program will have their shares bought back by the company. No 
shareholder is forced to resell.179  
                                            
175108/638. 
176Yeats JL, de la Harpe RA, Jooste RD, Stoop H, Cassim R, Seligmann J, Kent L, Bradstreet 
RS, Williams RC, Cassim MF, Swanepoel E, Cassim FHI and Jarvis KA (2018) Commentary 
on the Companies Act of 2008 2-506. 
177Latsky (2014) Stell LR 381. 
178Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 203. 
179See Latsky (2014) Stell LR 381. 
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Section 48(8) (b) is uncertain and lacks clarity.180 The section does offer 
protection to shareholders as it curbs abuse by directors.181 It appears that the 
protections to shareholders offered by section 48(8)(b) have been over-
shadowed by problematic formulation and inaccurate targeting of the situations 
where problems may arise. It is again suggested that the provision must be 
amended for clarity and certainty. 
 
5 6 6 An overview of additional requirements for fundamental 
transactions: section 115- Voting procedures and section 164- 
Appraisal Rights 
 
This part provides an additional overview of some of the requirements for 
fundamental transactions. Disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or 
undertaking of a company in terms of section 112,182 proposals for an 
amalgamation or a merger in terms of section 113 and schemes of arrangement 
in terms of section 114 of the Companies Act of 2008 are referred to as 
‘fundamental’ transactions.183 However, the term ‘fundamental transaction’ is 
not defined in the Act. Fundamental transactions contemplate major changes 
to the corporate substructure or essence of the business of the company 
proposing such a transaction. It is arguable that this is the reason why the 
legislature did not consider it necessary to define the term ‘fundamental 
transaction’: the term implies a major change to the shareholding in the 
company or the control over its assets. The requirements of section 115 of the 
Companies Act of 2008 must be met before fundamental transactions are 
implemented. Shareholder approval is necessary before the transaction may 
be implemented.184 The approval is by a special resolution of independent 
                                            
180 Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 203. 
181203. 
182Section 1 of the of the Companies Act of 2008 defines ‘All or the greater part of the assets 
or undertaking’ as meaning more than 50 percent of the company’s gross assets at fair market 
value, irrespective of its liabilities; or more than 50 percent of the company’s value of its entire 
undertaking, at fair market value. 
183See Part A of Chapter 5 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
184Section 115(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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shareholders.185 However, if shareholders holding 15 percent of the votes at a 
meeting convened to vote on a fundamental transaction voted against it, the 
company must obtain court approval before proceeding with the transaction.186 
The company may also decide not to proceed with the transaction.187 The 
requirement of a special resolution for fundamental transactions is there for 
good reason. As indicated earlier under paragraph 5 6 4 above, these 
transactions substantially affect the fundamental substructure of the company: 
additional protection for shareholders are required. For this reason, companies 
should not have authority to lower this requirement.188  
 
The additional requirements for fundamental transactions are similar but 
depend on the type of affected transaction. It is only fundamental transactions 
that are also affected transactions that are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Panel.189 All fundamental transactions that are affected transactions must 
comply with the requirement for obtaining an independent expert to advise the 
shareholders about the value of the shares they are selling. The requirements 
for an independent expert for affected transactions other than a scheme of 
arrangement are not incorporated in the Act, but are found under regulation 
90(1).190 The requirements will only be applicable where a fundamental 
transaction is also an affected transaction. However, in the case of a scheme 
of arrangement, the requirement to obtain an expert report is applicable 
irrespective of whether the scheme is an affected transaction or not.191 There 
may be an overlap in the application of the section 114(2) independent expert 
report for the scheme of arrangement and the expert report required by the 
regulations for affected transactions.192 In the case of the disposal of assets or 
undertaking of the company, the independent expert should provide a valuation 
                                            
185Section 115(4) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with section 115(4A) 
186Section 115(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
187Section 115(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
188It is notable that section 115 (2)(b), indicates that the approval may be by a higher threshold 
as provided in the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company, but the section is silent on a 
lower threshold.  
189Latsky (2014) Stell LR 363. 
190See Latsky (2014) Stell LR 370 at note 48. 
191Lasky (2014) Stell LR 369-370. 
192370. 
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of the undertaking or the assets being disposed of.193 Moreover, the overriding 
requirement appears to be that all shareholders are made aware of the 
protections offered to them in terms of section 115 and 164. The Companies 
Act of 2008 specifically requires that the independent expert report must include 
a copy of sections 115 and 164. This requirement is presumably intended to 
remind shareholders of their rights in terms of the Act.194 These requirements 
are additional to other disclosure requirements for affected transactions in 
terms of the Takeover Regulations.195 Further, the actions of directors 
undertaking the transactions are also subject to restrictions as discussed under 
paragraph 5 7 below. Regulation 89 provides for publication and delivery of 
notices to shareholders of companies involved in fundamental transactions.  
 
The appraisal right is made applicable to all fundamental transactions.196 The 
appraisal right in section 164 originated in the US.197 It is aimed at assisting 
shareholders to exit a company whose risks may have changed and therefore 
no longer wish to stay invested in the company. It also serves to balance any 
bad business decisions that directors may make.198 The appraisal remedy 
allows shareholders an opportunity to exit their company investment in return 
for payment in cash, but not to defeat a takeover or a merger. The section does 
not define ‘fair value’ or set out how ‘fair value’ must be determined. However, 
it indicates that the ‘fair value’ in respect of any shares must be determined as 
at the date on which, and time immediately before the company adopted the 
resolution that gave rise to a shareholder’s right under the section.199 Because 
the dissenters did not approve the event, any negative or positive effect on the 
value of their shares, should be excluded from calculating ‘fair value’.200 
Increases or decreases are disregarded. This principle has been carried from 
                                            
193Section 114(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 90. 
194Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and Offers” in Contemporary 
Company Law 663. 
195Regulations 102 and 106 contain detailed disclosure requirements and the timelines within 
which steps must be undertaken. The assumption is that timely disclosures will assist 
shareholders in making informed decisions. 
196Section 164 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
197Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 157. 
198Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 158. 
199Section 164(16) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
200See Delport Henocshberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 582. 
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Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd,201 which is regarded a seminal 
case.202  
 
The introduction of the appraisal right has been generally welcomed.203 
However, criticism has been levelled against a number of aspects of this new 
right. The efficacy of the appraisal right has been questioned due to its 
procedural flaws.204 The appraisal right as set out in the Companies Bill was 
criticised for being too complex, technical and rigid for shareholders. It is 
associated with delays and prohibitive costs.205 The appraisal right as 
contained in the Companies Bill remained substantially the same as in section 
164 of the Companies Act of 2008. Therefore, these comments are still 
applicable. 206 Davids et al207 share the view expressed by Cassim that the 
appraisal remedy may be costly to shareholders. They hold that this may 
discourage small shareholders with limited funding to exercise this right. An 
observation about this section is that it is one of the longest sections in the 
Companies Act of 2008, with subsections starting from 1 to 21. It is submitted 
that the section is complex and shareholders may find it difficult to exercise this 
right without requiring some expert advice.  
 
The appraisal right as a remedy has not been very successful in those countries 
that have introduced it.208 Many years before the appraisal right was 
implemented in SA, some of its critics had already indicated that:  
 
                                            
2011969(3) SA 629(A). In this case, the court dealt with a takeover scheme in terms of section 
103ter of the Companies Act 46 of 1926, (currently, expropriation section 124 of the Companies 
Act), and held that the fair value should be considered without considering profit potential in 
future after the takeover, or any special value to the offeror, but the company’s own profit 
potential as at the date of the takeover bid.  
202See M Seligson “Dissenting Minority Shareholders’ Appraisal Rights” (2016) 7:2 Business 
and Tax & Company Law Quarterly9. 
203Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 157; and also, Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338.  
204Cassim (2008) SA Merc LJ 176. 
205Cassim (2008) Merc LJ 164; and Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers 
and Offers” in Contemporary Company Law.  
206Cassim (2008) Merc LJ 164. See also Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, 
Takeovers and Offers” in Contemporary Company Law 807.  
207Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338.  
208Cassim (2008) Merc LJ 157-168. 
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“Altogether, the dissenter's appraisal statutes do not seem to work out very well 
in their practical administration. At best they are of modest and infrequent help 
to the dissenting shareholder, and they can be a distinct threat to others who 
have a stake in the enterprise.”209 
 
The appraisal right has also been criticised as a possible drain on a company's 
liquidity that may deter value-enhancing transactions. In addition, it is pointed 
out that it has limited power to keep managers' breaches of fiduciary duties in 
check, “because only large minority shareholders are likely to incur the legal 
expense required to exercise appraisal rights.” 210 Of relevance to SA as an 
emerging market, the critics further hold that: 
 
“The appraisal remedy will surely work even worse in emerging markets than 
it does in developed markets. Yet there is no obvious alternative. Policing 
fairness through judicial or regulatory approval of major transactions is neither 
practicable nor desirable. Hence, one can only try to ameliorate the worst 
problems associated with appraisal rights. For example, a shareholder must 
actively oppose a transaction to qualify for appraisal rights. The shareholder 
must take a number of steps. In emerging markets, this condition weakens an 
already weak right. Given poor mail systems, shareholders may not learn of a 
transaction in time to vote against it or may find that their votes did not reach 
the company in time or were conveniently lost.”211  
 
Another criticism is that a shareholder seeking appraisal must go to court (an 
expensive process), without knowing in advance what the appraised value 
might be.212 In that situation, the shareholders are at risk as they may not have 
all their expenses covered as they may receive a lower value than anticipated.  
 
Companies tend to be wary of this right and it appears that South African 
practitioners have sought ways to avoid the application of this right. A better 
                                            
209B Manning “Shareholder’s Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker” (1962) 72 The Yale Law 
Journal 238. 
210Black and Kraakman “A Self –Enforcing Model of Corporate Law” (1996) 109:19 Harvard 
Law Review 1056. 1056. 
2111056. 
2121056. 
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balance needs to be struck between protecting minority shareholders and 
facilitating economically advantageous transactions. Minority shareholders 
should not be allowed to hold up transactions against the will of the majority of 
shareholders who voted in favour the transaction.213 Practitioners advise 
companies to introduce certain terms and conditions in takeover and merger 
documents, which, presumably, are aimed at protecting the interests of the 
offeror and avoid paying a higher price where shareholders exercise this right. 
These terms include a suspensive condition that should a certain percentage 
of shareholders (commonly five percent), exercise their appraisal rights and 
follow the appraisal right procedure to finality, the offeror reserves the right to 
terminate the takeover or merger transaction.214 However, it is asserted that 
such conditions “neutralises the threat of uncertainty created by section 164 in 
relation to potential cash demands made by the shareholders in a target 
company.”215  
 
It is also asserted that in terms of section 6 of the Companies Act of 2008, 
dealing with anti-avoidance, a court and, in the case of a listed company, an 
exchange, has power to declare the particular condition or the entire offer 
agreement void. 216 Nevertheless, the issue will not be taken further here as it 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Researchers have pointed out the 
complexity of shareholders exercising appraisal rights as discussed. An 
interpretation and application by a court will assist shareholders in exercising 
the right.  
 
In a recent matter, Cilliers v La Concorde Holdings Limited (Cilliers case),217 a 
question of law was referred to the court in terms of Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) of the 
                                            
213Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338.  
214See Jinchuan Group Limited and Metorex Limited Circular to shareholder dated 2 August 
2011 among other transactions.  
215J Yeats The Effective and Proper Exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South African 
Companies Act, 2008:  Developing a strategic approach through a study of comparable 
foreign law Doctor of Philosophy Thesis University of Cape Town (2015) 209.  
216See Yeats The Effective and Proper Exercise of Appraisal Rights under the South African 
Companies Act, 2008: 209-214.  
217(23029/2016) [2018] ZAWCHC 68. 
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Uniform Rules of Court.218 The court was required to determine whether or not 
shareholder appraisal rights were established in favour of a dissenting minority 
shareholder of a holding company, under section 164 of the Companies Act of 
2008, where the holding company’s subsidiary disposes of all or the greater 
part of its assets or undertaking, in circumstances where, having regard to the 
consolidated financial statements of the holding company, the disposal by the 
subsidiary constituted a disposal of all or the greater part of the assets or 
undertaking of the holding company referred to in section 115(2)(b) of the Act. 
 
The court pointed out that section 164 created a right for a shareholder to exit 
the company, subject to compliance with certain requirements. The question is 
whether this appraisal right extends to the dissenting minority shareholders in 
the holding company. The court considered policy considerations for 
introducing the Act, including: (a) company law should provide remedies for 
investors;219(b) it is an express policy objective to give meaning form and 
content to exit and appraisal rights and to provide smaller investors with the 
ability to make informed choices;220 (c) the appraisal rights do not dilute or 
negate power of the majority, but seek to provide minority shareholders with 
equitable protection and fairness; 221 (d) the court concluded that a dissenting 
minority shareholder in the holding company is entitled to enjoy shareholder 
protection in the form of appraisal rights in terms of section 164 of the Act, 
where the disposal by the subsidiary constitutes a disposal of all or the greater 
part of the assets or undertaking of the holding company referred to in section 
115(2)(b) of the Act.222 The court further pointed out that section 115(8)223 of 
the Act extends the category of shareholders to all other shareholders who have 
voting rights, that are not necessarily envisaged by section 164. Therefore, all 
                                            
218Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and Local 
Divisions of the High Court of South Africa published under Government Notice R48 of 12 
January 1965 as amended. 
219Cilliers case at paragraph 42. 
220Para 43. 
221Para 44. 
222Para 44. 
223Section 115(8) of the Companies Act of 2008 provides as follows: “The holder of any voting 
rights in a company is entitled to seek relief in terms of section 164 if that person—(a) notified 
the company in advance of the intention to oppose a special resolution contemplated in this 
section; and (b) was present at the meeting and voted against that special resolution.” 
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shareholders with voting rights, provided they complied with the relevant 
requirements, are entitled to seek appraisal rights in terms of section 164.224 
Despite criticisms against the appraisal right section, it remains one of the most 
important sources of protection for minorities. It is therefore necessary that the 
legislature simplify section 164 procedures by an amendment.225 
 
5 6 7 Section 122 – The acquisition or announced intention to acquire 
beneficial interests in voting securities 
 
The fourth affected transaction is defined as the acquisition or intention to 
acquire beneficial voting securities in terms of section 122(1). Section 122 is 
headed “Required disclosures concerning certain transaction”. The section 
amongst other things requires that any party directly or indirectly acquiring or 
disposing of beneficial securities amounting to any multiple of 5 percent, 15 
percent and so on, must notify the regulated company in the prescribed 
manner. The regulation provides prescribed forms for filing with the Panel by 
both the acquirer and the seller. The company receiving the notification must 
then notify its shareholders by means of an announcement and file a copy with 
the Panel. Regulation 82(2) provides for acquisition and disposals of securities 
in terms of section 122(1). The regulation states that acquisitions in terms of 
section 122(1) does not create any obligations for acquirers until an offer is 
made for all securities. The regulation merely confirms what is expected of 
acquirers when they make an offer to all shareholders and is in line with the 
definition of affected transaction in 117(1)(c). It is suggested that regulation 
82(1) intends to clarify the obligations of certain parties and also the meaning 
of beneficial holders as contemplated in section 122(1). These include 
nominees or asset managers who have powers to dispose or vote on securities 
they hold. 
 
The inclusion of acquisition of securities in terms of section 122 as affected 
transactions has been criticised. A closer consideration of the acquisitions in 
                                            
224Cilliers case at para. 49. 
225See also the observations by Cassim & Yeats “Fundamental Transactions, Takeovers and 
Offer” in Contemporary Law 807, and Davids et al (2010) Act Juridica 337-338.  
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terms of section 122 indicates that such acquisitions should not have been 
classified as ‘affected transactions’ but rather as disclosures. There are a 
number of problems in defining the transactions as “affected transactions”. 
Section 122 transactions have two effects, as disclosures and affected 
transactions.226 The classification of these acquisitions as affected transactions 
causes confusion and it imposes unnecessary and incongruous obligations on 
companies. It means that transactions that meet the requirements of section 
122 will also have to meet the general requirements for affected transactions 
as set out in section 121.  
 
Principally, this means that the transaction must be reported and be approved 
by the Panel. However, section 122 only concerns limited transactions 
(acquisitions in multiples of 5 percent) and limited obligations (to disclose and 
notify the acquisitions of the relevant percentages to the regulated company). 
There is no need for this type of wide-ranging Panel intervention in these limited 
circumstances. All other affected transactions or offers create obligations that 
various parties have to undertake such as: disclosure of certain information and 
take additional steps including, posting a detailed circular to shareholders; 
voting by shareholders; or acceptance or rejection of offers in other instances. 
Broader supervision by the Panel in these circumstances appear to be more 
appropriate.  
 
Another problem is that the inclusion of the disclosure requirements as an 
affected transaction can be interpreted to mean that these transactions are 
‘partial offers’ or ‘offers’, as defined in the Act.227 The interpretation that the 
section requires an offer to be made, can have unintended consequences. For 
instance, an interpretation that an acquisition of five percent of the shares is an 
affected transaction, would also require that the acquirer must make a partial 
offer to acquire five percent of the issued shares from each shareholder.228 
                                            
226Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 429. 
227N Boardman “A critical analysis of the new South African takeover laws as proposed under 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 329. 
228See section 125 of the Companies Act of 2008.This section deals with partial offers and 
comparable offer. It states that parties making such an offer must acquire on pro-rata basis 
from each shareholder. 
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Boardman229 points out that this could lead to absurdity and such an 
interpretation is unworkable. The negative practical consequences could have 
been avoided if the stipulation had been properly identified as a mere disclosure 
requirement, instead of being within the definition of an affected transaction.230  
 
The Panel has issued a Guideline 4/2011 on section 122(1). The guideline 
seeks to exempt companies undertaking transactions in terms of the section 
from obtaining a compliance certificate prior to implementing those transactions 
in terms of section 119(6), the general exemption section. As the Guideline 
indicates, it is acknowledged that it is not practical for companies to obtain the 
compliance certificate required by section 121(b)(i) prior to implementing the 
transactions. This purported exemption is arguably ultra vires.231 In other 
respects, this section is in line with the requirements set in other countries 
where dealings in shares are disclosed. In the UK stricter threshold are imposed 
and notification to the authorities is also required.232 
 
In conclusion, there are significant problems with certain aspects of the 
Companies Act of 2008, and this needs to be removed by amendment.233 This 
section is just one of several provisions that needs attention.  
 
5 6 8 The announced intention to acquire a beneficial interest in the remaining 
voting securities  
 
The fifth affected transaction or offer is the announced intention to acquire a 
beneficial interest in the remaining voting securities of a regulated company not 
already held by a person or persons acting in concert in terms of section 
117(1)(c)(v). The affected transaction under this provision is intended to apply 
to those situations where the parties make an offer for the securities of a 
company under circumstances where they own a certain percentage of the 
                                            
229Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 329.  
230Sutherland (2012) Stell LR 173. 
231Latsky (2014 Stell LR 362 at footnote 3. 
232See UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) rules. In terms of the rule’s investors are obliged 
to report to the company and to the FSA share dealing of 3 percent or every 1 percent complete 
thereafter in line with the EU Transparency Directives.  
233Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 330. 
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shares of the company, and they wish to acquire the entire 100 percent of the 
securities of the company. The section is aimed at protecting minority 
shareholders in a company where a shareholder makes an offer to the 
remaining shareholders in the company for all their shares. The offeror is 
obliged to comply with all the reporting requirements of the Takeover 
Provisions. The shareholders are protected in that they are not subject to any 
time pressures or forced to accept an offer that does not have clear terms and 
conditions.234 The application of the section is not new as it was also applicable 
in terms of the SRP Code published in terms of the Companies Act of 1973.235 
The section may overlap with the mandatory offer in section 123 of the Act as 
discussed in the following paragraph below. 
 
5 6 9 Section 123 -The mandatory offer requirement  
 
5 6 9 1 Introduction 
 
The mandatory offer requirement in terms of section 123 is listed as an affected 
transaction in terms of section 117(1)(c).236 The mandatory offer requirement is 
the main focus of this dissertation. Accordingly, a detailed analysis of its 
application is undertaken in this part. The rationale for introducing the 
mandatory offer in South Africa is not easily discernible from research. 
Research on the mandatory offer provisions in South Africa is limited. Luiz, the 
leading scholar in this area, indicates that there is minimal literature specifically 
addressing mandatory offers in the context of South Africa. 237 At most it may 
be stated that the mandatory offer in South African law was initially based on 
the UK City Code.238 It appears that the mandatory offer is one of the company 
law rules imported into South Africa to protect investors. The rationale for the 
                                            
234See S Luiz “Protection of holders of securities in the offeree regulated company during 
affected transactions: general offers and schemes of arrangements” (2014) 26 Merc LJ. 570. 
235See definition of “affected transactions” in the SRP Code.  
236See the definition of affected transactions in paragraph 1 8 above.  
237Luiz An evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers LLD Thesis, Unisa. 727.  
238S Luiz & K van der Linde “The mandatory offer obligation and intermediaries” (2011) TSAR 
1. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
199 
 
application of the mandatory offer appears to be based on an incorrect 
application of the principles of the Perlman case relating to the sharing of a 
premium. It is asserted that the principles laid down in that case were 
specifically based on the unique facts of that case.239 The history of the 
mandatory offer and its criticism is explored in detail below. 
 
5 6 9 2 Development of the mandatory offer requirement  
 
The Companies Act 46 of 1926 had the takeover offer and the scheme of 
arrangement procedure as methods of achieving takeovers.240 Prior to the 
promulgation of section 103ter of the Companies Act of 1926, there was no 
statutory regulation specifically dedicated to takeovers and mergers in South 
Africa. This provision allowed squeeze outs where the offeror had obtained 90 
percent acceptances from shareholders.241 Accordingly, one of the first 
methods used for a takeover was a general offer, according to which the 
offering party could enforce compulsory acquisition after reaching 90 percent 
acceptance. The offer and acceptance methods were governed by common-
law contract.242 However, the scheme of arrangement was also used to 
facilitate takeovers. Each method had a different effect on protection of 
shareholders. First the protections are dissimilar and the choice of the method 
is often decided by the offeror, who will inevitably choose the method best 
suited for his interest.243   
 
The scheme of arrangement became the preferred method for a takeover for a 
number of reasons. These include, the smaller majority required to achieve a 
complete takeover as opposed to the general offer, the shorter period required 
to implement the scheme and the certainty of the implementation. At the 
                                            
239See chapter 2 and the detailed discussions on the equal opportunity rule. In addition, see 
Katz (1997) Journal for Juridical Science 39 where he criticize, the application of the Perlman 
case as a basis for the mandatory offer. 
240Luiz (1997) SA Merc LJ 242. 
241242. 
242SWL De Villiers “Takeovers Under Sections 311 to 321 of the Companies Act 1973” (1973) 
SALJ 351. 
243IH Macgregor “Takeovers Revisited” (1978) 95 S African LJ 330. 
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meeting, the offeror will know whether shareholders vote in favour of the 
scheme or not, thus avoiding a long period as in the case of the general offer.244 
Unlike the general offer, the scheme results in complete takeover in one 
procedure and avoids uncertainties of waiting for shareholder acceptance of 
the offer. 
  
The Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act under the chairmanship of 
Mr Justice Van Wyk de Vries (Van Wyk de Vries Commission), whose report 
culminated in the Companies Act of 1973, was already concerned about the 
potential abuse that could occur where takeovers were effected by schemes of 
arrangements.245 The important concern was whether the scheme procedure 
was being misused to avoid the take-over offer in terms of section 103ter of the 
Companies Act of 1926, the predecessor to sec 321 of 1973.246 The scheme of 
arrangement had been introduced as a takeover method in the late 1960s in In 
re National Bank Ltd247, an English court decision. The court sanctioned a 
scheme involving an outsider acquiring all the issued shares of a company. The 
scheme of arrangement contained in section 103ter of the Companies Act of 
1926 was then used as a method to achieve takeovers in South Africa. The 
offeror could avoid the compulsory acquisition procedure by using the scheme 
of arrangement.248 The Commission concluded that the fact that both the 
scheme of arrangement and the compulsory takeover offer could achieve the 
same commercial result was coincidental. It did not affect the legal principles 
involved. 249 The Van Wyk de Vries Commission introduced a number of 
changes to the takeover regulations. This commission considered regulation of 
takeovers for the first time in their Supplementary Report of 1972.250 The 
changes included regulation of compromises, arrangements and takeovers.251 
The Commission also broadly considered methods of takeovers in the country, 
                                            
244De Villiers (1973) S African L.J 350-352. 
245See Chapter XXIV of the Supplementary Report (RP 31/1972). (Commission Report). 
246See Luiz (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 443. 
247[1966] 1 All ER 1006(ChD). 
248Luiz “Some comments on the Application of the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers” (1997) 9 SA Merc LJ 240. 
249241. 
250De Villiers (1973) SALJ 350. 
251See Luiz (1997) SA Merc LJ 241. 
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principles underlying takeovers and the role of the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange in supervising takeovers.252 
 
The first statutory provisions regulating takeover schemes were sections 314 
to 320 of the Companies Act of 1973. Compulsory acquisitions were included 
in section 321, while compromises and arrangements were incorporated in 
sections 311-313.253 An offeror could achieve a takeover of a company by using 
the process in sections 314-320.254 The takeover process could be completed 
by the compulsory acquisition of the shares of shareholders who did not accept 
the initial offer by using section 321.255 Various methods of achieving a takeover 
were also used, including reductions of share capital subject to confirmation by 
court. The end result would be that the offeror would hold all the shares of the 
offeree company having cancelled some of the shares.256 The statutory 
takeover offer was aimed at protecting individual shareholders when a change 
of control had occurred. The important aspect was the consideration to be 
offered. Shareholders were to be protected by being offered a fair price for their 
shares. It was felt that there should be fair dealing and protection from prejudice 
during the course of a takeover bid. Offerors had to provide shareholders with 
reliable information and sufficient time to consider such information. The 
Commission considered General Principle 3 of the City Code, which states that 
shareholders must be given sufficient information about an offer to enable them 
to make an informed decision in sufficient time. The obligation to provide the 
information is placed on directors. Directors are required to provide an honest 
and disinterested opinion about the merits and fairness of the offer 
consideration. Shareholders had to be able to rely on the information in the 
takeover offer statements.257  
 
During the deliberations, the Commission considered it in the public interest 
that there was a statutory provision dealing with takeovers. The Commission 
                                            
252See Chapter XXIV of the Supplementary Report (RP 31/1972). (Commission Report). 
253See De Villiers (1973) S African L.J 350-352 See also discussions by Luiz (1997) SA Merc 
LJ.240 -243. 
254Luiz (1997) SA Merc LJ.241. 
255241. 
256242. 
257De Villiers (1973) S African L.J 350-354. 
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also accepted that it was not possible to make rules for every situation that may 
occur during a takeover or a merger. The Commission favoured principle-based 
regulation. Therefore, it was believed that general principles had to be laid down 
for regulation of takeovers and mergers and that they had to be enforced by the 
JSE. In making recommendations for the regulations, there were also some 
concerns about including the monitoring and enforcement of a complex piece 
of legislation.258  
 
The dearth of research on mandatory offers makes it difficult to ascertain the 
process leading to the adoption of the mandatory offer requirement. However, 
there is sufficient evidence to assume that the Commission‘s recommendations 
led to the introduction of the mandatory offer. The earlier recommendations 
from the Committee had already introduced some of the general principles of 
the UK City Code into the takeover offer procedure. 259 Even though the 
Committee considered some of the principles of the UK City Code for the 
takeover offer, it did not recommend the mandatory offer requirement at that 
stage. It is notable that equality of treatment of all shareholders was required 
for partial offers.260 The effect of this was that the offeror would have to acquire 
a proportional number of shares from each shareholder to ensure equal 
treatment. It appears that this was the early stage of the introduction of the 
mandatory offer.  
 
The mandatory offer in its more comprehensive form was introduced in South 
African company law in 1991 by means of chapter XVA of the Companies Act 
of 1973. Chapter XVA introduced the SRP Code as regulations to deal with 
takeovers and mergers. The chapter brought about major changes to the 
regulation of takeovers and mergers under the title “Regulation of Securities”.261   
 
 
                                            
258See Commission Report 31/1972 in paragraph 73.07. There is a suggestion that it may be 
difficult to police complicated takeover rules.  
259See discussions by De Villiers (1973) S African LJ 364 above, on general principles 3 and 4 
of the UK City Code. 
260See De Villiers (1973) S African L.J 366. 
261Luiz (1997) SA Merc LJ 242. 
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5 6 9 3 The mandatory offer requirement critiqued 
 
The mandatory offer has been defined in paragraph 1 1 of the introduction 
above. The main thrust of the mandatory offer requirement is that the relevant 
person, usually a new acquirer, or acquirers, must cross the threshold of 35 
percent of the voting securities of a regulated company through the acquisition 
transaction. The acquisition of more than 35 percent of the voting rights 
following an acquisition of the voting securities in a regulated company is 
regarded as a change of control for the purposes of section 123 of the 
Companies Act of 2008. This is not the same notion of control as is mentioned 
in section 2 of the Companies Act of 2008. The concept ‘control’ 262 as used in 
section 2 of the Companies Act of 2008 is related to de facto control through a 
shareholding of more than 50 percent, while the control relating to a mandatory 
offer refers to control of more than 35 percent of the voting rights of a regulated 
company as referred to under section 123, dealing with the mandatory offer 
requirements.263 Section 123(5) refers to this shareholding as the “specified 
percentage” and set the threshold creating the mandatory offer. Luiz indicates 
that the definition of ‘control’ introduces confusion into the Takeover 
Provisions.264 Moreover, the indiscriminate usage of the words “general voting 
rights”, “voting securities” and “voting rights” is confusing due to the differences 
in their meanings and thoughtless use by the drafters of the Act.265  
 
The architecture of the current South African mandatory offer differs 
substantially from the equivalent in the UK and in the Companies Act of 1973.266 
The Companies Act of 2008 focuses on specific types of transactions and 
classifies them as ‘affected transactions’.267 The transactions do not have to 
                                            
262See definition of control in Chapter 1 of this dissertation as extracted from the of the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
263See 123 (5) of the of the Companies Act of 2008 which provides that “For the purposes 
contemplated in this section, the Minister, on the advice of the Panel, may prescribe a 
percentage of not more than 35 - percent of the voting securities of a company”. See also the 
definition of control in Chapter 5 of the Takeover Regulations. 
264See Luiz (2012) PER/PELJ 102/638. 
265Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 431. 
266See Rule 9 of the UK City Code and also discussions by Luiz & van der Linde (2011) TSAR 
125. The UK rule is discussed in chapter 3 above. 
267Luiz (2012) PER/PELJ 103/683. 
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result in changes or consolidation of control.268 The mandatory offer in terms 
section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008 is listed as one of the affected 
transactions.269 The Companies Act of 1973 required that only a transaction 
that led to acquisition or consolidation of control, as defined, is an affected 
transaction.270  
Commenting on the earlier SRP Code, Luiz and Van der Linde271 point out that  
 
“The obligation to make a mandatory offer is made dependent on an arbitrary 
level of ‘control’, such as 30 percent or 35 percent, rather than on actual control. 
The ability to exercise or direct the exercise of voting rights is decisive for the 
South African definition of an acquisition of control, but not for a consolidation 
of control.”  
 
The mandatory offer has been justified in a number of ways, including that the 
minority should not be forced to remain in the company where there has been 
a change of control and a premium that has been paid to acquire control should 
be shared equally. The actual trigger of the obligation is not related to whether 
a premium is paid or not.272 The initiator is the acquisition of the specific 
percentage threshold of beneficial interest in voting rights. It is not a specific 
requirement that a change of control has actually occurred or that a control 
premium has been paid.273 The problem relating to payment of premium is 
certainly not easy to resolve. Legislation has extended the scope of the rule 
beyond its original purpose.274 Based on this, Luiz275 indicates that: 
 
“[A]n acquisition by a company of its own securities can even trigger a 
mandatory offer, without evidence of either a change of control or the payment 
of a premium.”276 
                                            
268103/683. 
269103/683. 
270103/683. 
271Luiz & van der Linde (2011) TSAR 127. 
272Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 569. 
273E Wymeersch "The Takeover Bid Directive, Light and Darkness” (2008) Financial Law 
Institute, Ghent University, Working Paper Series WP 2008–01 5–6, Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086987> (Accessed on 30-9-2013). 
2745. 
275Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 569. 
276569. 
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The rule is triggered at different thresholds among EU countries. The rule raises 
considerable doubt with respect to its justification, its scope, rules of application 
and its wider externalities.277 Many years into its implementation in EU 
countries, the arguments remain valid. In actual practice and in some respects, 
countries have followed different paths.278 The mandatory offer rule appears 
similar but has quite different characteristics.279 The mandatory offer is required 
even in cases where the controlling shareholder bought the shares on the 
market or from a number of shareholders who do not wish to control. In this 
scenario, control is not acquired but is ‘created’. In these cases, no premium is 
paid, but the controlling shareholder is obliged to make an offer for all shares, 
although there is no transfer of a control premium.280 Commenting on the 
projected revision of the Takeover Directive, Wymeersch suggests that the 
Takeover Directive should not only focus on a single factor such as the control 
premium, but should strike a balance “between flexibility, including 
contestability and stability and long term value creation, including in terms of 
human capital”.281 This suggests that takeover provisions should also allow for 
bidders to compete with each other among other considerations.  
 
The SRP considered reasons for the application of the mandatory offer, over a 
number of months during 1996.282 Some members asserted that the mandatory 
offer had the potential to inhibit good corporate governance and the reasons for 
its retention had to be re-examined. At a meeting of the SRP it was indicated 
that:  
 
“Members debated the philosophies of the premium attaching to control, 
minority protection from changes in management control and the equal 
                                            
277E Wymeersch “A New Look at the Debate About the Takeover Directive” (2012) Ghent 
University, Financial Law Institute Working Paper No 2012-05.3. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1988927.(Accessed 20 -5- 2018). 
2784.  
2793.  
2804. 
2813. 
282Minutes of the SRP held on 28 May 1996 and 4 December 1996. 
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opportunity and concluded that all the philosophies supporting the mandatory 
offer were flawed.”283 
 
Members also debated the introduction of the mandatory offer bid in the 
European Union, and the minutes indicate that: 
 
“The Panel cannot be out of line with international trends and it was agreed that 
the existing concept of the mandatory offers be retained in the Panel’s 
Rules.”284  
 
The Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law (SAC) during 1997 
considered the arguments for and against the mandatory offer. The SAC then 
decided to retain the mandatory offer as part of SA company law. The 
discussions of the SAC and retention of the mandatory offer was confirmed by 
the SRP at its meeting held during March 1997.285 The SRP indicated that in 
view of the fact that the SAC has decided to keep the mandatory offer, the SRP 
also “…decided that the status quo would remain.”286 The SRP in two meetings 
favoured the retention of the mandatory offer although it was acknowledged 
that the mandatory offer had certain undesirable characteristics.  
 
In deciding to retain the mandatory offer requirement, the SAC stated that the 
mandatory offer is... “generally seen as a measure to protect the minority 
shareholders.”287 The SAC offered the following justification to retain the 
mandatory offer: (a) shareholders should not be forced to remain minority 
shareholders without the option to sell their shares; (b) shareholders who are 
already minorities under a controller should not be forced to remain minorities 
under a new controller; and (c) ‘looters’, whose only aim is to gain control of the 
company and then sell its assets may be discouraged by the high cost of the 
                                            
283Minutes of the SRP held on 4 December 1996. 2 
284Minutes of the SRP held on 4 December 1996. 2 
285Minutes of the SRP held on 4 March 1997. At this meeting, members of the SRP discussed 
the issue at length and agreed that the mandatory offers should be retained. Members also 
agreed to prepare a paper setting out the reason for retaining the rule. 
286Minutes of the SRP held on 4 March 1997. 
287M Larkin & J Boltar (1997) Annual Surv S African L  430. 
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takeover.288 The obligation to make a mandatory offer increases the cost of a 
takeover substantially. The offeror must ensure that it has sufficient financial 
resources to buy out all the accepting shareholders. The Companies Act of 
2008 seems to emphasise this requirement where it provides that parties must 
be “ready, able and willing” to implement the transaction.289 While the SAC 
acknowledged the good intentions of the mandatory offer requirement, it also 
noted that there are convincing arguments against its application.290 Some of 
the arguments mentioned by the SAC include: (a) the protection offered by the 
mandatory offer is not absolute as the controlling shareholder could sell the 
shares to avoid application of the then SRP Code and the mandatory offer 
requirement would not be applicable;291 (b) the mandatory offer makes 
financing of a takeover offer extremely expensive; (c) the high costs of 
takeovers hampers the move toward black empowerment; (d) the current 
holders of economic power are in a position to further entrench their powers as 
only they, have financial resources to make a mandatory offer; and (e) ‘looters’ 
of companies will not necessarily be discouraged, as they will determine the 
price on the inherent value of the offeree company such that the mandatory 
offer price is not higher than the value of the offeree company. Under this 
circumstance, the takeover is still viable and they will still benefit.292 
Easterbrook and Fischel293 reject the idea of a raid by an offeror having paid a 
premium to a majority shareholder and then subsequently ‘looting’ the company 
to the detriment of the minority shareholders. They point out that it is unlikely 
that an offeror will buy a substantial shareholding with a motive to ‘loot’ the 
acquired company without generating new value in the company.  
 
                                            
288431. 
289See section 119 (2) (a) of the of the Companies Act of 2008. 
290Larkin & Boltar (1997) Annual Survey Company Law  431. 
291The sale referred to in the SAC minutes probably refers to a sale before the control threshold 
is triggered or an exemption has been granted. Rule 8.7 of the SRP Code allowed a transfer of 
shares from one party to another without triggering a mandatory offer where approval of 
independent votes was obtained. 
292See Larkin & Boltar (1997) Annual Survey Company Law  431.  
293FH Easterbrook & D Fischel “The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to 
a Tender Offer” (1981) 94: 6 Harvard Law Review 1185. 
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A threat of a takeover might encourage good performance by managers.294 
Skilled and competent managers should manage companies. Mandatory offers 
however, could prevent this change. The mandatory offer also does not protect 
minority shareholders in all respects, because the requirement to make an offer 
on the same or equal consideration will encourage an offeror to reduce the offer 
price so that he is able to pay for the shares of all shareholders.295 Only a full-
blown competing bid guarantees that the best price may be obtained.296 There 
is no obvious answer to the difficulties raised by the mandatory offer.297 This is 
due to the fact that both its abolishment or retention has pitfalls. Abolishing the 
mandatory offer may make changes of control cheaper and easier. However, it 
may also have a negative effect of undermining the equality of treatment rule. 
In this dissertation, it is argued that the benefits of retaining the mandatory offer 
rule as it currently stands are less than the harms caused by it.   
 
It is generally accepted that the mandatory offer requirement impedes BBBEE 
transactions due to costs.298 It has been asked whether BBBEE should serve 
as a basis for abandoning the mandatory offer.299 It has been submitted that 
even though BBBEE may be a laudable social and political goal, it should not 
be accommodated by interfering with the mandatory offer in order to reduce 
costs. BBBEE should be pursued by a cohesive economic strategy.300 This 
dissertation argues that the mandatory offer requirement not only interferes with 
BBBEE policies, but is also a deterrent to good corporate governance as it 
prevents removal of inefficient managers by means of a change of control. This 
concern has been acknowledged by members of the SRP, as discussed above 
in this paragraph. In addition, the benefits of the mandatory offer cannot be 
determined with any degree of certainty, as indicated in this chapter and 
chapter 3, relating to the mandatory offer in the UK in terms of rule 9 of the City 
                                            
294Larkin & Boltar (1997) Annual Survey Company Law  431-432. 
295Luiz An evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers 736. 
296736. 
297Luiz An evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers 737. 
298735. 
299737. 
300738. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
209 
 
Code. The SAC indicated that the arguments raised against the mandatory 
offer are also “very persuasive.”301 In addition, the offeror can avoid some of 
the rationales justifying the application of the mandatory offer requirement. 
 
Corporate governance measures, such as, the mandatory offer applied 
successfully in developed countries are not necessarily a solution for 
developing countries, as pointed out by Armour et al.302 In Chapter 3, relating 
to the UK mandatory offer it is generally accepted that the rule forms a 
cornerstone of protection of shareholders and operates well in the country. 
However, it has also been contended that its application in other EU countries 
has not been readily accepted. The success of the rule may be due to a number 
of reasons, such as: the type and size of capital markets; the ability to raise 
capital in those countries’ capital markets; the size of the economies; the types 
and sizes of companies and shareholding structures, and social and economic 
developmental needs of those countries. The context within which laws are 
developed is very important. This is also important for developing countries that 
may be eager to adopt a particular set of rules with the hope that by adopting 
the best international practice, it would encourage inward investments. Capital 
market reaction to transplanted legislation differs from one country to 
another.303  
 
5 6 9 4 Case law dealing with mandatory offers   
 
There are only a few cases in South Africa that deal with affected transactions 
or offers. “It is seldom that a case concerning the interpretation of the Securities 
Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) comes before the 
courts.”304 In Sefalana Employees Benefits Organisation v Haslam,305 the court 
                                            
301See Larkin & Boltar (1997) Annual Survey Company Law  431.  
302See DA Armour, S Deakin, P Lele & M Siems “How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from 
a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection” (2009) ECGI 
Working Paper Series in Law Working Paper N°. 129/2009, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431008> (Accessed on 14-4-2014). 
303See S Deakin “Corporate governance, finance and growth: Unravelling the relationship” 
(2010) Acta Juridica 216-217. 
304See Larkin & Boltar (1997) Annual Company Law Survey 427. 
305[2000] JOL 6205 (A)  
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indicated the issue “is as novel as it is narrow”.306 In Spinnaker Investments 
(Pty) Ltd v Tongaat Group Limited the first case, dealing with takeovers and 
mergers, the court dealt with the provisions of section 314(2) of the Companies 
Act of 1973. The court set out the rationale for regulating “tender offers” or 
“takeover bids”: 
 
“The mischief whereby entrepreneurs operating on a big scale can gain control 
of a company by buying out one or two large shareholders and ignoring the 
small shareholders is to some extent curtailed. In a word, the operations of the 
financier, who is sometimes referred to in terms that are less flattering as a 
predator, a white-collar looter or an early-dawn raider are no longer 
unrestricted.” 307 
 
The court further stated: 
 
“The need for legislation to regulate tender offers or ‘take-over bids’ … has long 
been recognised since there is from time to time a sharp conflict between the 
interests of the offeror and the incumbent management of the offeree company 
… The shareholders in the offeree company may in consequence be 
prejudiced unless they are treated fairly and unless full and timeous disclosure 
of all relevant facts [is] made … to them and unless there is some form of 
sanction for dishonest statements and dishonest nondisclosure. Moreover, the 
directors of the offeree company often resist a take-over bid, because they wish 
to continue managing the company themselves instead of making way for the 
directors appointed by the successful offeror, or because they believe that the 
consideration offered for the share bid is inadequate. In this situation the only 
way the offeror can gain control of the company is by addressing an offer 
directly to its shareholders.”308 
 
It is suggested that the arguments in the quotations above are not only 
applicable to mandatory offers but are applicable to the regulation of takeovers 
                                            
306[2000] JOL 6205 (A) 2. 
3071982 (1) SA 65 (A) 71. 
3081982 (1) SA 65 (A) 71.  
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and mergers in general. They deal with fair dealing and proper disclosures 
during a takeover or merger on a much broader basis.309  
 
In the Sefalana case, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) endorsed the 
principles of protecting minority shareholders where a change of control 
occurs.310 As indicated above, the enforcement of the mandatory offer is not a 
common occurrence. The matter was an appeal from an earlier decision of the 
High Court, where the High Court had ordered the appellant to make a 
mandatory offer to the respondent even though there was no actual change of 
control, because the party who would have acquired control repudiated the 
agreement to acquire control and the seller of control had accepted the 
repudiation. Briefly, the facts of the case that led to the appeal are: H, the 
plaintiff was shareholder in a company, Time Life Insurance Limited (Time). 
Sefalana Employee Benefit Organisation (SEBO), the defendant agreed to buy 
a controlling stake of 66 percent of the shares of Time from Concor Holdings 
(Pty) Limited (Concor). The agreement was subject to certain conditions that 
had been fulfilled. However, SEBO instead of continuing with the agreement to 
finality, repudiated and Concor, the seller, accepted the repudiation and the 
agreement was cancelled. It was generally accepted that the transaction fell 
within the definition of an ‘affected transaction’ of section 440A (1) of the 
Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code. The issue was whether the party 
who would have acquired control still had to make a mandatory offer in terms 
of rule 8.1 of the SRP Code, even though no change of control had occurred. 
The court of first instance agreed with the plaintiff that it did.311 On appeal, the 
SCA ruled against the requirement of having to make a mandatory offer. The 
court also pointed that what must be appreciated from the beginning is that 
ordinarily, shareholders are not entitled to be treated equally when offers to 
purchase their shares are made. A purchaser who is aiming at acquiring control 
of a company,  
 
                                            
309See section 119(1) and 119 (2) of the of the Companies Act of 2008 and Regulation 106 of 
the Companies Act 2011 (the regulations).  
310 [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 
311Haslam v Sefalana Employees Benefits Organisation 1998(4) SA 964(W). 
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“not in one fell swoop, but incrementally by way of a succession of purchases 
from different shareholders over an extended period of time, is under no legal 
or moral obligation to offer or to pay the same price from the inception of and 
throughout the exercise. It is only when the stage is reached at which an 
intended or proposed transaction will, if consummated, result in a change of 
control within the meaning of the Code that the hand of the panel is laid upon 
the transaction.”312 
 
The court pointed out the ‘mischief’ which the legislature tried to curb in 
enacting the mandatory offer referred to above in the Spinnaker case.313The 
SCA accepted the earlier decision by the High Court that the mandatory offer 
is directed, in the first instance, at actual takeovers and not aborted takeovers. 
An aborted or an attempted takeover of a company that does not succeed does 
not entitle minority shareholders to receive the mandatory offer. Partly, quoting 
from the decision of the High Court, the court observed:  
 
“[T] hat the would-be acquirer of control, ‘‘abandons the booty when he 
or she resiles from the deal’’, and that the minority shareholders “are left 
with shares they bought in the company, controlled as when they bought 
it.” ”314  
 
The SCA further pointed out: 
 
“[C]ommon to all the situations under consideration is the stark fact that the 
sole rationale for the existence of an obligation to make a similar offer to other 
shareholders, namely, a transference of control, has fallen away prior to the 
making of an offer to them and there no longer exists any present prospect of 
the offeror acquiring control. Whose ‘fault’ that is (and there may be none) is of 
no consequence; the fact of the matter is that shareholders who were in 
jeopardy of finding themselves locked into a company the control of which has 
changed without their concurrence, are no longer in such jeopardy. The 
                                            
312[2000] JOL 6205 (A) 6. 
313See [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 9-10. 
314 [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 5. 
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mischief which the relevant provisions of the Act and the Code were enacted 
to counter is entirely absent.”315  
 
The SCA further held that:  
 
“[T]he transaction envisaging a change of control was aborted before any offer 
had been extended to respondents, the rationale for making of a mandatory 
offer for respondents’ shares no longer existed, and it would have been 
pointless to require an offer to be made to them. No discernible legislative 
purpose would be served by it.”316 
 
The SCA added that:  
 
“[E]ven if there had been an acquisition of that nature, because it was cancelled 
prior to the making of any offer to respondents and without the situs of control 
having been disturbed in any way, no obligation to make an offer to 
respondents arose.”317 
 
Before ruling that no mandatory offer should be made, the SCA pointed out 
that: 
 
“What all this shows, in my opinion, is that the coming into existence of a 
transaction or proposed transaction which involves the acquisition of securities 
which will, if implemented, result in a change of control within the meaning of 
the Code is a necessary, but not a sufficient, state of affairs to trigger the 
obligation to make an offer to other shareholders. Its continuing existence is a 
sine qua non.”318 
 
Luiz points out that the above assertion is not accurate due to the fact that the 
definition of affected transaction under the Companies Act of 2008 does not 
make “a change of control a sine qua non of an affected transaction.”319 The 
regulation of affected transactions under the Companies Act of 2008 seems 
                                            
315 [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 9-10. 
316[2000] JOL 6205 (A) 13. 
317 [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 16. 
318 [2000] JOL 6205 (A) 20. 
319Luiz (2012) PER/PELJ (15) 5.105/638. 
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more about the regulation of situations that could be viewed as changes of the 
fundamental nature of a regulated company. Regulation of affected 
transactions under the Companies Act of 2008 is not exclusively about the 
regulation of transactions which would result in a change or consolidation of 
control of the voting securities of the company.320  
 
One of the difficult concepts to apply in regulating takeovers and mergers is the 
concept of parties ‘acting in concert.’321 The concept involves co-operation of 
two or more persons toward a common end or object.322 The definition of the 
concept in the Companies Act of 1973323 and according to Yeats et al, the SRP 
Code was also difficult to understand.324 This was the case even though these 
definitions were based on the UK City Code as they were not identical. Yeats 
et al,325 indicates that the UK City Code definition refers to a relationship 
between the parties. The concept ‘acting in concert’ is so defined because the 
City Code rules attach certain consequences to the existence of a relationship 
in terms of which persons are acting in concert. The rules treat the individual 
existing shareholdings of the parties to the agreement as the shareholdings of 
a single person and thus may oblige the parties to make a general offer where 
the holdings exceed the prescribed threshold of 30 percent.326 The problem 
with the definition of ‘acting in concert’ in the Companies Act of 2008 is that it 
does not deal with the criticism raised in respect of the definitions in the 1973 
Act and SRP Code, albeit that the detail regarding the problems with concept 
will not be discussed here as it would require too much of a digression. Suffice 
is to say that concert party agreements are difficult to prove and identifying 
exactly when shareholders ‘co-operate for the purpose of entering into or 
                                            
320Luiz (2012) PER/PELJ (15) 5.104/638-105/638. 
321See Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-47. 
3225-46. 
323Section 440A (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 indicates: ‘acting in concert’ means, subject 
to subsection (2)(a) [of section 440A], acting in pursuance of an agreement, an arrangement 
or understanding (whether formal or informal) between two or more persons pursuant to which 
they or any of them co-operate for the purposes of entering or proposing an affected 
transaction. (Subsection (2)(a) deems certain persons to be ‘acting in concert’). 
324See Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-47. 
3255-46 to 5-47. 
3265-46 to 5-47. 
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proposing an affected transaction’327 This led to the legislature trying to draft 
the concept as broadly as possible, using a catch-all approach.328 Failure to 
draw a precise line could result in avoidance. Therefore, the definition still 
needs to be improved for certainty and clarity. 
 
The court had to interpret the concept in the Securities Regulation Panel v MGX 
Limited (MGX case).329 The matter was decided by the Witwatersrand Local 
Division of the High Court and concerned the mandatory offer. Prior to the court 
hearing the merits of the case, the parties had several legal skirmishes before 
the regulator – the SRP. The SRP finally brought an action at the High Court to 
enforce the obligation of the parties to make a mandatory offer to the 
shareholders of EC Hold Limited.  
 
Briefly, the facts were that the plaintiff, the SRP, claimed that MGX Limited, the 
first defendant, and others, while “acting in concert”, acquired more than 35 
percent of the shares of EC-Hold Limited (EC-Hold) and became liable to make 
a mandatory offer to the minority shareholders of EC-Hold. Different persons 
acquired the shares, at different stages, but the combined acquisitions 
amounted to more than 35 percent of the shares of EC-Hold Limited. The SRP 
contended that the parties ‘acted in concert’ as contemplated in section 
440A1(1) of the Companies Act of 1973. Accordingly, it requested the court to 
order the parties to jointly and severally make a mandatory offer to the 
shareholders of EC-Hold. After lodging its particulars of claim, the plaintiff 
applied to the court to have them amended and add further averments. The 
defendant objected against the particulars of claim on various grounds, 
including that the plaintiff: (a) failed to allege the term of the ‘agreement, 
arrangement or understanding’ which is necessary to hold the defendants as 
persons ‘acting in concert’ in relation to an ‘affected transaction’; (b) failed to 
                                            
327See definition of ‘act in concert’ in section 117(1) of the Companies Act 2008.  
328See R Ghetti Acting in concert in EU Company Law: How Safe Harbours can Reduce 
Interference with the Exercise of Shareholder Rights” 2014.ECFR 4/2014 597-601. Discussion 
similar problems encountered in respect of the EU acting in concert definition. In this article, 
the author indicates the difficulties encountered in defining and limiting the application of acting 
in concert. It is indicated that concert party relations are generally hidden and difficult to prove. 
Identifying when exactly, shareholders are cooperating in order to circumvent a legal obligation 
may not be easy. 
329Securities Regulation Panel v MGX Limited (the MGX case) Case No 1602/03. 
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allege that the defendant acquired shares in or control over the offeree 
company as contemplated by the definitions of acting in concert and affected 
transaction in section 440A; and (c) the particulars of claims are vague and 
embarrassing.  
 
The court analysed the definition of ‘acting in concert’ and concluded that it is 
wide enough to include acts of co-operation that does not entail acquisition of 
shares. The court also indicated that the real issue is whether a party to an 
agreement, arrangement or understanding’ who does not himself acquire 
shares in the offeree company can be a concert party if other parties co-operate 
to acquire shares. The court concluded that the agreement, arrangements or 
understanding covers a whole range of agreements and other acts falling short 
of legally binding contracts.330  
 
The court also referred to the unreported case of Randgold and Exploration 
Company Limited v Fraser Alexander Limited (Randgold),331 relating to an 
urgent application for an interim order. It distinguished the issues in the MGX 
case from those that were considered in the Randgold case. In the Randgold 
case, the court indicated that for control to have occurred in a case that relates 
to parties co-operating to vote together at a meeting, it must go beyond 
‘tomorrow’s meeting’. The court indicated that the parties must have agreed to 
exercise control over the company at future meetings of the company. The fact 
that the parties had formed an alliance, which would result in them holding more 
than 40 percent of the shares and would give them management control in 
order to achieve the passing of a resolution the following day, was not sufficient 
to create an obligation in terms of the mandatory offer.332  
 
In the MGX case, the court indicated that the “mere voting agreement” 
concluded in the Randgold case did not have the effect of vesting control, and, 
thus, it did not establish an affected transaction per se, due to the fact that the 
                                            
330Securities Regulation Panel v MGX Limited, WLD Case No 1602/03. 
331WLD, Case No 21801/94 ,17 August 1994.  
332Case No 21801/94 17 August 1994.  
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effect of the voting agreement did not necessarily vest control of the company 
where it did not previously exist.333 The court‘s decision shows that there had 
to be an ongoing, coordinated stratagem to control the company beyond a 
particular meeting. The MGX matter did not reach a final hearing on the merits 
of the case. The court dismissed the objections raised by the defendants during 
the preliminary proceedings. The main defendant eventually made a mandatory 
offer to the remaining shareholders of EC-Hold limited, even though a period of 
more than five years had elapsed after the obligation arose.334 It is therefore 
argued that the shareholders of EC-Hold Limited did not receive ‘fair and 
equitable’ treatment as intended by the mandatory offer. The definition of ‘act 
in concert’ under the Companies Act of 2008 is not identical to the one under 
the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code. The expression ‘act in concert’ 
is defined in section 117(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008335 read with 
section 117(2), (which creates a rebuttable presumption). As discussed in this 
paragraph above, the concept is difficult to prove. Some of the concerns and 
ambiguities that arose under the Companies Act of 1973 may still persist.336 As 
indicated by the discussions in this paragraph above, the concerns are 
reasonable. 
 
5 6 10  Section 124 – Compulsory acquisitions and squeeze out 
 
The seventh type of affected transactions is the squeeze out. The requirements 
of this section is applicable where the acquirer buys 90 percent or more of the 
shares that are the subject of the offer (excluding the shares already held by 
the acquirer). If the acquirer reaches the 90 percent or more, it may undertake 
a squeeze-out within 4 months after the date of the offer.337 Making the 
compulsory acquisition under section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008, an 
                                            
333Securities Regulation Panel v MGX Limited, WLD Case No 1602/03. 
334See EC Hold Limited. Announcement dated 20 April 2006, relating to the results of the 
mandatory offer as reproduced by JSE Limited SENS Department. 
335Section 117(1)(b) defines the concept as: “‘act in concert’ means any action pursuant to an 
agreement between or among two or more persons, in terms of which any of them co-operate 
for the purpose of entering into or proposing an affected transaction or offer.” 
336Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-51.  
337Section 124(1) of the Companies Act 2008. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
218 
 
affected transaction ensures that the shareholders of the regulated company 
receive the protections available in the Takeover Provisions.338 
 
Firstly, section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008 concerns so called ‘squeeze 
outs.’339 Such an acquirer will be entitled to expropriate any remaining 
shareholders who did not accept the initial offer under section 124(4). The 
expropriation must be done on the same terms and conditions as the initial 
offer.340 The requirements of this provision is substantially similar to those 
which were applicable in terms of section 440K of the Companies Act of 1973, 
although the requirements of this section are phrased differently from those of 
its predecessor.341 Oddly, squeeze outs are not expressly listed as affected 
transactions in section 117(1)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008, but the heading 
to section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008 includes a ‘squeeze out’. This 
clearly is a mistake which requires amendment. 
 
While the compulsory acquisition is defined as an affected transaction in its own 
right, it is argued that it is not possible to undertake an affected transaction in 
terms of section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008 without having undertaken 
either a mandatory offer in terms of section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008 
or a general offer as described in paragraph 5 6 8 above, dealing with the 
announced intention to acquire the remaining securities. In addition, it is 
suggested that the time periods set out in terms of section 124 make it difficult 
to make an isolated section 124 compulsory offer in the absence of any other 
affected transaction.342 In order to expropriate or squeeze out shareholders, the 
shareholders holding 90 percent or more must have accepted the initial offer. 
This will then entitle the acquirer to proceed and issue the requisite notices to 
expropriate those shareholders who did not accept the offer in terms of section 
                                            
338See Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 581. 
339Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 434. 
340Section 124(4)(c) of the Companies Act 2008 
341Delport & Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 434. 
342See section 124 of the Act. The provisions allow for a limited period of four months within 
which an offeror may subject to certain protections expropriate in terms of the section.  
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
219 
 
124(1)(b), unless they successfully challenge the expropriation in terms of 
section 124(2) by obtaining a court order.343  
 
There is dearth of successful cases concerning these expropriations.344 Section 
124 further offers shareholders of the offeree company another opportunity to 
exit the company following the acquisition of 90 percent of the shares.345 Under 
section 124(1)(b), the shareholders are entitled to exit the company on the 
same terms and conditions as the initial offer and therefore shareholders should 
not have a complaint.346  
 
The rationale for the existence of the ‘squeeze out’ has been expressed as 
follows: 
 
“The legislature is concerned that the offeror, who may expend considerable 
sums of money in the expectation of acquiring total ownership of the shares in 
the target company, should not be prevented by a small minority of 
shareholders from acquiring total ownership of the shares and, if a corporate 
offeror, from converting the company into a wholly owned subsidiary, and so 
obtaining the commensurate and legitimate benefits financial, administrative 
and commercial that go with such ownership. In England, experience prior to 
the introduction in 1928 of legislation to facilitate by coercion of dissenting 
shareholders the amalgamation of companies, suggested that holders of small 
number of shares might, out of desire to exact better terms than the vast 
majority of their fellow shareholders were content to accept, hamper the 
arrangement or prevent it from materialising. Thus, the object of the legislation 
was, in effect, to prevent an oppression of the majority by a minority.”347  
 
The law protects shareholders who wish to exit the company, but it does not 
give a shareholder the right to stay invested in the company.348 The right of a 
shareholder to insist that his or her shares be bought in terms of section 
                                            
343Section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008. See also Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 581. 
344See Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 581. 
345573. 
346573. 
347Yeats et al Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-71. 
348Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 585. 
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124(4)(b) despite not accepting the initial offer ensures that the minority 
shareholder can still exit the company at the original consideration paid. The 
shareholders of a regulated company that is subjected to a complete takeover 
seem to receive protection in terms of the section.349 
 
5 6 11 Comparable and partial offers  
 
5 6 11 1 Comparable offers  
 
Comparable offers are regulated in section 125(2) of the Companies Act of 
2008, and regulation 87 of the Takeover Regulations. 350 Section 125(2) is not 
easy to follow and apply. The SRP Code had similar provisions in rules 11 and 
12. It is submitted that those rules were drafted better and easier to interpret 
and apply. Further, it seems that section 125(2) was derived from rule 11 of the 
SRP Code and some parts of rules 11 and 12 were inserted in regulation 88.   
 
The Act and the regulations do not provide the meaning of comparable offer. 
The mandatory offer provision in section 123 of the Companies Act of 2008 
does not deal with different classes of shares. It only refers generally to voting 
rights and voting securities. These provisions require bidders to make a 
comparable offer to the holders of voting securities in other classes where a 
mandatory offer is required. Accordingly, a person or persons acting in concert 
who acquires securities entitling that person or persons to exercise more than 
the prescribed percentage (currently 35 percent) of the general voting rights 
associated with all the issued securities of a company must make a comparable 
offer to acquire securities of each class of issued securities of that company.351  
 
While the provisions do not define a comparable offer, regulation 87 sets out 
the circumstances that create an obligation for a comparable offer. These 
include: where a company has issued securities with voting rights or securities 
                                            
349586. 
350Section 125 (2) of the Companies Act of 2008 and regulation 87. 
351See section 125(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 and regulation 87. 
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that could have voting rights in future, including options.352 Share incentive 
schemes that are cash settled whose future value are dependent on the future 
value of the securities under offer, must be taken into account and receive an 
equitable treatment.353 The offer consideration of a comparable offer must be 
established taking into consideration the class of security to which the 
comparable offer is to be made.354 Regulation 90 generally creates an 
obligation for the independent board of regulated companies to obtain 
independent expert opinions for affected transactions and those opinions must 
then be disclosed in the offer circular. Regulation 87(5) creates a separate 
obligation for the independent board of regulated companies to obtain a fair and 
reasonable opinion relating to comparable offers. The opinions of the 
independent expert and independent board in respect of a comparable offer 
must accord with opinions of independent experts and the independent board 
expressed regarding the offer that gave rise to the comparable offer. In the case 
of comparable offers the regulation aims to achieve fairness for holders of the 
securities subject to a comparable offer. For example, if the opinion in respect 
of the primary mandatory offer is that the offer is ‘fair and reasonable’, then the 
opinion by the expert and the independent board in respect of the comparable 
offer must also be that the comparable offer is ‘fair and reasonable’.   
 
An obligation to make a comparable offer only arises in case of regulated 
companies that have more than one class of issued securities. The distinction 
between mandatory offers and comparable offers is that the mandatory offer is 
made on the same or identical terms and conditions as those that which were 
applicable when the acquirer reached the specified percentage,355 while an 
offer in terms of section 125(2) is a ‘comparable offer’ as determined in terms 
of regulation 87. A comparable offer need not be an identical offer to the primary 
offer.356  
 
                                            
352See regulation 87(2). 
353See regulation 87(3). 
354See regulation 87(4). 
355See section 123(3) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 111 (2). 
356See UK City Code in Rule 14.1 and the notes thereunder. 
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Luiz indicates that the requirements for a comparable offer support the goals 
for equivalent treatment and equitable treatment.357 The requirements for 
comparable offers in terms of section 125(2) and regulation 87 serve an 
important role in protecting holders of securities identified in regulation 87. 
However, an amendment of section 125(2) and regulation 88 should improve 
interpretation and application of those provisions thereby offering better 
protection to those security holders.  
 
5 6 11 2 Partial offers  
 
The partial offer provisions are difficult to follow. Sections 117(1)(h) and 125 of 
the Companies Act of 2008 and regulation 88 provide for regulation of partial 
offers. However, despite partial offer being a defined term under section 
117(1)(h) and regulation 88(2), the application of these provisions to partial 
offers is not clear. 
 
(a) Partial offers in terms of section 125(3) 
 
The Act under section 125(3) provides for offers that would result in the offeror 
(together with related persons and concert parties) owning less than 100 
percent of a company’s voting securities commonly, referred to as ‘partial 
offers. Section 117(1)(h) of the Act defines a “partial offer” as an offer that, if 
fully accepted, would result in the offeror, alone or together with a related or 
inter-related person, or a person acting in concert with any of them, holding less 
than 100 percent of the voting securities of the company whose securities are 
the subject of the offer. This definition appears incomplete and section 125 sets 
both requirements for partial offers, but confusingly, also further defines what 
would constitute a partial offer. Section 125(3)(a) indicates that an offeror must 
make an offer to all holders of a class of securities. It would therefore require 
an offeror to make an offer to all shareholders but only for a proportion of their 
shareholding. A partial offer will only be regulated in terms of section 125 if it 
could result in an affected transaction.  Although other offers could strictly be 
                                            
357Luiz (2014) 26 Merc LJ 563. 
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partial offers, defining them as such will not have any legal consequences. The 
mere fact that an offer constitutes a partial offer will not make it an affected 
transaction. A partial offer will only be regulated in terms of Chapter 5 Part B if 
it is an affected transaction because it falls within one of the categories set out 
in section 117(1)(c), which could be that it would otherwise trigger the 
mandatory offer in terms of section 123 or that it would mean that one of the 
thresholds mentioned in section 122 would be crossed. Offers under section 
125(3) includes acquisitions of small stakes that would take a shareholder 
across one of the disclosable dealing thresholds such as 5, 35 or 50 percent 
provided for under section 122.358 
 
This section, if taken on its own, would be problematic when small acquisitions 
are made. It is difficult to see why this provision should apply where an acquirer 
or acquirers do not acquire control. Most of the requirements in section 125(3) 
would apply only where the prescribed percentage has been or could be 
crossed. It is only in these situations that: (a) the offer will have to be conditional 
on a specified percentage of acceptances;359 (b) the offer must be approved by 
independent holders of securities;360 (c) the offer must be for a specific 
percentage if it could also result in the offeror holding less than 50 percent of 
the voting rights;361 (d) a notice to this effect has to be given.362 In this sense, 
the impact of section 125 is limited, albeit that it is still overly wide.363  
 
Firstly, offerors who already have acquired the prescribed percentage may 
have to comply with some of these requirements in circumstances where it 
would not make much sense. These transactions will not be affected 
transactions in terms of section 123 but they could be for other reasons, such 
as, the crossing of the 5 percent thresholds. Under this scenario, the 
shareholder would already have made a mandatory offer and yet the partial 
offer provisions will still apply. This will be the case both where more than 35 
                                            
358See Boardman Acta (2010) Juridica 328. 
359Section 125(3)(b)(i) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
360Section 125(3)(b)(ii). of the Companies Act of 2008. See the discussion below. 
361Section 125(3)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
362Section 125(3)(d) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
363Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 330. 
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but less than 50 percent of the voting rights has previously been acquired, and 
even where more than 50 percent has previously been acquired.364 Secondly, 
and more importantly, the requirement that a partial offer will have to be made 
to all shareholders will apply more broadly to all partial offers that are affected 
transactions for reasons other than section 123.365 This will be the case at very 
low shareholding but also where the prescribed percentage had already been 
crossed previously. A very small acquisition that crosses a low threshold such 
as 5 percent could mean that a general partial offer will be required.366  
 
Regulation 88 provides that a partial offer is exempt from compliance with part 
B and Part C of Chapter 5 of the Act and the regulations: (a) if at the time the 
partial offer is made, the offeror beneficially holds securities of a class with 
voting rights of less than the prescribed percentage and the partial offer is 
limited to the acquisition of less than the prescribed percentage; or (b) where 
the offeror already holds voting securities equal to or more than the specified 
percentage and makes a partial offer to acquire less than 100 percent of the 
voting rights. The partial offers covered by the exemption in the regulation are 
those that at the time at which they are made, either will not result in the offeror 
acquiring voting rights of more than the specified percentage, or are those 
partial offers where the offeror already holds voting rights of more than the 
specified percentage but will not be acquiring the entire voting rights of the 
regulated company. 
 
In the first scenario the mandatory offer requirements in section 123 has not 
been triggered and there is no reason to provide exclusion from the mandatory 
offer as envisaged in section 125(3). Presumably, in the second scenario, the 
offeror would have complied with the mandatory offer obligations at some 
earlier stage or would have crossed that threshold in some legitimate manner 
at some stage of their share acquisitions. As an example, The Bidvest Group 
Limited (Bidvest) acquired 34.5 percent of the shares in Adcock Ingram 
Holdings Limited without involving the Panel. The parties appear to have relied 
                                            
364See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 331. 
365Section 125(3)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
366See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 331. 
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on this regulation and did not comply with the Takeover Provisions. The offer 
was undertaken by means of a “stand-by offer” (a public announcement offering 
to acquire the shares of the offeree company on the terms and conditions set 
out in the announcement) by Bidvest. This meant that it did not have to involve 
the Panel, as the transaction was not subject to the Takeover Provisions.367  
 
Although the Act does not say so explicitly, it would seem that section 125(3) 
read with the regulation is intended to provide an exclusion from the mandatory 
offer requirement in section 123 for offers that fall within section 123(2), which 
determines when section 123 would ordinarily apply.368 It concerns offers that 
would have triggered the full mandatory offer in terms of section 123 but will no 
longer do so if the requirements of section 125 are met. Although at first glance 
section 125(3) expands regulation, it in reality provides relief from the strict 
requirements of section 123. For this purpose, the most important requirement 
for the protection of offeree shareholders is section 125(3)(b)(ii). It requires that 
the partial offer be approved by independent shareholders.  
 
Nevertheless, the provision is badly formulated. It could also be read that it 
requires that independent shareholders who support the offer must hold more 
than 50 percent of all votes in the class and not just of the independent votes. 
The requirement will then be more difficult to meet where shareholders that are 
not independent have larger shareholding than it would be if they have smaller 
or no shareholding. Where the independent holders will no longer have 50 
percent, it will mean that the requirement can no longer be met. This would lead 
to the arbitrary outcome that offerors with large existing holdings will not be able 
to make partial offers while ones with smaller shareholding would be able to do 
                                            
367See Announcements released by The Bidvest Group Limited and Community Investment 
Holdings Pty Limited (the Parties) dated 2 December 2013 in which the Parties offer to acquire 
a maximum of 34.5 percent of Adcock Ingram Holdings Limited (Adcock) shares. In this 
announcement, Parties offer to acquire the shares of Adcock from the shareholders at R70 .00 
per share on a first come first served basis. The offer period closed on 4 February 2014. The 
Parties in their announcement dated 31 January 2014 indicated that they acquired 32,03 
percent, short of their intended target of 34.5 percent. It must be pointed out that the offer was 
completed outside the regulatory oversight of the Takeover Provisions as no circular approved 
by the Panel in terms of the regulations was sent to the shareholders of Adcock. What is also 
notable is that the time period for the notice to close the offer was very short leaving 
shareholders with little time for accepting the offer.  
368Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica  328. 
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so. Perhaps it would be better to interpret the approval requirement in the first 
part of the provision as being independent from the second part that refers to 
holding of 50 percent by independent holders. If so, understood approval by 
majority will be required only where the independent holders still have 50 
percent of the voting rights in a class but that no approval will be required where 
this is not so. Where the offeror and related parties control more than 50 percent 
of the voting rights no approval would be required. 
 
Where there is a vote on a partial offer, the offeror must advise shareholders in 
a specific and prominent notice that it would be able to exercise more than the 
prescribed percentage of the general voting rights of all the issued securities of 
the company, in the circular that is provided to shareholders before they 
approve the partial offer.369 Through this notice, shareholders are made aware 
that they will be forgoing the right to receive the mandatory offer before they 
vote in favour of the partial offer. The disclosures and voting required in terms 
of section 125(3) are aimed at protecting the interests of shareholders. 
Shareholders must be made aware that the partial offer may result in shifting of 
voting control to a new majority shareholder. The voting in favour of the partial 
offer by a majority of the independent shareholders aims to remove conflicts 
and oppression by the existing majority shareholders. 
 
Section 125(4) requires the exact percentage indicated in the partial offer to be 
achieved before the offer is declared unconditional as to acceptances. This is 
important as the implementation of the partial offer is predicated upon the 
condition being fulfilled. This also promotes transparency, as shareholders will 
know the exact number of shares held by the controlling shareholder. 
 
(b) Section 125(5)  
 
Section 125(5) of the Companies Act of 2008 concerns how a shareholder may 
tender shares in terms of a partial offer. In terms of this provision, the holders 
of different classes of securities are entitled to accept the offer in full for the 
                                            
369Section 125(3)(d) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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relevant percentage of that person’s securities holding. If all shares that are 
offered are not taken up in this way, any securities tendered in excess of the 
relevant percentage must be accepted by the offeror from each holder of 
securities in the same proportion to the number tendered as will enable the 
offeror to obtain the total number of shares for which it has offered to accept. 
Regulation 88(3) also assists in ensuring that shareholders are treated equally 
in a partial offer. It provides that where shareholders tender their acceptance 
for equal or less than the partial offer, then the offeror must accept all their 
shares. This again seems to merely confirm the statute when it comes to 
acceptance of an offer to its full extent, while it probably clarifies the position 
where a shareholder agrees to take up less shares than those offered. Finally, 
the regulation determines that if a shareholder tenders shares more than the 
partial offer percentage, then the offeror must accept that number of shares 
equal to the partial offer percentage, and accept the excess tendered by 
shareholders on an equitable basis.  
 
It would appear that regulation 88(1) will impact on the application of section 
125(5). It will mean that both the statute and the regulation regarding the 
manner in which shares purchased in terms of a partial offer will have to be 
taken into account.  
 
(c) Comparison with the UK City Code  
 
In the UK, rule 36 of the UK City Code deals with partial offers.370 The SA 
section 125(3)-(5) of the Companies Act of 2008 is very similar to rule 36 of the 
City Code. The UK City Code does not only concern partial offers that would 
otherwise be subject to the mandatory offer requirement. The UK Panel’s 
consent is required for any partial offer in terms of rule 36.1. In South Africa, 
partial offers that are not affected transaction are not subject to approval by the 
Panel.371 
 
                                            
370UK City Code (2016). 
371See Regulation 88 
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This means that approval in the UK will be necessary, even where the partial 
offer does not cross the mandatory offer threshold of 30 percent, although these 
transactions will not be covered in section 125(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
However, the Panel will normally grant such consent where the partial offer will 
not result in the offeror holding 30 percent or more of the voting rights of a 
company.372  
 
Moreover, where the UK Panel gives approval, the mandatory offer requirement 
will not have to be met even if the mandatory offer threshold is passed.373 
However, approval will not be given where the offeror has selectively or in 
significant numbers, acquired interests in shares in the offeree company during 
the 12 months preceding the application for consent or if interests in shares 
have been acquired at any time after the partial offer was reasonably in 
contemplation.374 In this sense, approval will have the same effect as 
compliance with the section 125(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. Rule 36.6 of 
the City Code provides that if the partial offer could result in the offeror and 
concert parties holding shares carrying over 50 percent of the voting rights of 
the offeree company, the offer document must include ‘specific and prominent 
reference’ to this fact. Further, the offer document must state that, if the partial 
offer succeeds, the offeror ‘will be free’, subject to other relevant rules to acquire 
further interests in shares without incurring any obligation to make a mandatory 
offer under Rule 9. While section 125(3) contains similar requirements, it does 
not go further and provide that the offer document must inform shareholders 
that the offeror would no longer be obliged to make a mandatory offer.  
  
Under rule 36.7 of the City Code, the offeror must accept tendered shares 
proportionally and those who wish to sell more or less must be able to do so. 
South Africa in section 125(5) and regulation 88(3) contains similar provisions. 
In the UK, offerors must not acquire additional shares during the offer period 
and further, for a period of 12 months, offerors must not acquire further shares 
                                            
372See rule 36.1 of the UK City Code (2016).  
373See rule 36.2 of the City Code (2016). 
374Rule 36.2 of the UK City Code. 
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in the offeree unless the Panel consent,375 and in SA, a similar provision is 
found in section 127(4). Although it does not specifically refer to the SA Panel’s 
consent, it is possible for offerors to obtain such consent from the SA Panel in 
terms of the SA Panel’s general powers to provide exemptions.376    
  
(d) Conclusion 
 
Section 125(3)–(5) of the Companies Act 2008 deals with partial offers where 
the offeror either does not have sufficient resources to acquire 100 percent of 
the securities of a company or where it chooses to do so for its own reasons.377 
The main benefit for offerors launching a partial offer therefore will be that it can 
provide the flexibility of not having to buy the whole company.378 One of the 
main concerns is that partial offers may not necessarily treat all shareholders 
equally and may create minority interests.379 In the UK, partial offers are not 
favoured.380 Partial offers are seen as unfair and oppressive to shareholders. It 
has been suggested that shareholders can be coerced into accepting a partial 
offer even if they did not believe the offer to be fair.381 In South Africa, there will 
now be wider scope for these partial offers than in the UK.382 The SA approach 
is favoured as it reduces the impact of the mandatory offer which has been 
submitted to criticism in this thesis. 
 
Section 125 allows considerable scope for partial offers. This could 
substantially restrict the impact of the mandatory offer requirements in South 
Africa. It is debatable whether there is a need to protect shareholders in case 
of partial offers by offerors who already have crossed the control threshold. 
Currently, protection for minority shareholder is under section 122 dealing with 
disclosures of acquisition of shareholdings of 5 percent, 10 percent or 15 
percent and so on and, also under section 117(1)(v), as discussed above in 
                                            
375Rule 36.3 of the UK City Code. 
376See section 119(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
377See Yeats et al, Commentary on the Companies Act of 2008 5-81. 
378Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 328. 
379328. 
380See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 329. 
381I Ramsay “Balancing Law and Economics: The case of Partial Takeovers” (1992) Journal of 
Business Law (369-397, 370. 
382Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 330. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
230 
 
paragraph 5 6 7, indicating that offerors who wish to acquire 100 percent of the 
voting securities in a regulated company, must comply with the requirements 
for affected transactions. Some of the requirements in terms of section 125(3) 
require clarification. The insertion of rule 36 of the City Code into section 
125(3)(c) creates confusion due to the fact that the South African mandatory 
offer requirements apply only until a person acquires 35 percent or more. Once 
a person has acquired that percentage, any further acquisitions above 35 
percent does not result in a further mandatory offer. In the UK the threshold is 
both 30 percent and 50 percent as discussed under paragraph 3 2 3 above, 
hence the requirement that offerors must disclose their shareholding position 
prominently.383 In the UK, this assists shareholders to determine which 
threshold has been reached, 30 percent or 50 percent. In this way, 
shareholders are informed about the threshold that created the mandatory 
offer. Shareholders can then choose to tender or not tender their shares 
knowing who the controlling shareholder is.  
 
In SA, the reference to 50 percent under section 125 is not relevant for the 
purpose of mandatory offer but may assist shareholders to establish if the 
offeror desires to acquire legal control. It also promotes transparency about 
controlling shareholders. Regulation 88 addresses some of the problems with 
the partial offer provisions but it has rightly been criticised from certain quarters. 
It is indicated that section 123 creates a mandatory offer obligation and 
regulation 88 appears to be ultra-vires as it seeks to exempt a category of 
“partial offers”’ as provided for by section 125(3) of the Act.384 Even if the 
Regulation is not ultra vires, the exact impact of the exemption of partial offers 
requires refinement and the formulation of these provisions must be amended 
to promote clarity and ease of application. It is preferable that section 125(3)-
(5) be amended rather than provide exclusions in terms of a regulation. 
 
 
 
                                            
383Rule 36 of the UK City Code (2016). 
384Latsky (2014) Stell LR 362. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
231 
 
5 7 An overview of the conduct regulated: restrictions before, during and 
after affected transactions and offers  
 
Some of the provisions in this section have been taken from the SRP Code and 
are word for word the same as those in the SRP Code.385 The general 
principles, previously in the SRP Code, have now been elevated to statutory 
provisions.386 The general principles have been described in paragraph 5 4 
above. 
 
This paragraph highlights some of the restrictions in terms of the Takeover 
Provisions and provides the reasons for such restrictions. Takeovers and 
mergers of companies are a common occurrence in commerce but are fraught 
with problems and potential conflict of interests. Conflicts may arise where the 
offeror attempts to acquire the shares at the lowest price possible as opposed 
to the shareholders who may wish to sell their shares or assets or undertaking 
of the company at the highest price possible.387 Conflicts could also arise 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. In addition, 
incumbent management also poses a problem during an affected transaction, 
as they may wish to secure their positions to the detriment of shareholders.388 
This appears to be one of the main aims of regulating takeovers and mergers 
by various regulatory authorities in different countries. Conflicts specifically 
involving directors require policing in order to safeguard the interest of 
shareholders during takeovers and mergers.389  
 
                                            
385See Rule 19 of the SRP Code. 
386Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 563. 
387See Luiz “Protection of holders of securities in the offeree regulated company during affected 
transactions: general offers and schemes of arrangements” (2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 561. 
388Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 560. 
389For Delaware, see chapter 2 dealing with standards of reviewing directors conducts during 
takeovers applied by the Delaware courts. For the UK, see chapter 3, the UK Panel rule 21.1 
of the City Code set a no frustrating rule in as part of board neutrality rule to curb conflicts of 
interests by directors. Finally, for Australia, see chapter 4. In particular paras 4 2 3 1 and 4 2 3 
2 for ASIC and the Australian Panel respectively. The power to declare unacceptable 
circumstance by the Panel discussed in para 4 2 4 above is also potent and effective in 
preventing conflicts of interests by directors.  
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Section 121 of the Companies Act of 2008 creates an obligation for parties 
entering into affected transactions or offers that may result in affected 
transactions, to report them to the Panel.390 Such transactions must not be 
effected unless they have been approved by the Panel or have been exempted 
from approval by the Panel.391 Section 121 also specifically provides that 
parties must not enter into such transaction unless they do so in accordance 
with the general requirements of the Companies Act of 2008 and Panel 
regulations. The earlier intervention by the Panel limits the potential prejudice 
to shareholders. For instance, a refusal by the Panel to approve a particular 
transaction before the transaction is announced on the market, reduces the risk 
that shareholders may trade in shares of a company to their prejudice. This is 
particularly true where the offeror is not able to fulfill its financial obligations in 
terms of the offer.392 The rationale for prohibiting certain actions by directors is 
aimed at protecting shareholders’ interests. Directors may impede a beneficial 
transaction for shareholders which prejudice the directors’ interests. A 
requirement to disclose under various regulations including regulation 106, and 
the requirement of a shareholder vote on some transactions, for example under 
section 125(5) and regulation 86(4), ensures transparency and avoids conflicts 
of interests. The procedures further enable shareholders to make informed 
decisions about affected transactions.393  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 also prohibits actions that may frustrate or prevent 
affected transactions or offers, unless shareholder approval and the written 
approval of the Panel are obtained in terms of section 126(1).394 Section 127(1) 
of the Companies Act of 2008 prohibits certain dealings during an offer. These 
include any favourable or collateral benefits from being paid to some securities 
holders during the course of an offer unless all securities holders are paid the 
                                            
390See definition of offers under section 117(1)(f) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
391Section 121(b) of the of the Companies Act of 2008. 
392See section 119(1) of the Companies Act of 2008 and regulation 111 dealing with 
requirements for bank guarantees and cash confirmations where parties are paying in cash. 
393See section 126 of the of the Companies Act of 2008. 
394This provision is similar to Rule 19 of the SRP Code referred to above and the wording is 
almost the same. 
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same.395 Prohibition of collateral benefits is intended to ensure that 
shareholders are treated equitably and fairly. Section 127(3) prohibits the 
offeror making another offer, or an offer that may require a mandatory offer for 
the shares of the company being made within a period of 12 months, in a 
situation where the initial offer has failed. The UK City Code, has similar 
restrictions.396 The UK Panel may consent and allow an offeror to make another 
offer in a number of circumstances. These include: where there is a competing 
offeror; where it determines that there has been material change of 
circumstances; or where the board of the offeree company recommends the 
new offer except in case where the initial offer closed within three months of 
such new offer and the offeror had indicated that it will not increase the initial 
offer. 397 The Panel is likely to follow a similar approach taking into consideration 
the provisions of section 119(6) of the Companies Act of 2008, in particular, 
119(6)(c), as discussed under paragraph 5 11 below. The UK City Code will 
also be useful in considering whether the Panel must relax a requirement, in 
particular, the explanatory notes under the various rules of the UK City Code 
are likely to be persuasive.  
 
It is asserted that restrictions following a transaction are intended to stabilise 
the operations of a company following the completion of an offer. This is 
necessary due to the fact that, during the course of the offer, directors of the 
offeree company have numerous obligations to ensure compliance with the Act 
and the regulations. During this period, the operations of the company may not 
receive undivided attention, to the detriment of shareholders’ interests. 
According to Pudge, the restriction in the rule is aimed at preventing a ‘siege’ 
being renewed immediately within 12 months.398 This rule is designed to create 
                                            
395For the purpose of this section the important consideration is the definition of the “offer 
period”. This period is defined as the period “from the time when an announcement is made or 
ought to have been made, of a proposed or possible offer until the first closing date or, if later, 
the date when the offer becomes or is declared unconditional as to acceptances or lapses” in 
section 117(1) (g)) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
396See UK City Code Rule 35. 
397see UK City Code rule 35 and notes thereunder. 
398D Pudge “Conduct During the Offer, Timing and Revision; and Restrictions Following the 
Offer” in Button (ed) A Practitioners’ Guide to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. City & 
Financial Planning 274. 
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a reasonable balance between giving shareholders an opportunity to consider 
offers for their shares and enabling the business of the company, in which they 
are invested in, to be carried on without continuous uncertainty and 
disruptions.399   
 
Another restriction in dealing with the shares of the target after an offer is 
completed, is found in section 127(5). The section restricts the offeror from 
acquiring shares in the company on more favourable conditions than was 
offered during the original offer for a period of 6 months following the closing 
date of the offer. The section is aimed at fostering equality of treatment and 
preventing offerors acquiring shares at a higher price immediately after the 
closing of the offer. It therefore promotes fairness and equity in line with section 
119(2) (b) of the Companies Act of 2008.  The restriction may also have the 
effect of stabilising the share price of the offeree company as any selling 
shareholder will be aware of the restriction. Therefore, the possibility that the 
share price will immediately rise or fall after the termination of the offer may be 
reduced.  
 
5 8 An overview of the remedies and enforcement measures 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 provides a number of ways for the Panel to enforce 
compliance with affected transactions and offers, and sets out the 
consequences of failure to comply. The Companies Act of 1973 also provided 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance in sections 440L and 440M.400 Section 
440L of the Companies Act of 1973 required that every affected transaction had 
to be proposed or entered into in accordance with the Act, unless exempted. 
Section 121 of the Companies Act of 2008 now states that the transactions 
must comply with certain reporting requirements, unless exempted. In addition, 
the section provides that transactions must not be implemented unless the 
Panel issues a compliance certificate or the transaction is exempted. The 
Companies Act of 1973 did not specify that the SRP must approve transactions. 
                                            
399275. 
400Chapter XVA of the Companies Act of 1973. 
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Moreover, the Takeover Regulations now specifically provides that the Panel 
must approve announcements and circulars in respect of affected 
transactions.401  
 
The Companies Act of 1973 did not create enforcement measures that could 
effectively deter potential transgressors. Section 440M of the Companies Act 
of 1973 provided that the SRP must approach the courts to enforce compliance 
where there was a contravention or possible contravention. In addition, section 
440M (4) provided that persons who suffered damages due to non-compliance 
could claim damages. However, concerns were raised that remedies and 
enforcement procedures were unsatisfactory.402 They were described as 
ineffective, lacking clarity and certainty, and without any deterrence.403 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 goes a long way to address these concerns by 
introducing a number of remedies and enforcement procedures. Persons who 
believe that they have been harmed by an affected transaction have a number 
of remedies. In addition, the powers of the Panel to enforce have been clarified 
and bolstered. The Panel may issue a compliance notice in terms of section 
119(4), where there is non-compliance. Section 119 of the Companies Act of 
2008 provides that: 
 
“(5) To the extent necessary to ensure compliance with this Part, Part C and 
the Takeover Regulations, and to fulfil the purposes contemplated in 
subsection (1), a compliance notice contemplated in subsection (4) (c) may, 
among other things— (a) prohibit or require any action by a person; or (b) order 
a person to— (i) divest of an acquired asset; or (ii) account for profits.” 
 
The section goes considerably beyond section 440M of the Companies Act of 
1973. The Panel may issue a compliance notice and will only have to revert to 
the National Prosecuting Authority or the courts if there is no compliance with 
the notice.404 These steps are necessary to ensure speedy and effective 
                                            
401See Regulation 117. 
402DTI 2004 Policy document. 
403DTI 2004 Policy document 
404Sections 119(5) (b) and 171 of the Companies Act of 2008, read with section 170. 
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enforcement of the Act. However, it is possible that the last part of the provision 
stating that the notices may only be issued if the alleged contravention could 
otherwise be addressed by an application to court or to the Companies 
Tribunal, may substantially limit the scope of the provision. 
 
The remedial and enforcement provisions of the Companies Act of 2008 are 
set out in chapter 7 of the Act, as read with the regulations in chapter 7 of the 
Companies Regulations. These provisions provide detailed steps and 
procedures in order to enforce compliance with the Act and the regulations. 
Section 157(1) of the Companies Act 2008, provides the Panel with extended 
authority to apply to court in any matter that is ; (a) directly contemplated in the 
particular provision of this Act; (b) acting on behalf of a person contemplated in 
paragraph (a), who cannot act in their own name; (c) acting as a member of, or 
in the interest of, a group or class of affected persons, or an association acting 
in the interest of its members; or (d) acting in the public interest, with leave of 
the court.405 
 
In addition, in terms of section 157(2) the Panel by itself (on its own motion 
according to the Act) and in its absolute discretion, may-  
 
“(a) commence any proceedings in a court in the name of a person who, when 
filing a complaint with the Commission or Panel, as the case may be, in respect 
of the matter giving rise to those proceedings, also made a written request that 
the Commission or Panel do so; or  
(b) apply for leave to intervene in any court proceedings arising in terms of this 
Act, in order to represent any interest that would not otherwise be adequately 
represented in those proceedings.”  
 
The Panel will play a central role in complaints concerning contraventions of 
the affected transaction provisions in Chapter 5 Part B and C. In terms of 
section 168, any person may lodge a complaint with the Panel or the Panel may 
                                            
405Section 157(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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initiate a complaint406 or the Minister may direct the Panel to investigate.407 The 
Panel must investigate in terms of a directive from the Minister,408 but may in 
other cases: refuse to investigate in some cases;409 refer the matter to the 
Companies Tribunal or an accredited entity that could attempt alternative 
dispute resolution (which would probably seldom occur in respect of the Panel 
as it would seem that this alternative is intended for the Commission); or appoint 
an inspector or investigator to investigate the complaint in terms of section 
169(1)(c).410 During the investigation, the Panel may designate a person or 
persons to assist the inspector or investigator. In appropriate cases, the Panel 
may request a company for a joint appointment with the company of an 
independent investigator, at the expense of the company or on a cost sharing 
basis, to report to it, the Commission and the company.411 The Panel may also 
apply to court for appointment of an independent investigator at the expense of 
the company, to report to it, and the company.412 The Commission or Tribunal 
may furthermore refer any complaint to the Panel in terms of section 170(1)(b), 
if the Panel is the authority that should deal with it.413 
 
In order to encourage co-operation during investigations, the Panel may issue 
summons. In the summons, it may request persons to appear, produce or 
deliver specified documents. Persons so summoned are entitled to protection 
against self-incrimination.414 On conclusion of the investigation, if the Panel 
chose to investigate, it may among other things: excuse the person against 
whom a complaint has been raised,415 refer the matter to the Tribunal, the 
Commission or the Panel, if the matter falls within their jurisdictions,416 refer the 
matter to the National Prosecuting Authority,417 or another authority when it 
                                            
406See section 168(1) and 168(2) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 135. 
407Section 168(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
408Section 169(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
409See regulation 135(4). 
410Section 169(1) of the Companies Act of 2008, read with regulation 137(1). 
411Section 169(2)(b)(i), of the Companies Act of 2008. 
412Section 169(2)(b)(ii), of the Companies Act of 2008. 
413See the analysis of this provision below. 
414Section 176 of the Companies Act of 2008. See also regulation 137. 
415Section 170(1) (a), of the Companies Act of 2008.  
416Section 170(1)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 140(1). 
417Section 170(1) (f). of the Companies Act of 2008 
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believes that an offence or other legislative contravention has been 
committed,418 issue a notice of non-referral to the complainant,419 initiate legal 
proceedings in the name of the complainant in appropriate cases,420 or issue a 
compliance notice.421 The decision of the Panel after the investigation may be 
published.422 Such a compliance notice may require a person to restore the 
assets to a company or to any other person or cease or correct or reverse any 
action that is in contravention of the Companies Act of 2008. A person who has 
been issued with such a notice may object by application to the court or the 
Takeover Special Committee (TSC) in terms of section 172 and follow a 
procedure set out therein, including making representations.423 In terms of 
section 172(4), a decision by the TSC is binding, subject to a right of review or 
appeal to a court. 
 
The compliance notice issued by the Panel remains in force until it has been 
set aside upon review by the TSC, or a court. Furthermore, a decision of the 
TSC can be taken on review by a court, while a decision by a court may be 
reviewed or appealed.424 The Executive Director may issue a compliance 
certificate once compliance has been achieved.425 When a compliance notice 
is issued to a person, a copy of such a notice must also be sent to any licensing 
authority that granted the licence authorising that person to conduct 
business.426 It appears that this provision is intended to ensure that professional 
bodies are aware of the conduct of professionals they have registered and 
granted licences to. For instance, it is common practice that the independent 
expert report is issued by a chartered accountant, and if it is found that there is 
a contravention of the Takeover Provisions after an investigation, such a 
professional may be reported to the relevant professional body. Similarly, 
should any professional provide misleading information during a takeover or 
merger, she/he may be reported to the relevant body. This provision may deter 
                                            
418Section 170(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
419Section 170(1)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 140(2). 
420Sections 157(2) and 170(1) (e) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
421Section 171(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
422Section 170(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
423Sections 172(1) and 172(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
424Section 171(5) and 172 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
425Section 171(6) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with regulation 139. 
426Section 171(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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potential transgressors from contravening the Companies Act of 2008 as it may 
have a negative effect on the conditions of their licence or professional 
standing.  
 
In terms of section 171(7), failure to comply with a compliance notice issued 
may result in a person being fined up to 10 percent of the company’s annual 
turnover or a maximum of R1 million by a court on application by the Panel, or 
a referral to the National Prosecuting Authority for prosecution as an offence, 
but not both. Perhaps the legislature should have ensured that the decisions of 
the TSC are capable of enforcement in a similar manner as those of the Appeal 
Board of the Financial Services Board (Appeal Board) that first came into 
existence under section 26 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990.427 
The form of the Appeal Board was subsequently expanded and its procedures 
amended under the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act No 22 of 
2008. Section 26A and 26B dealt with the Appeal Board, its panels and appeals 
proceedings. The Appeal Board has since been replaced by the Financial 
Services Tribunal (Tribunal) established under section 219 of the Financial 
Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSR Act).The Tribunal under the FSR Act 
may have as many members as decided by the Minister of Finance, but must 
have at least two retired judges or persons with suitable experience in law and, 
at least two other persons who have experience or expert knowledge in 
financial services, financial products, financial instruments, market 
infrastructures or the financial system.428 Under section 235 of the FSR Act, the 
decisions of the Tribunal may be taken on judicial review in terms of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, or any other applicable law. 
Where an order issued by the Tribunal has not been taken on review within the 
time period set, or the proceedings for review have been completed, a party to 
the proceedings may file a certified copy of the order made by the Tribunal with 
the registrar of a competent court.429 On being filed, the order of the Tribunal 
                                            
427See Financial Services Conduct Authority “General Information” available at: 
https://www/fsca.co.za/Enforcement-Matters/Pages/About-FSB-Appeal-Board.aspx. 
(Accessed 2 -6-2018).  
428See section 220(1)-(2) of FSR Act. 
429Section 236(1) of the FSR Act. 
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has effect of a civil judgment and may be enforced as if given in that court.430 
This facilitates quick and efficient enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions. Had 
the TSC had similar enforcement provisions, its decisions would then have 
been civil court judgments capable of enforcement as such. This would have 
facilitated speedy enforcement of the decisions of the TSC.  
 
In addition to creating offences specifically relating to failure to comply with 
compliance notices in the context of affected transactions and offers, a number 
of sections are aimed at ensuring that the Panel is able to perform its functions 
and investigate transgressions without being obstructed by the parties. These 
provisions include section 213 relating to breach of confidence, section 214 
dealing with the making of false statements, reckless conduct and non-
compliance, and section 215 relating to any actions intended to hinder the 
Panel in administering the Companies Act of 2008. The maximum period of 
imprisonment for convictions for any offences in terms of sections 213 and 214 
is 10 years, or a fine, or both.431 In the case of other offences a person may be 
imprisoned for a period of no more than 12 months.432 However, a person may 
not be subject to both an administrative fine and imprisonment in the case of 
non-compliance under the same compliance notice.433 It is suggested that the 
legislature considers contraventions of section 213 and 214 to be more serious, 
hence the higher penalties as compared to offences in terms of other 
sections.434  
 
Any person may commence a civil action against any other person for loss or 
damage suffered by that person as a result of any contravention by such a 
person of any provision of the Companies Act of 2008.435 This section is similar 
to section 440M (4) of the Companies Act of 1973. The Panel may also apply 
to court to declare a director to be a delinquent or under probation in certain 
                                            
430Section 236(2) of the FSR Act. 
431Section 216(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
432Section 216(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
433Section 171(7) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
434See sections 216 of the Companies Act of 2008.  
435Section 218 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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circumstances,436 for instance where the director has been acting as a director 
contrary to the provisions of section 69, due to the disqualifications in that 
section, or if he has abused his position as director.437 The Act gives locus 
standi to a broad range of persons and such declarations have serious 
implications for directors, including automatic removal as directors.438 In one of 
the first cases of this nature under the Act,439 an unreported case of Kukama v 
Lobelo,440 the court declared a director delinquent due to a number of 
transgressions by the director, which included: gross negligence by failing to 
detect tax fraud.441 Other instances that could lead to a declaration of 
delinquency by courts include: gross abuse of position as director; and taking 
personal advantage of information or opportunity belonging to the company.442  
 
In order to assist and strengthen investigations into alleged non-compliance 
with the provisions of the Companies Act of 2008, section 159(4) offers whistle-
blowers protection from any civil or criminal liability for disclosures made, 
subject to certain safeguards. 
 
The Companies Act of 2008 also includes an anti-voidance, exemptions and 
substantial compliance provision in section 6. A quick overview of the section 
suggests that it is intended to strengthen the provisions of the Act, promote 
accessibility, provide flexibility in application of the Act and also reduce 
technical arguments about compliant or non-compliant documents or 
procedures. In terms of the section, the Panel, the Commission or an exchange 
in respect of a listed company on that exchange, may apply to court to declare 
any agreement, transaction, resolution, arrangement or provisions of an MOI 
or rules: (a) to be substantially or primarily aimed at defeating or reducing the 
effect of a prohibition or requirement established by or in terms of the 
                                            
436Section 162(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
437Section 162(5) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
438R Cassim “Delinquent directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (Jan/Feb 2013): 26 
De Rebus 14. 
439Cassim (Jan Feb 2013) De Rebus)14. 
440South Gauteng High Court, Case No 38587/2011.  
441Delport Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 566. 
442566. 
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unalterable provision of the Act; and (b) void to the extent that it defeats or 
reduces the effect of a prohibition or requirement established by or in terms of 
an unalterable provision of this Act.443 In appropriate cases, the Companies 
Tribunal, on application by any person may issue an administrative order 
exempting an agreement, transaction, resolution, arrangement or provisions of 
an MOI or rules from any prohibition or requirement established by or in terms 
of an unalterable provision of the Act, except in the case of a provision that falls 
within the jurisdiction of the Panel.444 Accessibility and flexibility in the 
application of the Act comes in a number of ways. For instance, accessibility 
can be found in use of plain language,445 or allowing documents to be 
transmitted in electronic form.446 Flexibility is applied by: allowing unaltered 
electronically or mechanically reproduced documents, except share 
certificates;447 allows for usage of additional filing methods in addition to those 
prescribed in the Act;448 acceptance of prescribed forms, notice or documents 
as sufficient, if they satisfy all the substantial requirements.449 Further, 
deviations from a designated document or content, are allowed, provided that 
the deviations do not negatively and materially affect the substance of the 
document, record, statement or notice; or would reasonably mislead a person 
reading the document, record, statement or notice.450 
 
5 9 An overview of the takeover regulations and the information required 
 
The Minister, in consultation with the chairperson of the Panel and by notice in 
the Gazette, may prescribe regulations in respect of affected transactions and 
offers.451 This is similar to the Companies Act of 1973 where the SRP made 
                                            
443Section 6(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
444Section 6 (2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
445Section 6(5) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
446Section 6(10) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
447Section 6(7)) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
448Section 6(14) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
449Section 6(8)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
450Section 6(8)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
451Section 120 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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rules, which were then approved by the Minister.452 Under the Companies Act 
of 1973 this led to the creation of the SRP and SRP Code.  
 
Under the Companies Act of 2008, the regulations that govern takeovers and 
mergers no longer form a separate code. Some of the rules of the SRP Code 
are now in the Takeover Regulations, while others are in chapter 5 of the 
Companies Act of 2008. Some of the general principles of the SRP Code453 
have now become part of the Companies Act of 2008.454 A quick overview of 
the Takeover Regulations shows that they were written on an assumption that 
offerors would use a general offer as a main means of undertaking a takeover 
or a merger, even though the regulations apply to all affected transactions.455 
This is not surprising because the SRP Code on which they are mostly based 
was similarly premised.456 
 
The Takeover Regulations mainly deals with procedures, information and 
disclosures required to ensure compliance with chapter 5, Part B and C of the 
Act. The Takeover Regulations provide detailed requirements with which 
offerors and offeree regulated companies must comply in order to ensure that 
the principles set out in, among others, section 119(1) and section 119(2) of the 
Companies Act of 2008 are complied with. For instance, the principles in 
section 119(1)(a) are given effect in regulations 111(4) and 111(5), which 
require that bidders provide bank guarantees or confirmations that they have 
cash to complete the transactions. The regulations are aimed at upholding 
various principles, such as, maintaining the integrity of the market as stated in 
section 119(1)(a). Parties must also be able to pay and comply with the various 
Takeover Provisions, so as to avoid failed takeovers or mergers.  
 
Regulation 117 requires that the Panel must approve all documents relating to 
takeovers or mergers prior to publication or posting to shareholders. The 
documents include announcements and circulars relating to affected 
                                            
452Section 440C of the Companies Act of 1973. 
453See General Principles 1 to 11 of the SRP Code. 
454See Luiz (2014) Merc LJ 563. 
455561. 
456See SRP Code.   
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transactions. This is an important tool for ensuring the provision of accurate and 
relevant information in the context of affected transactions and in a timely 
manner. The Takeover Regulations support the disclosure and transparency in 
respect of takeovers and mergers. They also ensure that equality and fairness 
principles for shareholders of regulated companies are adhered to. The 
regulations provide for a detailed and orderly takeover or merger process, from 
the beginning to the end of a takeover or merger.457 For instance, regulation 
106, dealing with a circular to securities holders, provides detailed requirements 
concerning the information to be sent to shareholders. A closer look at 
regulation 106 shows that it is one of the important regulations as it provides 
the most comprehensive disclosure requirements by both the offeror and the 
offeree regulated company.  
 
In addition, section 114(2) of the Companies Act of 2008, read with regulation 
90, requires companies undertaking these transactions to retain an 
independent expert to advise the independent board of the offeree company or 
offeror in some cases.458 The independent board must provide the report about 
the offer to the relevant securities holders and also express their opinions about 
the offer. This is to provide some guidance to shareholders and assist them in 
making an informed decision.459 In order to ensure that securities holders are 
given enough time to consider the merits or demerits of an offer and have 
sufficient time to obtain advice, if they so wish, the regulations set out various 
timelines within which transactions must be undertaken and also provide how 
long offers should be open for acceptance by shareholders.460 
 
However, the information disclosed in circulars about certain affected 
transactions may be of limited use to shareholders due to inclusion of 
unnecessary information. Perhaps section 121 of the Companies Act of 2008 
and the Takeover Regulations should set limitations on the type, length of 
document, and manner in which information must be disclosed. Circulars to 
                                            
457See regulations 99 to 106. 
458See regulation 110(10) (a). 
459See regulation 110. 
460Luiz (2014) SA Merc LJ 565. 
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shareholders are often long and complex. There is a risk that important 
information can be buried in the circular.461 It is also doubtful whether the 
addition of more disclosures will necessarily assist shareholders in making an 
informed decision. Complicated and long documents may discourage 
shareholders from reading the contents of the circulars in their entirety. 
Shareholders are likely to follow the course of action proposed by companies 
and their advisers.462 These proposed actions are usually placed prominently 
at the beginning of the circular.463 The circulars are often written in hyperbolic 
language intended to persuade shareholders to support a takeover or merger. 
Researchers have commented about circulars as follows:  
 
“[O]ne of its purposes is to induce shareholders to accept the offer or vote in 
favour of the proposed resolutions; one must also expect to find an element of 
salesmanship.”464 It is suggested that a simplified document could be sent to 
shareholders written in simple understandable language to accompany the 
detailed circulars which complies with the Act and the regulation.”465  
 
Only information that is relevant to the current affected transactions should be 
published or included in the announcement or circular. Other transactions that 
may require approval by shareholders, but do not relate to the current takeover 
or merger should be excluded. Circulars dealing with affected transactions 
should not be used for any other purpose. Regulations could also require all 
such documents and announcements to be written in plain language.466 This 
may assist shareholders in focusing on the relevant information, and ultimately 
making better decisions about a takeover or merger. Further, there should be 
limitations on the amount of information contained in circulars and avoid 
                                            
461See among others, circular to the shareholders of Steinhoff International Holdings Limited 
relating to the scheme of arrangement dated 7 August 2015. 
462The proposed actions include attendance of the meeting, when will a transaction become 
effective. The latter implies how long it will take for shareholders be paid.  
463See Circular to Murray & Roberts Holdings Limited shareholders dated 9 April 2018 “Action 
required” on first page. 
464Macgregor (1978) S African LJ 329 -338. 
465339. 
466The SEC has published a handbook for general information only, on techniques for writing 
in plain English to create clearer and more informative disclosure documents. See SEC “A Plain 
English Handbook: How to create clear disclosure documents” 1998. Available 
https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.(Accessed 1-12-2016).  
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unnecessary verbiage. There should be an emphasis on the quality of 
information provided to shareholders rather than quantity.  
 
The current Takeover Regulations should be seen as a working document due 
to some glaring inaccuracies. It has been argued that the validity of certain 
regulations can be challenged on the basis that, as subordinate provisions, they 
are ultra vires to the principal provisions in the Act as some of them go beyond 
their empowering sections. It is suggested that practitioners have learnt to work 
around the provisions and make them practically workable. For example, it is 
common practice for practitioners to treat share repurchase transactions in 
terms of section 48(8)(b) as affected transactions and obtain approval or an 
exemption from the Panel before such transactions are implemented.467 Latsky 
asserts that a consensus is emerging among practitioners as to how to work 
around ambiguities.468 Nevertheless, this remains unsatisfactory. Regulations 
should be clear to foster certainty and encourage compliance. This will also 
make it easy for regulators to enforce, and create certainty for offerors and 
offeree regulated companies about their obligations to comply.  
 
5 10 An overview of the Panel’s general power to exempt affected 
transactions 
 
The Panel may grant exemptions to offerors or affected transactions in terms 
of section 119(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. The power to grant exemptions 
in section 119(6) is even wider than the SRP’s equivalent powers in terms of 
the Companies Act of 1973.469 The drafters wanted to achieve flexibility and to 
avoid unnecessary compliance.470 In terms of the section, the Panel may wholly 
or partially exempt application of any of the provisions relating to takeovers and 
mergers or the regulations with or without conditions. The exemption may be 
granted if: (a) there is no reasonable potential for prejudicing the interests of 
                                            
467See among other circulars, Basil Read Holding Limited Circular dated 2 November 2017 on 
page 26.  
468Latsky (2014) Stell LR 362. 
469Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 319. 
470319 
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any party to the transaction;471 (b) the cost of enforcing compliance will be 
disproportionate to the transaction;472 or (c) the exemption is reasonable and 
justifiable in the circumstances, taking into consideration the principles and 
purposes of the Takeover Regulations.473 The SRP had powers to grant 
exemptions from compliance with the SRP Code in broad terms in terms of Rule 
34.474 The ability of the Panel to grant exemptions in terms of this section is 
narrowly circumscribed, because the Companies Act of 2008 sets out a number 
of factors that the Panel must consider before granting the exemption. It is 
possible that section 119(6)(c) could be interpreted in such a way that it could 
afford wide grounds for exemption. This is so considering that the other two 
requirements relating to prejudice475 and cost of compliance476 are limiting. The 
issue of reasonableness and justifiability does not appear to be as limiting as 
the other two provided that some basis has been established for such a 
conclusion. It has been indicated that section 119(6)(c) exemption is broad and 
all encompassing.477  
 
The Panel does not have authority to regulate affected transactions relating to 
fundamental transactions entered into by a company that is subject to an 
approved business rescue plan in terms of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act of 
2008.478 The discussions and the issues as to whether the Panel should also 
regulate such transactions are complex and outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
  
 
 
 
                                            
471 Section 119(6) (a) of the Companies Act of 2008.   
472 Section 119(6) (b) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
473 Section 199(6) (c) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
474See rule 34 of the SRP Code, which provided in general terms that the Panel shall enjoy a 
general discretion to authorize, subject to such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, non-
compliance with or departure from any requirement of the Code and to excuse or exonerate 
any party from failure to comply with any such requirement. 
475Section 119(6)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
476Section 119(6)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
477See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 319. 
478Section 118(3) of the Companies Act 2008. 
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5 11 Concluding remarks 
 
From the analysis in this chapter, it is suggested that the intention of the 
legislature of promoting transparency, certainty and efficiency in respect of the 
SA takeover and merger regime has been achieved to some extent. The 
provisions on affected transactions also ensure that the South African takeover 
regulation is kept up to date with the best international merger and takeover 
practices as was envisaged in the DTI 2004 Policy document.479 With 
increasing globalization and resultant cross-border takeovers and mergers, 
new regulations may encourage inward investment and increased takeover and 
merger activity in South Africa. Further, the updated regulations encourage 
development of a market for corporate control as the rules of takeover and 
merger are clearer. Investors and market participants will have confidence in 
South African corporate law. It has been indicated that the Company Act 2008 
is “world-class” and puts South Africa in the forefront of corporate law reform.480 
However, it is argued that certain parts of the legislation need improvement. In 
particular, some of the Takeover Provisions need attention.  
 
Similar to takeover rules in other countries, the Takeover Provisions seek to 
maintain integrity of the markets, ensure fairness and equity to shareholders. 
The takeover procedures are aimed at protecting shareholders during 
takeovers or mergers, no matter which method is used. This is achieved by 
requiring that affected transactions must disclose sufficient information in a 
timely manner. Pressure tactics and preferential treatment is prohibited. The 
Takeover Provisions create a system of regulation that assures protections of 
shareholders beyond the mandatory offer requirements.  
 
It is at arguable that the framework of protection provided by the Takeover 
Provisions provide better protection to shareholders than under the 1973 Act 
and the previous SRP Code. Inter alia it may be mentioned that:481 the 
                                            
479DTI 2004 Policy document. 
480MM Katz “Governance under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Flexibility is the keyword” 2010 
Acta Juridica 262.  
481The aspects in this list are in addition to other protective measures mentioned elsewhere in 
this part. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
249 
 
definitions of affected transactions in the 2008 are clearer, the powers of the 
TRP to regulate affected transactions have been enhanced and they are clearly 
set out in the Act, the Takeover Regulations are written in the style of 
peremptory rules and the less formal and more general style of the SRP Code 
has been abandoned,482, the requirement for independent experts has been 
strengthened in section 114(2), read with regulation 90, which deals with 
fairness opinions and valuations during affected transactions, and  regulation 
106(11) which sets out a clear requirements that documents must to be 
available for inspection by shareholders.  
 
The Companies Act of 2008 attempts to attain a balance between minority 
protection and giving effect to the will of majority shareholders. Minority 
shareholders may not obstruct an affected transaction but are afforded 
protection by among others: disclosures, voting, appraisal rights, dispute 
resolution procedures and enforcement measures. The important protections 
for shareholders in terms of the Companies Act of 2008 are the shareholder 
approval, court review in certain circumstances, and the shareholder-appraisal 
remedy.483 The legislature has, in general, retained most of the provisions of 
the Companies Act of 1973 in respect of regulating takeovers and mergers. The 
new provisions seem to be in line with what was intended in the DTI 2004 Policy 
document. In general, the new takeover and merger provisions have been 
welcomed and are regarded as an improvement on the Companies Act of 1973 
and the SRP Code. However, it may take some time before the efficacy of the 
new provisions can be properly determined. Moreover, some sections and 
regulations need to be amended, for simplicity and clarity.  
 
However, while the Takeover Provisions have been welcomed and 
commended, there are a number of flaws in both the substantive provisions and 
in the regulations. These make it difficult to interpret and apply them and should 
be attended to as quickly as possible for the benefit of shareholders.  
 
                                            
482See SRP Code.  
483Davids et al (2010) Acta Juridica 337-338.355. 
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These include: 
 
(a) Formulation resulting in a poor relationship between the Act and the 
regulations. For example, section 125 of the Companies Act of 2008 and 
regulation 88, relating to comparable and partial offers. As indicated in 
paragraph 5 6 11 the provisions are very difficult to follow. 
 (b) The mandatory offer requirements as critically discussed under 
paragraph 5 6 9 above.  
(c) Complex and lengthy procedural requirements relating to appraisal 
rights as discussed under paragraph 5 6 6 above.   
(d) Other provisions that must be improved including: (i) the overreaching 
section 118(1)(c)(ii), which makes the Takeover Provisions applicable to 
small, private companies discussed under paragraph 5 5 above. As 
indicated, compliance with the requirements are costly for private 
companies; (ii) section 48(8)(b) discussed under paragraph 5 6 5 above, 
(iii) section 122 relating to disclosures as indicated under paragraph 5 6 
7 above; and (iv) the inefficient remedies and enforcement mechanisms 
as discussed under paragraph 5 8. 
 
In addition, the division of chapter 5 into part A, B and C, limits the authority of 
the SA Panel only to fundamental transactions that constitute affected 
transactions.484 The SA Panel is not able to regulate or provide exemption, as 
indicated by Latsky, in the cases of fundamental transactions that are not 
affected transactions.485 The SA Panel will not be able to grant exemptions from 
the application of the provisions regarding fundamental transactions in Chapter 
5 Part A, although they are an inherent part of many fundamental transactions. 
Where fundamental transactions are not affected transactions, the SA Panel 
will have no power to regulate transactions including granting any exemptions 
from overly-strict rules regarding fundamental transactions. In particular, 
closely-held private companies may not apply to the SA Panel for an exemption 
not to comply with certain requirements regarding fundamental transactions. It 
                                            
484See Latsky (2014) Stell LR 378. 
485370. 
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is not clear from the Act if such companies may apply to the Companies 
Tribunal for such relief. This is inappropriate and the SA Panel should have 
powers to regulate all transactions falling under chapter 5, and not only those 
under part B. The enforcement and remedies of the SA Panel should be 
simplified and strengthened as discussed under paragraph 5 8. Adopting the 
enforcement mechanism similar to that of the Financial Services Tribunal 
created under section 219 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017, will 
make the process of enforcement effective and efficient. As discussed under 
paragraph 5 9, the information and procedures could be improved such that the 
quality of the information provided is improved to enable shareholders to make 
informed decisions rather than quantity, which may impede and prevent 
shareholders from getting the relevant information. Some of the shortcomings 
of the various Takeover Regulations have already been identified under 
paragraph 5 10 and these should also be rectified. 
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Chapter 6: Evaluating takeover and merger provisions  
of the selected countries 
 
“The classical assessment of the mandatory bid rule by law and economics 
scholars is rather negative.”1 
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
This chapter evaluates regulation of takeovers and mergers in the comparative 
countries as discussed in chapter 2 in the case of the US, chapter 3 in the case 
of the UK, chapter 4 in the case of Australia and chapter 5 in the case of SA. 
The evaluations include the companies and types of affected transactions 
regulated, authorities regulating the transactions, dispute-resolution 
procedures and enforcement measures relating to affected transactions. 
Arguments for and against the mandatory offer rule are also evaluated. 
Takeover regulators are concerned with the possibility that mergers and 
takeovers may negatively impact the interests of various stakeholders of the 
company. Fraud, misleading information and poor disclosures, among others, 
were the main motivating factors for countries to develop stronger regulations 
for takeovers and mergers. In order to discourage and reduce the potential 
harm to shareholders, countries have adopted different methods to regulate 
takeovers and mergers. Mayer2 puts it as follows: 
  
“There is no greater source of regulation than scandals. Regulatory inaction in 
the face of fraud or deception is impossible.”3 
 
The review suggests that the SA takeover and merger regulations and 
procedures are closely related to and similar to that of the UK. However, the 
US and Australian takeover and merger regulatory procedures are different 
                                            
1EP Schuster “Efficiency in Private Sales -The Case for Mandatory Offer Bids” (2010) LSE Law, 
Society an Economy Working Papers 08/2010 London School of Economics and Political 
Science 3.  
2C Mayer “Corporate Governance: A Policy for Europe” (2003) A Paper presented at Saïd 
Business School, University of Oxford. This paper was presented at the 2003 Annual Congress 
of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics at the University of Bern on 21 March 2003. 
3Mayer (2003) Saïd Business School, University of Oxford.  
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from those of UK and SA. Accordingly, the evaluation will concentrate on the 
takeover and merger provisions of the UK and SA. Where applicable, the US 
and Australian takeover and merger regulatory environment will be referred to.  
 
6 2 A brief evaluation of developments of regulation of takeovers and 
mergers in the selected countries  
 
The reasons for regulation of takeovers and mergers by countries are similar. 
These include protection of investors and promoting investor confidence. 
Presumably, countries would select the preferred regulatory authority based on 
a number of aspects, including efficiencies and effectiveness of the type of 
regulatory model. The development of SA takeover and merger laws were 
closely influenced by those of the UK. However, it is generally accepted that 
the UK and the US have similar economic markets, including their levels of 
development, and similar-sized companies.4 Yet despite these similarities, their 
takeover methods are markedly different. Australia, even though it has 
historical and economic connections with the UK, has adopted a completely 
different method of regulating takeovers and mergers. Australian company law 
started off with the transplantation of UK company law. However, its company 
law has since evolved to suit local conditions. It is suggested that Australia 
recognised that the law had to be responsive to economic development of the 
country.5 According to Amour and Skeel Jr,6 the content of takeover rules has 
been influenced fundamentally by differences in the manner in which takeovers 
and mergers are regulated in the UK and the US. In the UK, the initial self-
regulation of takeovers has led to a regime, which is mostly driven by the 
interests of institutional investors, whereas in the US, the dynamics of judicial 
lawmaking, mostly by the Delaware judges, benefit directors by making it 
                                            
4See JA Armour & DA Skeel Jr “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The 
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 
1727, and J Franks, M Mayer & S Rossi “Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of 
Family Ownership in the United Kingdom” in Morck (ed) A History of Corporate Governance 
around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (2005) 584, among other 
scholars who agree to this view. 
5See P Lipton “History of Company Law in Colonial Australia: Economic Development and 
Legal Evolution” (2007) 31 Melbourne University Law Review. 806. 
6See Armour & Skeel Jr (2007) The Georgetown Law Journal 1764-1765. 
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relatively difficult for shareholders to influence the rules.7 One of the first hostile 
takeovers in the UK occurred during 1953 with the acquisition of J. Sears 
Holdings Limited. Franks et al8 suggest that this takeover introduced the 
concept of paying a premium to shareholders. It appears that for a short period 
in the UK, during the 1950s and 1960s, there was an unregulated takeover 
market. This created a potential for parties to acquire control by discriminatory 
means. Partial offers were also used to acquire effective control due to the fact 
that hostile takeovers were seen as increasing the costs of a full takeover bid.9 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the UK Panel was established during 1968. Two of 
the first rules enforced by the panel through the UK City Code were the equality 
rule and the mandatory offer rule. These two rules had the effect of increasing 
shareholder concentration and preventing discriminatory offer prices.10 The 
market for corporate control developed further during the 1970s, with a larger 
body of institutional shareholders, wider protection for minority shareholders 
and an active market for hostile offers.11 Until a few years ago, the UK City 
Code was not based on statute and was self-regulatory. The introduction of the 
EU Directive and the UK Companies Act 2006 changed this position.12 
However, it was asserted that, despite its statutory nature, the UK City Code 
should be regarded as self-regulatory.13  
 
Australia’s takeover and merger provisions are based on the main Eggleston 
Principles.14 These principles form the cornerstone of section 602 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001. The provisions of the Act are enforced by 
                                            
7Armour & Skeel Jr (2007) The Georgetown Law Journal 1764-1765. 
8Franks et al, “Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the 
United Kingdom” in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business 
Groups to Professional Managers 584. 
9584. 
10585. 
11585. 
12See Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (as amended by The Companies 
Act 2006 (Amendment of Schedule 2) (No 2) Order 2009). Rules are set out in the Takeovers 
Code (including this Introduction, the General Principles, the Definitions and the Rules (and the 
related Notes and Appendices). 
13A Johnston “Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical perspectives on the City Code” 
Cambridge Law Journal (2007) 66:2, 447. 
14Section 602 also incorporate additional principles relating to efficient, competitive and 
informed market as well as compulsory acquisitions. See guidance note 1 at paras 30-31. 
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two bodies, namely, ASIC and the Australian Panel.15 The UK and SA takeover 
legislation has similar mandatory offer provisions, while Australia has adopted 
unique takeover principles.16 In Australia, there is a prohibition against 
acquisitions of 20 percent voting securities, unless certain requirements are 
met.17 The reasons for developing takeover laws in Australia were to prevent 
potential prejudice to shareholders during takeovers.18  
 
According to researchers, most UK companies have dispersed shareholding 
structures.19 It has been argued that the prevalence of dispersed or 
concentrated ownership resulted from the type of protection that existed in a 
particular country.20 However, this is not necessarily the case due to the fact 
that strong investor protection took some time to be accepted by market 
participants and when it was accepted, substantial dispersed ownership had 
already taken root.21 This seems to support a view that it was not strong 
regulatory measures that led to dispersed ownership. It is suggested that 
introduction of strong protective measures was motivated by various 
stakeholders, such as financial firms and stock exchanges that desired to build 
a good reputation with investors.22 Shareholder dispersal in the US occurred 
sometime during the 1930s, while the dating of dispersed shareholdings in the 
UK is not well established.23  
 
The UK City Code brought improved compliance through the supervision of 
takeovers by the UK Panel and allowed the UK Panel to force compliance on 
its constituencies. This was done by “piggybacking” on the London Stock 
                                            
15See discussions under paragraph 4 2 3 in Chapter 4 dealing with Australian takeover and 
merger regulators.  
16E Hutson “Australia’s takeover rules: how good are they?” (2002) Corporate Regulation, 
Jassa Issue 4 Summer 33. 
17Section 606 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
18Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 830. See also M Hoyle “An Overview of the 
Role and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in Ramsay (ed) The Takeovers Panel and Takeover 
Regulation in Australia (2010) 39. 
19See CM Bruner “Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation” (2010) 50:3 
Virginia Journal of International Law 613. 
20613. 
21613. 
22613. 
23515. 
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Exchange’s enforcement machinery. This was partly due to the fact that the 
London Stock Exchange had the ability to sanction listed companies.24  
 
6 3 A brief evaluation of the authorities regulating takeovers and mergers in 
the selected countries  
 
The research shows that there are a number of regulatory models. There are 
some differences and similarities in respect of how transactions are regulated 
in the comparative countries. 
 
In Delaware the courts play an important role in enforcing the various corporate 
law rules, including those affecting applicable during takeovers and mergers.25 
The courts’ roles are evident where conflicts involving directors that may 
negatively affect shareholders during a takeover or a merger continuously 
arise. Accordingly, the courts have developed some of the important principles 
dealing with conflicts of interests of directors during takeovers and mergers.26 
Unlike the other jurisdictions in this study no separate regulatory bodies plays 
an active role in enforcing takeover and merger rules and unlike South Africa 
and the UK, Delaware has no mandatory offer.  
 
However, Delaware is an important comparator. It is perhaps the pre-eminent 
jurisdiction for merger law as most large US companies are incorporated there. 
The rules that apply to mergers in the other jurisdictions often have their origin 
in ideas that have emanated from Delaware even if they may have lost traction 
in that jurisdiction, such as the equal opportunity rule. Many of the rules 
regarding duties of directors will be relevant to the other jurisdictions under 
discussion even if they may have more expansive regulatory systems for 
mergers. The Delaware system like that of Australia furthermore shows that it 
is possible to properly protect shareholders without a mandatory offer rule. 
Finally, Delaware and its almost impenetrable case law perhaps also illustrates 
                                            
24627. 
25See the discussions under paragraph 2 3 1.  
26See discussions dealing with the standards of reviewing directors conduct during takeovers 
and mergers created by Delaware courts under paragraph 2 5. 
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why it may be better to put a more formal regulatory system for mergers in 
place. The ensuing comparison of institutions will accordingly concern the 
formal systems for merger regulation that exist in South Africa, the UK and 
Australia. 
 
In the UK, shareholders of the offeree company have primary powers to decide 
on the merits of a takeover or a merger.27 ‘Decision rights’ in respect of 
takeovers reside with shareholders.28 The Australian regulatory regime has 
been described as restrictive.29 Although its takeovers and mergers rules have 
similarities to other countries, it still has distinct features. In certain respects, 
the similarities are influenced by historical connections between the company 
laws of the countries. The UK, Australia and South Africa have dedicated 
authorities to regulate takeovers. However, each country has a different 
process for processing takeover documents.  
 
In the UK, the City Code encourages parties to consult the Panel at an early 
stage of the transaction. Parties may consult the Panel to obtain informal advice 
on how the Panel would consider a proposed takeover or merger.30 The UK 
Executive31 may, inter alia: give opinions on application and effect of the UK 
City Code;32 give rulings waiving certain requirements of the UK City Code,33 
and issue guidance in the form of published Practice Statements. The Practice 
Statements are non-binding.34 The Companies Act of 2008 has similar 
provisions allowing the Panel to issue guidelines for the benefit of persons 
involved in affected transactions.35 In South Africa, the Executive Director of 
                                            
27See J Payne “Schemes of Arrangement, Takeovers and Minority Shareholder Protection” 
(2011) II Part 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 74. 
28Franks et al in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups 
to Professional Managers 585. 
29See Hutson (2002) Corporate Regulation, Jassa Issue 4 Summer 33. 
30See UK City Code in 6 of the Introduction. 
31These are full-time employees of the Panel headed by the Director General.  
32See UK City Code in 5 of the Introduction. 
33See UK City Code in 6 of the Introduction. 
34See the UK City Code in 6 of the Introduction. 
35Section 201(2) (b)of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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the Panel may also provide non-binding opinions and binding rulings.36 Unlike 
the UK and SA Panels, the Australian Panel may not issue advance rulings.37 
 
The three systems can be distinguished when it comes to the question whether 
documents and circulars have to be pre-approved.  
The Australian Panel does not review documents to be sent to shareholders as 
ASIC performs this function.38 The Australian Panel is the primary adjudicator 
of disputes during takeovers and mergers, while ASIC administers the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 (among other laws). In respect of takeovers 
and mergers, ASIC has powers to conduct investigations, monitor transactions, 
prosecute contraventions and develop policy.39  
The UK Panel does not approve circulars or announcements to shareholders 
other than circulars containing a ‘whitewash resolution’ in terms of rule 9 of the 
City Code.40 The UK Panel also does not review and pre-approve circulars prior 
to being sent to shareholders. The Panel expects parties involved in 
transactions to comply with the City Code as indicated under code 
responsibilities and obligations.41 The City Code broadly provides which parties 
are responsible for compliance with the City Code and this includes not only 
directors of the companies involved in takeovers and mergers, but also their 
advisers.42 The UK system by which parties are encouraged to consult with the 
Panel, and by which guidance can be given will assist parties where difficult 
issues regarding disclosures may arise.43 However, no formal pre-approval of 
documents and circulars takes place in the UK. In the UK, practitioners must 
send copies of documents posted to shareholders to the UK Panel only for 
review at the same time as they are sent to shareholders. Should it be found 
that the circulars are deficient or not compliant with the UK City Code, the 
parties will be obliged to send revised circulars to shareholders.  
                                            
36See regulation 118. 
37Hoyle “An Overview of the Role and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeover Regulation in Australia 56. 
38See the discussions in Chapters 4 2 3 above.  
39See N Calleja The New Takeovers Panel – A Better Way? (2002) 2. 
40See Appendix 1 to the UK City Code. 
41See UK City Code in 3(f) of the Introduction. 
42See UK City Code in 3(f) of the Introduction. 
43See UK City Code in 3(f) of the Introduction. 
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Conversely, the South African Panel is required to review and pre-approve 
circulars to shareholders.44 This is not appropriate and should be criticised. It is 
suggested that they may be misleading to shareholders. This is because a pre-
approval process may create a wrong impression to shareholders that, since 
the Panel has vetted the documents, the Panel also approves that the merger 
or takeover is for the benefit of shareholders. This may mislead shareholders 
due to fact that Panel does not consider commercial advantages or 
disadvantages of takeovers or mergers.45 The pre-approved circulars may give 
shareholders a false sense of comfort that a regulator agrees with the 
transaction. Even if shareholders may have wished to oppose an affected 
transaction or offer, they may not do so. It is suggested that the UK Panel does 
not pre-approve documents for a number of reasons, including, avoiding a 
wrong impression that a pre-approval means the panel agrees with the 
commercial advantages of the transaction and also to ensure that advisers and 
companies have greater responsibility in preparing the documents and do not 
rely on the vetting process by regulators. 
 
According to the UK City Code, the Panel similarly does not consider financial 
advantages or disadvantages of takeovers and mergers as these are for the 
shareholders to decide.46 In South Africa, as if to emphasise the importance of 
this provision, it is set-out in two sections, in sections 119(1) and 201(3) of the 
Companies Act of 2008. Contrary to takeover panels in UK and South Africa, 
the Australian Panel, in considering declaring circumstances unacceptable in 
respect of a takeover or a merger, may consider a broader range of matters, 
including reaction of the financial markets,47 or how its decision is likely to be 
received by the investing community.48 The Australian Panel’s jurisdiction 
                                            
44See section 119 (1) of the Companies Act of 2008 and the Takeover Regulations. Regulation 
117 specifically states that the Panel must approve circular or announcement to shareholders.  
45See sections 119(1) and 201(3) of the Companies Act of 2008. The sections confirm a similar 
approach adopted by the UK City Code. 
46See UK City Code in 2 of the Introduction. 
47See discussions on Australian Guidance Note 1 Unacceptable Circumstances in chapter 4 
para 4 2 4.  
48I Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeovers Panel and Takeovers 
Regulation in Australia 10-11. 
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extends beyond the parties involved in the proceedings.49 Given the fact that 
the Australian Panel is tasked with interpreting and applying policies underlying 
the takeover provisions, rather than specific legal requirements, it is appropriate 
for it to look beyond a “strictly legal context”. Fairness and equity are also 
required.50  
 
The SA Panel has powers to exempt transactions in section 119(6) of the 
Companies Act of 2008. The UK Panel has wide powers to derogate or grant 
waivers from application of its rules.51 The SA exemptions are limited to those 
affected transactions or offers where there is no reasonable potential of the 
transaction prejudicing shareholders; if the cost of compliance is 
disproportionate relative to the value of the affected transaction or offer; or 
where giving the exemption is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances 
of the transaction taking into consideration the principles and purposes of the 
Takeover Provisions.52  
 
In Australia, ASIC have powers to exempt parties from compliance in terms of 
section 655A of the Corporations Act 2001. Prior to granting the exemption, 
ASIC must consider the principles set in section 602 the Corporations Act 
2001.53 However, there are notable differences between the Australian and the 
South African provisions and, the authorities that exercise powers to regulate 
takeovers and mergers. For example, in Australia, the powers to exempt 
transactions from compliance lies with ASIC, rather than the Australian 
Takeover Panel, but those powers are subject to review by the Australian 
Takeover Panel.54 In South Africa, the Executive Director or Deputy Executive 
Director of the Panel may exercise powers to exempt 55 or the TSC where the 
                                            
49E Armson “The Australian Takeovers Panel and unfair prejudice to third parties” (2004) 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 204. 
50192.  
51See UK City Code 2(c) on Derogations and Waivers in Introduction. 
52See section 119(6) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
53These are the main principles for regulating takeovers and mergers.  
54Ramsay “The Takeovers Panel: A Review” in The Takeover Panel and Takeover Regulation 
in Australia 8.  
55Section 119(6) of the Companies Act of 2008 read with section 200(2) and 200(3) of the 
Companies Act of 2008. 
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matter has been referred to it.56 Any decision by the Executive Director or 
Deputy Executive Director is subject to a review by the TSC.57 The final arbiter 
in any dispute are the courts, as discussed under remedies and enforcement 
in chapter 5, paragraph 5 8 above. 
 
6 4 A brief evaluation of the companies and types of takeover and merger 
transactions regulated in the selected countries  
 
The US, generally does not have a mandatory offer rule, although no state is 
precluded from enacting such a rule.58 However, the US disclosure regime 
similar to that required by section 122 of the 2008 Act, goes beyond those of 
the other jurisdictions.59 Shareholders acquiring more than 5 percent must not 
only disclose their shareholdings, but also declare whether or not they are 
intending to effect a takeover or influence control and, if so, to provide detailed 
information regarding their plans and proposals.60 The requirements are mainly 
aimed at revealing potential offerors at an early stage. In addition, the 
disclosures are aimed at wider issues of transparency.61  
 
As pointed out, “[T]his is the corollary of there being no mandatory offer 
requirements under US federal law.”62 Boardman,63 indicates that while the US 
may not have a mandatory offer bid, its disclosure rules aimed at flushing out 
potential bidders are aggressive. In addition, the board of directors has powers 
to frustrate a takeover bid should they believe that it is not in the interest of 
shareholders.64 The measures offer protection to shareholders by empowering 
their board, rather than the shareholders. This would not be appropriate in the 
                                            
56See section 202 (3)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
57Section 202 (3)(b) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
58See discussion in paragraph 2 1 above, and also Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 322 and 324. 
59Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 322. 
60Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 322. 
61Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 322. 
62Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 322. 
63Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 324 -325. 
64See Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 325. See also detailed discussions dealing with the 
standards of reviewing directors’ powers set by the courts when considering defensive tactics 
under paragraph 2 5.   
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SA context, as the measure risks disenfranchising minority shareholders.65   
 
The Takeover Provisions in South Africa apply to regulated companies as 
defined in section 117(1)(i), which includes public companies, state owned 
companies and private companies. However, in South Africa, section 118(1)(c) 
of the Companies Act of 2008 makes Takeover Provisions applicable to a wider 
number of private companies. The wide application of this section has been 
criticised by various commentators.66 The South African takeover provisions 
are onerous to small privately-owned companies. The criticism against section 
118(1)(c) of the Companies Act of 2008 has been discussed in chapter 5 above.  
 
The UK City Code applies to all takeovers and mergers of companies listed on 
the stock exchange and certain private companies. The UK City Code applies 
to the following companies: private companies, if such private companies have 
had their securities admitted to trading on a regulated market or a multilateral 
trading facility in the UK or on any stock exchange in the Channel Islands or 
the Isle of Man at any time during the 10 years prior to the relevant date, or if 
dealings and/or prices at which persons were willing to deal in any of their 
securities have been published on a regular basis for a continuous period of at 
least six months in the 10 years prior to the relevant date, whether via a 
newspaper, an electronic price quotation system or otherwise; or if any of their 
securities have been subject to a marketing arrangement as described in 
section 693(3)(b) of the UK Companies Act at any time during the 10 years prior 
to the relevant date, or if they have filed a prospectus for the offer, admission 
to trading or issue of securities with the registrar of companies or any other 
relevant authority in the UK.67  
 
The rules applicable to private companies in the UK appear to be intended to 
cover only private companies, which have widely held shares. It can be 
asserted that such requirements are necessary where companies have been 
                                            
65Boardman 2010 Acta Juridica 325. 
66PJ Sutherland “The State of Company Law in South Africa (A Review of Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive South African Economy by T Mongalo)” (2012) 1 Stell 157. 
67See Introduction 3(a) of the UK City Code.  
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previously listed on an exchange or the companies’ shares have been offered 
to the general public. This is due to the fact that where there is large number of 
shareholders involved, there is a greater chance of unfair and unequal 
treatment among them. Therefore, it is important that such shareholders be 
entitled to protection in terms of the takeover rules. Australia also appears to 
adopt a similar approach to the UK that only private companies that have a 
certain number of shareholders should be subject to takeover or merger 
provisions. The Australian takeover provisions apply to listed companies, 
unlisted companies that have 50 or more members and to listed managed 
investment schemes.68  
 
Australia and the UK do not have the concept of treatment among them. 
Therefore, it is important that such shareholders be entitled to protection in 
terms of the takeover rules. Australia al extends to listed investment schemes.69 
The UK and South African takeover provisions, on the other hand, are limited 
to companies.70  
 
The manner in which the transactions that are regulated are classified appears 
to differ from country to country although the type of transactions regulated are 
substantially the same. The SA Panel regulates affected transactions as 
defined in section 117(1) of the Companies Act 2008. These transactions have 
been dealt with in chapter 5 in this dissertation. The UK does not have a 
specified categorised list of transactions similar to South Africa. However, the 
UK City Code indicates that the transactions regulated are broadly referred to 
as ‘takeover bids and ‘merger transactions’. These transactions include 
schemes of arrangement. Other transactions include acquisitions by parent 
companies of shares in their subsidiaries, dual holding company transactions, 
new share issues, share capital re-organizations and offers to minority 
shareholders, which have as their objective or potential effect (directly or 
indirectly) obtaining or consolidating control of the relevant companies, as well 
                                            
68See chapter 6 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
69Section 606 of Corporations Act 2001. 
70UK City Code in 2 of the Introduction and in the case of SA, the definition of a regulated 
company in terms of section 117(1)(i) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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as partial offers. These transactions are defined in broad terms as ‘takeovers’ 
and ‘offers’.71 Section 602 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides for 
regulation of takeovers and mergers. Australian takeover provisions distinguish 
between market bids and off-market bids in section 616 of the Corporations Act 
2001. The UK Companies Act 2006 and the UK City Code does not specify 
market bids or off-market bids. Similarly, SA has no such distinction. 
 
The Australian takeover and merger procedures discussed in chapter 4 differs 
from those of the UK and South Africa in one very significant respect. Section 
606 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 has an outright prohibition to 
acquire or make an offer to acquire certain percentages of relevant interests in 
voting shares of specified companies. The starting point of the Australian 
takeover provisions is to prohibit specified acquisitions of voting shares or 
relevant interests in listed companies, in unlisted companies with more than 50 
members, or in listed investment management schemes, unless the 
acquisitions have been exempted in terms of section 611 of the Corporations 
Act 2001. 
 
The South African Takeover Provisions include disposals of the greater part or 
major assets or undertakings of companies in terms of section 112 of the 
Companies Act 2008, schemes of arrangements, mergers or amalgamations in 
addition to regulating transactions relating to acquisition of voting shares.72 The 
South African takeover provisions, like those in the UK, empowers the Panel to 
regulate schemes of arrangement albeit that, the South African Act does not 
allow the Panel to regulate compliance with the Chapter 5 Part A that deals with 
the basic requirements for these transactions. Moreover, schemes of 
arrangement in South Africa will seldom involve the courts. This will be the case 
only where shareholders have requested the company to do so or have applied 
to the courts.73 Voting procedures for schemes of arrangements in South Africa 
                                            
71UK City Code in 3(b) of the Introduction. 
72See definition of affected transactions in section 117(1) (c) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
73Section 114 of the Companies Act of 2008. Schemes of arrangements are required to comply 
with the provisions of sections 114, 115 and 164 and the Takeover Regulations.  
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are similar to those in the UK.74 In the UK, schemes of arrangement are subject 
to regulation by the UK Panel and the courts. The court process involves three 
steps.75 An application must be made to court to convene a scheme meeting; 
shareholders must vote in favour of the scheme at the meeting and; an 
application must be submitted to court to sanction the scheme.76 The court is 
not obliged to approve the scheme simply because shareholders have voted in 
favour of the scheme; it has an unfettered discretion to reject or approve it.77 
The documents presented to shareholders to enable them to vote at the 
scheme meeting must be in accordance with the UK City Code.78 The UK Panel 
ensures that all the schemes of arrangement contain the disclosures as if they 
were offers made in terms of the rules contained in the UK City Code.79  
 
In Australia, however, the Australian Takeover Panel has no powers to regulate 
schemes of arrangements. This is the exclusive domain of the courts. ASIC 
also reviews documents relating to a scheme and issues a statement indicating 
that it has no objection to the scheme. The statement is then presented at 
court.80 However, researchers suggest that the supervisory role for schemes of 
arrangement must be shifted from the courts to the Australian Takeover 
Panel.81 
 
Following a general offer or a mandatory offer, section 124(2) of the Companies 
Act of 2008 allows an offeror to acquire the shares of shareholders who have 
not responded to the offer where 90 percent of the shareholders to whom an 
offer was made, have accepted the offer in accordance with the section.82 This 
is similar to the UK83 and Australian84 expropriation sections. Shareholders also 
                                            
74See discussions in paragraph 5 6 4 in chapter 5 dealing with schemes of arrangement. 
75Payne (2011) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 87.  
7687. 
77N Boardman “A critical analysis of the new South African takeover laws as proposed under 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 316. 
78See Appendix 7 to the UK City Code that deals with schemes of arrangements. 
79See Appendix 7 to the UK City Code. 
80See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 317. 
81Hoyle “An Overview of the Role and Powers of the Takeovers Panel” in The Takeovers Panel 
and Takeover Regulation in Australia 26. 
82See section 124 of the Companies Act of 2008 also referred to as “squeeze out”. 
83See UK Companies Act 2006, section 979(2) (a). 
84See Chapter 6A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001. 
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have a corresponding right to force the acquirer who holds 90 percent to acquire 
their shares.85 The squeeze out provisions give both the offeror and the 
shareholders of the offeree company, subject to compliance with its 
requirements, an opportunity to sell-out at the same initial offer price.86 In the 
US, it appears that there is no federal law that provides for an explicit right for 
the remaining shareholders to compel the controlling shareholder to acquire 
their shares similar to section 124(4) of the Companies Act 2008. The DGCL 
also does not have a similar provision.87 However, it is suggested that in certain 
instances freeze-outs and appraisal rights under section 262 of the DGL 
achieve similar results.  
 
The UK has two thresholds for the mandatory offer to be triggered being 30 
percent and 50 percent of the voting rights, as discussed in chapter 3 above, 
while SA has only one threshold of 35 percent. The mandatory offer in the UK 
must be subject to a condition that the offeror must receive acceptances which 
will result in it holding more than 50 percent of the voting rights. Further, the 
offeror must not trigger a mandatory offer if its implementation is subject to the 
passing of the offeror shareholders’ resolution, other conditions, consents or 
arrangements.88 SA has no such requirements. Another major difference 
between the Australian takeover provisions and those of the UK and South 
Africa is that the Australian takeover provisions do not have mandatory offer 
requirements as indicated in paragraph 4 2 2 of chapter 4 above. 
 
A distinct feature of the South African Takeover Provisions as compared to 
those of UK and Australia is that fundamental transactions are subject to a 
requirement for appraisal rights in terms of section 164 of the Companies Act 
of 2008. The appraisal right remedy in terms of section 164 has been discussed 
in chapter 5 above. In this respect, South Africa follows the United States, in 
particular Delaware State. However, due to the different legal systems and 
                                            
85See also Payne (2011) Journal of Corporate Law 72. 
86See S Luiz “Protection of holders of securities in the offeree regulated company during 
affected transactions: general offers and schemes of arrangements (2014) SA Merc LJ 581.  
87See EJ Weiss “Balancing interests in cash-out mergers: The promise of Weinberger V UOP 
Inc.” (1983) Delaware Journal of Corporation Law 18. 
88UK City Code rule 9.3. 
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procedures followed in SA and Delaware, a comparative analysis is difficult. 
Some of the problems relating to application of appraisal rights in South Africa 
have nevertheless been discussed in chapter 5.  
 
6 5  Evaluating the arguments against the application of the mandatory offer 
in South Africa 
 
The mandatory offer is opposed by a number of researchers but has its 
supporters. The debates on the rationales for the application of mandatory offer 
rules have been discussed in various chapters above and its connection with 
the equal opportunity rule was established in chapter 2 relating to US takeover 
laws. However, it is concluded that these rules do more harm than good in SA 
and Australia while the US is better off for not adopting a mandatory offer rule. 
 
  In respect of South Africa, Katz89 questions the reason for implementing the 
mandatory offer rule. He questions the intellectual justification for implementing 
the rule. He further points out that the approach in the Perlman case was 
probably only justified by the special and unique facts of the case. Wiblin90 
comments that this may be one of those unfortunate cases where legislation is 
made based on a single case within a specific context. It is not clear if research 
was done to establish whether it was appropriate to apply the mandatory offer 
rule in South Africa. It appears that the rule was accepted as appropriate for 
implementation in South African markets without considering the differences 
between UK and South Africa’s financial markets, such as the shareholding 
structures.  
 
The assertions advanced by Dignam91 relating to the distortion of the market 
for corporate control by concentrated share ownership structures, seem to be 
correct if one considers the proposed takeover of Adcock by CFR by means of 
                                            
89MM Katz “Developments in corporate law” Journal for Juridical Science (1997) 22:2 Journal 
for Juridical Science 37. 
90JR Wiblin “Mandatory takeover offer-too high a price for the economy to pay?” (2004) 29:3 
Journal for Juridical Science 117.    
91A Dignam “Transplanting UK Takeover Culture: The EU Takeover Directive and the Australian 
experience” (2007) 4 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 148. 
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a scheme of arrangement in terms of section 114 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
The success of the scheme of arrangement was dependent on the support of 
major shareholders. At that time, a consortium led by the Bidvest Group Ltd 
was not in support of the scheme.92 The attempted takeover of Adcock by CFR 
failed due to the fact that the consortium accumulated 34,5 percent of the 
shares, which then indicated that the scheme would not be successful as the 
consortium would not vote in favour of it, and approval of 75% of the votes of 
shareholders was required before the scheme of arrangement could pass.93 
However, it is suggested that had one of the major shareholders supported the 
scheme even prior to the consortium bid, the scheme of arrangement may well 
have succeeded. Large shareholders opposed to a takeover will make it difficult 
for a takeover bid to succeed. This results in a negative influence on the 
preference for the sale of corporate market control.  
 
There appears to be a dearth of reliable information concerning control 
structures in companies.94 This causes problems in assessing the extent of 
protection for minority shareholders and the equality of the corporate 
governance system prevailing within a country.95 In SA, Luiz has pointed out 
that there is limited research about mandatory offers.96 Researchers generally 
accept the assertion that large economies such as the US and the UK have 
dispersed ownership.97 On the contrary, South Africa has concentrated share 
                                            
92See SENS Further Cautionary Announcement regarding the cash offer by a consortium led 
by The Bidvest Group Ltd dated 3 December 2013 by Adcock. The announcement states that 
should the Consortium hold 25 percent of the voting shares of Adcock, the Consortium would 
have negative control. This on its own suggests that without the support of the Consortium – a 
potential major shareholder at that stage, the scheme would fail.  
93 See SENS announcement by Adcock and CFR dated 7 February 2014 relating to the joint 
announcement by Adcock and CFR on the termination of the proposal to implement the scheme 
of arrangement due to the fact that The Bidvest Consortium held 34,5 percent Available at: 
http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?id=227208 (Accessed on 
20-3-2014). 
94See M Massari, V Monge & L Zannetti “Control premium in the presence of rules imposing 
mandatory tender offers: can it be measured?” (2004) Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”, 
MilanoIAFC – Institute of Accounting, Finance, and Control 3 
95Massari, et al (2004) Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”, MilanoIAFC – Institute of 
Accounting, Finance, and Control.3 
96Luiz An evaluation of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers LLD Thesis, Unisa. (2003) 727. 
97See Armour & Skeel Jr (2007) Georgetown Law Journal, 1728-1729. 
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ownership structures.98 Therefore, it can be argued that the impact of the 
mandatory offer rule on a UK company and a South African company will be 
different. The impact of the mandatory offer rule may discourage a change of 
control of a South African company. The large concentrated shareholding 
structures may require more mandatory offers to effect a change of control. 
This in turn requires large financial resources. Dispersed shareholding may 
have fewer mandatory offers. In light of the arguments put forward by 
researchers, questions may be asked as to the appropriateness of South Africa 
adopting the mandatory offer rule based on the UK rules. Concentrated 
ownership has been shown to consistently distort the market for ownership and 
control.99 Therefore, the market for corporate control may not be as effective as 
it could be. The DTI 2004 Policy document, indicates that the new company law 
should be consistent with existing laws, including BBBEE legislation.100 
However, the retention of the mandatory offer section in its current form is not 
in line with the policy document. Any value enhancing BBBEE transaction is 
likely to be impeded by the mandatory offer requirement. This will be discussed 
in a separate paragraph below.  
 
Even though the mandatory offer bid rule is intended to offer protection to 
minority shareholders when change of control occurs, there is no consensus on 
whether this can be achieved.101 One of the reasons is that the mandatory offer 
reduces the number of value-increasing transactions for corporate control.102 
Offerors are unlikely to make a higher offer knowing that they face the possibility 
of having to make a mandatory offer at a higher price.103 To avoid the high costs 
of a mandatory offer, such offerors will consider the implications of their 
                                            
98See G Hertig & JA McCahery “Company and Takeover Law Reforms in Europe: Misguided 
Harmonization Efforts or Regulatory Competition?” (2003) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law 
Working Paper No. 12/2003. 4 and A Dignam “The globalisation of General Principle 7: 
transforming the market for corporate control in Australia and Europe” (2008) Legal Studies 
96–118.  
99Dignam (2008) Legal Studies 22. 
100DTI 2004 Policy document.14. 
101T Papadopoulos "The mandatory provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and their 
deficiencies." (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review 528. 
102528. 
103528. 
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acquisition strategies before crossing the mandatory offer threshold.104 They 
will try to acquire shares at a price below the premium as they know that they 
will be required to buy additional shares from the remaining shareholders at the 
same price. This action will deprive the minority shareholders of the very 
protection that the mandatory offer rule is supposed to provide.105 Given the 
knowledge that there is an obligation to make a mandatory offer at the same 
offer price at which control was acquired from the controlling shareholders, an 
offeror is likely to reduce the premium to be paid to the controlling 
shareholder.106 The reason why an offeror would pay a higher price is to be 
able to make a profit from the company. It is doubtful whether any rational 
businessperson will undertake an action, which will oblige him to pay more for 
less value.107  
 
The strongest proponents of the deregulatory approach in takeovers are 
Easterbrook and Fischel,108 who hold that any requirement for sharing of the 
premium reduces the likelihood that there will be any gains to share. In the US, 
the approach is that a majority shareholder is free to sell the controlling stake.109 
While it is acknowledged that minority shareholders may be negatively affected 
during the transfer of corporate control, it is also asserted that there are 
adequate corporate rules to prevent possible abuse.110 In contradistinction to 
those countries enforcing the mandatory offer rule, the state of Delaware allows 
the market for corporate control to operate through the market rule approach.111 
Based on this approach, the new acquirer of corporate control determines the 
price it wishes to pay to the existing controller, without the sharing of a premium 
for control with other shareholders, required in the case of a mandatory offer 
bid. Corporate laws in the State of Delaware, adopt a director-centered 
                                            
104528. 
105528. 
106Massari et al (2004) Università Commerciale “Luigi Bocconi”, Milano IAFC – Institute of 
Accounting, Finance, and Control 4. 
107Papadopoulos (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review 528.  
108FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel “Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) 91 The Yale Law 
Journal 698.  
109See Zetlin v Hanson Holdings Inc. Zetlin 48 N.Y.2d 684 (1979) Court of Appeals of the State 
of New York. See also the discussions under paragraph 2 2 above. 
110Duke 1961 Duke Law Journal 560. 
111See Schuster 2010 LSE Law 9. 
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approach towards takeovers and mergers. This gives directors discretion to 
decide on a merger or a takeover.112 Corporate law also supports a dual 
approach to deal with approval of takeovers and mergers to deal with agency 
problems and the possible conflict of interests, particularly where directors are 
in the final stage of their tenure, as in transactions involving a change of 
control.113 In those instances directors approve a merger followed by 
shareholder voting to protect the interests of shareholders interests. In a way, 
this is similar to the requirements for shareholder approval in cases of 
fundamental transactions.114  
 
Mandatory offers have been labelled “bad for the market of corporate control, 
the freedom of establishment, and the integration of European equity markets 
in general.”115 The mandatory offer rule has the effect of interfering with 
penetration of equity markets in Europe.116 When corporate ownership is highly 
concentrated, the mandatory offer rule will tend to prevent corporate 
acquisitions: it becomes “in practice, an anti-takeover defense”.117 Albuquerque 
and Schroth found, among other things, that the mandatory bid rule enforced 
in the EU, is not necessarily beneficial to shareholders.118 The mandatory offer 
bid rule during a change of control is regarded as a protection from unfair 
expropriation for shareholders whose companies have dispersed share 
ownership may protect management from an effective challenge in companies 
with concentrated shareholder ownership.119 Some scholars also reject the 
“highest price rules” advocated by the EU Directive as based on the UK City 
Code.120 The ability of the mandatory offer rule to act as dampener for changes 
                                            
112Black & Kraakman 2002 North Western University School of Law 558. 
113559. 
114See discussions under paragraph Chapter 5  
115Papadopoulos (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review 528. 
116528. 
117SM Sepe “Private Sale of Corporate Control: Why the European Mandatory Offer Bid Rule  
is Inefficient” (2010) Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper 10-29. 26. 
118RA Albuquerque & EJ Schroth “Determinants of the Block Premium and of Private Benefits 
of Control” (2008) ECGI- Finance Working Paper No 202/2008; Swiss Finance Institute 
Research Paper No. 08-21. 2. 
119See S Deakin “Corporate governance, finance and growth: Unraveling the relationship” 
(2010) Acta Juridica 217. 
120Hertig & McCahery (2003) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law Working Paper No. 12/2003. 
27. 
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of control that are disciplinary measures for ineffective directors has been 
discussed in detail in chapter 5 above.  
 
6 6 Evaluating the dispute resolution procedures of the selected countries: 
The SA Takeover Special Committee, the UK Hearings Committee and 
the UK Takeover Appeal Board, and the Australian Review Panel   
 
The UK Panel regulates all aspects of a takeover or a merger, including the 
discussions prior to the announcement of the transaction.121 The day-to-day 
functions of the Panel are undertaken by the executives of the Panel who 
operate independently of the Panel.122 The executives provide guidance on the 
interpretation, application and effect of the City Code.123 Their procedures 
include resolution of disputes where the executives of the Panel issue rulings. 
The executives may also publish Practice Statements and provide non-binding 
opinions.124 If parties do not agree with any decision, they may appeal to the 
Hearings Committee, and finally, to the Takeover Appeal Board (UK Appeal 
Board).125 Proceedings before the UK Hearings Committee are usually private. 
The hearings are conducted in terms of the Rules of Procedure, which set 
various steps and how parties must conduct themselves during hearings. 
Although not usual, parties may be represented by legal advisers. Witnesses 
may be called with the consent of the chairman. The hearings are informal and 
there are no rules of evidence.126 Rulings of the Hearings Committee are 
binding on the parties to the proceedings, unless and until overturned by the 
Takeover Appeal Board. Rulings may be published in the form of a Panel 
Statement.127 Appeals against decisions of the Hearings Committee goes to 
the Appeal Board the UK Appeal Board is an independent body made up of 
three members.128 The UK Appeal Board is created in terms of the UK City 
                                            
121The UK City Code, Introduction. 
122See UK City Code in 5 of the Introduction. 
123See UK City Code in 6 of the Introduction. 
124See UK City Code in 6 of the Introduction. It is indicated that the executives may among 
others, provide opinions and guidance on the interpretation of the City Code.  
125UK City Code in 7 and 8 of the Introduction. 
126See UK City Code in 7(b) of the Introduction. 
127UK City Code in 7 of the Introduction. 
128UK City Code in 8 of the Introduction. 
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Code. The procedures of the UK Appeal Board are set-out in its rules.129 The 
hearing process of the UK Appeal Board is similar to that conducted by the 
Hearings Committee. Its rulings are issued as public statements. 130   
 
The South African Panel also regulates all aspects of an affected transaction 
or offer, including the resolution of disputes. The Executive Director of the Panel 
may perform any function of the Panel subject to the Act, the Takeover 
Regulations, policies and directions of the Panel.131 The daily functions of the 
Panel are undertaken by the Executive Director and officers of the Panel.132 
The Executive Director or Deputy Director’s decision may be appealed or 
reviewed by the TSC.133 There is only one level of appeal as compared to that 
of the UK that has two levels for appeals. 
 
The SA TSC is a committee of the Panel and is created in terms of section 202 
of the Companies Act of 2008. Members of the TSC are not separate from those 
of the Panel. However, membership of the TSC is restricted to those members 
appointed by the Minister in terms of section 197(d). In addition, the chairperson 
is required to have certain qualifications.134  
The primary focus of the Australian Takeover Panel is to resolve disputes 
during a takeover or a merger. The review and approval of takeover documents 
is undertaken by ASIC.135 The Panel may review the decisions of ASIC.136 The 
appeal, like those in the UK and South Africa, take the form of a rehearing. 
However, the review panel may not refer the matter back to the original 
panel.137 Furthermore, the Australian Panel prefers written submissions rather 
than oral arguments.138 The Australian Panel also prefers to accept 
                                            
129See also Takeover Appeal Board at www.thetakeoverappealboard.org.uk. (Accessed 20-12- 
2016). 
130UK City Code in 8 of the Introduction. 
131See section 200(2) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
132See regulation 116. 
133Section 202(3) of the Companies Act of 2008.  
134See discussions in paragraph 5 3 of Chapter 5. 
135See paragraph 4 2 3 of chapter 4 above, discussing bodies responsible for regulating 
takeovers in Australia. 
136See paragraph 4 2 3 2 of chapter 4 dealing with Australian Panel. 
137Calleja The New Takeovers Panel – A Better Way? (2002) 18. 
138E Armson “Models for Takeover Dispute Resolution: Australia and the UK” (2005) 5 Part 2 
JCLS 418-422. 
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undertakings to comply rather than make orders.139 In contrast, in South Africa, 
it is common for parties to make written submissions followed by oral 
arguments.140 In addition, the South African TSC issues written rulings and 
reasons for such rulings are the norm.141 The TSC is not an appeal tribunal in 
the traditional sense. At a hearing of the TSC, the matter may be argued de 
novo and parties are not restricted to arguing the matter based on the papers 
submitted earlier. The TSC rehears the matter and new evidence may be 
submitted to it. The regulations are specific in that the South African Panel is 
not restricted to the laws of evidence.142  
 
The process of regulating takeovers and mergers in Australia is formalistic 
compared to the UK, which has informal procedures.143 Australian Panel 
proceedings are conducted like those of a court in an adversarial setting.144 The 
panel deals with disputes between the parties in an adversarial setting. 
However, it is also pointed out that the panel proceedings are markedly different 
from a court process. The panel takes into consideration the need to deal with 
matters speedily, efficiently and fairly.145  
 
Some researchers criticise the Australian Panel’s proceedings as lacking 
transparency and not being up to the standard of what could be expected before 
a court.146 However, such restrictions are based on efficiency concerns as they 
seek to encourage parties to provide complete information as quickly as 
possible. The restrictions are also aimed at avoiding an adverse effect on the 
market due to partial publicity. Often parties who attend the proceedings will 
have additional information about both companies, which is not in the public 
domain. This can result in unfairness for those parties who are not able to 
                                            
139418-422. 
140See Regulation 119(1). 
141See Regulation 119(3) (c) which requires that the chairperson of the TSC must provide a 
written decision supported by reasons and a summary to the parties within a reasonable period. 
142See Companies Regulation 119. 
143Armson (2005) JCLS 421.  
144E Armson “The Australian Takeover Panel: Commercial Body or Quasi-Court” (2004) 
Melbourne University Law Review 568.  
145568-569. 
146571.  
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attend the hearing.147 During the hearing of the South African TSC, parties 
exchange a number of documents such as applicant submissions and claim 
document, respondent submissions, matters agreed, and heads of argument 
as if they exchange pleadings in a court case.148 The TSC’s proceedings are 
open to the public, unless one of the parties can justify that the proceedings 
should be held in private.149 In addition, the regulations governing the 
proceedings are simple and do not resemble rules set for court proceedings, 
as they are controlled by the chairperson of the TSC. They may be conducted 
informally.150 Often parties agree on a timetable for exchanging heads of 
argument.  
 
However, some of the procedural steps such as the exchange of documents 
appear to be somewhat formalistic, even though the regulation provides for 
informal procedures.151 It is asserted that the formalistic nature of South African 
proceedings can be attributed to the fact that the majority of the members of 
the TSC are practising attorneys and that the Companies Act of 2008 requires 
that an attorney or an advocate, whether practicing or not must be the 
chairperson of the TSC.152 In some cases, junior and senior advocates 
represent parties that appear at TSC hearings. In a hostile takeover of 
Freeworld Coating Limited (Freeworld) by Kansai Paint Co. (Kansai), Freeworld 
and Kansai were each represented by a junior and senior advocate, and an 
additional team of attorneys.153 The formalistic process of the South African 
panel is similar to that of the Australian Panel, where it has been indicated that 
the presence of a large number of lawyers on the panel influences procedures 
                                            
147569-570. 
148See Regulation 119 and also the Ruling of the TSC in Country Bird Holdings Proprietary Ltd 
v Sovereign Food Investments Limited. Available on www.trpanel.co.za./rulings. (Accessed 8 -
8- 2017). 
149In terms of regulation 119, the proceedings of the TSC are under control of the chairperson 
and may in appropriate circumstances rule on such a request.  
150See Regulation 119 of the Takeover Regulations which provides for among other things: 
calling of witnesses; the informal nature of the hearing; who must preside and control the 
hearing; the audi alteram partem; recording and transcription of the hearing; decisions and 
written reasons for the decision and publication of the decision of the TSC, or the Panel. 
151Takeover Regulation 119.  
152Section 202(2)(a) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
153See Ruling of the TSC in Country Bird Holdings Proprietary Ltd v Sovereign Food 
Investments Limited.  
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adopted by the panel. It frequently causes proceedings to become more 
complicated and procedural.154 
 
Australian Panel proceedings are not legalistic and are aimed at promoting 
commercial interests. While the proceedings are formalistic, the Australian 
Panel also tries to discourage litigation attorneys from appearing at its 
proceedings and have issued a guideline in this regard. It is recommended that 
only commercial attorneys who advised the parties should be involved in panel 
hearings. Parties must obtain leave to be represented and this is normally 
granted.155 The SA Takeover Provisions have no such restrictions during panel 
proceedings.  
 
The participation of lawyers in Panel proceedings has raised some concerns in 
Australia. This is due to the fact that panel proceedings may be subject to 
tactical litigation.156 Tactical litigation could result in delaying takeovers and 
mergers. This would be against policy considerations that takeovers and 
mergers should be regulated as efficiently as possible.157 However, the counter 
argument is that lawyers may promote efficiency by facilitating that the Panel 
consider relevant legal and takeover policy issues.158 The Australian 
regulations provides for procedures to deal with parties who misbehave during 
panel proceedings or who abuse panel proceedings.159  
 
A comparison of the UK Panel hearing procedures indicates that they are better 
structured and more user friendly than those of South Africa. However, the 
Australian hearing procedures would be preferable for South Africa. The 
Australian regulations dealing with procedures for hearings are clear and 
detailed.160 The Australian regulations place an emphasis on “speedy and 
                                            
154Armson (2005) JCLS 425. 
155423. 
156423. 
157See section 196 (2)(d) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
158 Armson (2004) Melbourne University Law Review 573. 
159Australian Takeovers Panel, Panel Proceedings, (Australian Takeover Panel Procedural 
Rules) Available at: http//www.takeovers.gov.au. content/rules_for_proceedings/ default.aspx, 
(Accessed on 15-2-2014).  
160See Australian Takeover Panel Procedural Rules. 
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quick” resolution of disputes. This requirement is considered to be one of the 
important cornerstones in the regulatory process and resolution of disputes. 
Proceedings must not be delayed unnecessarily.161 
 
In addition, the Australian regulations appear to deal effectively with vexatious 
proceedings, whereas the South African regulations do not have equivalent or 
similar regulations. The role of the Australian Panel in resolving takeover 
disputes is a difficult one. This can be attributed to among others things: the 
adversarial nature of the dispute-resolution process, short time periods involved 
and the technical nature of takeover law, which is combined with consideration 
of policy issues. Procedural fairness is also important as it allows matters to be 
properly ventilated. Parties should have enough time to be heard.162 
 
Even though the UK Panel is now a statutory body, its takeover dispute-
resolution process still operates as it was when it was self-regulatory.163 It 
operates differently from that of Australia. 164 The differences mainly relate to 
the extensive powers the UK Panel has. In addition, the UK Panel has powers 
to make and enforce its own takeover or merger rules. Even though there are 
differences between the two jurisdictions, the Australian and UK panels apply 
similar principles designed to ensure equal treatment of offeree shareholders, 
an informed market and proper conduct by offeree company directors. Both the 
regulatory systems rely mainly on non-judicial bodies to deal with takeover 
matters efficiently. The UK Panel procedures allow for a flexible process for 
dispute resolutions. Decisions are taken quickly and, according to Armour and 
Skeel Jr, in “real time.”165  
 
 
 
 
                                            
161See Armson (2004) Melbourne University Law Review 569. 
162569-573. 
163L Gullifer & J Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy (2011)572. 
164See Armson (2005) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 408-409. 
165Armour & Skeel Jr (2006) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working 
Paper No. 331 2. 
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6 7 A brief evaluation of the enforcement measures for takeovers and 
mergers in the selected countries  
 
The UK City Code makes it clear to parties involved in takeovers and mergers 
what their obligations entail. The UK City Code uses ordinary day-to-day 
English language. The use of legalese has been avoided.166 The drafters 
considered that it is important for rules to be accessible to all since failure to 
comply with the provisions of the City Code is a serious transgression.  
 
In the UK, a number of measures have been adopted to ensure compliance 
with the UK City Code. In some instances, where it is found that the circular 
sent to shareholders is deficient or does not comply with the City Code, parties 
may be required to correct the relevant documents and reissue the document 
to shareholders.167 In addition, parties may be publicly censured, face 
disciplinary action, or be “cold shouldered”.168 These provisions are aimed at 
enforcing and discouraging non-compliance with the UK City Code. It is 
important that non-compliance be dealt with as speedily as possible.  
 
The SA Panel does not have power to discipline, censure or “cold shoulder” 
any party. Instead, the SA Panel may, among other things: prohibit or require 
any action by a person, and order a person to divest of an acquired asset or 
account for profits;169 issue compliance notices for infringements; refer the 
matter to the National Prosecuting Authority or other authority where it believes 
that an offence has been committed; issue a notice of non-referral to the 
complainant; or initiate legal proceedings.170 It is an offence to fail to comply 
with a compliance notice issued by the Panel.171  
 
The SA Panel may also bring a court action for the court to impose an 
administrative fine in terms of section 175 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
                                            
166See the UK City Code, and the rules thereunder. The UK City Code also has extensive 
explanatory notes for most of the rules. 
167The UK City Code in 10 and 11 of the Introduction. 
168The UK City Code in 10 and 11 of the Introduction. 
169Section 119 (5) of the Companies Act of 2008, 
170Section 170 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
171Section 214 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
 
279 
 
Neither the UK Companies Act 2006 nor the UK City Code provides the UK 
Panel with such powers. In Australia, the power of enforcing takeover or merger 
provisions rests with both ASIC and the Australian Panel. 
 
In SA however, the JSE Limited plays a limited role in approving circulars in 
respect of listed companies. For example, companies listed on the JSE Limited 
cannot remove their shares from the listing unless a general offer is made to 
shareholders and they be given an opportunity to exit the company at a fair 
price. However, where the approval of documents relates to other affected 
transactions, the Listings Requirements provides that the Panel must approve 
documents relating to takeovers and copies of documents sent to the Panel for 
approval and letters of approval from the Panel must be submitted to the JSE 
Limited.172 However, as indicated in 5 8 above, the enforcement powers of the 
SA Panel could be enhanced and made more efficient if the rulings of the TSC 
could be enforced in a similar manner as those of the Financial Services 
Tribunal established under section 219 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 
9 of 2017. In Australia, ASIC as a main administrator of the Corporations Act 
2001, has extensive powers in terms of that legislation. According to the 
information sheet from ASIC: 
 
“The ASIC Act directs ASIC to ‘take whatever action it can take, and is 
necessary, in order to, enforce and give effect to the laws of the Commonwealth 
that confer functions and powers on it’.”173 
 
The Australian Panel has powers to declare unacceptable circumstances in 
relation to a takeover or merger. Following the declaration, the Panel may 
then order additional disclosures, cancellation of contracts or even freezing of 
transfers of assets resulting from the transaction.174 Section 119(5) of the 
                                            
172See JSE Limited Listings Requirements sections 9.30-931.   
173See Australian Securities Exchange and Investment Commission, Available at: 
http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/INFO_151_ASIC_approach_to_enf
orcement_20130916.pdf/$file/INFO_151_ASIC_approach_to_enforcement_20130916.pdf> 
(Accessed on 10-10-2014). 
174See discussions in chapter 4 dealing with powers of the Australian Panel in terms of section 
602 of the Corporations Act 2001. 
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Companies Act of 2008, gives the Panel teeth to ensure compliance. In terms 
of the section, the SA Panel may prohibit and require any action by a person 
or order a person to divest of an acquired asset, or account for profits. 
 
The Australian takeover provisions create absolute liability offences for 
contravention of certain provisions.175 The courts enforce the Australian 
Panel’s orders and panel rules.176 The UK Panel has powers to issue 
compliance rulings and compensation rulings in certain circumstances.177 The 
UK Panel also has disciplinary powers in terms the UK City Code.178 The UK 
Panel may also approach the courts to enforce its rules.179  
 
6 8 A brief evaluation of the role of the courts in the regulation of takeovers 
and mergers in the selected countries 
 
In the UK and Australia, takeovers and mergers are the domain of specialist 
commercial regulators, rather than the courts. In contradistinction to the US, 
the role that the courts play during a takeover or a merger in jurisdictions is 
limited. In evaluating the role of the courts in the US during a takeover or 
merger, one should not lose sight of the fact that the various standards of 
reviewing the decisions of the boards of directors were developed by the 
Delaware courts in order to protect shareholders from certain actions of 
directors. Such an approach is not suitable for SA.180 Accordingly, while it may 
be appropriate for SA to adopt certain US provisions such as appraisal rights, 
it would not be appropriate to have the courts as primary regulators of takeovers 
and mergers. However, the standards of reviewing directors’ conduct during 
takeovers and mergers created by Delaware courts, would be useful in 
preventing conflicts and promoting transparency during a takeover or merger 
                                            
175See E Armson “Before the High Court: Attorney-General (Commonwealth) v Alinta Limited: 
Will the Takeovers Panel Survive Constitutional Challenge?” (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review. 
499. 
176See Armson (2007) Sydney Law Review. 499. 
177UK City Code in 10(b) and (c) of the Introduction.  
178UK City Code in 11 of the Introduction. 
179Section 955 of the UK Companies Act 2006 and UK City Code in 10(d) of the Introduction. 
180See Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 325. 
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in the SA context. This would further enhance protection of minority 
shareholders. In particular, the requirement that the board must be well 
informed about a takeover or a merger before requesting shareholders to vote 
on it181 and the requirement that an independent, well informed, fully 
empowered special committee must consider certain takeovers and mergers 
could be of considerable value to shareholders in South Africa.182 Unlike in 
countries where a mandatory offer rule is enforced and where separate 
regulatory bodies actively enforce takeover and merger rules, the courts in 
Delaware are central to enforcing the various corporate law rules, including 
those applicable during takeovers and mergers.183 Accordingly, the courts have 
inter alia developed the important principles that deal with conflicts of interests 
of directors during takeovers and mergers.184   
 
In the UK, the courts may not interfere with the takeover or merger process, in 
accordance with the principles established in the Datafin case.185 There is a 
restraint on the courts’ power to review the decisions of the UK Panel during a 
takeover. The UK Panel, which enforces the UK City Code – has exclusive 
jurisdiction on regulation of a takeover while such a takeover is in progress. The 
implementation of the EU directive has no effect on this rule.  
 
The Australian Panel has exclusive jurisdiction during the course of a takeover 
or a merger.186 The panel may, however, refer questions of law to the courts. 
The Australian Corporations Act 2001, in section 659AA, restricts the role of 
the courts during a takeover or a merger. Section 659AA of the Corporations 
Act 2001 provides that only certain specified governmental agencies may bring 
a matter before the courts. In addition, section 659C of the Corporations Act 
                                            
181See Smith v van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del 1985, a decision of the Delaware Supreme 
Court. 
182See Kahn v M & F Worldwide Corp, 88 A3d 635 (Del 2014), a decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court 
183See the discussions under paragraph 2 3 1.  
184See discussions dealing with the standards of reviewing directors conduct during takeovers 
and mergers created by Delaware courts under paragraph 2 5. 
185R v The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc and another 1987 QB 815. 
See also Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 568. 
186Armson (2005) JCLS 408. 
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2001 limits the powers of the courts to make certain orders following the 
completion of a takeover bid. The courts may not unwind a merger or a 
takeover. Where there is a finding that the Corporations Act 2001 has been 
infringed during a takeover or merger, the court can only order a remedy in the 
form of monetary compensation as indicated in chapter 4.187  
 
The SA Companies Act of 2008, unlike the Australian Corporations Act 2001, 
is silent on whether or not courts may intervene in a takeover or merger 
process. The legislature left it to the courts to decide whether or not to allow 
offerors to approach the courts during the course of the takeover or merger 
process. A brief review of previous court cases indicates that in appropriate 
circumstances offerors may approach the courts and stop an offer prior to its 
completion. In the Gold Fields case,188 court intervention resulted in a hostile 
takeover bid being defeated. Briefly, in the attempted hostile takeover of Gold 
Fields Limited (Goldfields) by Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 
(Harmony), Gold Fields adopted various legal tactics to prevent a hostile 
takeover. The tactics included approaching various regulatory authorities, such 
as, the Competition Authorities and the then SRP, the predecessor to the 
Takeover Regulation Panel, and finally the courts.189 The matter culminated in 
Gold Fields succeeding to defend the hostile takeover. Gold Fields won the 
case when the court held that the period within which the takeover bid had to 
be made had expired, and such a period could not be extended.190 The legal 
tactics eventually led to the hostile bid being prevented. The takeover bid did 
not fail because shareholders did not like the price offered. The shareholders 
did not have the opportunity to choose between accepting or rejecting the offer 
from Harmony. The attempted takeover failed due to the fact that the directors 
of the offeree company prevented the shareholders from making their own 
choices about the merits of the offer.  
 
                                            
187Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 661. 
188Gold Fields Ltd v Connellan NO [2005] 3 All SA 142. 
189A L Christison & RC Williams “The Harmony –Gold Fields Take -over battle” (2008) SALJ 
790- 822. 
190Gold Fields Ltd v Connellan NO [2005] 3 All SA 142. 
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Another attempted hostile takeover involved Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd, 
the target, and Eqstra Holdings Ltd – the offeror. The offeree company 
approached the courts to challenge the takeover on the basis of a contract 
entered with its BBBEE partners. The hostile bid was subject to a condition 
precedent that shareholders holding more than 50 percent of the issued shares 
accept the offer before the offer could be implemented. The offeree company 
argued that in terms of the contract with the BBBEE party, (which was also one 
of the significant shareholders), the BBBEE party could not accept the offer in 
terms of the agreement with the company.191 The court proceedings caused 
delays, and this in turn resulted in the hostile bid failing as the time period for 
the bid had expired. The hostile offeror had to terminate the offer.192 It is 
suggested that the failure to meet the conditions relating to the percentage of 
shareholders who accepted the offer, was influenced by the uncertainty created 
by the court proceedings. Until the court proceedings had been resolved, 
shareholders would have been reluctant to tender into the offer and accept the 
offer since they would not have been certain when they would receive payment. 
Shareholders would prefer to hold on to their share portfolios until the 
uncertainties have been resolved.  
 
In yet another attempted takeover of Adcock Ingram Limited (Adcock) by CFR 
Pharmaceuticals SA (CFR), it was reported that the Bidvest Group Consortium 
was threatening to challenge the proposed scheme of arrangement to be 
entered into by Adcock and CFR before it was implemented.193 According to 
reports in the financial press, court papers were served on some of the parties 
with the aim of preventing the implementation of the scheme transaction. In 
                                            
191BBBEE agreements are subject to funding arrangements involving a number of parties 
including the beneficiary company. Such agreements often restrict the ability of BBBEE 
partners to vote or sell their shares unless parties agree otherwise.  
192See Announcement to shareholders of Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd from Eqstra Holdings 
Ltd about the details of the hostile offer dated 21 February 2013 Available at 
http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?id=208573>, and a 
response announcement from Protech Khuthele Holdings Ltd to its shareholders dated 5 
December 2013, and finally a SENS announcement dated 1 August 2013 from Eqstra 
HoldingsLtd,Availableat:http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?i
d=21737 (Accessed 20-3-2014). 
193BizNews.com. “Bidvest’s legal challenge –executive summary of papers served to spike 
CFR’s guns on Adcock takeover” November 2013 Available at 
(http://www.biznews.com/archives/2013/11/ Accessed 20-3-2014). 
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addition, the application requested, among others, orders that the scheme be 
declared void and that the scheme meetings were not properly convened.194 
The announcement of a court application on its own raised uncertainty for 
parties involved and the affected shareholders as to how such an application 
would impact the scheme of arrangement once the scheme was approved by 
the shareholders.  
 
These cases illustrate that it is possible for unwilling offeree companies to adopt 
tactical litigation to defeat takeovers. Takeover law should not facilitate such 
tactical litigation, as these are prejudicial to offeree-company shareholders.  
It is suggested that court orders to unwind mergers create unnecessary 
uncertainty in the market for corporate control. In Australia, the courts’ powers 
are limited to awarding damages rather than to unwind a transaction.195  
 
6 9 Mandatory offer and Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
 
Of particular importance, and relevance, to South Africa is that the effect of the 
mandatory offer requirement on Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE)should not be underestimated. Acquisitions of shareholdings by 
BBBEE beneficiaries in this context do not refer to the mere handing over of 
shares by one party to another person. Financing of significant BBBEE 
transactions remains one of the stumbling blocks to economic transformation 
in South Africa.196 Therefore, where a mandatory offer is required, funding to 
pay for additional shares for such deals may not be available. It is generally 
acknowledged that raising funding to acquire shares to implement a BBBEE 
transaction is expensive and difficult, and that parties and funders to such 
transactions often resort to some innovative funding structures.197 The 
                                            
194SENS Announcement by Adcock dated 4 December 2013  
Available at: http://data.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb/sharedata/scripts/sens.asp?id=224531> 
(Accessed 20-3-2014). 
195Armson (2009) Melbourne University Law Review 661. 
196See NE Phillips The funding of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa. Unpublished 
Thesis presented in fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters’ Degree in Economics at the 
University of Stellenbosch (2004). 42. 
197See Phillips The funding of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa. In this research, 
it is indicated that BBBEE funding methods are not sustainable and often results in participants 
of such transactions not benefiting. Chapter 2, pp 33-52. 
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requirement for a mandatory offer makes an acquisition of a meaningful stake 
expensive.198 The mandatory offer rule raises the costs of implementing 
BBBEE share ownership transactions.199 
 
For South Africa, it has been suggested that there is no good grounding for the 
mandatory offer rule.200 The Van Wyk de Vries Commission, whose work 
culminated in the introduction of the rule into South African legislation, 
emphasised the protection of minority shareholders.201 It is suggested that the 
possibility that the rule may impede the wider share ownership by previously-
disadvantaged groups was not considered. This fact should not be surprising 
due to the political and economic imperatives at that time. The SAC later raised 
this concern but it was ultimately decided that the rule should be retained.202 
Still, it is submitted that as the imperative of BBBEE gains even further 
momentum, it should be asked whether it is not time to reconsider the rule as it 
undermines BBBEE.  
 
One of the differences between the mandatory offer requirements of the UK 
and South Africa is the trigger threshold.203 It is asserted that this ensures that 
BBBEE parties are not required to make a mandatory offer due to the fact that 
many BBBEE transaction are aimed at holdings of one- third of the voting 
rights.204 It is doubtful that this could have been intended to accommodate 
BBBEE transactions because the mandatory offer rule was in existence even 
before the BBBEE policies were introduced. The threshold of 35 percent is not 
new, as it was set in the SRP Code and the Companies Act of 1973.205 It also 
does not appear from the DTI 2004 Policy document that BBBEE share 
ownership and the impact of the mandatory offer rule on such initiatives were 
                                            
198M Lepaku “Mandatory offers and BEE” (2005) 13 (4) JBL 170-171.171. 
199See Wiblin (2004) Journal for Juridical Science 183.  
200Katz (1997) Journal for Juridical Science 28-41. 
201Luiz (1997) S A Mercantile Law Journal 239-264.  
202Minutes of the SRP held on 4 March 1997. At this meeting, the members of the SRP 
discussed the issue at length at agreed that the mandatory offer rules should be retained. 
Members also agreed to prepare a paper setting out the reason for retaining the rule. 
203Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 324. 
204324.  
205See discussions on this point under chapter 5 on ‘affected transaction’ in terms of section 
440A (1) of the Companies Act of 1973 and the SRP Code. 
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considered.206 If the suggestion is that the BBBEE parties should be satisfied 
with less than 35 percent in order to avoid the mandatory offer rule, then the 
provision is clearly inadequate when it comes to the promotion of BBBEE. 
Although the 35% threshold to some extent ameliorates the impact of 
mandatory offers on BBBEE transactions, the share ownership of BBBEE 
shareholders should not be artificially limited to 35 percent. BBBEE is not about 
merely obtaining the minimum shareholding required by various BBBEE Codes 
but acquisition of meaningful shareholding by black groups. The mandatory 
offer rule is hampering such acquisitions. 
 
Further, as discussed in paragraph 5 6 9 4 of Chapter 5, according to the ruling 
in the MGX case,207 the interpretation of “parties acting in concert” is broad. 
Accordingly, a wide range of parties may become subject to the mandatory offer 
rule because of the wide definition of the phrase “acting in concert”. Within the 
South African context, this broad definition of the concept makes the mandatory 
offer rule broader and limits the ability of BBBEE parties to raise funding. A 
funder may be regarded as a “concert party” and may be liable to make a 
mandatory offer even though the intent was to merely facilitate the acquisition 
of a meaningful stake for the BBBEE shareholders, and not to acquire control. 
This may create a further obstacle for funding for BBBEE transactions.  
 
The findings by researchers about the resistance to changes in patterns of 
share ownership in South Africa, despite the existence of the laws to promote 
BBBEE can be explained by reference to important theories that explain the 
reasons for such resistance. One of the theories relate to path dependency of 
laws. According to Hathaway208  
 
“In broad terms, “path dependence” means that an outcome or decision is 
shaped in specific or systematic ways by the historical path leading to it. It 
entails, in other words, a causal relationship between stages of temporal 
                                            
206See DTI 2004 Policy document. 
207Securities Regulation Panel V MGX Limited WLD Case NO 1602/03. 
208OA Hathaway “Path dependence in the Law: The course and pattern of legal change in a 
common law system” (2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 603- 604.  
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sequences, with each stage strongly influencing the next stage. At the most 
basic level, therefore, path dependence implies that “what happened at an 
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a later point in time”209 
 
Path dependence can result in locking of decisions and resistance to changes. 
This inflexibility can lead to inefficiency when legal rules fail to respond to 
changing conditions.210 This appears to be in line with the assertion of Bebchuk 
and Roe,211 that existing rules may heavily influence new rules. They point out 
that: 
 
“A country’s legal rules at any point in time, might be heavily influenced by the 
ownership patterns that the country had earlier; The efficient ownership 
structure for a company is often path dependent; The relative efficiency of 
alternative ownership structures depends partly on the structures with which 
the company and/or other companies in its environment started; Those parties 
who participate in corporate control under an existing structure might have the 
incentive and power to impede changes that would reduce their private benefits 
of control even if the change would be efficient. For example, a controlling 
shareholder might elect not to move her firm to a diffused ownership structure 
because the move would reduce the controller’s private benefits of control.”212 
 
These findings have important implications for the implementation of initiatives 
to promote the economic participation of black people, such as BBBEE share 
ownership. Such initiatives have little chance of success, unless supported by 
existing shareholders. However, it is not necessarily in the interest of some of 
the shareholders to support such initiatives as they interfere with their private 
benefits. It is of course true that the mandatory offer rule may also offer 
protection for BBBEE shareholders that are shareholder offerees in takeovers. 
However, this argument does not justify maintaining the mandatory offer rule 
because a) of the urgent need to grow meaningful BBBEE shareholding in 
                                            
209603- 604. 
210603- 604.  
211L Bebchuk & M Roe “Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance” 
(1999) Discussion Paper No. 26610/99, Harvard Law School. 3.  
212Bebchuk & Roe (1999) Discussion Paper No. 26610/99, Harvard Law School. 3.  
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companies and b) the relatively low level of shares held by BBBEE 
beneficiaries. Furthermore, it may be argued that other regulations such as 
appraisal rights may also serve as a disincentive for BBBEE and they are 
subject to similar criticisms. However, the appraisal right process does no more 
than to allow the shareholder to receive a fair value for his shares. The cost of 
having to react to appraisal rights may complicate BBBEE transactions but 
probably not to the same extent as mandatory offers. The main problem with 
mandatory offers is that they vastly increase the cost of control transactions. 
This distinction is particularly important if it is considered that major 
shareholders who are aware of the potential benefits that their BBBEE 
transaction will add to the company, will adopt a tactical strategy to defeat such 
a transaction through exercising their appraisal rights. At least the risk that an 
exercise of an appraisal right may be costly for the offeree in comparison to the 
gains achieved from it may keep the exercise of these rights within reasonable 
bounds. At least appraisal rights are only restricted to fundamental 
transactions.  
 
The requirement to pay the same price in terms of the mandatory offer rule 
prevents transfer of control to BBBEE and therefore, partly contributes to the 
failure of initiatives to spread share ownership among listed companies. The 
previous situation whereby certain groups were not able to participate in the 
financial markets is maintained by the enforcement of the mandatory offer 
requirement. Therefore, this supports the argument that rules are path 
dependent, as postulated by some researchers.213 The existence of the earlier 
established mandatory offer requirement influences the implementation of 
BBBEE share ownership in line with the path dependence theory.  
 
Further, the initial legal and political structures affect future corporate rules, 
which in turn affect future decisions on corporate structures. As Bebchuk and 
Roe214 point out, “the concern is with the corporate rules system “in action” 
rather than “on the books”. Therefore, policy makers should be aware of the 
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totality of the rules, which may be an impediment to their efforts in changing the 
economic environment. The role of interest groups in influencing existing and 
old laws has been argued as that their choices might sometimes lead to 
inefficient rules being chosen or maintained.215 Political interactions of those 
interest groups depend on the existing pattern of corporate ownership.216 
Various interest groups will try to protect and maintain their interests by forcing 
the retention or change of certain laws, depending on whether those laws 
threaten or promote their interests.217 In this regard, the relative power of each 
interest group is important in influencing the direction of laws. Due to the fact 
that interest groups differ in their ability to get support and exert pressure in 
favour of or against certain laws, the groups with more resources will tend to 
be more successful.218 These dynamics are suggestive of some of the reasons 
why the existing distribution of wealth and power plays an influential role in the 
rules chosen. Corporate laws of a country may therefore depend on the 
economy’s earlier existing corporate structures.219 The above discussions 
suggest that South Africa should take into consideration some of these 
stumbling blocks when it enacts legislations intended to achieve economic 
changes. The detailed discussions on the dynamics, in respect of South Africa, 
on the role played by various interest groups are beyond the scope of the 
dissertation, however a few brief observations on this topic is justified.  
 
The structure of corporate law in any given country is a consequence of that 
country’s particular pattern of corporate ownership, which is, in turn, 
determined, at least in part, by forces outside corporate law.220 Further, patterns 
of ownership structures shape corporate law in two ways. Firstly, interest 
groups will distribute larger portions of company fruits to themselves and 
secondly, “share ownership patterns shape the problems to which reforms 
designed to facilitate investment respond”.221 The fact that certain groupings 
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will have more wealth means they will have more influence over corporate laws 
that are chosen. Inevitably, these interest groups will more likely choose 
corporate laws which favour the retention of existing corporate structures where 
these structures are the ones that ensure protection of their interests.222 
 
In certain instances, corporate rules affect ownership and governance 
structures in different ways.223 These may include facilitating concentrated 
share ownership structures.224 This is relevant where controlling shareholders 
benefit from private benefits. In such a case, controlling shareholders will be 
reluctant to lose control.225 Therefore, such controlling shareholders are more 
likely to favour existing corporate rules, such as, the mandatory offer rule, which 
protect their position. By making control costly, it ensures that the existing 
controlling shareholders continue enjoying private benefits. Controlling 
shareholders are unlikely to support initiatives aimed at distributing share 
ownership to the broader community. Referring to the rules which encourage 
maintenance of concentrated share ownership, such as, the mandatory offer 
rule, some researchers point out that controlling shareholders are likely to have 
more resources and will use those resources to ensure maintenance of 
concentrated share ownership.226  
 
Scholars point out that control over corporate decision-making and resources 
also provides political power.227 Interest groups such as controlling 
shareholders or professional managers are likely to have more influence 
because of the resources that they have under their command. These 
resources enable them to lobby, contribute to political campaigns and even gain 
political influence. These resources could also provide those interest groups 
with visibility, access to media, ability to raise their social status, and access to 
elite and influential groups.228 All these actions assist these interest groups to 
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influence the corporate laws to what is suitable and beneficial to them.229 Those 
in control of companies can push to retain or expand legal rules that favour 
them. This in turn ensures that existing patterns of ownership are retained.230 
Interest groups choose laws and structures that will benefit them.231 This 
suggests that where there is a pattern of concentrated ownership, programmes 
aimed at encouraging dispersed ownerships may be impeded and, similarly, 
where there are dispersed ownership structures, such structures may be 
maintained. This will be dependent on what the interest group perceives as a 
threat to their interests.  
 
Roe232 suggests that it would be wrong to ignore the societal and political 
considerations, when trying to find reasons why one firm succeeds while 
another fail. Extrapolated to government policies, this means that where 
governments are trying to implement certain policies, it is imperative that policy 
makers not disregard societal and political contexts within which corrective 
initiatives are undertaken. It has also been pointed out that, in some instances, 
the legal system is isolated from social and economic change.233 This suggests 
that policy makers in South Africa should be careful when effecting various 
proposals for economic reforms and improvement. The economic impact and 
efficacy of such programmes in assisting economic development should be 
considered, based on work of researchers from other disciplines, such as, 
economics and sociology.  
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6 10 Concluding remarks 
 
The evaluation in this chapter indicates that similar issues among comparative 
countries influenced the development of regulations for takeovers and mergers. 
The general aims include, to encourage confidence and integrity in financial 
markets by combating any type of fraud, market abuse and misinformation of 
investors. While it is generally accepted that takeovers and mergers must be 
regulated, countries are, however, no closer to finding an effective regulatory 
regime. This is not surprising as jurisdictions face numerous complexities in 
designing a suitable regulatory regime. In the case of the EU, arbitrage and 
regulatory competition also plays an important role in decisions to determine 
which regulatory regime to implement. This may result in companies choosing 
countries which allow innovative takeover rules. 234 Therefore, countries have 
to balance the interests of their corporate citizens against the harmonisation of 
rules relating to protection of shareholders in general.235 
 
Naturally, most countries will lean towards policies that protect their own 
companies and shareholders. Hence, the view has been expressed that the EU 
Takeover Directive “is likely to be ineffective or to promote bureaucratic 
uniformity rather than enable market-driven diversity.”236 According to Ferrell,237 
the US and the UK’s experiences of adopting takeover regimes is important. 
One of the lessons that can be learnt is that, in designing a takeover regime, 
substitutes must be considered having regard to any negative impact such rules 
may have on other specific legal rules aimed at achieving identified goals. For 
SA, the mandatory offer requirement should be considered in this vein. 
 
The US and Australia have developed different takeover and merger regulatory 
systems from those of the UK. Presumably, these regulatory regimes have 
                                            
234See Hertig & McCahery (2003) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law Working Paper No. 
12/2003.34. 
23524. 
2363- 4. 
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been adopted because they serve those countries’ economies and financial 
markets better. Even though there are differences between the SA takeover 
and merger provisions and their UK counterpart, the South African provisions 
have closer similarities to those of the UK than any other comparative country. 
This is not surprising considering that the early SRP Code was transplanted 
word-for-word from the City Code.238 The introduction of the Companies Act 
2008 and the takeover regulations has not significantly changed the earlier 
transplanted takeover rules.239 Therefore, the influence of the UK City Code is 
still evident in the South African takeover and merger legislation in the 
Companies Act 2008 and the Takeover Regulations.240 This is despite the 
marked differences in the ownership structures, economies and social and 
developmental needs of South Africa as opposed to the UK.  
 
The UK City Code had been operative for some years before chapter 6 of the 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 was promulgated. It is also generally 
accepted that the method for regulating takeovers and mergers set-out in the 
City Code is widely applied by many countries. Some of its provisions have also 
been adopted by the EU and have been incorporated in the EU Takeover 
Directive.241 However, despite these accolades, rather than adopting the UK 
model for regulation of takeovers and mergers, Australia chose a different path 
towards achieving an effective takeover and merger regulatory model. It is 
suggested that Australian policy makers took into account their own cultural 
and economic considerations and chose to tailor-make their own takeover 
provisions that would be suitable for their financial markets. Regulations for 
takeovers may differ depending on: 
  
                                            
238See Introduction to the repealed SRP Code indicating that the SRP Code is based on the 
UK City Code. 
239See Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 216. 
240See discussions by Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica on the provisions of the Companies Act 
of 2008 and the UK Companies Act 2006 and the UK City Code. 
241See P Bockli, P Davies, E Ferran, G Ferrarini, J Garrido Garcia, K Hopt, A Pietrancosta, K 
Pistor, R Skog, S Soltysinski, J Winter and E Wymeersch, European Law Experts “Response 
to the European Commission’s Report on the Application of the Takeover Bids Directive” (2014) 
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http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn (Accessed 20-3- 2014). 
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“[T]he varying historical and cultural contexts in which the regulation developed 
and differing emphasis and assessments of priorities.”242 
 
Political considerations also play an important role in determining the type of 
laws to be adopted.243 This is important for South African policy makers as, 
ignoring historical context of legal development may negatively affect 
development of new laws. Closer political ties between countries may well 
result in the adoption of another country’s laws, even though its economies and 
markets may be different to those of the country from where the laws originate. 
This appears to be applicable in the case of South Africa’s adoption of the 
mandatory offer requirement. Historically, the UK has close political ties with 
SA and, therefore, it may have been convenient to adopt some of their rules, 
such as the mandatory offer requirement, without considering the impact of 
these laws on South Africa’s economy and its financial markets. From the 
deliberations of the SAC, it appears that the existing relationship leads to the 
continued application of the mandatory offer.244  
 
Corporate governance systems should not be adopted merely on the 
assumption that because they are effective for a particular country, they also 
will be beneficial for another country. The unique cultural, social and economic 
needs of each individual country must be accommodated within the corporate 
governance systems if such systems are to be accepted by the citizens of those 
countries. Olson245 points out that: 
 
“[W]hat is ‘wrong’win Delaware or England may be entirely appropriate for 
South Africa, just as what works well in South Africa may not work in the culture 
of Germany or Australia. There is and should be room for national variations in 
the thrust and content of corporate governance prescriptions. In South Africa, 
it seems clear to this observer, as a direct result of the relatively recent 
                                            
242Armson (2005) JCLS 402. 
243R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes & A Schleifer (1998) Journal of political economy 1145.See 
also Bebchuk & Roe (1999) Discussion Paper No. 26610/99, Harvard Law School.  
244See discussions in paragraph 5 6 9 3 where the SRP indicated that it must keep with 
international standards. 
245Olson “South Africa moves to a global model of corporate governance but with important 
national variations” (2010) Acta Juridica 247. 
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establishment of a just and diverse political system and related changes to the 
nation’s social and economic structures, that concerns of the Companies Act 
for promotion of broader economic and social benefits than corporate 
profitability, and for worker and another stakeholder representation, are 
understandable and appropriate.”246  
 
In this regard, one needs to consider that the US and the UK have divergent 
corporate systems despite economic, legal and cultural similarities.247 
Therefore, it is important that South African policy makers realise that “social 
needs and regulatory responses will inevitably be bound up with each other”.248 
The mandatory offer rule negatively affects the aims of reducing the socio-
economic inequalities in the country, and creates an unhealthy tension with 
other legislation seeking to promote BBBEE. According to research, it is 
unlikely that a significant number of BBBEE transactions will be achieved 
unless some of the stumbling blocks are removed.249 Abolishing or relaxing the 
application of the mandatory offer rule could be one such initiative. The role of 
takeovers in promoting efficient markets and good governance would also be 
promoted. 
 
The existing patterns of share ownership influence the future of this ownership 
scheme and hence determine the success or failure of policies aimed at 
distributing share ownership. As can be seen from the arguments presented in 
this chapter, the mandatory offer rule assists in the preservation of undesired 
patterns of ownership in SA. Existing constraints may frustrate efforts to ensure 
justice and equity in the economy through, among other things, broad-based 
share ownership. Bebchuk and Roe250 assert that: 
 
                                            
246Olson (2010) Acta Juridica 247. 
247Bruner (2010) Virginia Journal International Law 583. 
248590. 
249See Lipton (2007) Melbourne University Law Review 830. See also Phillips  The funding of 
Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa, who discusses the various obstacles relating 
to financing meaningful shareholding by BBEEE participants. Chapter 2 pp-33-52.  
250Bebchuk & Roe (1999) Discussion Paper No. 26610/99, Harvard Law School. 3.  
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“Path dependence is an important force—one that students of comparative 
corporate governance need to recognise—in shaping corporate governance 
and ownership around the world.” 
 
Hertig and McCahery251 support the view that the differentiation of corporate 
governance systems is necessary, and that the needs of each individual 
country have to be taken into account in corporate reform initiatives. Writing on 
the implications of transplanted laws in the context of the EU, Hertig and 
McCahery deal with the EU Takeover Directive and point out the following: 
 
“[T]here is no simple model for corporate regulators to use when designing 
reforms. While current efforts to modernise European Union (EU) company law 
and to create a takeover regime are influenced by shareholder value 
maximisation considerations, one must not forget that there are political 
barriers to transplanting the Anglo-Saxon approach in continental Europe. 
Given the important differences between corporate governance systems in 
Europe, the appropriate regulatory approach is to provide firms with the 
freedom to select the regulatory environment that suits their needs.”252 
 
Of relevance to SA, Bruner holds that : 
 
“[T]he use of comparative analysis to generate claims about what a given 
country’s regulatory system ought to do is fraught with complex problems and, 
in particular, that social, cultural, and political variables are often airbrushed out 
of the picture to facilitate straightforward cross-border comparisons. As the 
foregoing discussion suggests, comparative analyses ignoring the impact of 
political context will inevitably present a distorted picture, resulting in 
unsupported claims regarding what the future might bring.” 
 
He therefore, indicates that:  
 
                                            
251Hertig & McCahery (2003) ECGI Working Paper Series in Law Working Paper No. 12/2003. 
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“[R]regulatory divergences may actually reflect variation in the social needs and 
problems that each society aims to address through the corporate governance 
system.” 253 
 
This assertion tends to support a view that it is acceptable for countries to differ 
in respect of corporate governance measures. Therefore, it is necessary for SA 
to introduce corporate governance systems that are aimed at achieving 
particular societal goals, namely, that of contributing to the reduction of the high 
economic inequality in the country, and it should be acceptable that different 
corporate governance measures should be adopted. The continued application 
in SA of the mandatory offer rule based on the UK’s City Code should be 
seriously questioned. Differences in the economies and financial markets and 
SA’s unique social and economic developmental needs, justify a different 
approach in SA.
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Chapter 7:  Conclusions and recommendations 
 
“South Africa’s path toward sustainable economic development requires a sound legal 
structure for governance of its businesses – a structure that complements and 
supports the continuing development of a diverse, equitable political system and 
respects South Africa’s distinct social needs.”1  
 
7 1 Conclusions  
 
This dissertation researched regulation of takeovers and mergers with an emphasis 
on the mandatory offer rule, specifically its impact on the market for corporate control 
in South Africa. This concluding chapter recaps the discussions and conclusions 
arrived at in the preceding chapters. It then makes recommendations in respect of the 
mandatory offer rule, the takeover and merger provisions in the Companies Act 2008 
and the Takeover Regulations. From the literature review and the comparative 
research, a number of conclusions has been made in each chapter and these are set 
out underneath. 
 
Takeovers and mergers play an important role in developing a country’s economy.2 
Takeovers and mergers promote good corporate governance by acting as a 
disciplinary measure against managers who perform poorly, and also promote efficient 
allocation of resources within companies. Allowing a free market for corporate control 
is in the best interests of the economy and the society at large.3 Takeovers should be 
allowed to occur freely as such transactions pass control of assets and resources to 
the most productive users.4 The law should not impede such transfers as these may 
have huge cost implications for the community and companies may be saddled with 
                                            
1JF Olson “South Africa moves to a global model of corporate governance but with important national 
variations” (2010) Acta Juridica 219. 
2See S Deakin “Corporate governance, finance and growth: Unravelling the relationship” (2010) Acta 
Juridica 191. 
3See D Fischel “Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control and Regulation of 
Cash Tender Offers” (1978) 57:1 Texas Law Review 1-2. 
4MM Katz “Developments in corporate law” (1997) 22:2 Journal for Juridical Science 28-41. See also J 
Mayanja “The equal opportunity principle in Australian takeover law and practice: time for 
review?” (2000) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 15. 
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poorly-performing directors with no effective way of removing them.5 Corporate control 
transactions and subsequent changes in management increase the wealth of 
investors. Changes to the corporation, such as, the appointment of their own 
managers, are likely to produce gains for all shareholders but at a lower cost for the 
new controlling shareholders. In this way, the freedom to undertake a bid encourages 
bidders to undertake a takeover that, in turn, will benefit all shareholders.6 The quote 
below is relevant for the purposes of the mandatory offer:  
 
“[G]iven its propensity to chill takeover activity and thereby deny shareholders the 
substantial benefits associated with that activity, it is advisable to reconsider the need 
for the rule of mandatory equal treatment. While fairness is a laudable objective, the 
interests of shareholders may be served better by a system of unequal distribution. 
That system might facilitate more takeover transactions. By ensuring maximum gains 
from takeover activity, the unequal distribution is likely to enhance the welfare of all 
shareholders, including shareholders whose shares are not acquired. Society will also 
benefit to the extent scarce resources are permitted to pass to their optimum uses.” 7  
 
In the words of other scholars: 
 
“[T]he market for corporate control and threat of cash tender offers are of great 
importance in creating incentives for management to maximise welfare of shareholders 
… Since a successful takeover bid results in displacement of current managers, 
managers have a strong incentive to operate efficiently and to keep share prices high.”8  
 
For South Africa, scholars have questioned the application of the mandatory offer rule 
as far back as 1997, and have pointed out that: 
 
“[I]t is surely in the public interest that corporate assets should be transferred to the 
stewardship of good managers. Conversely management of companies must be 
encouraged to good performance by realisation that neither the corporate laws nor the 
competition laws of the country will stand in the way of a healthy and thriving takeover-
                                            
5See Mayanja (2000) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 15. 
6F Easterbrook & D Fischel “Corporate Control Transactions” (1982) The Yale Law Journal 705. 
7Mayanja (2000) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 16. 
8Fischel (1978) Texas Law Review 9. 
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industry. This raises, inter alia the question whether the mandatory offer to the minority 
is not an unhealthy impediment to a vital takeover-industry by making acquisitions of 
control too expensive. As a matter of common law there is no obligation to make an 
offer to the minority on the occurrence of a change of control.”9  
 
Transplanted laws rarely work as expected10 and therefore policy makers should be 
careful of a “global template” on corporate governance. This template is often based 
on selected aspects of American and British law and their customs.11 It is important to 
understand the relationship between corporate governance, finance and economic 
growth when considering the role reforms of company law might play in facilitating 
sustainable economic development.12 However, it appears that the effect of enhancing 
laws to protect shareholders are not as clear cut as originally thought, especially for 
developing countries. Shareholder rights may be over protected or the laws may not 
be as effective as in their country of origin. Therefore, the need to bring shareholder 
oriented legal reforms to promote economic growth in developing countries should be 
questioned.13 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the regulations of takeovers and mergers in the US, in particular, 
the State of Delaware, which is preferred by large companies as their state of 
incorporation. The chapter discussed the equal opportunity rule in Perlman case, 
which formed the basis of the mandatory offer rule. Further, it was concluded in this 
chapter that the courts in Delaware, rather than regulatory bodies, play a leading role 
in regulating the conduct of directors during takeovers and mergers. The courts have 
established various standards to assess the conduct of directors during takeovers and 
mergers. The standards include the business judgment rule, enhanced scrutiny and 
the entire fairness. The standards are intended to protect shareholders during a 
takeover or merger. The conduct of directors is tested against these standards.  
 
In chapter 3 it was indicated that the development of the regulatory framework for 
takeover and mergers occurred to protect minority shareholders during takeover bids. 
                                            
9Katz (1997) Journal for Juridical Science 37.  
10Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 216 
11See Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 216. 
12Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 217. 
13Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 216-217. 
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The mandatory offer in the UK developed over a fairly long period. In this chapter, it 
was shown that the application of the mandatory offer rule in the UK is not without 
concerns. In the EU, the mandatory offer rule has also raised a number of ongoing 
debates and is not universally accepted. Continuous review of the rule is required, 
probably to suit various countries’ markets for corporate control environment. 
 
The discussion in chapter 4 focused on Australia’s unique takeover regulation process 
applying the Eggleston Principles. The study concluded that Australia does not have 
a mandatory offer rule despite the fact that its company laws have a close connection 
with the UK company law. Some academics have suggested that Australia is one of 
the few countries that addresses the social aspects of takeover in its take-over laws.14 
As appears from the research, Australia adopted a regulatory regime for takeover and 
merger regulation that does not include the UK mandatory offer rule, in order to suit 
its economy and financial markets.  
 
In chapter 5, the dissertation investigated the history of regulating takeovers and 
mergers in South Africa. Various methods of undertaking a merger or a takeover and 
the regulations applicable to each were discussed. The study found that, while the 
Takeover Provisions in the Companies Act 2008 have introduced efficient methods for 
achieving takeovers, teething problems in respect of some of the interpretations and 
application remain. While the main focus of the dissertation is the mandatory offer in 
section 123, the study found that practitioners generally welcomed the improved and 
simplified takeover and merger provisions such as the amalgamation in terms of 
section 113, scheme of arrangements in terms of section 114, and the voting 
procedures in terms of section 115. Further, the additional protection for shareholders 
in the form of appraisal rights in section 164 has also been welcomed despite some 
problems such as its complexity. It is argued that additional protection such as the 
detailed disclosures requirements in the regulations, goes a long way to providing 
sufficient protection of minority shareholders during takeovers and mergers. This 
further strengthens the position of minority shareholders in takeovers. Some of the 
provisions regarding protections could be improved and clarified to strengthen the 
                                            
14See B Sheehy “Australia’s Eggleston principles in takeover law: Social and economic sense?” (2004) 
17 Australian Journal of Corporate Law. 2. 
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protections offered to minority shareholders but once this is achieved minorities will be 
sufficiently protected even without a mandatory offer requirement. Most importantly, 
the mandatory offer requirement in section 123, and its role in South African merger 
regulation is subjected to closer scrutiny and its disadvantages for SA is discussed. 
The dissertation concludes in chapter 5 that the mandatory offer is not appropriate for 
South Africa and the reasons are enumerated thereunder.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an evaluation of the takeover and merger regimes of the various 
comparative countries. These include, the rationale for regulating the transactions, the 
main institutions regulating those transactions and the methods of dispute resolutions. 
Several proposals for the strengthening of the institutions and rules relevant to 
enforcement of takeover rules are made. Most importantly, an evaluation in this 
chapter shows that academics have criticised the negative impact of the mandatory 
offer rule on takeovers and mergers. Its efficacy in protecting minority shareholders 
has also been questioned. Other scholars have extoled its virtues in protecting 
investors. From the analysis of the various jurisdictions, it appears that there is no 
clear consensus on the advantages or disadvantages of the mandatory offer rule. This 
is not surprising for a number of reasons including the fact that the mandatory offer 
rule affects each country’s shareholders differently depending on whether a country’s 
companies have concentrated shareholding structures or not. However, it appears that 
the debates are stacked against the application of the mandatory offer rule. Some of 
the criticism appears to be closely related. Some of the main reasons why scholars 
oppose the mandatory offer can be summed up as: 
 
- the rationale for the decision in the Perlman case, (which has served as a strong 
trigger for a mandatory offer rule) is not clear.15 Further there is criticism against 
the calculation and sharing of the premium as indicated in various paragraphs 
above, including paragraph 5 6 9 3.16 A change of control without acquisition of 
shares present a unique challenge to explain the sharing of a premium of 
                                            
15WD Andrews “The Stockholder’s right to equal opportunity in the sale of shares” (1965) 78:3 Harvard 
Law Review 515-516. 
16See also paragraph 6 5 of chapter 6 dealing with difficulties in justifying payment of a premium in 
changes of control. 
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control and the obligation for a mandatory offer bid.17 The right to sell shares 
when a change of control occurs has also been questioned;18  
-  it increases the costs of a takeover and therefore, discourages persons from 
undertaking offers;19  
- it prevents transfer of assets to the most productive managers and prevents 
efficient use of capital,20 as additional payment must be made to other 
shareholders before a takeover can be implemented. 
-  it hampers the disciplinary aspect of takeovers and mergers21 and entrenches 
directors who perform poorly or do not have the appropriate skills to manage 
particular assets.22 This is because under-performing directors are aware that 
they cannot be removed without the new controller having to make a mandatory 
offer. The role of takeovers in removing inefficiencies is not often reported by 
the mass media and the well-documented creation of shareholder value by 
takeovers is often dismissed as “paper gains”.23   
- the application of the mandatory offer rule in countries whose companies have 
dispersed shareholdings is not suitable in countries where shareholding is 
concentrated as the rule may encourage entrenchment of control by block-
shareholders. This could be to the detriment of good corporate governance as 
it discourages change of corporate control. 24   
 - for South Africa, it appears that the rule is against the aims of policy makers as 
published in the DTI 2004 Policy document.25 Despite weaknesses due to 
implementation, BBBEE policies have generally been accepted as desirable for 
SA economy. The mandatory offer rule promotes preservation of existing 
patterns of share ownership to the detriment of BBBEE policies. As pointed out 
by researchers, existing legislation has a tendency of promoting and preserving 
                                            
17See Andrews (1965) Harvard Law Review 551. 
18See L Gullifer & J Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy (2011) 615. 
19See Gullifer & Payne Corporate Finance Law Principles and Policy 615. 
20See Mayanja (2000) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 16. 
21See T Papadopoulos "The mandatory provisions of the EU Takeover Bid Directive and their 
deficiencies." (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review 528 at note 30.  
22See H Manne “Bring Back the Hostile Takeover” (26 June 2002) The Wall Street Journal 2.  
23See GA Jarrell, JA Brickley & JM Netter “The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence 
Since 1980” 2 :1 The Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter, 1988) 49-68 Available at: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1942739 (Accessed 20-10-2013). 
24See Deakin (2010) Acta Juridica 217.  
25See DTI 2004 Policy document as discussed in Chapter 1. The policy encourages efficient use of 
capital and seeks to promote corporate governance, among others. 
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the status quo.26 The mandatory offer rule disadvantages BBBEE investors 
because these parties may not be able to acquire management control unless 
they offer the same price to all other shareholders. To acquire a controlling 
stake in a JSE-listed company, the costs can be very significant, running into 
millions or even billions. Accordingly, such parties may not be able to pay the 
price required to acquire control. To the extent that appraisal rights may be used 
strategically to defeat BBBEE transactions, it should be criticised to the same 
extent, as discussed under paragraph 6 9 above.   
- According to Davies & Worthington, while the mandatory offer may have 
advantages in certain countries, the mandatory offer bid “discourages 
acquisitions by those who would increase the value of the company for the 
benefit of all shareholders but who are wealth constrained and so cannot raise 
the finance needed to bid for all the outstanding shares.”27 
- And as indicated in Yeats et al,28 the SAC pointed out that:  
 
“ ‘[T]he mandatory offer makes financing of a take-over expensive, because the offeror 
must make an offer for all the voting shares of the offeree company, and not only those 
that will confer control’, and that ‘the resultant high cost of take-overs hampers the 
movement towards black economic empowerment in the South African context; 
because of the high cost of a take-over, the people/entities that presently have 
economic power are in a position to further entrench that power, because only they 
have the means to implement a mandatory offer’. ”  
 
In South Africa, there are many situations where the mandatory offer is not applied. 
This reduces its usefulness as a protective measure. For instance, partial offers under 
section 125(3) allowing a person who crosses the 35 percent mandatory offer 
threshold not to make the offer if such a person obtains approval by a simple majority 
resolution of independent shareholder, as discussed in paragraph 5 6 11 2. Further, 
in the financial period between 31 March 2011 and 31 March 2017, the scheme of 
                                            
26L Bebchuk & M Roe “Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance” (1999) 
Discussion Paper No. 26610/99, Harvard Law School. 3. 
27Davies & Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law 964. 
28Yeats JL, de la Harpe RA, Jooste RD, Stoop H, Cassim R, Seligmann J, Kent L, Bradstreet RS, 
Williams RC, Cassim MF, Swanepoel E, Cassim FHI and Jarvis KA Commentary on the Companies 
Act of 2008 App1-91. 
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arrangement has consistently been the most preferred method to implement a 
takeover or merger by a large margin.29 Mandatory offers on the other hand are few 
and far in between with bidders preferring to obtain a waiver from compliance with the 
mandatory offer requirements.30 But these requirements of obtaining approval from 
shareholders not to make the mandatory offer, further add to unnecessary costs for 
bidders. 
 
In conclusion, takeover laws should achieve a number of objectives including to: 
protect stakeholders; enhance investment; and promote the market for corporate 
control. It is important that takeover laws protect minority shareholders to encourage 
investment. However, this must be done at the right level to maintain integrity of the 
market.31 Small shareholders should be encouraged to invest. Too much protection 
for shareholders can make takeovers and mergers expensive, difficult to undertake, 
and create an inefficient takeover or merger environment. In this type of market, 
potential bidders can be discouraged. This in turn can lead to illiquid markets and 
increased inefficiencies.32 Hence, it is suggested in this dissertation that the 
mandatory offer rule should be amended to suit local economic conditions and the 
environment for the market for control in SA.   
 
7 2 Recommendations 
 
Developing countries are faced with ever changing societal demands and business 
environments. New rules must be developed to suit local economic development and 
meet other societal needs. Taking into consideration the additional methods available 
for effecting a change of corporate control, it is suggested that there are sufficient 
protections for minority shareholders in the Companies Act 2008. The deletion of the 
mandatory offer section in its entirety may also facilitate a market for corporate control 
in general and promote good corporate governance, in line with the DTI 2004 Policy 
document. In addition, the amendment should remove one of the obstacles towards 
                                            
29See SA Panel Annual Reports for the years ended 31 March 2011-31 March 2017. Available at: 
www.//trpanel.co.za. (Accessed 30- 5- 2018).  
30SA Panel Annual Reports. 
31See N Boardman “A critical analysis of the new South African takeover laws as proposed under the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2010) Acta Juridica 311-312. 
32Boardman (2010) Acta Juridica 311-312. 
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promoting transfer of ownership of shares to the previously-disadvantaged individuals. 
This is also in line with the DTI 2004 Policy document as published.  
 
However, should it be found after research that the repeal of the mandatory offer 
section in its entirety is not desirable, then it is suggested that the exemption provision 
in section 119(6),33 and as alternative, section 123 of the Companies Act be amended 
to facilitate BBBEE transactions. It may be argued that section 119(6) of the 
Companies Act of 2008 in its current form may be used to relax the strict application 
of the mandatory offer rule; this is inappropriate. The provisions of section 119(6) must 
be limited to those transactions that in their own right meet the tests as set out in that 
section. In addition, such applications are subject to a number of formalities and 
payment of the necessary fees, which makes them undesirable. The current 
exemption provisions are also of general application for affected transactions and not 
specific enough for BBBEE transactions. Therefore, this may lead to difficulty in 
justifying their application to BBBEE transactions. A specific exemption provision 
would also give comfort to funders of BBBEE transactions and avoid uncertainties, as 
is the case in the Competition Act 89 of 1998.  
 
The Competition Act 89 of 1998 in its preamble acknowledges that the SA economy 
should be opened to a greater ownership by a greater number of its citizens. The 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 indicates that:  
 
“2 The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in 
order- (f) to promote the greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of the previously disadvantaged individuals.” 
 
There is sufficient information to justify and conclude that the mandatory offer rule is 
indeed not suitable for application in South Africa in its current form. It is recommended 
that this rule be reviewed and amended to suit local economic circumstances. A 
balance should be maintained between the interests of the shareholders and the 
                                            
33Section 119(6) of the Companies Act is a general provision that empowers the Takeover Regulation 
Panel to exempt certain takeover or merger transactions. Such transaction may be exempted if there is 
no potential prejudice to other shareholders; the costs of compliance are disproportional to the value of 
the transaction and in cases where it is reasonable and justifiable to give the exemption under the 
circumstances.  
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promotion of the interests of the broader society and the South African economy. Even 
in the case of the UK, where the mandatory offer rule has been enforced for many 
years, various scholars have indicated that the unqualified application of the 
mandatory offer rule needs some thought. As shown in the dissertation, other 
countries have designed their company laws to accommodate their country 
requirements, most notably Australia with its unique requirements and the UK which 
has a very flexible takeover law despite its statutory nature. In the United States, in 
particular the State of Delaware, the judiciary plays a pivotal role in regulating 
takeovers and mergers. The TSC established under section 202 of the Act should play 
a vital role in adjudicating disputes in takeovers and mergers. Its role and powers 
should be clarified and enhanced. The regulations should be amended to include the 
following: Chairperson of the TSC should play an active role once a matter has been 
referred or parties lodge an appeal. This will allow the TSC to give directions and hear 
the matter as speedily as possible. Further, as pointed out in chapter 5 8 above, the 
enforcement role of the TSC should be improved to enhance efficiency. For instance, 
adopting the enforcement mechanism similar to that of the Financial Services Tribunal 
created under section 219 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017, will make 
the process of enforcement to be effective and efficient. 
 
Based on the above conclusions about mandatory offers, there are good reasons for 
the South African legislature to amend section 123 of the Companies Act along the 
lines of the recommendations suggested. For South Africa, it should be noted that, 
“[O]ptimal corporate law depends on institutional context, and a country's corporate 
law should evolve as its economy and legal system evolve.”34  
 
Accordingly, the following recommendations are made: 
 
1 Deletion of section 123 of the Act and applicable Regulations; or 
 
2. Alternatively, amendment of section 123 of the Act to add the following 
subsection: 
 
                                            
34B Black & R Kraakman “A Self –Enforcing Model of Corporate Law” (1996) Harvard Law Review 1079. 
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“123(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 123(2) above, this section 
shall not apply to acquisitions intended to promote the spread of share 
ownership, in particular to increase the share ownership of historically 
disadvantaged persons as contemplated in the Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003 as amended.” or  
 
3. Amendment of section 119 of the Act by addition of the following subsection: 
 
“(7) Despite the provisions of section 123 (1) of the Act, an affected transaction 
in terms of that section entered into by an offeror or persons acting in concert’ 
with such offeror for the purposes of promoting the greater spread of ownership 
of securities by the previously disadvantaged individuals in accordance with the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, may be 
exempted in terms in terms of subsection 6.” 
 
4. The dissertation in paragraph 5 12, identifies a number of glaring deficiencies 
and difficult sections and regulations. It is suggested that these should be 
rectified so that the Takeover Provisions can better promote some of the 
objectives set out in section 7 of the Companies Act of 2008.  
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